Aliyar v. Returning Officer — 1999 DIGILAW 473 (KER)

Judgment :- G. Sasidharan, J. The petitioners were members of the committee of the 2nd respondent, Perumbavoor Urban Co-operative Society Limited and the term of the committee expired on 18.1.1999. Before the expiry of the term of the committee, an order was passed by the Joint Registrar superseding the committee. The above order was passed on 24.11.1998 and the copy of the same is Ext. P1. Even though an order superseding the committee was passed on 24.11.1998, that order did not come into effect till the expiry of the period of the committee for the reason that there were certain orders passed by this Court directing that the order should not be implemented. -, 2. The members of the previous committee the term of which expired on 18.1.1999 filed O.P. No. 7846 of 1998 in which there was an interim order passed by this Court that the order of supersession, if any, could be passed but it should not be implemented until permission was obtained from this Court. It was during the pendency of the above Original Petition, that the order of supersession was passed by the Joint Registrar. When the fact that the order of supersession was made was brought to the notice of this Court, by Ext. P2 judgment the O.P. was disposed of with a direction to the petitioners therein to prefer an appeal if they were aggrieved by the order of supersession. Such a direction is seen to have been given by this Court on the basis of the submission made by the counsel appearing for the respondents that the petitioners therein had the remedy of filing statutory appeal against the order of the Joint Registrar. The further direction in Ext. P2 was that the petitioners in that O.P. could file an appeal within three weeks from the date of disposal of that O.P. and that the Government had to consider the appeal and dispose of the same within three months from the date of receipt of the appeal filed by the petitioners. In disposing of the above O.P., this Court granted stay of implementation of the order of supersession dated 24.11.1998 for a period of three weeks. Thereafter, the members of the committee filed an appeal and an application for stay before the Government. In disposing of the above O.P., this Court granted stay of implementation of the order of supersession dated 24.11.1998 for a period of three weeks. Thereafter, the members of the committee filed an appeal and an application for stay before the Government. Then they filed O.P. No.25581 of 1998 which was disposed of by this Court with a direction to the Government to consider the stay petition filed by the appellants and pass appropriate orders within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment in that O.P.Ext.P3 is the copy of the judgment in O.P. No. 25581 of 1998. In Ext. P3 judgment, there was a direction that till a decision was taken by the Government on the stay petition, the order of the Joint Registrar superseding the committee would be kept in abeyance. 3. Before the Government had occasion to consider the stay petition, the term of the committee expired on 18.1.1999. On 25.1.1999 the Joint Registrar made Ext. P4 order appointing an Administrator for the management of the Society. Later, the Government on 25.2.1999 made Ext. P5 order in the appeal filed by the members of the committee on taking note of the fact that the order of supersession did not come into effect because there was stay order passed by this Court. In the light of the fact that the term of the committee expired on 18.1.1999, appeal was disposed of by the Government. 4. The Returning Officer appointed for conducting election to the committee of the Society issued Ext. P6 notice and in pursuance of that notice petitioners filed nominations for contesting the next election. Then the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of nominations said that the petitioners were disqualified from contesting the election in the light of R.44(1)(k) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules since they were members of a superseded committee. Thereafter, raising objection to what the Returning Officer said regarding the above disqualification pointed out by him, Ext. P7 notice was sent to the Returning Officer by the petitioners. Ext P8 reply was given by the Returning Officer in which it is stated that the petitioners were disqualified by virtue of what is said in R.44(1)(k) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and therefore the nominations were rejected. 5. P7 notice was sent to the Returning Officer by the petitioners. Ext P8 reply was given by the Returning Officer in which it is stated that the petitioners were disqualified by virtue of what is said in R.44(1)(k) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and therefore the nominations were rejected. 5. According to the petitioners, the disqualifications mentioned in R.44(1)(k) will be there only in cases where the committee is actually superseded. In the present case, even though an order of supersession was passed the committee continued till its normal term expired on the strength of the order passed by this Court. According to the petitioners, even though the Joint Registrar made an order superseding the committee that did not take effect and because of that there will not be any disqualification as envisaged in R.44(1)(k) for the members of the committee to contest the election. 6. S.32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act deals with supersession of committee. As per the above section the power to supersede a committee is vested with the Registrar. Before passing an order superseding the committee the Registrar has to be satisfied that the committee of any society is persistently making default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the Act or the Rules or bye-laws or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or willfully disobeys or willfully fails to comply with any lawful order or direction issued under the Act or the Rules. Before passing an order of supersession, the Registrar has to give the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any. Under S.32 of the Act, the Registrar is also having the power to appoint a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society in the place of the superseded committee. It is also open to the Registrar to appoint one or more administrator or administrators who need not be a member or members of the society to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year. A reading of S.32 of the Act makes it clear that the power of suppression of the committee can be exercised by the Registrar on being satisfied that one of the conditions mentioned in that section exists for taking action against the committee. 