JUDGMENT : - Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. : This first appeal is at the instance of a tenant/defendant in a suit for eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent, reasonable requirement and also on the ground of annoyance and nuisance alleged to have been created by the appellant and is directed against the judgment and decree dated November 23, 1991 passed by the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 98 of 1978 thereby passing a decree for eviction in favour of the respondents. 2. The aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint. 3. So far the ground of default is concerned, the appellant by complying with the provision contained in section 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act ("Act") got protection under section 17(4) thereof. 4. Ultimately, the learned trial Judge passed the said decree only on the ground of reasonable requirement. 5. Being dissatisfied, the tenant/defendant has preferred the instant first appeal. 6. During the pendency of the instant appeal, the respondents filed an application for amendment of plaint thereby incorporating certain subsequent events for the purpose of showing that the requirement of the respondents have further enhanced. 7. The appellant has also filed additional written statement controverting the aforesaid fact. 8. At the time of hearing of the instant appeal before entering into the question of reasonable requirement, Mr. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of a valid notice under section 13(6) of the Act. 9. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of Mr. Banerjee, the following facts are relevant. 10. As it appears from Exhibit 'A', the letter of agreement of tenancy dated September 24, 1968, it was agreed between the parties that the tenancy would commence with effect from October 15, 1968 and that the rent for the odd days of October, 1968 would be paid in advance simultaneously with the signing of the said agreement. It was further provided, that thereafter the tenancy would run according to English calendar month and aforesaid monthly rent will become due and payable in advance by the 7th day of each and every current month. It was further provided, that thereafter the tenancy would run according to English calendar month and aforesaid monthly rent will become due and payable in advance by the 7th day of each and every current month. In paragraph 1 of the plaint, the respondents specifically stated that the appellant was a tenant at a rental of Rs. 300/- per month payable according to English calendar and the said tenancy commenced with effect from October 15, 1968 on the condition mentioned in the defendant's letter dated September 24, 1968, thus admitting the contents of the said letter. There is no dispute that the notice under section 13(6) of the Act was given on December 1, 1977 terminating the tenancy of the defendant and also directing him to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession with the expiry of 14th day of January, 1978. 11. By relying upon the aforesaid materials on record, Mr. Banerjee contends that the tenancy of his client was according to English calendar and as such the suit filed on the basis of an eviction notice under section 13(6) of the Act with the expiry of 14th day of January, 1978 was not in accordance with section 13(6) of the Act and the suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 12. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has on the other hand supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and has contended that although in view of an agreement between the parties, rent was' payable according to English calendar month but the tenancy having commenced admittedly on October 15, 1968, the said tenancy cannot be according to English calendar. In this connection Mr. Roychowdhury relies upon the provision contained in section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. Mr. Roychowdhury further by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagabandas Agarwalla vs. Bhagwandas Kanu and Ors., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1120 , submits that a notice should not be construed in such a manner for the purpose of finding fault. Mr. Roychowdhury, thus, submits that the notice was quite legal, valid and sufficient. 14. Mr. Roychowdhury, thus, submits that the notice was quite legal, valid and sufficient. 14. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that if a tenancy starts from the particular day of a month, it expires with the end of the day previous to that day of the next month, unless in the meantime the parties by agreement have changed the mode of tenancy. Mr. Banerjee in this connection has relied upon a decision of this court in the case of Lalbhai Ramjibhai vs. A.V. Seth, reported in AIR 1974 Cal 362 , in support of his contention that the landlord having accepted the rent for the broken period of October, 1968, the month of induction and thereafter having accepted rent month by month according to English calendar, the tenancy was according to English calendar. 15. In the aforesaid case, under the similar circumstances, the landlord took the rent for the broken period of February, the tenancy having commenced on February 14, and thereafter started taking rent according to English calendar month and in those circumstances it was held that a new tenancy commencing from the first day of English calendar was created. In the instant case, as it appears from the agreement itself which has not been disputed by the landlord that it was specifically stated therein that after the broken period of October, 1968, the tenancy will run according to English calendar month and in view of such unequivocal terms there is hardly any scope of argument that the tenancy was from 15th to 14th of the next English calendar month. P.W.-1 in his evidence admitted that the defendant paid rent for first fifteen days and then he started realizing rent month by month. 16. The landlord not having disputed the terms of the agreement as mentioned in Exhibit 'A' and also having admitted acceptance of rent for the broken period of October, 1968, we are left with no other alternative but to hold that from the month of November, 1968, the tenancy ran according to English calendar and as such the disputed notice by which the appellant was asked to vacate the property with the expiry of 14th of a month was not in accordance with the provision contained in section 13(6) of the Act. 17. Thus we find substance in the contention of Mr. Banerjee that the notice in this case was an invalid one. 17. Thus we find substance in the contention of Mr. Banerjee that the notice in this case was an invalid one. 18. As regards the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagabandas Agarwalla vs. Bhagwandas Kanu and Ors., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1120 , in our opinion, the same has got no application to the fact of the present case. In that case, the direction in the notice to vacate the premises "within the month of October, 1962 otherwise he would be treated as trespasser from 1st November, 1962" made it abundantly 'clear that the intention was to terminate the tenancy from the end of October and not from any earlier date. All that has been held in the said case is that an eviction notice should not be construed for the purpose of finding fault in it. 19. In the instant case, as mentioned above, the notice has not been given with the expiry of the month of tenancy as contemplated under section 13(6) of the Act and as such cannot be said to be valid. Therefore, the said decision has no application to the' fact of the present case. 20. The notice of eviction having been held to be invalid, the suit based on such notice is also not maintainable and such suit is liable to be dismissed. 21. In view of our finding on the question of notice, we do not propose to go into the question of reasonable requirement. Moreover, in view of amendment of the plaint and additional written statement filed by the appellant, we could not even dispose of the appeal itself on the ground of reasonable requirement as in view of those subsequent events there is necessity of taking additional evidence. 22. In any event, no fruitful purpose will be served by remanding the matter on the question of reasonable requirement as we have found that the suit is not maintainable for want of a valid notice. Thus, we set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and dismiss the suit only on the ground that the notice of eviction on the basis of which the suit has been filed was illegal. 23. In the facts and circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Amit Talukdar, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed.