K. RAMAMOORTHY, J. ( 1 ) THERE are ten petitioners. The first petitioner is The college Section Officers Association (University of Delhi ). Petitioner No. 2 is Delhi University Section Officers Association. Petitioner No. 3 is Delhi University and College Karamchari Union. Petitioner No. 4 is a Section Officer in College of Vocational Studies. Petitioner No. 5 is a Section Officer in Dayal Singh College, Delhi. These two Colleges are maintained by the University of Delhi with the granting aid from the University Grants Commission. Petitioners 6 to 10 are Section Officers in the University of Delhi. The petitioners had been garnted the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 w. e. f. 19. 2. 1993. But in the writ petitioner, the petitioners claim that this should have been given w. e. f. 1. 1. 1973. ( 2 ) IN a nutshell, the case of the petitioners is that the Section Officers in the Colleges and the University are equal to the Section Officers in the University Grants Commission and the Union of India. The Section Officers in the Union of the India and the University Grants Commission have been given the pay sacle of Rs. 650-1200 w. e. f. 1. 1. 1973 and therefore, the Section Officers in the Colleges and the University of Delhi should also be given the same pay scale w. e. f. 1. 1. 1973. ( 3 ) IN view of the nature of the controversy, it is necessary to set out the facts in some detail. ( 4 ) THE petitioners have given the list of Section Officers working in Colleges in Annexure a . In Annexure b , the list of Section Officers functioning in the University of Delhi is given. The petitioners have stated in paragraph 4 of the writ petition: "that the grievance of the petitioners in the present writ petition is that though they have been performing the same duties as Section Officers as are being performed by the Section Officers of the Government of India or of the University Grants Commission, yet while Section Officers of the Government of India and/or University Grants Commission have been getting the scale of. Rs. 650-30-740-35-810-EB-35-880-40-1000-EB-40-1200 with effect from 1. 1. Rs. 650-30-740-35-810-EB-35-880-40-1000-EB-40-1200 with effect from 1. 1. 1973 as per Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1973 promulgated on the basis of the recommendations of the Third Central Pay Commission, the petitioners herein have been given the said scale only with effect from 19. 2. 1983. " ( 5 ) IT is stated that from the year 1978, the present Section Officers were given this designation while they were previously designated as Superintendent and it is stated by the petitioners that the Executive Council of the University had recommended to maintain the parity between the Section Officers in the University Grants Commissions and the colleges. ( 6 ) IT is stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition :- "that it would be interesting to note that though, on one hand, the scale of Rs. 650-1200 which was given to the petitioners with effect from 19. 2. 83 was on the express ground of removing disparity in the matter of pay scales and promotional avenues between the Section Officers of the University of Delhi/ various Colleges on one hand and Section Officers of the Government of India/university Grants Commission on the other hand, yet the respondents have evidently ignored that disparity which existed during the period from 1. 1. 1973 to 18. 2. 1983 has not been removed for the said period and this has been in spite of the fact that the petitioners have been representing their case right from 1973 and even from a time prior to that and that the University of Delhi through its Executive Council, as already stated above, had taken the decision in favour of the petitioners as far back as 1973 and the delay of the said period of about 10 years has been wholly and solely on the part of the authorities concerned. In humble submission of the petitioners, the impugned act of the respondents in not giving the scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1. 1. 1973 has, thus, been wholly arbitrary and hence violative of not only Articles 14 and 16, but also Article 39 of the Constitution. " ( 7 ) THE petitioners have given the history relating to the revision of scale of pay. Reference is made to the representation made by the Section Officers in the University/ Colleges on the 12th of November, 1973. " ( 7 ) THE petitioners have given the history relating to the revision of scale of pay. Reference is made to the representation made by the Section Officers in the University/ Colleges on the 12th of November, 1973. That is filed as Annexure c and the same is as under :- "we have been provided the following scales of pay from 1. 3. 1968 :- Grade 1:350-25-500-30-650 (w. e. f. 1. 12. 1968) Grade II: 325-15-475-EB-20-575 At the time of revision of scale of pay as noted above the Superintendents as well as the Karamchari Union had urged the University authorities for parity in the revision of scale of pay of Superintendents with those of the Superintendents in the UGC. The University had agreed to the request and had requested the UGC to sanction the scale of pay to the Superintendents of the University at par with the Superintendents in the UGC i. e. as follows. Grade 1:400-25-500-30-530-EB-30-680 Grade II: 350-25-575 Although the grades of the Superintendents in University were not given exactly at par with those of the Superintendents of the UGC, yet the parity had been maintained to a greater extent i. e. against the scale of pay of Rs. 350-575 prevailing in the UGC for grade II the scale of pay of Rs. 325-575 had been agreed to and against the grade of Rs. 400-680 for grade I post the scale of pay of Rs. 350-650 was agreed to. It is understood that the UGC has further revised the scale of pay of the Section Officers in the UGC as follows:- Grade 1:620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900 Grade II: 350-25-500-30-590 In view of the fact that the Superintendents in the University are having the same responsibility and are discharging duties comparable to thier counterparts in the Government of India and UGC (this contention has already been agreed to by the Establishment Committee and the Executive Council in 1969 when (he proposal for revision of pay scale had been made to the UGC) there is no reason as to why the Superintendent in the University should not be provided the same designation and the grade as are obtaining in the UGC. Therefore, the designation of the Superintendent in the University should be changed to Section Officer Grade I and Grade II and should be placed at par with the Section Officers In the UGC not only for the time being, but also for all further revisions, We, therefore, request that our above-noted grievance may kindly be considered by the Executive Council under the provisions of the State G (ix ). " ( 8 ) ON the 19th of December, 1973, a resolution was passed by the Executive Council of the University In the following terms ;- "the Council considered the representation of the Superintendents working in the University regarding bringing their designation and scale of pay at par with that prevailing in the University Grants Commission, (vide Appendix XXVIII ). In this connection it was noted that at present there was difference between the grades of the Superintendents of the University and the Section Officers of the University Grants Commission. The Superintendents of the University were placed in the following grades: Grade 1:350-25-50030 650 (Selection Grade) Grade II : 325-15-475-EB-20-575 Their counterparts, namely Section Officers in the University Grants Commission were in the following two grades: Grade 1:620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900 Grade II: 350-25-500-30-590 The Council resolved that the grades of the Superintendents in the University be revised as follows subject to the approval of the University Grants Commission: Grade 1:620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900 Grade II: 350-25-500-30-590 The Council further resolved that the designation of the post of Superintendent in the University be also changed to that of Section Officers Grade I and Grade II, as prevailing, in the University Grants Commission, and the proposals be referred to the Commissions for their approval. