V. K. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE order dated 28th January, 1997 passed by the learned single Judge is under challenge in this appeal. The appellant before us was enrolled as an Advocate with the Respondent No. 1, Bar Council of West Bengal in terms of the Advocates Act, 1961. It appears that a complaint in respect of and against the aforesaid enrolment of the appellant was received by the said Bar Council of West Bengal. One Nirode Chandra Biswas has preferred this complaint. The complaint appears to have been made on 21. 9. 91. We do not wish to enter into the detailed facts forming the subject matter of this complaint or other relevant facts leading to the passing of the final impugned order by the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council in view of the order that we propose to pass in this appeal. We are saying so because we do not want to make any comments in this appeal which may tend to influence the outcome of the pending proceedings, as would be seen later. ( 2 ) THE complaint dated 21. 9. 91 made by the above-referred complainant Nirode Chandra Biswas against the appellant formed the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant in terms of sec-tion 35 read with section 36b of the Advocates Act, 1961. On 11. 5. 94 accordingly, an order was passed by the Disciplinary Committee (No. 2) of the Bar Council of West Bengal whereby the enrolment of the appellant as an Advocate was re-called and his name was directed to be removed from the Rolls of the Bar Council on and from 1. 6. 94 in terms of clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 35 of the Advocates Act. Against this order the appellant filed an application before the Bar Council under section 44 of the Advocates Act seeking review of the said order, but it appears that the Disciplinary Committee dismissed the Review application by holding that the grounds warranting any review of the said order did not exist and that there was no material on which the review could be sought. Aggrieved, the appellant by invoking the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed a writ application which, as noticed above, was dismissed in limine by the learned single Judge vide judgment dated 28th January, 1997 on the only ground that alternative remedy of filing statutory appeal agaisnt the impugned order being available to the appellant, the writ application was not maintainable. ( 3 ) A bare look at section 37 of the Act no doubt clearly suggests that any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council has a right of filing an appeal within 60 days from the date of the communication of the order, to the Bar Council of India. Section 37 of the Act then goes on to explain in details the modalities under which such a statutory appeal may be disposed of by the Bar Council of India. As a first impression therefore, one may tend to agree with the view of the learned single Judge that the alternative remedy of a statutory appeal under section 37 of the Act should in normal course operate as a clear bar in maintaining a writ application under Article 226 of he Constitution of India and therefore one may adopt the view that the learned single Judge was right in dismissing the writ application in limine on this ground alone. However, when we look to the facts of the present case, we find that the order dated 11. 5. 94 as passed by the Disciplinary Committee in terms of section 35 read with section 36 (B) of the Act suffered from the basic defect of total lack of inherent jurisdiction and that this order was passed in patent violation of the mandatory prescription contained in section 36 (B) of the Act. It is a very well settled principle of law that if an order patently suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction or is in total violation of a mandatory legal requirement, this court does not insist on the petitioner availing the alternative remedy of first filing a statutory appeal and does not hesitate in striking down the order itself. It is a very well settled principle of law that if an order patently suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction or is in total violation of a mandatory legal requirement, this court does not insist on the petitioner availing the alternative remedy of first filing a statutory appeal and does not hesitate in striking down the order itself. We are fortified in this view by a judgment of the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Mohamed Mustafa K. A. v. The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu reported in 1986 (2) Madras Law Journal Reports page 362. Section 36b (1) of the Advocates Act reads as under :"the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall dispose of the complaint received by it under section 35 expeditiously and in each case the proceedings shall be concluded within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, failing which such proceedings shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India which may dispose of the same as if it were a proceeding withdrawn for inquiry under sub-section (2) of section 36. " ( 4 ) THE complaint against the appellant was made on 21. 9. 91. Even though from the available records before us, it is not forthcoming as to when the complaint was actually received by the State Bar Council or its Disciplinary Committee despite its having been made on 21. 9. 91, it does appear that on 4. 6. 92, the Bar Council of West Bengal had sent a communication bearing No. WBC/567/1992 of 4-6-1992 to the appellant asking him to show cause in respect of the contents of the above-referred complaint. What therefore emerges is that at least as on 4. 6. 92 the Bar Council of West Bengal was in receipt of the above-referred complaint dated 21. 9. 91 filed by Nirode Chandra Biswas against the appellant. The impugned order recalling the appellant was passed on 11. 5. 94, that is beyond the period of one year from the date of receipt of the complaint by the Bar Council of West Bengal. 9. 91 filed by Nirode Chandra Biswas against the appellant. The impugned order recalling the appellant was passed on 11. 5. 94, that is beyond the period of one year from the date of receipt of the complaint by the Bar Council of West Bengal. Sub-section (1) of section 36 (B) of the Advocates Act clearly enjoins upon the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council to conclude the proceedings within one year from the date of receipt of the complaint or the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the said Bar Council and to pass appropriate final order. It is the undisputed case of the parties that the proceedings against the appellant started on the basis of the complaint filed by Nirode Chandra Biswas against the complaint and not at the instance of the said Bar Council. The period of limitation of one year therefore would commence from the date of receipt of the complaint against the appellant. As already indicated, 4. 6. 92 can safely be treated to be the latest date on which the complaint can be deemed to have been received by the said Bar Council and its Disciplinary Committee. The proceedings therefore should have been completed and orders passed latest by 3. 6. 93. But this was not done. The order was passed actually on 11. 5. 94. ( 5 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of section 36b, however, says that if the proceedings are not concluded within one year from the date of receipt of the complaint, this shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India which may dispose of the same as if were the proceedings withdrawn for enquiry under section (2) of section 36. Sub-section (2) of section 36 reads as under :" (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may, either of its own motion or on a report by any State Bar Council or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw for inquiry before itself any proceedings for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any State Bar Council and dispose of the same. " ( 6 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of section 36 clearly stipulates the withdrawal of proceedings for enquiry by the Bar Council of India from a State Bar Council either on its own motion or on a report of any State Bar Council or on an application made to it by any person interested. *a combined reading of section 36 (B) (1) and sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act leaves us in no manner of doubt that once the Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council lets the limitation period of one year expire without concluding the proceedings, it loses its jurisdiction over the matter because the proceedings stand transferred automatically to the Bar Council of India for disposal in accordance with section 36b of the Act, in the light of the stipulation contained in sub-section (1) of section 36b of the Act. Rather than letting that happen, the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order on 11. 5. 94. That order therefore clearly was without jurisdiction and in patent violation of section 36 (B) (1) of the Act. Once the period of one year had elapsed, the State Bar Council had lost its jurisdiction. Over the matter and the matter had by operation of law stood automatically transferred to the Bar Council of India for disposal in accordance with section 36 of the Act. ( 7 ) BASED upon the aforesaid reasons therefore, we have no hesitation in setting aside and quashing the order dated 11. 5. 94 and the consequential order dated 25. 7. 96 since both these orders suffer from patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. We are of the view that the learned single Judge ought not to have dismissed the writ application in limine on the ground of the alternative remedy being available to the petitioner. The present is not a case where in ordinary course the writ court should have insisted on the alternative remedy being availed of by the writ petitioner since, clearly the order impugned was patently erroneous and suffered from total lack of jurisdiction. It is a settled principle of law that the rule regarding alternative remedy being availed of before filing a writ application is not absolute in terms and the High Court in such cases where the Order is basically erroneous and suffers from lack of jurisdiction entertains the writ application and grants appropriate relief to the aggrieved parties. It is a settled principle of law that the rule regarding alternative remedy being availed of before filing a writ application is not absolute in terms and the High Court in such cases where the Order is basically erroneous and suffers from lack of jurisdiction entertains the writ application and grants appropriate relief to the aggrieved parties. We accordingly set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 28th January, 1997. ( 8 ) THE appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. Both the orders passed by the respondents on 11. 5. 94 and 25. 7. 96 are hereby quashed and set aside. Allowing this appeal does not mean that the proceedings against the appellant stand dropped. As we have clearly indicated, on the expiry of one year period from the date of receipt of the complaint in terms of section 36 (B) (1) of the Act, the proceedings stood automatically transferred to the Bar Council of India for disposal in accordance with section 36 (2) of the Act. We therefore do wish to observe and direct that the Bar Council of India shall from now onwards deal with the proceedings in accordance with the above-referred provisions and on its merits. We therefore direct the Bar Council of West Bengal to transmit all the records of the case forthwith to the Bar Council of India along with a copy of this judgment for such other action in accordance with law as is required to be done on the merits of the case. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copy of the judgment be given to the learned Advocates for the parties. P. K. Sen, J.-I agree appeal allowed.