( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred by the State of Karnataka and it assails an order of acquittal recorded in favour of original accused 5 to 9 in S. C. No. 13 of 1994 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, U. K. Karwar. ( 2 ) THESE accused along with original accused 1 to 4 whose case has been split up stood charged with having committed the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 302, 201, 323, 114 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The incident had taken place at Mugdum Colony in Bhatkal Town at about 7. 40 p. m. on the evening of 20-8-1993. The allegation was that the deceased-Mahadev who used to run a small tea shop on the Bunder road was assaulted by nine persons some of whom were armed with knives and that he was not only stabbed but also beaten and kicked and that as a result of this attack, he died on the spot. The further allegation against the accused was that they had taken away the body of Mahadev to the side of a small hill and that the body was wrapped in two gunny bags and taken to that spot along with the bicycle which belonged to the deceased. This is the reason why there is an additional charge under Section 201 of the IPC for concealment/destruction of evidence. We are informed at the Bar that in two of the earlier trials against some of the other accused that the Court had acquitted those persons viz. , in S. C. No. 29 of 1996 and in S. C. No. 4 of 1996. There is still one Sessions Case pending against another accused person but we are really not concerned with those aspects in this case. As far as the present proceeding is concerned, it is alleged that the complaint came to be lodged on 22-8-1993 at about 1 O'clock in the afternoon and that it was registered as Cr. No. 618 of 1993. It is alleged that in the course of the investigation accused No. 6 made a certain statement pursuant to which he led the police and the panchas to a spot where fresh earth was detected and on excavation at that place, the police recovered the damaged bicycle as also the body of Mahadev which was wrapped in two rotten gunny bags. The body was sent for post-mortem and it was disclosed that it bore as many as twenty-two injuries. According to the prosecution, accused No. 7 made a voluntary statement pursuant to which he led the police to the side of a hill from where he produced a bunch of keys that is alleged to have belonged to the deceased. We need to straightaway mention that we will have occasion to deal with the quality of the investigation subsequently, but that even the conduct of the trial has not been up to the mark and we find from the record that formal evidence for purposes of identifying the key bunch and establishing that it in fact belonged to the deceased has not been led by the prosecution. This recovery is therefore of no consequence. Next we come to the voluntary statement attributed to accused No. 9 pursuant to which on 30-8-1993 at about 9. 00 a. m. in the morning accused No. 9 is alleged to have led the police and the panchas to the spot from where a knife was recovered but again no further investigation has been carried out with regard to this M. O. as a result of which, the prosecution can hardly rely on the recovery because it has not been identified as the weapon with which the injuries were caused to the deceased nor is there any report from the Chemical Analyser or Serologist which could incriminate the accused by virtue of that recovery. Even the Panch witnesses as far as this recovery is concerned have turned hostile and hence we do not propose to place any reliance on these circumstances. The learned Trial Judge after evaluating the evidence led by the prosecution and hearing the learned Counsel has recorded an order of acquittal holding principally that on the state of the record it would not be possible to hold that any of the charges has been established. It is against this order of acquittal that the present appeal has been directed. ( 3 ) WE propose only to deal with that limited part of the record of the relevant aspects of this case which we are required to consider for purposes of deciding as to whether the order of acquittal requires to be disturbed. It is against this order of acquittal that the present appeal has been directed. ( 3 ) WE propose only to deal with that limited part of the record of the relevant aspects of this case which we are required to consider for purposes of deciding as to whether the order of acquittal requires to be disturbed. At the hearing of the appeal the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor as also the learned Counsel Sri S. K. Venkata Reddy who has been appointed by us as Amicus Curiae since the accused were unrepresented, have taken us virtually through the entire record threadbare. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that P. W. 1-Hanumanth who is an eye-witness has stated that he was proceeding on his bicycle with a load of fish on that evening and that he saw the incident from a distance of about ten metres. He states that P. W. 2-Venkatesh has also witnessed the incident with him. P. W. 1 is a regular resident of that town and he claims to know the identity not only of the deceased but also of the accused persons. His version is very short, very simple and very clear and he states that he saw the deceased-Mahadev being mercilessly assaulted by the nine accused persons who were originally charge-sheeted. He has named these persons and according to him they were all participating in the assault. Some of them were armed with knives with which they were stabbing the deceased on different parts of the body and the others were assaulting and kicking him. He states that having seen the i ncident, he went away from that place and that he even made two attempts to contact the police on the telephone but that he was unsuccessful and this is really the explanation