Honble MADAN, J.–The appellants who are residents of village Barauli Chhar of Panchayat Samiti Nadbai, Distt. Bharatpur, have come up by way of this present special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance whereby they have challenged the propriety of the order dated 1.4.1998, passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 1361/1998, by which the said writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed as he found no merit in the same. (2). The case of the appellants in short is that as residents of Village Barauli Chhar, Panchayat Samiti Nadbai District Bharatpur, they had made complaints against the conduct of one Jagdish Prasad Bhatra (respondent No. 6) herein , the then Sarpanch of Panchayat Samiti of their village to the State Government. During the course of his tenure respondent No. 6 is alleged to have forged certain docu-ments and made illegal payments to one Rati Ram for which there were complaints against him by the villagers of the said village on 21.9.1995 and 19.10.1995. Thereafter an inquiry was initiated against respondent No.6 by the competent authority. On the basis of the preliminary enquiry conducted against him the Collector and Zila Vikas Adhikari, Bharatpur, had recommended for the suspension of the Sarpan-ch vide order dated 23.3.1996. Thereafter regular enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer, who also happened to be Chief Executive Officer cum Secretary Zila Parishad, Bharatpur. The said enquiry officer recorded the finding that the Sarpanch had knowingly made illegal payments to one Rati Ram, who was hired as a labour from the period 1.10.95 to 10.10.95 and from 11.10.95 to 14.10.95 for ex-cavation of soil with the help of his Tractor within three days and to complete the work by 14.10.95. It is alleged that the Sarpanch had made an excess payment of 262 trolleys which was not actually due to Rati Ram. Consequently the enquiry officer had held the Sarpanch guilty and charges 1 and 3 stood proved against him and the enquiry report was thereafter sent to the competent authority for its ratifi-cation and approval. Thereafter the Director & Special Secretary, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development, Department, who was the competent authority in the matter, directed the dismissal of the Sarpanch and also directed for recovery of Rs. 18,980/-alongwith penalty imposed by way of interest from the Sarpanch vide its order dated 12.8.1997. Thereafter the Director & Special Secretary, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development, Department, who was the competent authority in the matter, directed the dismissal of the Sarpanch and also directed for recovery of Rs. 18,980/-alongwith penalty imposed by way of interest from the Sarpanch vide its order dated 12.8.1997. On the basis of the aforesaid order of dismissal and recovery of the said amount which is purported to have been illegally paid, the Collector cum District Development Officer on 26.8.1997 declared the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Barauli Chhar, Panchayat Samiti Nadbai, District Bharatpur, as having fallen vacant. (3). The appellants, being aggrieved by the order dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-9), passed by the Under Secretary, State Government, by which earlier order dated 12.8.1997 (Annexure-5), passed by the Special Secretary, State Government, was recalled and reviewed resulting in reinstatement of the Sarpanch respondent No.6 Jagdish Prasad in service, approached this court vide SB Civil Writ Petition No. 1361/98. The learned Single Judge of this court finding no merit in the writ petition dismissed the same vide order dated 1.4.1998, against which the present special appeal has been preferred, which is now after hearing the learned counsel for the appellants being finally disposed of. (4). Shri Rajendra Soni, learned counsel for the appellants, has challenged the propriety of the order dated 1.4.1998 of the learned Single Judge on the grounds, inter alia, that a competent authority had passed the order for dismissal of the Sarpanch respondent No. 6 and for recovery of the amount of Rs. 18,980/-alongwith interest due thereof. The learned counsel further submitted that once the said order having been passed could not be recalled, reversed, reviewed or modified by an authority subordinate to the authority which had passed the said order and since the order dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-9), passed by the Under Secretary to the State Government was obviously an authority subordinate to the authority which passed the earlier dated 12.8.1997 (Annexure 5), being the Special Secretary to the State Government, the same is not tenable in law being hit by the provisions of Section 37 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and being not a speaking order. He has further contended that it was not open to the State Government to revise its earlier order, since the Sarpanch had been found to have indulged in illegal practices and having been removed from the services of Panchayat Samiti Village Baranli Chhar, he cannot be reinstated in the service by the State Government by reviewing its earlier order. His yet another contention is that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 1.4.1998 as well as the order dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-9) are not the speaking orders and hence not tenable, since no reasons have been stated in both the orders, the same are being challenged by way of the present appeal. (5). In support of his aforesaid contentions Mr. Soni, learned counsel for the appellants, placed reliance upon the judgments of Apex Court as well as other High Courts in the matters of M/s Ajanta Industries & Ors. vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes (1), Satya Narain vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2) and Testeels Ltd. vs. N.M. Desai Conciliation Officer & Anr. (3). (6). In the matter of M/s Ajanta Industries & Ors. vs. CBDT (supra) the appell-ants being the assessees under the Income-tax Act, 1961 challenged the impugned order of assessment on the grounds inter-alia non-communication of reasons by the appropriate authority in making the assessment orders final without giving the appellants-firm opportunity of hearing. By the impugned notice the assessee firm was asked to submit in writing if it had any objections to the proposed transfer of its case file for facility of investigation from the respective Income-tax Officer at Nellore to any other Income-tax Officer in particular Ward, Special Circle II, Hyderabad. The appellants made their representation objecting to the transfer, and on a particular date, the Central Board passed the impugned order transferring the cases of the assessee-firm from Nellore to Hyderabad. (7). The short question which had arisen for consideration before the Apex Court was as to whether the failure to record the reasons in the order which was communicated to the appellant-firm was violative of the principles of natural justice and for which the said order could be held invalid? (7). The short question which had arisen for consideration before the Apex Court was as to whether the failure to record the reasons in the order which was communicated to the appellant-firm was violative of the principles of natural justice and for which the said order could be held invalid? After discussing the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act with reference to amended Section 27 of the Finance Act No.2 of 1961 including the provisions relating to the transfer of cases by the Commissioner, it was held that transfer of cases in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act of 1961 may be made at any stage of the proceedings which shall not render necessary the re-issuance of any notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transferred. It was further observed that once the reasons were communicated to the assessee by way of a notice inviting objections against the