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the University sought the approval of the University Grants Commission, the second respondent and the University Grants Commission expressed its inability to accord approval. According to the petitioner, in June, 1974 the Vice-Chancellor wrote to the University Grants Commission for the acceptance of the proposal for the revision of pay scales of the Superintendents. According to the petitioner, in June, 1974 the Vice-Chancellor wrote to the University Grants Commission for the acceptance of the proposal for the revision of pay scales of the Superintendents. The Executive Council again considered the matter on the 8th of January, 1974 and decided as under :- " (I) That the University Grants Commission be written to again, reitoroting our earlier proposal that the designation of the posts of Superintendents in the University be changed to that of Section Officers Grade I and Grade II as prevailing in the University Grants Commission and that the revised scale of pay of Superintendents as Section Officers in the University Grants Commission s Office be approved in the case of the Superintendents. (ii) That in the meantime the new scales of pay as approved by the University Grants Commission be implemented and the University Grants Commission be informed that these had been accepted by the University provisionally. " ( 10 ) THE Executive Council of the University wrote to the University Grants Commission reiterating its earlier stand. As noticed above, in 1978 the approval of the change of designation to Section Officer from Superintendent was granted. ( 11 ) ON the 19th of February, 1983 the University Grants Commission accepted the recommendations of the Committee and the minutes of the meeting of the University Granto Commission are as under: ( 12 ) IT may be noted that it is only pursuant to this the pay scales of Rs. 650-1200 was given to the Section Officers w. e. f. 19. 2. 1983. ( 13 ) ON the 14th of April, 1983, the Deputy Secretary, University Grants Commission wrote to the Registrar, University of Delhi in the following terms :- SUB : Upgradation in salary scales of Ministerial and Class IV categories of staff in Central Universities. In continuation of this office letter of even number dated 8th April, 1983 addressed to the Vice-Chancellor of Your University, I am directed to say that the University Grants Commission, on the recommendations of the Committee appointed by the Commission to identify disparity in the pay scale and promotional avenues of non-teaching staff in the Central Universities has agreed to upgrade the scale of pay of the category of staff mentiond below w. e. f. 19. 2. 1983 in the Central Universities: S. No. Post Existing scales Upgraded scales of pay of pay as on 9. 2. 2. 1983 in the Central Universities: S. No. Post Existing scales Upgraded scales of pay of pay as on 9. 2. 1983 1. Section Officer Rs. 650-960 Grade-1 2. Section Officer Rs. 550. 900 Rs. 650- 1200 Orade-II 3. Sr. Assistant Rs-425-700 - Rs. 425-800 4. Stenographers Rs-425-700 Rs. 425-800 A separate communication is being sent regarding mode of fixation of pay for the above categories of staff. A further communication will follow with regard to the scales of pay of the personal assistants. The above orders will also be applicable to Delhi University affiliated Colleges receiving maintenance grant from the University Grants Commission. ( 14 ) IN paragraph 17 of the writ petition, it is stated: THAT it would also be seen from the said representations that the scale of pay of Section Officers of the University/colleges had been ordered to be revised as Rs. 650-1200 by the UGC, but unfortunately this was done only with effect from 19. 2. 1983 even though this was done with effect from 1. 1. 1973 in the case of Section Officers of the UGC and/or the Government of India. In this connection, a copy of letter of the UGC dated 14. 4. 1983 is attached herewith and marked as Annexure 1. * ( 15 ) IN paragraphs 18 to 20 of the writ petition, the petitioners based their claim. They are as under:- "that it may be clarified here that so far as the Section Officers of the Government of India are concerned, they were, prior to 1. 1. 1973, getting the scale of Rs. 350-900 and from 1. 1. 1973 they were given the scale of Rs. 650- 1200. So far as the Superintendents/ Section Officers of the UGC are concerned, they, prior to 1. 1. 1971, as already stated above, were getting the scale of Rs. 620-900 (Grade 1) and Rs. 350-590 (Grade II ). However, the said scales were revised to Rs. 840-1200 (Grade-1) and Rs. 650-1040 (Grade II) with effect from 1. 1. 1973. That it may be mentioned that the placement from Grade II to Grade I in UGC as well as in the University/college was made on the basis of seniority and the posts in Grade I were 50%of the posts in Grade II. 840-1200 (Grade-1) and Rs. 650-1040 (Grade II) with effect from 1. 1. 1973. That it may be mentioned that the placement from Grade II to Grade I in UGC as well as in the University/college was made on the basis of seniority and the posts in Grade I were 50%of the posts in Grade II. This was ultimately found as arbitrary and unreasonable in as much as though the incumbants of Grade II performed the same duties as were performed by the incumbents of Grade , yet some people were given the higher scale of Rs. 840-1200. That so far as the UGC is concerned, both the said scales were merged into one I. e. Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 23rd June, 1982. The Section Officers of the UGC, though technically were given the scale of Rs. 650-1040 in Grade II, but, in effect they got the scale of Rs-650-1200 with effect from 1. 1. 1973. Though on paper, it was said to be effective from 23. 6. 1982, but, in fact, by that date, (he incumbents concerned could not reach the stage of Rs. 1200. 00. In fact, the said revision also was arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the incumbents ought to have been given the scale of Rs. 840-1200 as some of the incumbents were in fact getting the scale of Rs. 840-1200 with effect from 1. 1. 1973 when the arbitrary bifurcation was existing and this, as stated above, was sought to be removed only with effect from 23. 6. 1982. " ( 16 ) IN paragraph 21 of the writ petition, the petitioners have stated: "that under the aforesaid circumstances, the Section Officers of the University/ Colleges including the petitioners herein, became entitled to the scale of Rs. 640-1200 from 1. 1. 1973. In the alternative, they became entitled at least to the scale of Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 1. 1. 1973 as was being given to the Section Officers of the Government of India/ugc. Still alternative, the petitioners became entitled to the scale of Rs. 840-1200 (Grade-1) and Rs. 650-1040 (Grade-11) with effect from 1. 1. 1973 to 22nd June, 1982 and to a common scale of Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 22nd June, 1982 as was done in the case of Section Officers of the UGC. Still alternative, the petitioners became entitled to the scale of Rs. 840-1200 (Grade-1) and Rs. 650-1040 (Grade-11) with effect from 1. 1. 1973 to 22nd June, 1982 and to a common scale of Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 22nd June, 1982 as was done in the case of Section Officers of the UGC. ( 17 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, there was some correspondence between the University Grants Commission and the University and it is not relevant. It is only on these grounds the petitioners claim pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 w. e. f 1. 1. 1973. ( 18 ) IN paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent, University Grants Commission, it is stated: "that it is incorrect to say that the scales of pay of Section Officers in the UGC were at par with that of the Government of India with effect from 1. 1. 1973, as alleged. The UGC, unlike the Government of India had two different scales for Section Officers (Grade-1) and Section Officers (Grade-11 ). In fact, these two grades were integrated only w. e. f. 23. 6. 1982, and the pay revised from the said date. As regards the averments contained in para 4 that the petitioners are performing the same duties as Section Officers in the Government of India and the UGC, such comparison of duties is impossible in the absence of any specific details in the petition regarding the nature of such work. It would not be correct to say that the nature of work in the Government of India, the UGC, the Delhi University and the Colleges is the same. As held by this Hon ble Court in Des Raj Vs. Lt. Governor (1982 (2) SLR 681 ), even the fact that the work may be of equal importance (assuming it is so) does not make it an identical work attracting the constitutional mandate of equal pay for equal work. " ( 19 ) IN paragraph 12 of the counter, the second respondent made its position clear relating to the change of designation to Section Officer which was accepted in 1978. The same reads as under :- "that the University itself re-designated the post of Superintendents as Section Officers and approached the UGC for the same. " ( 19 ) IN paragraph 12 of the counter, the second respondent made its position clear relating to the change of designation to Section Officer which was accepted in 1978. The same reads as under :- "that the University itself re-designated the post of Superintendents as Section Officers and approached the UGC for the same. As may be seen from Annexure-F of the petition, the UGC expressed its no objection to the redesignation of Superintendents as Section Officers in the existing scale. It was, however, made clear that the approval did not commit the UGC to revise the scale of pay of these posts. Up to November, 1978, the scales of pay were not at par with the Government of India or with the UGC. " ( 20 ) IN paragraph 15 and 16, the situation is fully explained. The same reads as under:- "that in reply to para 15, I say and submit that it is a fact that the UGC on a reference received from the Ministry of Education had constituted a Committee to look into the question of disparity in the pay scales of Central Universities. The Committee was constituted in August, 1982 and its recommendations were placed before the UGC on 27th January, 1983. The UGC further desired that these recommendations may be examined by another Committee vide its resolution dated 27th January, 1983. The recommendations of this Committee were further considered by the UGC at its meeting held on 19- 20th Feb. , 1983 and the UGC broadly agreed with the recommendations, On the basis of the decision taken in the UGC s meeting, the approval of the UGC was conveyed to the Delhi University for the placement of the Grade II and Grade I Section Officers in the scale of Rs-650-1200 w. e. f. 19. 2. 1983. The decision was made effective from the date of the decision taken by the UGC. That in reply to para 16, I refer to the reply contained here-in-able in para 15. The date from which the decision of the UGC was to be effective was the date when the decision was taken by the UGC. 2. 1983. The decision was made effective from the date of the decision taken by the UGC. That in reply to para 16, I refer to the reply contained here-in-able in para 15. The date from which the decision of the UGC was to be effective was the date when the decision was taken by the UGC. It was not possible for the UGC to compare Section Officer with a Teacher in the matter of par fixation in view of the fact that the non-teaching staff of the Central Universities are governed by the rules applicable to the Government servants whereas the teachers of Central Universities were governed under the Acts and Statues of the Universities. " ( 21 ) DEALING with the comparison of the nature of work done by the Section Officers in the University Grants Commission, Government of India, University and the colleges, it is stated: "that the contents of paras 21 and 22 seek cartain reliefs without any foundation. The UGC, the Government of India and the Delhi University are the different bodies and the employees of one cannot automatically be equated with the employees of the other for purposes of equating scales of pay. The nature of duties performed by different officials in these three bodies is notand need not necessarily be identical. To say that because Section Officers in the Government of India or in the UGC -have been sanctioned a particular scale of pay and that, therefore, Section Officers in the Universities/colleges should also be sanctioned the same scale of pay is not logical, unless it is clearly established that all of them are identically situated. The petitioners not having considered it necessary to plead or to bring out the identity and the nature of work of Section Officers in the different establishments, they are not entitled to any refiefs as prayed for in the petition. " ( 22 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G. D. Gupta, submitted that the Supreme Court had laid down that when employees in different organisation coming under the control of the Government of India do the same work, they are entitled to equal pay. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G. O. Gupta, referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his submission:- 1. randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Othwes", AIR 1982 SC 879 . 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G. O. Gupta, referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his submission:- 1. randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Othwes", AIR 1982 SC 879 . 2. "m/s. Mackinnon Mackenzle and Co. Ltd. Vs. Audrey D costa and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1281 . 3. y. K. Mehta 6 Others Vs. Union of India 4 Another. AIR 1988 SC 1970 . 4. "grih Kalyan Kendra Workers" Union Vs. Union of India and Others . AIR 1991 SC 1173 . 5. "chief Conservator of Forests and another, ete. etc. . Vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, etc. ete. ", air 1996 SC 2898 = 1996 1 SLR 56 ( 23 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G. D. Gupta, making particular reference to "m/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd Vs. . Audrey D costa and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1281 , submitted that the supreme Court had laid down that the financial obligation of the employer cannot stand in the way of the grant of relief in respect of equal pay for equal work". ( 24 ) THE learned counsellor the second respondent, Mr. Gourab. K. Banerjee, submitted the a statement with remarks explaining the situation, which is as under- ( 25 ) THE learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, referred to the following rulings by the Supreme Court :- 1. "unioft of India and Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswar, (1994) 4 SCC 212 . 2. sher Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others", (1995) 6 SCC 515 . 3. "dr. P. N. Puri and Others Vs. State of UP and Others", (1996) 7 SCC 493 . 4. "university Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary and Others", (1996) 10 SCC 536 . 5. "rao Somashekara and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (1997) 7 SCC 649 . 6. "wee Chancellor, G. B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology and Another Vs. Dr. Kewala Nand and Others JT 1998 (6) SC 283. ( 26 ) THE learned counsel for the second responden,. Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, submitted that the position of the Section Officers in the colleges, in the Universities, in the University Grants Commission and in the Government of India is entirely different. Dr. Kewala Nand and Others JT 1998 (6) SC 283. ( 26 ) THE learned counsel for the second responden,. Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, submitted that the position of the Section Officers in the colleges, in the Universities, in the University Grants Commission and in the Government of India is entirely different. The nature of the work is not the same; the responsibility is not the same, and Section Officer in University or the college cannot be compared with the Section Officer in the University Grants Commission or the Government of India. The designation alone would not make them equal and on that footing the petitioners cannot claim parity in the scales of pay. The University Grants Commission, however, after considering the matter had decided on the 19th of February, 1983 to grant the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 and that has been granted. The decision of the University Grants Commission had beei given effect to with effect from the date of its resolution. The petitioners cannot claim the parity for the period from 1. 1. 1 973 to 18. 2. 1983 and the University Grants Commission had taken the decision having regard to the relevant aspects of the matter. The learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, submitted that the stand taken by the petitioners in the writ petition is not sustainable in law, ( 27 ) HAVING considered the matter in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case for the grant of pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1. 1. 1973 to 18. 2. 