JUDGMENT - J.A. PATIL, J.:---In Tenancy Case No. 20 of 1988, the A.L.T., Amalner, District Jalgaon allowed the application made by the respondents under section 32-P of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and directed eviction of the petitioners from the land in dispute. This order was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Amalner in Tenancy Case No. 2 of 97 and the appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed. The petitioners then preferred a revision application being TEN/125/97 before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal but, the same came to be dismissed on 11-11-1997. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have now filed this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and sought quashing and setting aside of all the three above mentioned orders. The relevant facts necessary for appreciating the dispute are in brief, as under: 2. The dispute between the parties relates to an agricultural land bearing Gat No. 205 (previously Survey No. 103) admeasuring 3 Hectares and 2 Ares of village Sonkhed, taluka Amalner. Previously, this land was jointly owned by two brothers namely Ramchandra Madhav Bangali and Purushottam Madhav Bangali. Purushottam Bangali died some time in 1926-27 leaving behind him his widow Ramabai and two minor daughters Tungbhadra and Malati (respondents Nos. 1 and 2). On 13-1-1928, Ramchandra executed a registered deed of maintenance whereby the above mentioned land was given to Ramabai and her two minor daughters in lieu of their maintenance. 3. One Ganpat Lahanu Patil, the predecessor in title of the petitioners, was a tenant in the land and he was in possession thereof as such on the tillers day i.e. 1-4-1957. The land was the Inam land Class-V. After abolition of the Inams, it was regranted to Ganpat in 1959 on payment of Rs. 4,120/. It appears that Ramabai however, preferred an appeal before the Revenue Commissioner, with the result of that, the earlier order was set aside and the land was regranted in her favour. 4. Since Ramabai was a widow, the deemed purchase of the land was postponed. Ramabai died on 10-1-1984. The original tenant Ganpat had died long back. The petitioners are the legal heirs of the said Ganpat. After the death of Ramabai, the names of her two daughters (respondents No. 1 and 2) came to be entered in the revenue record in 1989. Ramabai died on 10-1-1984. The original tenant Ganpat had died long back. The petitioners are the legal heirs of the said Ganpat. After the death of Ramabai, the names of her two daughters (respondents No. 1 and 2) came to be entered in the revenue record in 1989. Till then, the entries continued to be in the name of Ramabai only. It appears that, Ramabai's brother-in-law Ramchandra filed an application before the Tenancy Court claiming possession of the land on the ground that he had become owner thereof on the death of Ramabai. Notices came to be issued to the petitioners in connection with that application. According to the petitioners, it was for the first time that they came to know about the death of Ramabai. Thereafter, they filed an application for fixation of the price of the land. In the mean time, the respondents No. 1 and 2 filed an application under section 32-P of the Act before the A.L.T., Amalner. The A.L.T. held that the petitioners had failed to exercise their right of purchasing the land within the period of two years from the death of Ramabai and as such, the deemed purchase of the land had become ineffective. The A.L.T. held that it was not obligatory on the part of the respondents No. 1 and 2 to inform the petitioners about the death of Ramabai. As indicated above, the decision of the A.L.T. was confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the revision application filed by the petitioners against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer came to be dismissed. 5. Shri P.R. Katneshwarkar, learned Advocate for the petitioner made two submissions before me. The first submission is that in the instant case, the date of deemed purchase was not postponed beyond 1-4-1957 as Ramabai was not the sole owner of the land in question. He pointed out that the respondents No. 1 and 2 who are the daughters of Ramabai were major on 1-4-1957 and they were not suffering from any disability. Therefore, according to Shri Katneshwarkar, the date of deemed purchase of the land could not have been postponed and as such, the tenant Ganpat Patil became deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957. He pointed out that the respondents No. 1 and 2 who are the daughters of Ramabai were major on 1-4-1957 and they were not suffering from any disability. Therefore, according to Shri Katneshwarkar, the date of deemed purchase of the land could not have been postponed and as such, the tenant Ganpat Patil became deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957. The second submission of Shri Katneshwarkar is that the petitioners had no knowledge about the death of Ramabai and, therefore, they could not exercise their right to purchase the land within the stipulated period of two years from the death of Ramabai. They have however, exercised their right immediately after they came to know about the death of Ramabai. Shri Katneshwarkar further submitted that the respondent No. 1 and 2 who are the successors in interest of Ramabai did not give any intimation to the petitioners about the death of Ramabai. Shri P.M. Shah, the learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 2, on the other hand, contended that there is no obligation on the legal heirs of the landlord to give intimation to the tenant about the death of the landlord. He further submitted that the petitioner's right to purchase the land is extinguished by the efflux of time and as such, the findings recorded by all the three courts need no interference. 