JUDGMENT - PATIL J.A., J.:---By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing and the order of his dismissal from service. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge, J.D. and Judicial Magistrate, F.C. on 2-12-1981. Thereafter, he underwent the usual training and also completed his probation period. The petitioner was allowed to cross efficiency bar on 6-1-1987. In the course of his service, the petitioner was posted at Vaijapur in June, 1990 and there he worked for a year. Thereafter, he was transferred to Akot. The petitioner has stated that on the basis of a complaint made by one of the Advocates at Vaijapur and the resolution passed by the Bar Association, Vaijapur a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the District Judge, and thereafter, departmental enquiry was initiated against him on the charges that he was in the habit of consuming liquor and presiding over the Court in the state of intoxication, that he was not observing the working hours and was in the habit of going to the dais and retiring to the chamber as per his whim and that, he was continuously giving inadequate disposal. Pending the said inquiry, the petitioner was suspended on 9-3-1992. The Inquiry Officer (respondent No. 3) thereafter, submitted his report which was accepted by respondent no. 2 i.e. the High Court who in turn, recommended to respondent No. 1 i.e. the State of Maharashtra to dismiss the petitioner from service. Accordingly, the recommendation made by the High Court came to be accepted and the petitioner was dismissed from service by a order dated 18-3-1994. It is this order as well as the whole departmental proceeding which is the subject matter of this writ petition. 3. It is the grievance of the petitioner that while conducting the Departmental Enquiry, principles of natural justice and fair play were violated. The petitioner was not allowed to engage any legal practitioner to defend himself though he was entitled to do so under Rule 9(8) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1979). According to the petitioner, besides other witnesses, two District Judges were examined as witnesses in the inquiry and, therefore, it was not psychologically possible for the petitioner to cross-examine them effectively. According to the petitioner, besides other witnesses, two District Judges were examined as witnesses in the inquiry and, therefore, it was not psychologically possible for the petitioner to cross-examine them effectively. The petitioner has further contended that he was not supplied with any copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer. The third grievance made by the petitioner is that no copy of the recommendation made by the High Court to the State Government for dismissing the petitioner from service was supplied. Similarly, the petitioner was not given personal hearing by the High Court. The petitioner has contended that before passing the impugned order, the respondent No. 4 i.e. Maharashtra Public Service Commission was not consulted as per Rule 9(4)(ii)(a) of the Rules, 1979. Thus, according to the petitioner, the entire proceeding was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and legal rights of the petitioner. The petitioner has also contended that the order of the dismissal from service is unduly harsh. On these grounds, the petitioner has prayed for the above mentioned reliefs. 4. On behalf of the respondent No. 1-State, Shri M.D. Khobragade, Superintendent (Legal), Law and Judiciary Department, Aurangabad has filed his affidavit wherein he has stated that by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has full control over the Judicial Officers and that it is the High Court who is the Disciplinary Authority for the Judicial Officers. It is further stated that the petitioner came to be dismissed on the recommendations made by the High Court. Shri Khobragade has further submitted in his affidavit that it is not necessary in the cases of Judicial Officers to consult the M.P.S.C. before passing dismissal orders. It is further submitted that the principles of natural justice do not require the delinquent to be heard at every stage before taking the final decision and that, it is sufficient if the delinquent had a fair chance of putting up his defence. 5. On behalf of the respondent No. 2 i.e. the High Court, Shri V.R. Datar, the then Additional Registrar filed his affidavit and stated that before initiating the Departmental Enquiry, explanation of the petitioner was called but, since the same was not found satisfactory, Departmental Enquiry came to be initiated against him and it was conducted by the Inquiry Officer in accordance with the provisions of Rules, 1979. It is pointed out that the petitioner was offered opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the department and the petitioner did cross-examine them. It is further pointed out that the petitioner led evidence of seven defence witnesses. As regards the refusal of permission to the petitioner to engage legal practitioner, it is stated in the affidavit that no Presiding Officer was appointed on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority and the charges framed against the petitioner were not complicated. Therefore, permission to engage an Advocate was not granted. Shri Datar has further affirmed that after receipt of the report of the Inquiry Officer, the same was placed before the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court and pursuant to the decision taken by it, a show cause notice accompanied by a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner then filed his written representation dated 5-10-1993 and on receipt of the same, the matter was again placed before the Disciplinary Committee on 12-1-1994. The Disciplinary Committee, upon consideration of the report of the Inquiry Officer and the written representation made by the petitioner, decided to reject the representation of the petitioner and in view of the gravity of the charges established against the petitioner, it was decided to impose major penalty of dismissal from service as prescribed by Rule 5(i)(ix) of the Rules, 1979. Accordingly, the Government of Maharashtra was moved to pass necessary orders and thereafter, the Government of Maharashtra by its order dated 18-3-1994 dismissed the petitioner from service from the date of the receipt of the order. It is contended that the decision to dismiss the petitioner has been legally taken by the competent authority and it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the same as the scope of the writ petition is limited. The petitioner is not entitled to have reassessment or re-appreciation of the evidence recorded in the enquiry and he cannot challenge the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer which are confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority. 6. The petitioner is not entitled to have reassessment or re-appreciation of the evidence recorded in the enquiry and he cannot challenge the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer which are confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority. 6. The averments made by the petitioner in regard to the refusal of permission to engage a legal practitioner are denied and it is pointed out that a Government servant may not engage legal practitioner unless Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner or the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. It is pointed out that the charges framed against the petitioner were not complicated and that, the petitioner has effectively cross-examined the witnesses including the two District Judges. It is further stated that after the inquiry, a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer was supplied to the petitioner and he was given an opportunity to file his representation. It is further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority after considering the representation made by the petitioner, took the decision to dismiss him from service. It is stated that the High Court has exclusive control over the Judicial Officers and that, the recommendation made by the High Court in regard to the disciplinary action, is normally binding upon the Government. It is denied that the respondent No. 1 i.e. the State of Maharashtra is the Disciplinary Authority for the Judicial Officers. It is also contended that the consultation with the M.P.S.C. is not necessary in the cases of Judicial Officers. The allegations that the principles of natural justice were violated and that, the petitioner was not given due opportunity to defend himself are denied. 7. We heard Shri D.A. Gursahani, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri R.G. Karmarkar, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and Shri Babhulgaonkar, learned A.G.P. for the respondent No. 1. 8. The first contention raised by Shri Gursahani relates to the power and authority of the High Court to initiate Departmental Enquiry against the petitioner. In this respect, the petitioner was averred in para 22 of his petition that under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1979, the Governor alone was has the power to institute disciplinary proceeding and that, initiation of the same by respondent No. 2 i.e. High Court on its own is contrary to the service conditions and hence bad in law. In this respect, the petitioner was averred in para 22 of his petition that under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1979, the Governor alone was has the power to institute disciplinary proceeding and that, initiation of the same by respondent No. 2 i.e. High Court on its own is contrary to the service conditions and hence bad in law. Rule 2(c) of the Rules, 1979 defines "Disciplinary Authority" as the authority competent under the Rules to impose on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule 5. Rule 5 enumerates different minor and major penalties which can be imposed on a Government servant. Rule 6 deals with the powers of the appointing authority, heads of department and Commissioners of divisions to impose penalties specified in Rule 5. But, there are certain limitations on their powers. So far as the Governor is concerned, he has the power to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 5 on any Government Servant. Rule 7 states the authority which can institute departmental proceedings. Sub-clause (1)(a) states that the Governor or any authority empowered by him by general or special order, may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant. The petitioner who was Civil Judge, J.D. and Judicial Magistrate, F.C. was a Class I Government servant. The substance of the contention of Shri Gursahani is, therefore, to the effect that it is the Governor and not the High Court who could have instituted a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. Shri Gursahani submitted that the Rules, 1979 which essentially deal with departmental proceedings, are very much applicable even to the Judicial Officers. 