7. A reading of S.32 of the Act makes it clear that the power of suppression of the committee can be exercised by the Registrar on being satisfied that one of the conditions mentioned in that section exists for taking action against the committee. 7. R.44 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules deals with the disqualification for being elected or appointed as a member of a committee. As per sub-clause(1)(k) of the above Rule, no member of the society shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if he was a member of the committee which has been superseded and a period of one year has not elapsed from the date of supersession. Therefore, as per the above pro vision in the Co-operative Societies Rules in case the petitioners are treated as members of the committee which has been superseded, they are not entitled to contest the next election if the election is being conducted within a period of one year of the date of supersession. 8. The argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is t hat even though an order of supersession has been made by the Joint Registrar, it has not taken effect and for that reason the petitioners cannot be treated as members of the committee which has been superseded. What R.44(1)(k) says is that the disqualification for the reason that a member of the society was a member of the committee which has been superseded will be there for a period of one year from the date supersession. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners since the disqualification will be there for one year from the date of supersession, it is necessary that a committee is actually superseded and the period of one year has to be reckoned from the date on which the actual supersession took place. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited (1985 (Suppl) SCC 280) was relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in support of his argument that when supersession is envisaged that has to be actual suppression of the committee. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited (1985 (Suppl) SCC 280) was relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in support of his argument that when supersession is envisaged that has to be actual suppression of the committee. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the observations made in paragraph 66 of the judgment wherein the meaning of the word 'supersession' was interpreted by resorting to the meaning of that word given in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and the Supreme Court understood the word 'supersession' as meaning "the action of superseding or condition of being superseded". The meaning of the word 'supersede' given in the above dictionary was also referred to by the Supreme Court and the meaning given in the above dictionary as given in paragraph 66 of the judgment is "to put a stop to; to render superfluous or unnecessary; to make of no effect; to annul; to take the place of (something set aside or abandoned); to succeed to the place occupied by; to supply the place of a thing". Then referring to Webster' s Third New International Dictionary, the Supreme Court said that the word 'supersession' was given the meaning "the state of being superseded: removal and replacement". The Supreme Court was trying to understand the word 'supersession' given in a Notification which said that the Notification was issued in supersession of previous Notifications. The Supreme Court on understanding the meaning of the word 'supersession' given in the Dictionaries referred to above said that the expression "in supersession of all previous notifications" used in the notification which was in question meant that the previous notifications were repealed and replaced by new notification. That was a case in which the subsequent notification in which it was said that that notification was issued in supersession of all previous notifications came into effect and the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the above expression in the later notification and the effect of that notification on the previous notifications for the reason that the later notification was issued in supersession of all the previous notifications. The previous notifications were held to have been repealed and replaced by the subsequent notification in which it was said that that was issued in supersession of previous notifications. The previous notifications were held to have been repealed and replaced by the subsequent notification in which it was said that that was issued in supersession of previous notifications. Here, the facts cannot be said to be similar to the facts which were there before the Supreme Court in the case in which the meaning of the would 'supersession' was interpreted. The question here is regarding the supersession of a committee and as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners there is only an order superseding the committee which has not taken effect. The argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that there was no supersession at all because the order has not taken effect and the committee which was in existence was not replaced by any new committee or by an administrator taking charge of the affairs of the society. 