1983. The authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. G. D. Gupta, do not help the petitioners. ( 28 ) IN "randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Others", AIR 1982 SC 879 , the facts are entirely different. The facts, as noticed by the Supreme Court, in that case are: "the petitioner is a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and he demands that his scales of pay should at least be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration. The scale of pay of a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210-270 in the case of non-matriculates and Rs. The scale of pay of a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210-270 in the case of non-matriculates and Rs. 225-308 in the case ofmatriculates. The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the non-Secretariat office In Delhi is Rs. 260-6-290-EB-6-326-EB-8-8-8-390-10-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260-350. The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330-480. The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous duties than the others. He complains that there is no reason whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver-Constables merely because he and his ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force. " ( 29 ) REFERRING to the Report of the Third Pay Commission, the Supreme Court observed: "it appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head "the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads. . . . . . . . "after considering the qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisations with large fleet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non-availability of adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations. The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay Commission failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have, therefore, prevailed in the case of driver-constables also. The driver-constables were not only required. to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as driver-constables in the police force. The duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities;. no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments. Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant exposure to security risks. The petitioner and other driver-constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issuance of a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. " ( 30 ) IT was submitted on the behalf of the Union of India that the petitioner, was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force. The Supreme Court had noticed that though he was employed as constable, he was only working as driver. The Supreme Court noticed: "he was designated as constable because, for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force, he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force. The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force. The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force. " ( 31 ) DEALING with the counter-affidavit filed by the Union of India, the Supreme Court observed: "the counter-affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the view of the respondents, the circumstances that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstances to justify different scales of pay irrespective of the identity of their powers, duties and responsibilities. We cannot accept this view. If this view is to be stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers, duties and responsibilities are identical. We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them very, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same. " ( 32 ) REFERRING to the concept of equal pay for equal work under Article 39 D which provides for equal pay for equal work for men and women, the Supreme Court expressed the view: "our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 427, Makhan Singh Vs. Union of India, ILR (1975) 1 Delhi 227 where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Unionof India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14. Union of India, ILR (1975) 1 Delhi 227 where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Unionof India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work", is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the tower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay for equal w (frk would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to them. It is true that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. equal pay for equal work for both men and women means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statue for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental Policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature leave the millions of the people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India in to a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word socialist must mean something. Even if it does not mean To each according to his need , it must at least mean equal pay. for equal work . The principle of equal pay for equal is expressly recognised by all socialist systems of law, e. g. . Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code. Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanina Code. Indeed this. principle has been incorporaled in several western labour codes too. Under provisions in S. 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Aregentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all colleetive bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section. 3 of Grundgestz of the German Federal Republic and clauses 7, Section 123 of the Mexiean Constitutiuon, the principle is given universal sigrufieance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265 ). In accordance with Section. 3 of Grundgestz of the German Federal Republic and clauses 7, Section 123 of the Mexiean Constitutiuon, the principle is given universal sigrufieance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265 ). The preamble of the Constitution of the international Labour Organisation recognises the principle of equal remunertion for work of equal value as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice hardship and privation large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle equal pay for Equal work is deducibte from those Articles and may to property applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification through those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. " ( 33 ) ULTIMATELY, the Supreme Court held: "there cannot be slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same function and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the power functions and Privileges of a police officer their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other depsartments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scales of pay than others? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer in unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. We have shown that the answer in unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The Scale of pay shall be effective from 1st Jan, 1973 the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect. " ( 34 ) THE dictim laid down by the Supreme Court in "randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Others". , AIR 1982 SC 879 is entirely different, and I fail to see how this could help the petitioners. ( 35 ) IN M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Vs. Audrey D costa and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1281 , the Supreme Court was dealing with claim of a lady stenographer for equal pay under Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (Act 25 of 1976 ). The ratio in. that case is entirely different and that has absolutely no application to the instant case. It is only with reference to the claim under the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The Supreme Court observed: "appluicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the managemeht to pay equal remueration as prowled by it. " This is relied on to project the claim of the petitioner without proper appreciation of the setting in which the observation was made by the Supreme Court. ( 36 ) IN "y. K. Mehta and Others Vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 1988 SC 1970 , three categories of Staff Artistes of Doordarshan under the Ministry of Information and Broacteasting, namely, Cameraman Grade-11, Sound Recordist and lighting Assistant Ughtman. have claimed that they should be declared as Government servants and should be given the same pay scales as given to their respective counterparts in the Film Division under the same Ministry. ( 37 ) REFERRING to the nature of the work, the Supreme Court observed: "it is the case of the petitioners that the nature of work performed by them is similar to that performed by their counterparts in the Film Division. The qualifications required for appointment to these categories of Staff Artistes, are the same as required in the cases of their counterparts in the Film Division. The qualifications required for appointment to these categories of Staff Artistes, are the same as required in the cases of their counterparts in the Film Division. In the circumstances, it is submitted by the petitioners that the said Government order dated March 9, 1977 is discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, in these writ petitions it has been prayed that the petitioners should be declared as Govemment servants and paid the same scales of pay as paid to their counterports in the Film Division with effect from respective dates of their appointrnenfe. " ( 38 ) DEALING with the case of the Government of India, the Supreme Court observed: "the respondents have opposed the writ petitions by filing counter-affidavits. it has been averred in the counter-affidavits that the Staff Artistes of Doordarshan are not Government servants, but they are engaged on contract basis. It is submitted that as they are not of the same class as of the employees in the Film Division, they are not entitled to the same scales of pay. With regard to the Sound Recordist, petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 974 of 1978, it is the case of the respondents that there is no such post in the Film Division as "sound Recordist". It is averred that in the Film Division, there are three posts, namely, the Chief Sound Recordist, the Recordist and the Assistant Recordist. It is, accordingly, contended. that in Doordarshan, the organisational structure is entirely different and consists of only one category of post, that is, the Sound Recordist. " ( 39 ) FURTHER considering what is stated in the petitions and the counter-affidavits, the Supreme Court observed: "we have gone through the averments in the writ petitions and those made in the counter-affidavits filed by the Director General of Doordarshan and we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioners perform the same nature duties as those performed by their counter parts in the Film Division. When two posts under two different wings of the same Ministry are not only identical, but also involve the performance of the same of duties, it will be unreasonable and unjust to discriminate between the two in the matter of pay. When two posts under two different wings of the same Ministry are not only identical, but also involve the performance of the same of duties, it will be unreasonable and unjust to discriminate between the two in the matter of pay. One of the directive principles of State Policy, as embodied in clause (d) of Article 39 of the Constitution, is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. The provision of Act, 39 (d) has been relied upon by the petitioners. The directive Principles contained in Part-IV of the Constitution, though not enforceable by any Court, are intended to be implemented by the State of its own accord so as to promote the welfare of the people. Indeed, Article 37 provides, inter alia, that it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. Even leaving out of our consideration Art. 39 (d), the principle of "equal pay for equal work", it not given effect to in the case of one set of Government servants holding same or similar posts, possessing same qualifications and doing the same kind of work, as another set of Government servants, it would be discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such discrimination has been made in respect of the petitioners, who are the Staff Artistes of Doordarshan, by not giving them the same scales of pay as provided to their counterparts in the Film Division under the same Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to the same scales of pay as their counter parts in the Film Division. ""but the question is as to from which date they will be entitled to the scale of pay as prescribed for their counterparts in the Film Division. The petitioners have claimed that such scales of pay should be admitted to them with effect from their respective dates of appointments. ""but the question is as to from which date they will be entitled to the scale of pay as prescribed for their counterparts in the Film Division. The petitioners have claimed that such scales of pay should be admitted to them with effect from their respective dates of appointments. After having given a careful thought to this aspect, we are of the view that ends of justice will be met sufficiently, if such scales of pay are given to the petitioners with effect from the first day of the month of the year in which each writ petition was filed in this Court except that in the case of Writ Petition (C) No. 1756 of 1986 such scales of pay shail be given to the petitioners with effect from December 1, 1983. " ( 40 ) EVENTUALLY, the Supreme Court granted the relief in the following terms :- "in the circumstances, all these writ petitions are allowed. The Sound Recordists, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 974 of 1978, shall be given the pay scale of the Recordist/sound Recordist in the Film Division i. e. , Rs 550-900 with effect from January 1, 1978. The Cameramen Grade-11, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 1239 of 1979, shall be given the pay scale of the Cameraman of the Film Division i. e. , Rs. 650-960 with effect from August 1, 1979. The Lighting Assistants/lightmen, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 1756 of 1986, shall be given the scale of pay of Assistant Cameraman in the Film Division i. e. , Rs 425-700 with effect from December 1, 1983. The petitioners in all these writ petitions will also be entitled to the substituted scales of pay and consequential benefits. The respondents are directed to disburse to the petitioners the arrear amounts being the difference in the pay scales within four months from today. "here also the ratio is entirely different and cannot be called in aid for the purpose of the claim of the petitioners. ( 41 ) IN "grih Kalyan Kendra Workers" Union Vs. Union of India and Others", AIR 1991 SC 1173 , the employees working under the Grih Kalyan Kendra claimed parity with other employees performing similar work in NDMC and other departments of Delhi Administration. ( 41 ) IN "grih Kalyan Kendra Workers" Union Vs. Union of India and Others", AIR 1991 SC 1173 , the employees working under the Grih Kalyan Kendra claimed parity with other employees performing similar work in NDMC and other departments of Delhi Administration. The Supreme Court reiterating the principle observed: "equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a fundamental right but in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Art. 39 (d) of the Constitution "equal 'pay for equal work" has assumed the status of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual employment within a reasonable period has been accepted by this Court as a. constitutional goal to our socialistic pattern. It has ceased to be a judge made law as it is the part of the constitutional philosophy which ensures a welfare socialistic pattern of a State providing equal opportunity to all and equal pay for equal work for similarly placed employees of the State. This Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal pay for equal work in. effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in a number of decisions. See : Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : (AIR 1982 SC 8719): Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under ' P and T Department Vs. Union of India. ( 1988 1 SCC 122 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2342 ): Dhirendra Champlivs. State of U. P. , (1986)1 SCC 637 : Surinder Singh Vs. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, 1986 (1) SCC 639 : AIR 1986 SC 584 : R. D. Gupta Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration, ( AIR 1987 SC 2086 ); (1987) 4 SCC 505 : Bhagwan Dass Vs. State ofharyana, 1987 (4) SCC 634 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2049 ): Jaipal Vs. State of Haryana, (1988) SCC 354: ( AIR 1988 SC 1504 ): Dharwad District Public Witness D Literate Daily Wage Employees Association Vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 . State ofharyana, 1987 (4) SCC 634 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2049 ): Jaipal Vs. State of Haryana, (1988) SCC 354: ( AIR 1988 SC 1504 ): Dharwad District Public Witness D Literate Daily Wage Employees Association Vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 . Therefore, the principle of equal pay for equal work even in an establishment which is an instrumentality of a State is applicable in its full vigour"dealing with the claim of the petitioner in that case in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it was observed: "the question then arises whether the respondents have practiced discrimination in denying the employees of the Kendra pay which the Union of India has been paying to other similarly placed employees doing the same or similar work. This question is of primary importance which requires investigation of facts. Unless, it is demonstrated that the employees of the Grih Kalyan Kendra are discriminated in matters relating to pay and other emoluments with the other similarly placed employees, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied. While considering this question, it is not necessary to find out similarity by mathematics formula but there must be a reasonable similarity in the nature of work, performance of duties, the qualification and the equality of work performed by them. It is permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts, pay scales, value of work and responsibility and experience. The classification must, however, have reasonablerelation to the object sought to be achieved, in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers Vs. Union of India, 1988 (3) SCC 91 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1291 ), Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) observed at page 1297 of AIR: "there may be qualitative differences as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference, one cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions, of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonable on an intelligible criteria which was a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonable on an intelligible criteria which was a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasis that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right. " Elaborating the aforesaid observation the learned Judge further observed thus at page 1300 of AIR: "the same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less - it varies from nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. If it has a rational nexus with the object to be sought for, as reiterated before a certain amount of value judgment of the administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the pay scales has to be left with them and it cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived mala fide either in law or in fact. "here again, f am unable to see how this case could be of any assistance to the petitioners. ( 42 ) IN "chief Conservator of Forests and another, etc. etc. . Vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, etc. etc. ", AIR 1996 SC 2898 , the Supreme Court referred to which it had decide: "two questions in the main need our determination in this batch of appeals which are by the Chief Conservator of Forests. State of Maharashtra. The first and foremost question is whether Forest, Department of the State Government is an "industry" within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter 'the Central Act'), which definition has been adopted by the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short 'the State Act' ). We shall have then to address ourselves to the question whether in the cases at hand the employer, namely, the State Government, had indulged in unfair labour practice visualised by item 6 of Schedule IV of the State Act, as alleged by the respondents before the Industrial Court, Pune/ahmednagar. We shall have then to address ourselves to the question whether in the cases at hand the employer, namely, the State Government, had indulged in unfair labour practice visualised by item 6 of Schedule IV of the State Act, as alleged by the respondents before the Industrial Court, Pune/ahmednagar. If these questions would be answered in affirmative, we would be required to consider whether the directions given by the aforesaid industrial Courts need our interference. "the facts of that case are entirely different. It is not necessary to discuss them and this has absolutely no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the instant case with reference to the claim of the petitioners for pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 for theperiodfrom 1. 1. 731018. 2. 1983. ( 43 ) THIS would take me to the authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee. ( 44 ) IN "union of India and Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, (1994) 4 SCC 212 , the fixing of 1st of August of the year concerned as the date with reference to which the eligibility of persons desirous of sitting in competitive examination for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service/indian Foreign Service etc. , qua their age for which both minimum and maximum is normally fixed, was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had held; "having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1st August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose of marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, lone are material. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose of marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, lone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August, as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be "very wide off any reasonable mark" or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference. "in the instant case, the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 is given w. e. f. 19. 2. 1983 which was the date of resolution of the University Grants Commission. It cannot be said that giving effect to the decision from that is capricious and whimsical. ( 45 ) IN "sher Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others", (1995) 6 SCC 515 , the librarians employed in the University of Delhi claimed parity in pay with the corresponding categories of teaching staff. The Supreme Court held: "after a serious and anxious consideration on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, according to us there appears to be no rationale or any justification in the claim of parity between the teaching staff and the library staff in Delhi University and its colleges for the simple reason that the two sets of employees belonged to different categories of employees who stand on a different footing. The nature of duties, workload, experience and responsibilities of the two sets of employees in question are totally different from each other. The teaching staff has to (lo some research work, deep study in their respective subjects and to make preparations for the daily lectures in the classrooms and other academic work while this is not so in the case of library staff. The experience of library staff Is totally different from the one which is required for the teaching staff. Working pattern of the two sets of employees cannot be said to be identical so as to claim parity between thelibrary staff, the experiance of library staff and the teaching staff. The experience of library staff Is totally different from the one which is required for the teaching staff. Working pattern of the two sets of employees cannot be said to be identical so as to claim parity between thelibrary staff, the experiance of library staff and the teaching staff. If the Government as a matter of policy had equated the library staff for the purposes of pay scales earlier for a certain period as contended by the appellants, they should be thankful to the Government as they could not have claimed the parity as of right. In any case that was the decision of the Government which had allowed the equation of pay scales during the period from 1961 to 1. 1. 1973. Later, if the Government had taken a policy decision to grant party again with effect from 1. 4. 1980 and not with retrospective effect from 1. 7. 