JUDGMENT Kulshrestha, J. -- 1. This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, has been filed against the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in First Appeal No.3 of 1990, by which the decree of specific performance of contract of sale passed by the learned Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 13-A of 1982, has been affirmed. 2. A suit for specific performance of contract of sale of the land measuring 65,000 Sq.ft. of Kh. Nos. 449/1 and 449/3 in village Ameri (now within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Nilaspur) was filed by the respondent (plaintiff) on the basis of an agreement dated 1.9.1980 against the appellant No. 1 as the vendor and against the respondent No.2 as subsequent transferee of the land. It is not disputed that the appellant No. 1, an advocate and a notary, is engaged in real estate business and deals in sale and purchase of properties. It is also not disputed that the appellant No. 1 had entered into an agreement dated 1.9.1980 for sale of land measuring 65,000 Sq. ft. out of the land comprised in Kh. No. 449/1 and 449/3 at the rate of Re. 1.10 per Sq. ft. and had received a sum of Rs. 6,000/- towards earnest money and agreed to execute sale-deed by 30.9.1980 on receipt of the balance consideration after measurement of the land. 3. The case of the respondent, in short, was that the respondent approached the appellant No. 1 for getting the land measured, but on one pretext or the other, he avoided the same and after expiry of the date mentioned in the agreement, the vendor sent a legal notice dated 22.10.1980 (Annexure-P/3) informing the respondent (plaintiff) that although the land was got duly measured through Patwari in the presence of the parties, the plaintiff \vas avoiding to perform his part of the obligation under the contract and, therefore, he was called upon to appear before the Registrar within three days for conveyance of the property, failing which the agreement would be cancelled. The plaintiff sent a Reply dated 25.10.1980 (Annexure-P/2) to the said notice through his advocate, informing the defendant vendor that he had approached him several times for getting the land measured and for executing the sale-deed, but he evaded his obligation on the ground that the plaintiff should first purchase stamp-papers. The plaintiff sent a Reply dated 25.10.1980 (Annexure-P/2) to the said notice through his advocate, informing the defendant vendor that he had approached him several times for getting the land measured and for executing the sale-deed, but he evaded his obligation on the ground that the plaintiff should first purchase stamp-papers. The plaintiff also stated in this reply that the defendant was negotiating with other parties for sale of the said land and called upon the defendant to execute the sale-deed within 15 days, failing which he would be compelled to institute action in the Civil Court for specific performance of the contract. Thereafter, the suit was filed on 3.12.1980 and the subsequent purchaser (appellant No.2) of part of the suit land was also joined as a defendant on the ground that she had purchased the land with prior knowledge of the agreement with the plaintiff. 4. The appellants resisted the suit and pleaded that there was failure on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the obligation till the date the vendor rescinded the contract by notice. According to the defendant (vendor), the land was got measured through Patwari (D.W. 2) twice, on 24.8.1980 and 9.9.1980, well before the agreed date for execution of the sale-deed, but despite that, the plaintiff took no steps to make payment of the balance amount and to get the sale-deed executed in his favour. The plaintiff remained unwilling even after notice Annexure-P/3 was issued by the defendant vendor, as he did not have the funds with him to meet this liability. 5. Learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence brought on record, decreed the suit for specific performance and the said decree of the trial Court has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge by Judgment dated 5.8.1998. It is against this Judgment that the two appellants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal. 6. 5. Learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence brought on record, decreed the suit for specific performance and the said decree of the trial Court has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge by Judgment dated 5.8.1998. It is against this Judgment that the two appellants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal. 6. Shri Deoras, learned counsel for the appellants, has assailed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court as also by the learned Single Judge on the grounds: (i) that the plaintiff had himself committed breach of the conditions of the contract and had been throughout unwilling to discharge his obligation during subsistence thereof as he was not possessed of sufficient funds to meet his obligation; (ii) the conduct of the plaintiff prior to the suit and even during the suit/throughout indicated that he did not have funds and further that his readiness and willingness was contra-indicated by the lethargy shown in prosecuting the remedy; and (iii) that in the facts and circumstances of the case, he was not entitled to a decree for specific performance and could be adequately compensated monetarily. 