6. The perusal of the judgments of the A.L.T., S.D.O. and the M.R.T. shows that these three authorities have proceeded on the assumption that Ramabai was the exclusive owner of the land on the Tiller's day. The assumption would have been correct if the land in question had been given to Ramabai alone. This is however, not so, because the land was given in lieu of maintenance not to Ramabai alone but to her two minor unmarried daughters, namely, Tungbhadra and Malati long back in 1928. It appears that these two daughters were married in 1941 and 1945 respectively. Any way, by virtue of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Ramabai and her two daughters became full owners of the land which they earlier held as the limited owners. Thus, on the Tillers day, Ramabai alone could not have been the exclusive owner of the land. She was a co-owner alongwith her two daughters, each having one-third share. Thus, on the Tillers day, Ramabai alone could not have been the exclusive owner of the land. She was a co-owner alongwith her two daughters, each having one-third share. The authorities below have not considered this position and relied upon a finding given by the Additional District Judge in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1991 to the effect that Ramabai was the exclusive owner of the land in question. It appears that the said appeal was filed by Ramchandra Madhav Bangali. However, that finding cannot be regarded as final and conclusive. Moreover, the position of law pointed out above is quite clear. Consequently, it will have to be held that all other three authorities below erred in holding that Ramabai was the exclusive owner of the land. 7. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are the married daughters of Ramabai who together had a two-third share in the land during the life time of Ramabai. Under section 32 of the Act, every tenant on 1-4-1957 is deemed to have purchased from the landlord, free of all encumbrances, the land held by him as tenant. This proposition is of course subject to certain conditions and provisions. Where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, then there is postponement of the right of the tenant to purchase the land in view of the provisions of section 32-F. So far as the respondents No. 1 and 2 are concerned, they did not fall under any of the three categories mentioned above. Therefore, there was no question of postponement of the right of the tenant namely, Ganpat Patil to purchase the land. Consequently, the provisions of section 32(1) were applicable and effective on 1-4-1957 with the result that the tenant Ganpat Patil shall be deemed to have purchased from respondents No. 1 and 2 their two-third share in the land held by him as a tenant. It appears that the A.L.T. did not take up any proceedings under section 32-G to determine the price of the land to be paid by the tenant. It will be therefore, necessary for the A.L.T. to start a proceeding under section 32-G, so far as the two-third share of respondent No. 1 and 2 is concerned. 8. It appears that the A.L.T. did not take up any proceedings under section 32-G to determine the price of the land to be paid by the tenant. It will be therefore, necessary for the A.L.T. to start a proceeding under section 32-G, so far as the two-third share of respondent No. 1 and 2 is concerned. 8. So far as Ramabai is concerned, she being a widow, fell under one of the three categories mentioned in section 32-F with the result that the tenant's right to purchase her one-third share stood postponed for a period of two years in view of the provisions of section 32-F(1)(a) and (b). Admittedly, Ramabai died on 10-1-1984 and as such, the petitioners, who are the successor of the tenant Ganpat Patil, could have exercised their right of purchase before 10-1-1986. However, they did not do so till 15-12-1988 on which date they served respondents No. 1 and 2 with a legal notice through their Advocate intimating their willingness to purchase the land. Thus, obviously there was a delay of more than two years and eleven months on their part to exercise their right to purchase the one-third share of Ramabai. The explanation given for this delay is that the petitioners were not aware of the death of Ramabai and that they came to know about it for the first time when Ramchandra Madhav Bangali filed an application before the Tenancy Court claiming possession of the land on the ground that he had become owner there of on the death of Ramabai. The question which, therefore, arises is whether the delay on the part of the petitioners to intimate their willingness to purchase the land can be condoned and whether they could be allowed in the peculiar circumstances of the case to exercise their right even after the expiry of the period of two years as stipulated by section 32-F. 9. Relying upon certain observations made in (Balkrishna v. Sada Devram)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 894, Shri Katneshwarkar submitted before me that the Court should interpret the provisions of the Act in such a way as to advance the intention of the legislature. Relying upon certain observations made in (Balkrishna v. Sada Devram)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 894, Shri Katneshwarkar submitted before me that the Court should interpret the provisions of the Act in such a way as to advance the intention of the legislature. In the said case the Supreme Court while dealing with a case under the Act pointed out that it was an Agrarian Reform Law whose avowed object is to confer full proprietorship on tilling tenants and it is a fact of common knowledge that landlords resort to cute Agrarian legal engineering to circumvent the provisions. Shri Katneshwarkar mainly relied upon the decision of this Court in (Yeshwant Govind Botre v. Sadashiv Mahadev More)2, 1996(2) Bom.C.R. 548 : 1996(1) Mh. L.J. 416 wherein the facts were that the landlady Haribai was a widow with no issue and she died on 11-5-1973. Her nephews gave information regarding her death to the village officer in writing on 5-7-1975 and applied for mutating their names in the record. The mutation entry in their name came to be made on 6-12-1975 and was certified on 26-4-1976. The information thereof was given to the tenant on 25-5-1976 and thereafter, the tenant intimated his willingness to exercise the right of purchase conferred on him under section 32-F(1). Thereafter a proceeding under section 32-G read with section 32-F was initiated by the tenant. The A.L.T. held that the tenant was entitled to purchase the land but, in appeal by the successors-in-interests of the deceased landlady, the Additional Collector held that as no notice had been given to the heirs of the landlord within one year of her death, there was no compliance of the provisions of section 32-F(1A) and hence the tenant was not entitled to purchase the land. The Additional Collector, therefore, allowed the appeal and his order was confirmed in revision by the M.R.T. The tenant filed writ petition under Article 227 challenging the adverse order passed against him. The learned Single Judge held that in case of widow landlady, section 31(3)(ii) of the Act says that the successor-in-interests of a widow can ask for possession under section 29 within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceased to exist. It was further observed that the successor-in-interest must show the date on which the widow ceased to have interest and their right was created. It was further observed that the successor-in-interest must show the date on which the widow ceased to have interest and their right was created. That date would be when mutation was made. The tenant then comes to know who is/are successor/s-in-interest and to whom notice under section 32-F(1A) is to be given. It was held that in the absence of such knowledge regarding heir it is not possible for a tenant to give intimation as contemplated by section 32-F(1A). On facts, it was held that mutation entry in favour of the successors-in-interest was made on 6-12-1975 and the tenant by giving intimation to them on 25-6-1976 had exercised his right within one year from 6-12-1975 on which date the widow ceased to have interest and the rights of the successors-in-interest were created. Consequently, it was held that the tenant had complied with the provisions of section 32-F(1A). 10. Shri Shah, the learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 2 however, pointed out a material distinguishing feature which, according to him makes the said decision inapplicable to the facts of the present case. He pointed out that the land lady Haribai was staying at different places and she died issueless and had no near heirs. However, it is not in the instant case since Ramabai left behind her two married daughters. It is not the petitioners case that they were not aware of this fact. It is, therefore, futile for Shri Katneshwarkar to rely upon the said authority. 11. Shri Katneshwarkar then placed reliance upon the decision in (Chand Ladlesaheb v. Dattatraya)3, 1974 Mh. L.J. 44 in which the facts were that on the death of widow landlady, her successor-in-title sought to evict the tenant of the widow under section 84 of the Act. The application made by him was finally dismissed and thereafter, the tenant within three months of the dismissal of the application, sent a notice to the successor-in-title expressing his willingness to purchase the land. There was a proceeding started under section 32-G read with section 32-F wherein the tenant stated that he wanted to purchase the land while the successor-in-title of the widow contended that the right had been lost as the tenant had failed to give intimation within a period of one year from the date of the death of the widow as required by section 32-F(1A). The learned Judge of this Court held that as the tenancy itself was challenged, the tenant was prevented by the successor-in-title of the widow in giving notice within the period prescribed by section 32-F(1A) and consequently, the successor-in-title could not take advantage of the proceeding instituted under section 84 and seek to defeat the right of the tenant to purchase the land. It was held that section 32-F(1A) applies only in case where the tenant's tenancy is not challenged by the landlord and it cannot be applied to a case where the tenant could not comply with the provisions of section 32-F(1A) on account of the proceeding against him by the landlord challenging his tenancy. This decision will not assist the petitioners for the simple reason that in the instant case there was no such dispute about the tenancy of the petitioners or their predecessor-in-title. 12. Shri Shah, the learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 2, contended that the petitioners right to purchase the land is extinguished by efflux of time and in support of the said contention, he relied upon the decision in (Chintaman Tukaram Datir v. Anand Moreshwar Bhat)4, 1991(2) Bom.C.R. 666 : 1991 Mh. L.J. 435 which was relied upon in a subsequent decision in (Ganpat Keraba v. Dattatraya Narayan)5, 1998(3) Bom.C.R. 242 : 1998(1) Mh. L.J. 807. In Chintaman's case, it was held that the right of purchase contemplated under section 32-F of the Act is required to be exercised not during the life time of the widow landlady but, after her death. It is to be exercised not against the widow but, against her successors. It was held that there is no provision in section 32-F which casts an obligation upon the successors of the widow to intimate the fact of the death of the widow to the tenant. It was, therefore, held that as a natural corollary, the period within which the tenant can exercise his right of purchase provided in section 32-F(1) cannot be extended on the ground that the tenant had no knowledge of the fact of the death of the widow. It was pointed out that when the legislature intended to cast obligation upon some parties in certain circumstances, the same has been specifically provided for. It was pointed out that when the legislature intended to cast obligation upon some parties in certain circumstances, the same has been specifically provided for. If the legislature has provided such an obligation in respect of one contingency and has refrained from casting a similar obligation in respect of another contingency, it would be reasonable to infer that such an obligation is not cast in the case of the latter. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in Chintaman's case. It is not possible to accept the petitioners contention that they could not exercise their right to purchase as they were not aware of the death of Ramabai. Consequently, it will have to be held that the petitioners have lost their right to purchase the one-third share of deceased Ramabai in the land in question. 13. In the result, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order of the A.L.T., Amalner in Tenancy Case No. 20 of 1988, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Amalner in Tenancy Case No. 2 of 97 and the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Mumbai in Tenancy Revision Application No. A 125/97 are hereby partly quashed and set aside in so far as they relate to the two-third share of respondents No. 1 and 2. It is held that the petitioners have a right to purchase the said share of respondents No. 1 and 2 under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their respective costs. Petition partly allowed.