1973 when it was disturbed there 'could be no legitimate grievance for the same because the Government has the right to change its policy from time to time, according to the administrative exigencies and demands of the relevant time* As a matter of fact the courts would be slow in interfering with matters of Government policy except where it is shown that the decision is unfair, mala fide or contrary to any statutory directions. There will be no justification for the Court to interfere with the policy of the Government merely on the ground of change in the policy. If earlier the Government took a policy decision to grant parity to the library staff with the teaching staff it was the policy of the then Government and if for certain reasons the Government took a different policy decision to withdraw the parity and to enforce it again with effect from a certain date it will again be a matter of policy of the Government and it is not for the courts to interfere with such policy decisions , ' of the Government. Normally the courts will not dictate the decision of the statutory authority in exercise of its discretion and formulation of its policy. The Court will not direct the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. "the Court can only command the statutory authority by a Writ of mandamus to perform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. The Court will not direct the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. "the Court can only command the statutory authority by a Writ of mandamus to perform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. This was also the view expressed by the Court in U. P. SRTC Vs. Md. Ismail, (1991) 3 SCC 239 . In the present case, we find that there is no judicial or quasi judicial duty or any obligation imposed on the Government to equate- the library staff with the teaching staff, on the basis of which the enforcement thereof could be claimed by the appellants. In such a situation it cannot be said that the Government did not act fairly or acted mala fide so as to call for any interference by this Court invoking the power of judicial review. " ( 46 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, the principle laid down herein would apply to the facts of the instant case. The University Grants Commission took the decision and that was given effect to and the University Grants Commission had taken the decision after considering the whole history of the service. ( 47 ) IN "dr. P. N. Puri and Others Vs. State of U. P. and Others", (1996) 7 SCC 493 , similar question was posed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dealing with the point held: "the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court for direction to pay equal pay on a par with Medical Officers at Rs. 2200-4000. There was a long controversy regarding the entitlement of the petitioners and their companions for the said scale of pay. Ultimately, it was referred to the Anomaly Committee which had decided in its proceedings dated 1. 1. 1995 accepting the new pay scales of different posts in the urban local bodies, namely, persons like the petitioners would be paid the scale of pay at Rs. 2200-4000 and recommended to upgrade the said scale from 7. 11. 1994 and to pay the scales of pay from that date. The Government has accepted the above recommendation and issued orders on 16. 2. 1995. Calling that order in question, the petitioners have filed the writ petition seeking payment of arrears from 1986. 2200-4000 and recommended to upgrade the said scale from 7. 11. 1994 and to pay the scales of pay from that date. The Government has accepted the above recommendation and issued orders on 16. 2. 1995. Calling that order in question, the petitioners have filed the writ petition seeking payment of arrears from 1986. Initially, directions were given by the Court to consider why the petitioners were not being paid w. e. f 1. 1. 1986. Afterconsideration again, the respondent filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances. Undoubtedly, one of the circumstances stated was that previously the petitioners were unequals and were not being paid the same pay and, therefore, they were not entitled to the same scale of pay. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition by order dated 21. 9. 1995. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reason given by the respondents is not relevant since the Anomaly Committee recommended that they are performing the same duties on a par with the Medical Officers. Therefore, the High Court ought to have granted them the scale of pay from 1986. As stated earlier, reasons given in the counter- affidavit may not be the correct reasons but the Anomaly Committee had recommended for payment of the same scale of pay to the persons like the petitioners w. e. f. 7. 11. 1994. It is well-settled law that fixing a date is not arbitrary violating Article 14. It is settled law that the authorities cannot pick up from their hat and fix a date. The question, therefore, which arises for decision is : whether the date fixed is arbitrary? The question was referred to the Anomaly Committee to advise the Government as to the fixation of the scale of pay to which persons like petitioners would be entitled to. The Committee had gone into the question and recommended the scale of pay of Rs. 2200-4000 to persons like the petitioners and also recommended to give effect from the date on which they had decided, namely, 7. 11. 1994. The Government having accepted the same had given effect from that date. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that fixation of date is arbitrary violating Article 14. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. " ( 48 ) IN "university Grants Commission Vs. 11. 1994. The Government having accepted the same had given effect from that date. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that fixation of date is arbitrary violating Article 14. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. " ( 48 ) IN "university Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary and Others", (1996) 10 SCC 536 , the point relating to the choice of a date was considered. The Supreme Court held: "we find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubgbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India Vs. Parameswaran Match Works, (1975)1 SCC 305 : (1975) 2 SCR 573 , at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr.) Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1985 Supp SCC 45 : 1985 SCC (LAS) 565 ; (1985) 3 SCR 243 , at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31. 12. 1993, as fixed by notification dated 21. 6. 1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph. d. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Pho. or M. Phil, degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31. 12. 1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. The exemption from eligibility test that has been granted under para 5 of the advertisement dated 23. 1. The High Court was in error in taking this view. The exemption from eligibility test that has been granted under para 5 of the advertisement dated 23. 1. 1995 is relatable to the introduction of the requirement of eligibility test in the 1991 Regulations. The object underlying the grant of exemption is to mitigate the resultant hardship to candidates who had registered for Ph. D. degree or had joined the course for M. Phil, degree on the basis of the minimum qualifications prescribed under the 1982 Regulations. The validity of the fixation of cut-off date for the purpose of grant of exemption from the eligibility test has to be considered with reference to the date of issuance of the 1991 Regulations and not with reference to the date of advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the direction of the High Court that it would not be necessary to appear in the eligibility test for candidates who have applied or/are applying for the Lecturers, posts pursuant to the advertisement dated 23. 1. 1995 if they have obtained M. Phil. degrees or submitted Ph. D. thesis before 31. 12. 1994, i. e. , prior to the date of the publication of advertisement dated 23. 1. 1995 and the further direction to the Haryana Public Service Commission and State of Haryana to ensure that as and when any such advertisement is issued, they would bear in mind that the eligibility dates be not far off from the date of advertisement. The exemption from the requirement regarding clearing the eligibility test has to be confined within the limits indluted in the amendment introduced in the 1991 Regulations by notification dated 21. 6. 1995. Respondents 1 and 2 who had moved the High Court by filing the writ petition obtained their M. Phil. degrees prior to 31. 12. 1993. They would be entitled to exemption from clearing the eligibility test under the terms of the notification dated 18. 6. 1995. The decision of the High Court, Insofar as it relates to the said respondents, Is not required to be disturbed and Is, therefore, maintained. " ( 49 ) IN "rao Somashekara and Others Vs. Stata of Karnataka and Another". They would be entitled to exemption from clearing the eligibility test under the terms of the notification dated 18. 6. 1995. The decision of the High Court, Insofar as it relates to the said respondents, Is not required to be disturbed and Is, therefore, maintained. " ( 49 ) IN "rao Somashekara and Others Vs. Stata of Karnataka and Another". ( 1997) 7 SCC 649, the petitioners before the Supreme Court were Secondary School Teachers in the State of Kamataka working In Government and Government-aided Secondary Schools. The Supreme Court had referred to the circumstances to which the question was mooted. The same is as under: "certain Secondary Grade Teachers In the former State of Hyderabad were allotted to the State of Kamataka as on 1. 