for why the complaint came to be lodged on the afternoon of 22-8-1993 which is about 36 hours after the incident. He states that having seen the i ncident, he went away from that place and that he even made two attempts to contact the police on the telephone but that he was unsuccessful and this is really the explanation for why the complaint came to be lodged on the afternoon of 22-8-1993 which is about 36 hours after the incident. The learned Counsel submitted that p. W. 1 is a fish vendor that nothing has been elicited to show that he is either hostile or inimical to the accused, that he is an independent person and furthermore that even though it was dark he has stated that he saw the incident because there was a puddle of water in that place and a rickshaw had stopped and was slowly proceeding because of the water and according to him, he was facing the headlight of this vehicle that he saw the incident clearly and identified the accused. It was submitted that if the evidence of this witness is to be carefully scrutinized it will be found that there are no infirmities, no contradictions, no omissions and furthermore that it has withstood the test of cross-examination. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that with evidence as good as this that a conviction can easily be based on the testimony of a single impregnable and reliable witness and that the learned Trial Judge was totally in error in having rejected this evidence. We reserve our comments with regard to this evidence till we have briefly recounted the evidence of P. W. 2. ( 4 ) IT is true that as pointed out by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor P. W. 2 also described the incident though not as well as P. W. 1 and again there is very little that can be faulted with regard to this evidence. A strong submission was advanced before us to the effect that as far as P. W. 2's evidence is concerned that it lends requisite support and corroboration to the evidence of P. W. 1 and that this testimony along with that of P. W. 1 is more than what the Court would look for in order to hold that the charges are established. At this stage, we need to point out that it was very strongly argued on behalf of the respondents-accused by the learned Counsel Sri Venkata Reddy that there are times when the evidence of a single or group of witnesses may appear to be hundred per cent acceptable and reliable but that the Court will have to sometimes evaluate it on the basis of other parts of the record for purposes of testing its creditworthiness. Sri Venkata Reddy drew our attention to the fact that the complaint in the this case has been lodged on 22-8-1993 at about 1. 05 hours in the noon. He emphasizes the fact that p. W. 1 claims to have witnessed a gory murder before his very eyes. P. W. 1 is residing in the very town where the incident took place and where the attacks and assaults of this type are the order of the day. It has also come on record that the police themselves were maintaining a special watch and that special steps were taken to look after the law and order situation and in such a background the normal and immediate conduct of P. W. 1 would have been to go straight to the police station which is at a very short distance from where the incident took place. He reinforced this argument by pointing out to us that it is not as though p. W. 1 is absolutely an illiterate fisherman but he has on his own admission stated that he was studying at the relevant time even though we do not know whether he appeared for the examination. More importantly, sri Venkata Reddy relies very heavily on P. W. 1's own statement that he made efforts to contact the police on the telephone immediately after the incident and the learned Counsel submits that the reason given that the line was busy is a lame excuse because if P. W. 1 was in fact an eye-witness and if he could not get through on the telephone he would certainly have gone personally to the police station since he was conscious of the need to lodge the complaint with the police. In this background he submits that if the whole of that night, the next day and night and half of the following day have elapsed before P. W. 1 lands at the police station that it is not only a case of grave suspicion but that the Court will have to hold that P. W. 1 is nothing more than a planted witness. This is undoubtedly a serious charge against P. W. 1 but we take note of the fact that the learned Trial Judge after considering the unexplained delay has very rightly recorded a finding that it would be too dangerous for the court to rely on the complaint and if the complaint goes, then the evidence which proceeds on that complaint cannot form the basis of conviction. Undoubtedly, this is a very unusual situation but one that is not foreign to criminal trials and the learned defence Counsel is justified in pointing out to us that even if prima facie, on an evaluation the evidence of P. W. 1 passes the test, of scrutiny, if there appears to be grave suspicion as to whether at all P. W. 1 could have witnessed the incident or whether he has been put up to make a certain statement after the possible recreation of what must have happened, then the evidence becomes suspect. If P. W. 1 has not gone to the police for such a long period of time and if there was a valid reason for it the prosecution ought to have put forward that reason, but in the absence of any such explanation an adverse inference is inevitable. The argument is therefore justified and on these tests being applied, the evidence of P. W. 1 which is seemingly good otherwise cannot still be relied upon by the Court with any degree of confidence. ( 5 ) WE do not need to add very much with regard to the evidence of P. W. 2 because this evidence is essentially supportive and if the evidence of P. W. 1 is rejected on the grounds that we have already set out, it would hardly be