Judgment R.A.Sharma, J. 1. Doubting the correctness of the Single Bench judgment of this court in Gopi Krishna Kejriwal V/s. State of Bihar, a learned Single Judge has referred this case to the Division Bench for deciding the question as to whether a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, who has not been "specially empowered" by the State Government but has been authorised by the High Court by an administrative order, can try a case if the offence is covered by Sec. 12-A(2)(b) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Petitioner No.2 Domanlal Gupta is a dealer dealing in the essential commodities. On 10-7-1977 during the course of inspection of his shop premises in which the business was being conducted by petitioner No.1 Raj Kishore Prasad, who is brother of petitioner No.2, certain deficiencies and contravention of the conditions of the licence were detected. On 21-7-1977, a criminal case was justified against the petitioners, pursuant to which after investigation the charge-sheet was submitted against them, on the basis of which they were prosecuted convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for sixmonths each under Sec. 7 of the Act by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Chakradharpur at Chaibasa. Aggrieved there by, they filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Singhbhum at Chaibasa. Thereafter, they have filed the present revision challenging their conviction and sentence by the aforementioned two courts. 3. When this revision was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have been tried and convicted by a Magistrate who has not been "specially empowered" by the State Government in terms of Sec. 12-A (2) (b) of the Act and therefore, their conviction cannot be sustained. In support of this submission, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on Single Bench judgment of this Court in Gopi Krishna Kejriwals case (supra) in which it was laid down that a Magistrate who has not been "specially empowered" by the State Government cannot try a case and convict the accused for an offence covered under Sec. 12-A (2) (b) of the Act. The learned Single Judge, who was hearing the revision, doubted the correctness of the said judgment as he was of the-view that the de facto doctrine as laid down by the Apex Court in Bokar Raja Rangaraju V/s. State of A.P. will be attracted in such a case. This case was, accordingly, referred to a Division Bench for deciding this issue. 4. Sec. 12-A (2) of the Act, which was inserted in the Act by Act 30 of 1974, insofar as it is relevant, is reproduced below: "12-A Power to try summarily. ............... (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) all offences relating to (a) the contravention of an order made under Sec. 3 with respect to (i) cotton or woollen textiles; or (ii) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; or (iii) drugs; and (b) Where by notification issued under Sub-sec. (1) in relation to a special order is in force, the contravention of such special order, shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf of the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Secs. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial ". 5. The Act was further amended by the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981, whereby and where under Sec. 12-A was substituted by a new section, which provided for Constitution of Special court consisting of a Single Judge to be appointed by the High Court. But, this Amendment Act will not apply to any offence committed prior to its enforcement. It is clear from Sec. 2 of the said Amendment Act, which is as under: "2. Act 10 of 1955 to have effect subject to certain special provisions for a temporary period. - During the continuance in force of this Act, the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in Secs. 3 to 11; Provided that the amendments specified in Secs. 7 to 11 shall not apply to, or in relation to, any offence under the Principal Act committed before the commencement of this Act and the provisions of the Principal Act shall apply to, and in relation to, such offence as if those amendments had not been made." 6. 3 to 11; Provided that the amendments specified in Secs. 7 to 11 shall not apply to, or in relation to, any offence under the Principal Act committed before the commencement of this Act and the provisions of the Principal Act shall apply to, and in relation to, such offence as if those amendments had not been made." 6. As in the instant case, the offence was committed in 1977, it will be governed by Sec. 12-A as it was before it was substituted by the said Amendment Act. 7. Perusal of Sec. 12-A (2) of the Act makes it clear that every Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class cannot try the case if the offence relates to Sec. 12 A (2) (b) of the Act. It is only such Magistrates who are "specially empowered" in this behalf by the State Government, can try such cases. The expression "specially empowered" means conferment on the Magistrate special powers which are not part of the powers conferred on them by the Criminal Procedure Code. In the State of Gujarat V/s. Chaturbhuj Maganlal, the Apex Court whileconsidering the meaning of the expression "specially empowered" under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 has laid down as under: "21. The above observation are an apt guide to the interpretation of the expression "specially empowered" in Sec. 2(c) of the Act with which we are concerned. Although the words in Sec. 