11. 1956. After reorganisation, the corresponding posts in former State of Mysore were equated with the posts of the allotted personnel. There was revision of pay scales on 1. 1. 1957 and again on 1. 1. 1961 but the disparity in pay scales was allowed to continue. This anomally was continued till 1. 1. 1970-for nearty fourteen years, when for the first time under the Kamataka Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1970 concerned which came Into force on 1. 1. 1970, based on the report of the Pay Commission headed by Justice Tukol, the scales were brought on a par with scales of allotted Hyderabad officers prospectiveiy by enhancing the scales of all the Kamataka teachers w. e. f. 1. 1. 1970. But the grievance of the Secondary School Teachers of Government of Karnataka for the period from 1. 1. 1957 to 31. 12. 1969 continued and has not been 'removed. That Is the subject of these writ petitions. " ( 50 ) IN paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court dealt with the case of the respondents in the following terms: "it is to be noticed that in these writ petitions, after 1. 11. 1956, the disparities in the scales of pay continued till 1. 1. 1970 and it was only from the date that, on the basis of Justice Tukol Commission Report, the scales of the Mysore/ Karnataka Secondary School Teachers were brought on a par with those of the Secondary School Teachers of the erstwhile Hyderabad State allotted to the State of Karnataka. In other words, the State took about fourteen years to set right the disparities. In other words, the State took about fourteen years to set right the disparities. As to whether any inquiry is necessary for deciding about hostile discrimination, the petitioners contend that there is no dispute because the posts in the allotted areas of Hyderabad State and of Karnataka were equated soon after 1956. Question therefore is whether, in the writ petitions filed in this Court in 1991, we are compelled to interfere? We are Of. the view that the State Government had before it the report of the Commission and on that basis it took a decision that the disparities should stand eliminated prospectively from 1. 1. 1970 and not retrospectively from 1. 1. 1957. The question as to whether the date from which the scales ought to have been equated should be 1. 1. 1970 or an interior or a later date was a matter which had to be arrived at by taking all factors into account. It whi be difficult for this Court to decide as to from what date the continuance of the existing scales should be treated as discriminatory or the continuance would lose its temporary character arising out of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. It may be that the State of Karnataka felt that the grievance of the non-allotted Primary School Teachers whose salaries were lesser than the salaries of non-allotted Secondary School Teachers was a matter of grave concern requiring redressal even as late as 1979 or 1986. Merely because the grievances of non-allotted primary teachers were reminded even after considerable lapse of time, we cannot say that grievances of Secondary School Teachers - even if it was late -should have also been redressed for the period 1. 1. 1957 to 31. 12. 1969. Above all, the financial burden involved was also a matter of relevant consideration. We are not therefore inclined to hold that the cut-off date of 1. 1. 1970 fixed after the report of Justice Tukol Commission, in regard to Secondary School Teachers, is arbitrary or violative of Article 14. In any event, principle of laches applies equally to applications under Article 32 of the Constitution of lhdia (Rabindranath Bose Vs. Union of India, 5 (1970)1 SCC 84 ; (1970) 2 SCR 697 ). " . ( 51 ) THIS was relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. In any event, principle of laches applies equally to applications under Article 32 of the Constitution of lhdia (Rabindranath Bose Vs. Union of India, 5 (1970)1 SCC 84 ; (1970) 2 SCR 697 ). " . ( 51 ) THIS was relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee in support of-the case of the second respondent. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee. the University Grants Commission, after taking into account all facts, had taken the dedsion to give the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 to the petitioners and that was given effect to w. e. f. 19. 2. 1983. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, the 'petitioners cannot claim pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1,1. 1973. ( 52 ) IN "vice Chancellor, G. B. Pant University of Agriculture and Tecimologyand Another's. Dr. Kewala Nand and Others JT 1998 (6) SC 283, the Supreme. Court had referred to the circumstances under which the appeal had arisen before the Supreme Court. The same reads as under :-"civil Appeal No. 3751 of 1996 has been filed by the G. B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, Pant Nagar in the State of UP against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court under which Research Assistants working in the appellant-university have been declared as entitled to payment of salary in the pay scale of Rs. 700-1600 and the subsequently revised pay-scale of Rs. 2200-4000 from the date from which the said pay-scales have been given to the Research Assistants of two other agricultural universities in the State, namely, Narendra Deva University of Agriculture and Technology, Faizabad and Chandrashekhar Azad University of Agriculture and Technology, Kanpur. Civil appeal No. 6724 of 1996 is an appeal filed by the State of U. P. against the same judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court while Civil Appeal No. 3752 of 1996 is filed, by the Association of Teachers in the G. B. Pant University of agriculture and Technology. against the same judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. In the appellant-university there are two cadres in the research wing. There is a cadre ofresearch Assistants and there is cadre "of Senior Research Assistaing. Prior to 1. 4. against the same judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. In the appellant-university there are two cadres in the research wing. There is a cadre ofresearch Assistants and there is cadre "of Senior Research Assistaing. Prior to 1. 4. 1978 ther minimum qualification prescribed for a Research Assitant was a B. Sc degree while the minimum qualification prescribed. for a Senior Research Assistant was an M. Sc. degree. The scale of pay of Research Assistants was Rs 350;700. With effect from 1. 4. 1978 the pay-scale of Research Assistants was revised to Rs. 500-900. The payscate of Rs. 700-1600 which was given to Senior Research Assistants has been revised with effect from 1. 1. 1986 to Rs. 2200-4000. " ( 53 ) DEALING with the point, the Supreme Court observed:"therefore, the High Court. has proceeded on a wrong assumption that alt Research Assistaritsin the other universities were given from inception the pay-scale of RS. 700-1600. In the other two universities, there was no separate caijre of Senior Research Assistants. Therefore, those possessing an M. Sc. degree were given a. higher pay-scale of Rs. 500-900 which was also the pay-scale of Research Assistants in the appellant-university at the relevant time. When there are two separate cadres of Research Assistants and Senior Research Assistants' the pay of the two cannot be directed to be identical when separate minimum qualifications are prescribed and there is a separate selection for the two cadres. Nevertheless, the Research Assistants in the appellant-university have, in fact, been given, with the approval of the Government, the same pay-scale as Senior Research Assistant with effect from 12. 12. 1989 it they possess an M. Sc. degree - after they were declared as teachers. There is no legal basis for the claim of the Research Assistants for the same pay-scale for the period 1. 4. 1978 to 12. 12. 1989. " ( 54 ) THE principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cages cited by Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, the learned counsel for the second respondent, would apply to the facts of the instant case, the having regard to those principles, I am of the view that the petitioners cannot claim the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 w. e. f. 1. 1. 1973 and what has been granted, to the petitioners is absolutely in accordance with law. 650-1200 w. e. f. 1. 1. 1973 and what has been granted, to the petitioners is absolutely in accordance with law. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed ( 55 ) THERE shall be no order as to costs.