proposed transfer, it is, therefore, manifest that the reasons given in the show cause notice namely; ``facility of investigation can be read as part of the impugned order although, there is no mention of any reasons therein as such. In an appeal preferred by appellants again-st the order of Commissioner Income-tax, if was held by the Apex Court that when law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated. (8). In the matter of Satya Narain vs. The State of Rajasthan and ors. (supra), the matter related to enquiry against a Sarpanch and the State Govt. after taking into consideration the relevant material, had come to the conclusion that none of the allegations against him stood proved. Consequently, the enquiry initiated against the Sarpanch was closed against which, review petition was filed. The State Govt. vide its order passed on a particular date directed removal of Sarpanch. The evidence on the record was not marshalled and the conclusion was arrived at by no process of reasoning. The grounds raised in the review was subjudiced in two writ petitions from which it was not clear as to whether the allegations were duly considered. The State Govt. vide its order passed on a particular date directed removal of Sarpanch. The evidence on the record was not marshalled and the conclusion was arrived at by no process of reasoning. The grounds raised in the review was subjudiced in two writ petitions from which it was not clear as to whether the allegations were duly considered. It was consequently held by the learned Division Bench of this Court that the impugned order of the State Govt. is seriously affected by principles of natural justice and can by no stretch of imagination be said to be speaking or a reasoned order and hence was not held sustainable. (9). In the matter of Testeels Ltd vs. N.M.Desai Conciliation Officer and anr. (supra), the reference was made before the learned Full Bench of Gujarat High Court as to whether an Administrative Officer discharging quasi-judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. Is it required of him that he should make a speaking order ? This question had arisen in a reference to an order made by the Conciliation Officer under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The conciliation proceeding was pending before the Conciliation Officer with regard to industrial dispute between the petitioner and its workmen. During the pendency of the conciliation proceedings, the petitioner had discharged the respondent who was one of the workmen employed in the petitio-ners factory after following the procedure prescribed by the standing orders. The discharge was for misconduct not connected with industrial dispute. The second respondent to whom the notice of application was issued, contested the same on various grounds. The validity of the said order was challenged before the learned Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court and the learned Division Bench made a reference to the learned Full Bench who while allowing the reference held that both on principle and on authority, every administrative officer exercising the quasi-judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary from the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of the Indian constitutional set-up. It was further observed that the administrative authorities have a duty to act judicially and they cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. (10). The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary from the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of the Indian constitutional set-up. It was further observed that the administrative authorities have a duty to act judicially and they cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. (10). We have examined the aforesaid decisions and we are of the view that the ratio decidendi of the aforesaid decisions is not attracted to the instant case for the reasons that by the impugned order dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-9) by which the Under Secretary (Vigilance) Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur had reviewed the earlier order dated 12.8.1997 passed by Director & Special Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Govt. of Raj., Jaipur is a reasoned and speaking order hence, it is not open to challenge. (11). Prima facie, we are of the considered view that it is always open to the State Government in exercise of its revisional powers by virtue of Section 97 of the Act of 1994 to review either on its own motion or on an application from any person interested call for and examine the record of a Panchayati Raj Institution or of a Standing Committee or sub-committee thereof in respect of any proceedings to sa-tisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein or as to regularity of such proceedings and, if in any case, it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. (12). Section 38 of the Act of 1994 empowers the State Govt. in appropriate cases to pass an order of removal or suspension from services of an employee serving under the Panchayati Raj Institution after giving a full opportunity of hearing and making such enquiry as it may deem necessary, pass the order of removal from office any member including a Chairperson or Dy. in appropriate cases to pass an order of removal or suspension from services of an employee serving under the Panchayati Raj Institution after giving a full opportunity of hearing and making such enquiry as it may deem necessary, pass the order of removal from office any member including a Chairperson or Dy. Chairperson of Panchayati Raj Institution who (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct: Provided that any enquiry under this sub-section may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or, if already initiated before such expiry, be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges levelled. (13). Sub-section 5 of Section 38 stipulates that the decision of the State Government on any matter arising under this Section shall subject to any order made u/s. 97, be deemed to be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. (14). From the perusal of the above provisions it is clear that if an order has been passed contrary to the provisions of law or the rules in dismissing, removing or suspending any employee in services of the Panchayati Raj Institution, in appropriate cases the State Government may review, recall or modify its own order passed by any competent authority in exercise of its powers u/Sec. 97 of the Act of 1994 if the earlier order has not been found to be passed correctly in accordance with law. This is apparent from the language of Section 97 of the Act of 1994 itself which mandates that if it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order passed earlier deserves to be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. The only requirement which has been contemplated as per proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the Act of 1994 is that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The only requirement which has been contemplated as per proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the Act of 1994 is that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The contentions of Shri Soni, learned counsel for the appellants, as advanced at the bar, if appreciated in the right perspective in the light of the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 1994, the correct position which emerges is that it is always open to the State Government to examine the legality or propriety of any order passed by a competent authority constituted under the Act by reviewing or modifying its earlier decision and the same is not open to challenge in any court of law. This position is explicitly clear from the provisions of Section 38 (5) read with Section 97 of the Act of 1994 which have to be read in consonance and not in isolation of each other. As a result of the above discussion, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.