7. Shri Ravish Agarwal, appearing for the respondent, has, in controversion, submitted that the defendant-vendor had throughout conducted himself in the manner to avoid execution of the sale-deed after receiving the earnest money and had failed to get the land measured as required under the agreement while the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to pay the balance consideration and to get the sale-deed executed. He has also pointed out that the vendor had deliberately avoided to get the land measured, as required under the agreement. According to Shri Agarwal, the learned Single Judge having concurred with the findings arrived at by the trial Court, the appellants were not entitled to any relief in the present appeal. Both the learned counsel have taken us through the record of the case. 8. According to Shri Agarwal, the learned Single Judge having concurred with the findings arrived at by the trial Court, the appellants were not entitled to any relief in the present appeal. Both the learned counsel have taken us through the record of the case. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out that time limit prescribed for taking steps may not amount to making time the essence of contract but, at the same time, it must have some significance and total inaction on the part of the purchaser to take steps to show his readiness and willingness disentitled the plaintiff from the relief of specific performance of contract as the grant of decree is not automatic and the discretion is to be exercised on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience especially when not only the conduct of the plaintiff prior to the filing of the suit but also his conduct thereafter, in view of enormous rise in the price of the property, were relevant factors for exercising the discretion against grant of the relief of specific performance of contract. Learned counsel for the respondent, in rebuttal, has pointed out that delay in filing the suit even upto the period of limitation is not enough to disentitle the plaintiff from the relief unless it is coupled with waiver indicating release from the obligation or abandonment. Shri Deoras, learned counsel for the appellants, has invited our attention to plaintiff's Reply to the application dated 28.1.1981 under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, in which he has stated that a suit for specific performance of contract can be brought within a period of 3 years and the plaintiff can wait and file the suit for specific performance any time before expiry of the period. Learned counsel has, on that basis, contended that not only that the plaintiff had not shown any inclination upto the date specified in the agreement for sale, to get the sale-deed executed, he had leisurely proceeded with the suit and had sought amendment of the plaint to seek specific performance as the suit filed initially for injunction and declaration was not maintainable. This amendment was allowed on 2.11.1981 but still the plaint was amended on 5.1.1982 and thereafter, the Court fee was also paid in instalments which was indicative of the fact that the plaintiff had no capacity to pay the balance amount of consideration. This amendment was allowed on 2.11.1981 but still the plaint was amended on 5.1.1982 and thereafter, the Court fee was also paid in instalments which was indicative of the fact that the plaintiff had no capacity to pay the balance amount of consideration. He has further pointed out that the plaintiff had not diligently pursued the suit as he had sought adjournment from 1984 to 1988 for examining his witnesses who were not present during this period. 9. Learned Single Judge has observed that the condition about measurement of the land before execution of the deed coupled with the conduct of the vendor in issuing notice dated 22.10.1980 (Annexure-P/3) after the date stipulated in the agreement for performance, calling upon the plaintiff to obtain conveyance within three days of the receipt of the notice, were clear indications that time was not the essence of the contract. To us also it clearly seems that without measurement as necessary for carving out the land to be conveyed, it was not possible to execute the sale-deed and the failure to discharge this obligation was only on the part of the vendor. Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam and others v. Vairavan AIR 1997 SC 1751 in which it has been observed that the rigor of the rule that time is not the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties, evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown, requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It was observed that time limit may not amount to making time the essence of the contract but it must yet have some meaning and while exercising discretion, the Court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limits for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance. Learned counsel therefore, contends that in the present case on failure to perform his part of the contract by the date specified in the agreement for sale, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim specific performance of contract. Learned counsel therefore, contends that in the present case on failure to perform his part of the contract by the date specified in the agreement for sale, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim specific performance of contract. We notice from the agreement Annexure-P/1 that the vendor had agreed to execute the sale-deed by 30.9.1980 on payment of the balance amount of consideration but there was also a specific stipulation that the land would be got measured before the execution of the sale-deed. Admittedly, the land continued to be in possession of the defendant/vendor even after he had received the earnest money under the said agreement and it was, therefore, incumbent upon the vendor to have got the land measured within the stipulated period and the vendor, even after the Reply Ex.P/2, did not take any step in this behalf. In the case relied upon by the learned counsel, there was total inaction on the part of the plaintiff for and a half years in clear violation of the terms of agreement and during this period, there was substantial rise in the prices and the delay had brought about a situation where it was inequitable to grant relief of specific performance to the plaintiff. In the present case, the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff was manifest from the prompt Reply sent by the plaintiff. 10. One of the essential conditions of the agreement was that the land would be got measured before execution of the sale-deed. This was apparently because only a part of the land was agreed to be sold under the agreement Ex.P.11. In order to indicate that the vendor had duly carried out this obligation, Patwari Babldau Prasad (D.W. 2) was examined to prove that on 24.8.1980, the land had been measured by him and map Ex.D/1 had been prepared and on 9.9.1980, again the land was measured and map Ex. D/3 was prepared. Learned Single Judge has observed that although the documents bear recitq.1 to the effect that both parties were present, they do not contain the signatures of the parties for which no explanation had been offered. It has also been observed that the maps prepared did not fully carve out the exact area to be mentioned in the sale-deed for conveyance. Even in the notice dated 22.10.1980 Ex. It has also been observed that the maps prepared did not fully carve out the exact area to be mentioned in the sale-deed for conveyance. Even in the notice dated 22.10.1980 Ex. P/3 sent by the defendant No. 1, specific mention of the dates on which the land was got measured through Patwari does not find place. The learned Single Judge has therefore, agreed with trial Court that the vendor had failed to get the land measured as stipulated in the contract. The finding is duly supported by the evidence on record. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants has also assailed the monetary soundness of the plaintiff to question his readiness and willingness. The learned Single Judge has observed that both the parties were residents of the same place and known to each other and it was most unlikely that if the plaintiff, who was a lecturer in the college, was not a man of means, the defendant No. 1, an advocate practising in the same area, would have entered into an agreement with him and accepted earnest money of Rs. 6000/-. The plaintiff has deposed that he had repeatedly called on the defendant No. 1 to get the land measured and to execute the sale-deed but he avoided to do so. He has further deposed that he had ready cash with him and his National Saving Certificate was about to mature. According to his statement he had 80 to 85 thousand rupees in cash with him from his savings and the money received from his father. Learned counsel for the appellants has severely criticised the testimony on the ground that. irrespective of the fact that the burden of proof may not be on a party, the plaintiff was under an obligation to produce this document (NCC) having material bearing over the issues and on account of his failure, adverse inference should be drawn. Attention has been invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others 1969 MPLJ 271. From the evidence of the plaintiff, it is clear that what the plaintiff had deposed was that he was about to receive also the maturity value of NSC but in so far as the funds available with the plaintiff were concerned, he has categorically deposed that he had Rs. 80-85 thousand in ready cash available with him. From the evidence of the plaintiff, it is clear that what the plaintiff had deposed was that he was about to receive also the maturity value of NSC but in so far as the funds available with the plaintiff were concerned, he has categorically deposed that he had Rs. 80-85 thousand in ready cash available with him. The plaintiff has been believed about the availability of the funds with him to enable him to perform his part of the contract by the trial Court as also by the learned Single Judge. The plaintiff has also explained that he had given a cheque for Rs. 8000/- to his advocate for payment of Court fees and therefore, from the fact that the Court fees had been paid in instalments, no inference of paucity of funds can be drawn against the plaintiff. From the evidence on record, it is noticed that the plaintiff had been, at all points of time ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the failure to execute the sale-deed was attributable solely to the defendant No. 1 who avoided to get the land measured and to take steps for the conveyance of the property. In the plaint itself, the plaintiff has in clear terms, averred that he had always been