9. We are unable to accept the contention of Shri Gursahani in view of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution of India and the well-settled law on the point of High Court's disciplinary control over the subordinate Judicial Officers. Articles 235 states inter alia, that the control over the persons belonging to judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court. Articles 235 states inter alia, that the control over the persons belonging to judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court. In (State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash)1, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1841, it was observed that the control which is vested in the High Court is complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment including the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, the initial posting and the initial promotion to district Judges. It was pointed out that there is nothing in Article 235 to restrict the control of the High Court in respect of Judges other than District Judges in any manner. In (Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu)2, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 193, the Apex Court observed that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. It comprehends wide variety of matters including the disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal etc. It was further held that in the exercise of this control, the High Court can hold inquiries against the member of the subordinate judiciary, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal, subject however, to the conditions of service and the right of appeal, if any, granted thereby and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required to Article 311(2). In the light of the above authoritative pronouncements about the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court, the contention challenging the authority of the High Court deserves a outright rejection. 10. The second contention of Shri Gursahani is about the non-consultation with the Public Service Commission before imposing penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. In this respect, reliance is placed on Article 320 of the Constitution of India which provides inter alia that the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of a State in a civil capacity. In this respect, reliance is placed on Article 320 of the Constitution of India which provides inter alia that the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of a State in a civil capacity. The contention raised by Shri Gursahani cannot be sustained in view of the decision is (Baldev Raj v. Punjab and Haryana High Court)3, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2490, wherein it was observed that when the High Court exercising disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary finds, after a proper inquiry that a certain officer is guilty of gross misconduct and is unworthy to be the retained in judicial service, and therefore, recommends to the Governor his removal or dismissal, the recommendation of the High Court in respect of Judicial Officers should always be accepted by the Governor. It was further observed that whenever in an extra-ordinary case, rare in itself, the Governor feels, for certain reasons, that he is unable to accept High Court's recommendation, these reasons will be communicated to the High Court to enable it to reconsider the matter. The Apex Court further held that consultation with the Public Service Commission after receipt of the recommendation of the High Court for removal of the officer is not warranted by the provisions of Article 235. The High Court is the sole custodian over the discipline of the Judicial Officer and there is no warrant for introducing another extraneous body between the Governor and the High Court in the matter of disposal of a disciplinary proceedings against the Judicial Officer. It was held that the Judicial Officers although, holding post in civil capacity, are not serving under the Government of a State and they are entirely under the jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of control and discipline. It was, therefore, held that there is no constitutional justification or sanction for the Governor even if he wishes to consult the Public Service Commission under Article 320(3)(c) in respect of Judicial Officers. In view of this position, we have, therefore, little hesitation to reject the second contention of Shri Gursahani. 11. The third contention raised by the Shri Gursahani relates to the fact that in the departmental enquiry the petitioner was not permitted to engage any legal practitioner to defend himself. In view of this position, we have, therefore, little hesitation to reject the second contention of Shri Gursahani. 11. The third contention raised by the Shri Gursahani relates to the fact that in the departmental enquiry the petitioner was not permitted to engage any legal practitioner to defend himself. Admittedly, the petitioner had moved an application to the High Court and sought permission to engage a legal practitioner to defend him on the ground that two of the witnesses were his Superior Officers and that, he would not be in a position to cross-examine them. It is not dispute before us that the said application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not complicated and that no Presiding Officer was appointed for conducting the Departmental Enquiry. In this respect, Shri Gursahani drew our attention to Rule 8(8) of the Rules, 1979 which reads:--- "8(8) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presiding Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner, or, the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." 12. Shri Gursahani pointed out that two of the five witnesses examined on behalf of the department were District Judges under whom the petitioner had worked for sometime. He further submitted that because of the departmental enquiry and suspension, the petitioner was already under mental strain. Therefore, he could not have been in a position to cross-examine effectively his superior officers. Shri Gursahani further submitted that the concept of reasonable opportunity and doctrine of fair play, therefore, warranted that the petitioner should have been permitted to engage the services of a legal practitioner. This was necessary, particularly because of the gravity of the penalty which was likely to be imposed on the petitioner in the event of his having been held guilty of the charges. In support of his submission. Shri Gursahani relied upon certain decisions to which a reference would be necessary. 