possible for the Court to sustain a conviction on the basis of the evidence of P. W. 2 in isolation. ( 6 ) THE charges in this case are serious ones. ( 6 ) THE charges in this case are serious ones. We are also conscious of the situation that existed around the time when the incident took place and the Court would therefore be extremely cautious before recording a conviction on grave charges of the present type unless the Court is totally and completely satisfied with regard to not only the guilt but above all the sufficiency of the evidence before the charges can be held proved. ( 7 ) THERE was a reference to the medical evidence because the learned additional State Public Prosecutor emphasises the fact that this evidence corroborates the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2. Also it was submitted that the recovery of the knife is supportive. We have already indicated for the reasons set out, that we do not propose to place any reliance on the recovery of the knife and having held that the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 does not inspire sufficient confidence on the fact that the medical evidence discloses undoubtedly that Mahadev met with a homicidal death will not carry the case very much further. ( 8 ) THE learned Additional State Public Prosecutor advanced the second limb of argument whereby he submitted that there are charges under Sections 149 and 114 and he contended that if it can be demonstrated that the very incriminating evidence relating to the recovery of the body at the instance of accused 6 is accepted by the Court that a conviction under Section 201 of the IPC must follow. The learned Counsel demonstrated to us that from the medical evidence it is very clear that the deceased had sustained as many as 22 injuries on different parts of his body and that the condition in which the body was found would clearly indicate to anybody who had seen that body or had anything to do with it, that this was the body of a person involved in a criminal offence. He submits that even if the evidence on the main charge were to be rejected by the Court for whatever reason, that the recovery of the body at the instance of accused 6 which has been established, is sufficient for such a conviction. He submits that even if the evidence on the main charge were to be rejected by the Court for whatever reason, that the recovery of the body at the instance of accused 6 which has been established, is sufficient for such a conviction. The added submission was that something unusual has happened in this case i. e. , that the body was buried along with the damaged bicycle belonging to the deceased and he submits that this circumstance alone is sufficient to destroy any argument that even if accused 6 knew about the burial or had taken part in it that it cannot fasten guilty knowledge to him. There is considerable substance in this submission, but we need to also briefly record what has been pointed out to us on behalf of the defence. Sri Venkata Reddy has brought it to our notice that in the first instance the body was enclosed in two gunny bags and that therefore even assuming somebody has been associated with this burial that it does not mean that those persons had been able to see the condition of that body. The second aspect of the matter is that the incident had taken place late in the evening and the body and the bicycle were taken hurriedly and buried, there is no guarantee that those involved in the process could really have taken cognizance of what precisely was happening. These submissions have been put forward principally in order to meet the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants, that if accused 6 has pointed out the spot where the body was recovered from, that he must be fastened with the additional knowledge of the fact that the items in question were buried there and that this would lead to the guilty knowledge that is a condition precedent for a conviction under Section 201 of the IPC. Secondly, what Mr. Venkata Reddy emphasised was that the disposal of evidence or destruction of evidence as contemplated under Section 201 of the IPC must be for the specific purpose or reason that it is in order to screen the accused in a criminal offence or in order to prevent that evidence being used against the accused in a trial for that criminal offence. This is a very involved argument but a very substantial one because what was basically contended was that if the earlier evidence implicating accused 6 in the offence is unacceptable, then the Court has to proceed on the premise that the highest that can be held against accused 6 is that he knew where the items were buried. His submission is that unless there is something more than this, that the very basic ingredients of Section 201 of the IPC are not made out. The learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v Kapil Deo and Another, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to emphasize the two cardinal ingredients of Section 201 of the IPC and to hold in the absence of knowledge that the evidence in question is associated with the commission of a criminal offence and the intention to destroy or keep back that evidence or make it unavailable for the prosecution being established, that no conviction under Section 201 could result. This is an important aspect of the case and we have applied our minds to the requirements of the section, more importantly, the case law on the point, whereunder the section has been interpreted. The facts on record do establish that the body of deceased-Mahadev was recovered at the instance of accused 6. This would fasten him with the liability or knowledge of where the body and the bicycle were buried. Had there been some additional evidence to indicate that he had physically participated. in the carrying of the items to that spot or more importantly had there been evidence on record to