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, the construction of which was considered in Abdul Hussains case, AIR 1968 SC 432 , were "specially appointed", their connotation is the same as conveyed by the expression "specially authorised" or "specially empowered" (See Oxford Dictionary according to which the word "authorised" means "empowered", "appointed"). In construing the expression "specially empowered in the instant case, therefore, we can safely adopt the reasoning in Adbul Hussains case. Thus, considered, the term "specially" must be taken to have reference to the special purpose of the empowerment. Even according to Oxford Dictionary, one sense of this word is "of special purpose". It qualifies the word "empowered". It is used in an attributive sense to highlight special nature of the power. It does not convey the sense of a contradistinction or contrast between "special" empowerment and general empowerment. Even according to Oxford Dictionary, one sense of this word is "of special purpose". It qualifies the word "empowered". It is used in an attributive sense to highlight special nature of the power. It does not convey the sense of a contradistinction or contrast between "special" empowerment and general empowerment. All that this word signifies is the investment of some or all the Magistrates of the First Class with powers which are "special" and are not part of the ordinary or Additional powers which can be conferred on a Magistrate of the First Class under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In short, the word "specially" cannot is that, it is the empowerment which is special and not the person. Thus, considered, special empowerment does not necessarily involve selection of individuals by name or ex-officio from the Magistrates of the 1st Class." The Judicial Magistrates have been conferred with the powers under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. But, these Magistrates cannot try a case where the statute provides for special authorization/ empowerment by the competent authority for trial. Unless the notification/order conferring such power on them has been issued. 8 In the instant case, the admitted position is that the offence for which the petitioners have been convicted falls under Sec. 12-A(2) (b) of the Act. It is also admitted that the Judicial Magistrate who tried the petitioners and convicted and sentenced them was not "specially empowered" by the State Government. In fact the State Government has not issued any order notification specially empowering the Judicial Magistrates to try the cases relating to offence which falls under Sec. 12A (2) (b). There was only an order of the High Court in the administrative side authorising the Judicial Magistrates of the 1st Class to try the cases under Section.7 of the Act. Under the circumstances, the Magistrate, who has tried and convicted the petitioners, was not competent to do so. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Radhe Lal Sao and others V/s. State of Bihar has held that a Judicial Magistrate, who has not been specially empowered under Sec. 12- A(2)(b) of the Act, had no jurisdiction to try the case. 10. It is true that High Court. n the administrative side has issued an order authorising the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to try the cases pertaining to the offence under Sec. 7 of the Act. 10. It is true that High Court. n the administrative side has issued an order authorising the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to try the cases pertaining to the offence under Sec. 7 of the Act. But, Sec. 12-A(2)(b) of the Act requires conferring of such power by the State Government and not by the High Court. The High Court is different from the State Government, even though the Government while exercising such a power has to act in consultation with the High Court but the order specially authorising the Judicial Magistrate has to be that of the Government and not of the High Court. 11. The "de facto doctrine" cannot be attracted to the instant case. This doctrine applies when there is a defective appointment of a Judge. The appointment of the Judge is a condition precedent for applying this Rule. If, the appointment of the Judge is defective, the order passed by him cannot be declared bad and in such a situation the Rule of "de facto doctrine" is applicable. In the instant case, there is no challenge to the appointment of the Judicial Magistrate who has tried and convicted the petitioners. The grievance of the petitioners is that the concerned Magistrate was not "specially empowered" by the State Government to try the case falling under Sec. 12-A(2)(b) (If the Act. It is not a case where the appointment of the Judicial Magistrate is found to be defective. Here is a case where the Magistrate though validly appointed but was not conferred with the special power by the Government. To such a case, the principle of "de facto doctrine" cannot be attracted. 12. We, accordingly, hold that a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class, who was not "specially empowered" by the State Government cannot by an offence falling under Sec. 12-A(2)(b) of the Act. The Single Bench judgment in Gopi Krishna Kejriwals case (supra) lays down the correct law and it is accordingly approved. 13. Let this case be listed before the learned Single Judge for deciding the revision in accordance with law. A.K.Prasad, J. 14 I agree.