13. In (Nripendra Nath v. Chief Secretary, Government of W.B.)4, A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 1, one of the questions posed for consideration before the Court was whether assistance of a lawyer to the delinquent would be regarded as a part of reasonable opportunity to show cause? Shri Gursahani relied upon certain decisions to which a reference would be necessary. 13. In (Nripendra Nath v. Chief Secretary, Government of W.B.)4, A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 1, one of the questions posed for consideration before the Court was whether assistance of a lawyer to the delinquent would be regarded as a part of reasonable opportunity to show cause? In that case, the delinquent was an Additional District Judge against whom a departmental enquiry was conducted on various charges. In all 30 witnesses were examined on behalf of the department and 13 as defence witnesses. In addition, two witnesses were examined by the Tribunal which conducted the enquiry. On these facts, it was held that refusal to allow the delinquent to have assistance of lawyer even for the purpose of making notes was denial of "adequate opportunity" under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and "reasonable opportunity" under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Shri Gursahani drew our attention to the following observations, in particular, "If a physician is not a proper person to heal himself, a lawyer is not necessarily a proper person to conduct his own case at least unaided. I have also yet to know that all Judges, specially career Judges in the State Services who have hardly practised at the Bar, made good lawyers after their retirement. ......." 14. The next case cited on this point is (C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin)5, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2178, wherein it was observed that the Government servants by and large, have no legal training. Moreover, when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. It was pointed out that, therefore, Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules provided for representation by a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with a contravention of the rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner. In (Chandrakant v. Government of Maharashtra)6, 1990 Mh.L.J. 577, a Superintendent of Jails, was facing departmental enquiry on the charge of dereliction of duty in connection with the escape of a prisoner. In (Chandrakant v. Government of Maharashtra)6, 1990 Mh.L.J. 577, a Superintendent of Jails, was facing departmental enquiry on the charge of dereliction of duty in connection with the escape of a prisoner. In the departmental enquiry, the department was represented by the Principal of the Prison Officers' Training School who was well versed in law and Procedure and an experienced person. The petitioner was however, not allowed to be represented by a lawyer. On these facts, the Division Bench of this High Court at Nagpur held that admittedly, the matter was highly complicated and two highly placed superior officers i.e. Inspector General of Prisons and Deputy Inspector General of Prisons were witnesses in the enquiry, were to be cross-examined, indicated the constraints under which the petitioner would be without any proper assistance. It was, therefore, held that the petitioner had a right to be represented by a lawyer but, since he was not permitted to do so, the whole enquiry had vitiated. 15. In (J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd.)7, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1221, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the question of right of delinquent to be represented by a lawyer in connection with Haryana Civil Services Appeal Rules. It was pointed out that Rule 7(5) itself recognizes that where the charges are so serious as to entail a dismissal from service the inquiry authority may permit the service of a lawyer to the delinquent employee. It was observed that in the matter of exercise of this discretion one of the relevant factors is whether there is likelihood of the combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of justice and a denial of a real and reasonable opportunity for defence by reason of the employee being pitted against a Presenting Officer who is trained in law. 16. In (Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar)8, 1983 Mh.L.J. 1(S.C.), there was a Departmental Enquiry before the domestics Tribunal in which the delinquent officer was pitted against a legally trained officer. However, the delinquent was refused the permission to have legal assistance. On these facts, it was held that such refusal would amount to denial of a reasonable request of the delinquent to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice were violated. 17. Shri Karmarkar, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. However, the delinquent was refused the permission to have legal assistance. On these facts, it was held that such refusal would amount to denial of a reasonable request of the delinquent to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice were violated. 17. Shri Karmarkar, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 however, pointed out that in all the above mentioned decisions relied upon by Shri Gursahani, Presiding Officers were appointed to represent the concerned department. Shri Karmarkar submitted that in the instant case no Presiding Officer was appointed obviously, because the charges against the petitioner were not complicated. He further pointed out that the question of permitting the delinquent to engage legal practitioner under Rule 8(8) of the Rules, 1979 arises only when a Presenting Officer is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority and such Presiding Officer is a legal practitioner. Therefore, according to Shri Karmarkar, there was nothing wrong or illegal in not permitting the petitioner to have the services of a legal practitioner to defend himself. Shri Karmarkar laid emphasis on the fact that prior to his appointment, the petitioner had practised as an Advocate and also worked as Assistant Public Prosecutor. He worked as a Judge of the Co-operative Court and served as a Judicial Officer for about thirteen years. Therefore, according to Shri Karmarkar, the petitioner was well versed and experienced with legal aspect of the case and cross-examination of the witnesses. 18. In support of his submission, Shri Karmarkar relied upon some decisions, the first of which is (Krishna Chandra v. Union of India)9, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1589. In that case, the facts were that a disciplinary inquiry was held against the Income Tax Officer and under the Rules, he was not entitled to the assistance of an Advocate at the inquiry. All he had to do in the course of enquiry was to defend the correctness of his assessment orders and the enquiry was such that a trained lawyer could have hardly helped him in his defence. On these facts, it was held that a refusal of the Enquiry Officer to accede to the request of the said officer to have an assistance of an Advocate did not amount to a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 19. On these facts, it was held that a refusal of the Enquiry Officer to accede to the request of the said officer to have an assistance of an Advocate did not amount to a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 19. In (Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. R.N. Tripathi)10, A.I.R. 1993 S.C.W. 1106, the question was whether the Inquiry Officer was justified in refusing the delinquent to be represented by an office bearer of a Trade Union which did not have the employees working in the establishment of the employer in question except the delinquent and he was not a member of either recognised union or non-recognised union functioning within the undertaking where the delinquent was employed. Moreover, that person was not authorised by the State Government. After considering the provisions of section 22(ii) of the M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act, the Apex Court held that the Inquiry Officer was justified in refusing permission and that, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. 20. Shri Karmarkar also relied upon the decision in (Union of India v. J.N. Sinha)11, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40, wherein it was observed that if a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. It is, therefore, the submission of Shri Karmarkar that when the Rules, 1979 permit assistance of legal practitioner only in specified circumstances, then a delinquent cannot be permitted to engage a legal practitioner unless the conditions of Rule 8(8) are complied with. 21. On a careful consideration of the rival submissions at the Bar in the light of the above mentioned decisions, as well as the peculiar facts of the case on hand, we are of a considerate view that there was no illegality or impropriety in rejecting the application of the petitioner to be represented by a legal practitioner. On a plain perusal of Rule 8(8) of the Rules, 1979, it is clear that in a departmental enquiry, the Government servant may take assistance of any other Government servant to present his case. However, he cannot engage a legal practitioner for that purpose unless the Disciplinary Authority has appointed a Presiding Officer and that, such Presenting Officer is a legal practitioner. However, he cannot engage a legal practitioner for that purpose unless the Disciplinary Authority has appointed a Presiding Officer and that, such Presenting Officer is a legal practitioner. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no Presenting Officer appointed by the High Court. Therefore, there was no question of permitting the petitioner to have the assistance of a legal practitioner. The petitioner could have taken assistance of any Government servant to present his case but he did not do so. The charges framed against the petitioner were not of such a nature as to require any legal assistance. There were three charges against the petitioner one being that he was in the habit of consuming liquor and presiding over the Court in the state of intoxication. The second was non-observing of working hours and the third was continuous giving of inadequate disposal. So far as the third charge is concerned, it is only a matter of record. In the Departmental Enquiry, in all six witnesses were cited, out of whom five were examined. Two of them were practising Advocates in the Court of Vaijapur which was presided over by the petitioner, two were the District Judges of Aurangabad and Akola respectively and one was a stenographer who was working under the petitioner at Akot. 22. Shri Gursahani submitted before us that Civil Judges will not be in a position to cross-examine effectively the persons who were his District Judges. According to him, mere opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses has no meaning and that it must be real and not for name's sake. Shri Gursahani, therefore, contended before us that the petitioner ought to have been allowed to have the assistance of a legal practitioner. We have pointed out above that under the Rules unless a