indicate that he had participated in the offence and therefore knew that these items were crucial evidence and furthermore, if the prosecution had brought forward the material to indicate the above, coupled with something which permits the Court to draw the inference that the purpose of burying these items was in order to try to cover up the tracks of the participants in the crime and to prevent that evidence from being discovered or used by the prosecution, then a conviction under Section 201 of the IPC would certainly have been permissible as against accused 6. We have had occasion earlier to deal with the quality of the evidence and we find from some of the parts of the record to which Sri Reddy has drawn our attention to the fact that even the Investigating Officer does not seem to have been sufficiently diligent and systematic. With regard to the manner in which the investigation was carried out, there are inconsistencies and contradictions and to quote one P. W. 21-B. Kantharaj, Dy. S. P. states that as far as accused 6 was concerned that it was under his instruction that P. W. 17 went in search of him on the afternoon of 22-8-1993. The complaint was lodged only after 1. 00 p. m. whereas P. W. 21 insists that on that very day he had already instructed P. W. 17 to look for and apprehend accused 6. On the other hand the evidence of p. W. 17 contains an admission that he was instructed to search out and arrest accused 6 at about 12. 00 noon on that day which happens to be one hour before the complaint was lodged. This is a very serious inconsistency and infirmity and only adds to the highly unsatisfactory manner in which the entire case has been investigated and presented. The situation gets further compounded because we are ourselves conscious of the seriousness of the accuracy of evidence of this type and while carefully scrutinizing the evidence we ran into serious difficulties with regard to the identity of the respective accused at different parts of the record and to quote one specific example, there is a serious error in the recording which indicates that it was at the instance of accused 1 that the body was recovered. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor sought to contend that accused 1 would mean effectively accused 5 because original accused 1 to 4 are not before the Court. This explanation is still useless because the person we are concerned with as far as this evidence goes is accused 6 and not accused 1 or accused 5. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor sought to contend that accused 1 would mean effectively accused 5 because original accused 1 to 4 are not before the Court. This explanation is still useless because the person we are concerned with as far as this evidence goes is accused 6 and not accused 1 or accused 5. We are making specific reference to this because these are errors in the case of which there can be no compromises and if sufficient and meticulous care is not taken while recording the evidence by the Presiding Officer of the court, the consequences to the prosecution would be irreparable damage, but it also creates a serious difficulty to the Trial Court and more so to the Appellate Court because we require to co-relate the evidence from different quarters in order to reconcile it and having regard to what has happened in this case, we consider it our duty to once again bring it to the notice of the learned Judges conducting trials, in particular that one needs to be extremely conscious, extremely careful, extremely professional, particularly while dealing with the material before the Court and recording evidence. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the limited material that is available before us, more importantly, on an analysis of the law on the point, we find that it would be incorrect and impossible to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the offence under Section 201 of the IPC or for that matter any of the other offences as against accused 5 to 9. At the very highest what can be said is that the evidence does give rise to a strong suspicion but it is well-settled law that in criminal trials it is on the basis of evidence and on the basis of good and reliable evidence alone that a conviction can be based, and no amount of suspicion howsoever grave can take the place of evidence. The learned Trial Judge has, after a careful consideration of the material before him, recorded the finding that the charges are unsubstantial and after a thorough review of the case, we confirm those findings though for the reasons set out by us in this judgment. We need to record that we are indebted to the learned additional State Public Prosecutor Shri B. V. Pinto and to the learned. We need to record that we are indebted to the learned additional State Public Prosecutor Shri B. V. Pinto and to the learned. Counsel who appeared as Amicus Curiae Sri Venkata Reddy for the assistance rendered to the Court during the hearing of this appeal. ( 10 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. The order of acquittal recorded against the accused-respondents before us who were original accused 5 to 9 stands confirmed. If the accused are on bail, it is directed that their bail bonds be cancelled forthwith. ( 11 ) NORMALLY, the office would have been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the learned Counsel Sri Venkata Reddy who has assisted the Court as Amicus Curiae and that too at relatively short notice. The learned Counsel has requested us to instruct the office to pay the amount in question to the Advocates Welfare Fund. It is an extremely magnanimous gesture for which we need to record our appreciation. The office to accordingly draw the amount and deposit the same with the advocates Welfare Fund and to file the receipt with the case papers. This procedure to be completed within a period of three months from today. --- *** --- .