JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petitions have been filed for seeking direction to the respondents to admit petitioners in LL.B. Part II. for determining the controversy, the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 287/1999 are being considered. 2. Petitioner took admission in LL.B. Part I in the year 1997. He appeared in the examination in 1998 and the result was declared on 10.9.98, wherein he was declared "Failed". Petitioner applied for re-evaluation and his total marks were revised from 268 to 273 but he was again declared "failed" as he could not obtain 48% aggregate marks in all the subjects taken together as is evident from his marks-sheet dated 24.12.98 (Annex.2). He approached the respondent-university for admission/promotion in LL.B. Part II but as he failed to get the relief, he filed the instant writ petition. 3. Respondents have filed reply wherein they have stated that for promotion from LL.B. Part I to LL.B Part II, a student must obtain 36% marks in each of six papers and if he gets 48% marks in the aggregate of four papers out of the said six papers, he may be promoted to LL.B Part II and allow to qualify two papers alongwith six papers of LL.B. Part II. In the instant cases, petitioners could not get 48% aggregate marks in four papers out of six and as such they could not be promoted. 4. The endorsement of the Notes made in the back of the marks-sheet is not properly worded and satisfactory, and the same is quite confusing. Likewise, the letter dated 28.12.90 issued by the learned Vide Chancellor of the respondent-University regarding Promotion Policy is also confusing but in view of the specific stand explained by the respondents and the categorical statement of the learned counsel for the respondents, if a candidate does not secure 48% marks in aggregate atleast in four papers out of six, he cannot be promoted to LL.B. Part II. In such a case, it would be safe to rely upon the practice adopted by the authorities consistently. 5. In K.P Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the rule of contemporanea expositio as the Apex Court found it a well established rule of interpretation of a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority. 5. In K.P Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the rule of contemporanea expositio as the Apex Court found it a well established rule of interpretation of a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority. However, the Apex Court added the words of caution that such a rule must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Similarly, in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and another v. M/s. Parley Export (P) Ltd., AIR 1980 SC 644 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the words used in the provision should be understood in the same way in which they have been understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily deal with them. In Indian Metals and Ferry Alloy Ltd., Cuttack v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1991 SC 1028 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has applied the same rule of interpretation by holding that "Contemporanea expositio by the administrative authority is a very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expression used in a statutory instrument." Same view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Daal and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772 , and Y.R. Chawla and others v. M.P Tiwari and another, AIR 1992 SC 1360 . In N. Suresh Nathan v. Union of India and others, 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 584 , and M.B. Joshi and others v. Satish Kumar Pandey and others, 1993 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 419 , the Apex Court observed that construction in consonance with long-standing practice prevailing in the concerned department is to be preferred. 6. In J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 191 , it has been held that the maxim is applicable in construing ancient statute but not to interpret Acts which are comparatively modern and an interpretation should be given to the words used in context of the new facts and situation, if the words are capable of comprehending them. Similar view had been taken by the Apex Court in Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarain Chopra and others, AIR 1962 SC 159 . 7. Similar view had been taken by the Apex Court in Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarain Chopra and others, AIR 1962 SC 159 . 7. In Desh Bandhu Gupta and others v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 1049 , the Apex Court observed that the principle of contemporenea expositio, i.e. interpreting a document by reference to the exposition it has received from Competent Authority can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction. The administrative construction, i.e. the contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers responsible for execution of the Act/Rules etc. generally should be clearly wrong before it is over-turned, Such a construction commonly referred to as practical construction although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight and is highly persuasive. However, it may be disregarded for cogent reasons. In a clear case of error the Court should, without hesitation refuse to follow such construction for the reason that "wrong practice does not make the law." (Vide Municipal Corporation for City of Pune v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 2856 . In D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India and others, 1997 (4) SCC 753 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "past practice should not be up-set provided such practice conforms to the rules" but must be ignored if it is found to be dehors the rules. 8. Thus, in view of the above, one may reach inescapable conclusion that the rule of administrative interpretation, even if is not of binding nature, has great persuasive value. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent University has submitted that the University has consistently adopted the procedure explained above in promoting the students from LL.B. Part I to LL.B. Part II and, thus, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the procedure has correctly been applied by the respondent-university. 10. Much has been said by the respondents regarding the delay in making the applications for promotion in LL.B. Part II, but it is not relevant, in view of the fact that the petitioners did not obtain the qualifying marks in four papers and they are not entitled for any relief whatsoever. 11. The contention raised by Mr. 10. Much has been said by the respondents regarding the delay in making the applications for promotion in LL.B. Part II, but it is not relevant, in view of the fact that the petitioners did not obtain the qualifying marks in four papers and they are not entitled for any relief whatsoever. 11. The contention raised by Mr. Singhvi that Clause 4 of the letter dated 28.12.90 provides that a candidate cannot be declared "passed" in LL.B. Course unless he secure 48% marks in the aggregate in LL.B. Part I, II and III. Such a candidate would be required to appear again in the next year in LL.B Part III examination in as many papers as he likes in order to make his aggregate 48% and petitioners may complete the required aggregate marks after completing the LL.B. Part II examination, is untenable as under the said provisions, they are not entitled to be promoted to LL.B. Part II. 12. The question involved herein is not only of promotion to LL.B. Part II, rather the issue is that the.educational Institutions have a solemn duty to maintain standard of education. In the first petition, petitioners could secure 48% marks only in two papers out of six and in the second petition, petitioner could not secure 48% marks in any of the papers and his total marks are about 40.2% only. In such a situation, no relief can be granted to them. 13. In the joint petition, petitioner has been provisionally promoted in LL.B. Part II under the interim order of this Court. There can be no quarrel on the legal proposition that no party can suffer from the action of the Court and when the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. (Vide Grindledge Bank Limited v. Income Tax Officer and others, AIR 1980 SC 656 , Ram Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1992 SC 1888 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyasaya & Company (Supra), and Smt. Rampati Jayaswal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1997 Allahabad 170 ). 14. (Vide Grindledge Bank Limited v. Income Tax Officer and others, AIR 1980 SC 656 , Ram Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1992 SC 1888 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyasaya & Company (Supra), and Smt. Rampati Jayaswal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1997 Allahabad 170 ). 14. It is, also, settled law that no litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim "Actus Curie neminem gravabit" is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Dr. A.K. Sircar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 734 , Shiv Shanker and others v. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 726 , M/s. Kannoriya Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P Electricity Board, AIR 1994 Allahabad 273 , Ugam Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1997 (3) RLW 1517 , the Committee of Management, Arya Inter College v. Shree Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1997 SC 3071 , and G.T.C. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 1998(3) SCC 376 ). 15. 15. The same view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Mohanan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1997 SC 1986 , and Bileshwar Khan Udyog Khedut Shahkari Mandi Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 1999 (1) JT 543 , wherein it has been held that the appointment/ continuation in service by interim order, does not create any legal right in favour of the appointee. In State of U.P and others v. Raj Karan Singh, (1998) 8 SCC 529 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that interim order cannot disturb the position in law. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Ramchander and others v. Additional District Magistrate and others, (1998) 1 SCC 183 . A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a Member), has taken the same view in Aqueela v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1998 (2) WLC (Raj.) 321 . 16. Thus, in view of the above, the petitions are dismissed. Interim order passed in the joint petition stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******