willing and anxious to perform his part of the contract and had called on the defendant No. 1 to get the land measured but the defendant, on one excuse or the other, kept on avoiding it. In view of this clear statement in plaint, the decision in Abdul Khader Rowther v. PK Sara Bai and others AIR 1990 SC 682 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, the requisite averment in the pleadings that the plaintiff was willing to perform his part was absent, while in the case at hand the respondent has clearly stated so. We have, therefore, no reason to differ from the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 12. In the said case, the requisite averment in the pleadings that the plaintiff was willing to perform his part was absent, while in the case at hand the respondent has clearly stated so. We have, therefore, no reason to differ from the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 12. This takes us to the last limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the escalation in the price of the property and the fact that the plaintiff has made an alternative claim for the refund of money, it would be unjust and most inequitable to grant him decree for specific performance of contract especially when the conduct of the plaintiff shows that he had caused undue delay even after filing the suit and had not diligently pursued the remedy. As observed in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. Tellogi Rao and others AIR 1905 SC 1405, mere delay upto the period of limitation is not enough to disentitle the plaintiff from the relief for specific performance of the contract unless it is coupled with circumstances to indicate that there was waiver or abandonment of the right but in the present case, the plaintiff has at all stages, asserted his right and required the defendant No. 1 to execute the conveyance deed but the defendant has avoided to do so. As observed in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal and others AIR 1996 SC 2150 , rise in price is not the sole consideration to refuse specific performance. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others AIR 1996 SC 116 in support of his contention that conduct both prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit must be taken into consideration, we find that there was ample evidence on record indicating that the respondent had never been wanting in his readiness and willingness. It is clear from the material on record that the defendant No. 1, after obtaining the earnest money, did not get the land measured as required and avoided to execute the sale-deed although approached by the plaintiff in this behalf several times. We do not find any circumstances on record to persuade us to take a view different from the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 13. We do not find any circumstances on record to persuade us to take a view different from the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that in view of the escalation in the price of the property, at this distance of time, the plaintiff can be adequately compensated by refund of the amount with interest and the defendant No. 1 was willing to pay him adequate compensation as may be determined by the Court. The learned Single Judge has also recorded that an offer of Rs. 1.25 lacs was made by the defendant. The defendant No. 1 alone is guilty of breach as he failed to execute the sale-deed even after the Reply Ex. P/2 had been sent requiring him to do so. Thereafter, the plaintiff had filed the suit and merely on account of escalation in the price of the property, the plaintiff cannot be denied the relief of specific performance. The learned trial Court has directed the plaintiff to pay the balance amount of consideration together with 6% annual interest. It is not disputed before us that the defendants had been restrained from alienating the property during the pendency of the suit. There is no evidence to suggest that the defendant had any income from this land. The interest on the balance amount of consideration at the rate of 6% per annum appears to be inadequate. We may here refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bibi Jaibunisha v. Jagdish Pandit and others [ (1997)4 SCC 481 ] where in the case of specific performance of the contract, of reconveyance of property, offer 10 times the consideration due, was considered reasonable and it was directed that on deposit of the amount so offered, the vendor shall produce the Title Deed before the Court and reconvey the property. In the facts and circumstances of the present case where initial agreement was executed in the year 1980, keeping in view the admitted escalation in the price of the property and the fact that the plaintiff as a prudent man must have earned interest on his money, we are of the opinion that it would be equitable, just and proper to direct the plaintiff to deposit the balance amount of consideration with interest @ 12% per annum, compoundable yearly, for conveyance of the property. 14. 14. In the result, the Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge is maintained with the modification that the plaintiff shall pay 12% interest, compoundable yearly, upto the date of the execution of the sale-deed in place of 6% awarded by the learned trial Court. With the above modification, this Appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs of this Appeal.