10. In the decision in Nelson Motisv. Union of India (AIR 1992 SC 1981) relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, it is observed by the Supreme Court that it is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are therefore reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences. In the above decision, the Supreme Court was giving interpretation to a provision in the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, 1965. The Supreme Court said that the language of the Rule was precise and unambiguous and therefore had to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. Pointing out the above decision, the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that since it is clear from the language used in R.44(1)(k) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules that there has to be actual supersession, no different interpretation can be given to it. R.44(1)(k) of the Rules does not say that there will have to be actual supersession of the committee. So, it cannot be said that on a plain reading of R.44(1)(k), it is clear that there has to be actual supersession of the committee for incurring the disqualification for being elected as a member of the committee for one year. R.44(1)(k) of the Rules does not say that there will have to be actual supersession of the committee. So, it cannot be said that on a plain reading of R.44(1)(k), it is clear that there has to be actual supersession of the committee for incurring the disqualification for being elected as a member of the committee for one year. The meaning of the above Rule has to be understood by taking into consideration the purpose for which such a rule has been made regarding disqualification for being elected as a member of the committee. 11. There are certain circumstances in which as mentioned in S.32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar can supersede the committee. When the Registrar finds that one of the circumstances mentioned in S.32 is there, he can supersede the committee. The Rule which provides that a member in a superseded committee has to be disqualified for one year from the date of supersession for being elected to a committee is made with the 'intention that a member of a committee which was responsible for there being ground for supersession of the committee should not be allowed to a member of the future committee for a period of one year. So, the meaning of R.44(1)(k) regarding the disqualification for being elected as a member of the committee has to be understood by taking into account the fact that the disqualification is provided for the reason that when a person who wants to contest the election of committee he should not be a person who was responsible for the supersession of the committee. 12. In the present case, even though actual supersession did not take place for the reason that there were stay orders passed by this Court, the fact remains that the Joint Registrar was satisfied that there were circumstances which justified supersession of the committee. Ext. P1 order was issued superseding the committee. There was an appeal filed by the petitioners before Government and it was dismissed by Ext. P5 order dated 25.2.1999. A reading of Ext. P5 order of the Government would make it clear that there was consideration on merits regarding the grounds for supersession of the committee. There is statement in Ext. P5 order regarding the manner in which the society was being is true that in Ext. P5 order it is stated that even though Ext. A reading of Ext. P5 order of the Government would make it clear that there was consideration on merits regarding the grounds for supersession of the committee. There is statement in Ext. P5 order regarding the manner in which the society was being is true that in Ext. P5 order it is stated that even though Ext. P1 order of supersession was passed, it did not take effect as a result of the orders passed by this Court, After taking into account the above fact, Ext. P5 order was passed on 25,2.1999 on confirming the order of the Joint Registrar superseding the committee. What has to be understood on g reading of Ext. P5 is that even though the appeal was disposed of after the term of the committee was over it was found by the Government that the offer passed by the Joint Registrar superseding the committee was perfectly correct. So the question whether there will be disqualification for contesting the election as envisaged in R.44(1)(k) of the Co-operative Societies Rules has to be decided by taking into account the fact that the order passed by the Joint Registrar was confirmed by the Government on finding that there were sufficient grounds for superseding the committee. 13. Even though actual supersession did not take place, there was a finding by the competent authority that the committee was acting prejudicial to the interest of the society and hence the committee was liable to be superseded. That finding of the Joint Registrar was considered by the Government on merits and Ext. P5 order was passed confirming the finding of the Joint Registrar and dismissing the appeal. So the finding 'of the Government in Ext. P5 that the action of the Joint Registrar in passing the order of supersession is fully justified has become final. That shows that the petitioners were members of a committee which could be superseded even though actual suppression did not take place as a result of the stay order passed by this Court. The disqualification for being elected as a member of a future committee for one year arises when a person was a member of the committee which was superseded. The disqualification for being elected as a member of a future committee for one year arises when a person was a member of the committee which was superseded. Once an order of supersession is made, the question whether there was actual supersession or not becomes irrelevant when considering the question whether there will be disqualification for a person for being elected as a member of the committee as envisaged in R.44(1)(k) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. That being the position, the petitioners cannot be heard to say that they are not having disqualification for the reason that there was no actual supersession of the committee. It follows that the rejection of the nomination papers submitted by the petitioners for the election to the committee is not in any way illegal. Hence, no direction can be given to the first respondent to accept the nomination papers submitted by the petitioners. The Original Petition is hence dismissed.