Presiding Officer is appointed, no question of allowing the delinquent to engage legal practitioner to defend himself arises. We have gone through the record of departmental proceeding which was made available to us by Shri Karmarkar. On perusal of the same, we find that the above mentioned five witnesses examined on behalf of the High Court have been effectively cross-examined by the petitioner at length and we do not think that a legal practitioner could have done any better than what the petitioner himself has done. On perusal of the same, we find that the above mentioned five witnesses examined on behalf of the High Court have been effectively cross-examined by the petitioner at length and we do not think that a legal practitioner could have done any better than what the petitioner himself has done. So far as the question of cross-examining the two District Judges is concerned, it may be pointed out that witness No. 5 Shri S.K. Kulkarni is a retired District Judge who had visited Vaijapur in connection with an inquiry on the application made by Advocate Shri Kadam. However, Shri Kulkarni appears to have made only an oral enquiry and, submitted a formal report to the High Court. He did not record statements of any witnesses. It appears that he was examined to prove his report only. Therefore, he being a formal witness, there was no question of cross-examining him at length. He had no personal knowledge about the allegations made against the petitioner. 23. The other District Judge who was examined as a witness is Shri G.B. Asmar who was working at Akola when the petitioner was working as a Civil Judge, J.D. and J.M.F.C., Akot. Shri Asmar appears to have visited Akot on 8-1-1992 to ascertain whether there was any improvement in the work and behaviour of the petitioner. His visit was pursuant to the direction given by the High Court. Shri Asmar has stated the facts about the petitioner when he visited Akot. According to him, the petitioner was in drunken condition. Shri Asmar has been cross-examined by the petitioner himself who tried to rebut his version by pointing out that the symptoms of drunkenness noticed by Shri Asmar were on account of other reasons. On going through the cross-examination of Shri Asmar, we are unable to accept the submission of Shri Gursahani that there was no effective cross-examination. 24. The next argument of Shri Gursahani is that the Inquiry Officer himself assumed the role of prosecutor and cross-examined the witnesses examined in defence by the petitioner. This, according to Shri Gursahani, has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Shri Gursahani drew our attention to the decision in Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar (supra) wherein it was observed, "Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. This, according to Shri Gursahani, has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Shri Gursahani drew our attention to the decision in Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar (supra) wherein it was observed, "Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a Court presided over by an unbiased Judge? The Enquiry Officer combines the Judge and prosecutor rolled into one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions." Shri Gursahani also made a reference to the decision in (M.S. Rane v. State of Maharashtra)12, 1990(1) C.L.R. 337, wherein the Single Judge of this Court observed, "One fails to understand why the Inquiry Officer had no question the petitioner in such great details when the Presiding Officer was present at the enquiry and he could have legitimately cross-examined the petitioner. Instead of allowing the Presenting Officer to do his duty, the Inquiry Officer assumed the role of a cross-examiner and by such conduct he assumed the role, both of the prosecutor as also the Judge. On this ground also, it will have to be held that the findings of the Inquiry Officer were vitiated." In the said decision, the learned Single Judge has made reference to the case of ((N.S. Chari v. Union of India)13, 1988(II) C.L.R. 249, in which no Presenting Officer was appointed and the entire inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer himself. It was observed in the said case,--- "If the enquiry contemplated by the Rules has to be fair and impartial, the Inquiry Officer cannot be saddled with the functions both of a Prosecutor as also a Judge. In this view of the matter, I hold that the proceedings before Inquiry Officer stands vitiated on this ground also." 25. Shri Gursahani also relied upon the decision in (D.S. Patil v. R.B. Company Ltd.)14, 1986(53) F.I.R. 39. However, the facts in that case are very much different. In that case, the petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses produced against him before the Inquiry Officer. Moreover, the witnesses produced by the petitioner in defence were cross-examined by the Inquiry Officer himself despite the presence of the Presenting Officer. However, the facts in that case are very much different. In that case, the petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses produced against him before the Inquiry Officer. Moreover, the witnesses produced by the petitioner in defence were cross-examined by the Inquiry Officer himself despite the presence of the Presenting Officer. On these facts, it was held by the learned Single Judge of this High Court that the enquiry was conducted in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The following observations made by the learned Judge deserve notice,- "The Inquiry Officers are not professionals. It was open to them to seek information or clarification on certain points from witnesses examined by them. If they did so, it could not be said that they acted with bias or as prosecutors." 26. In this case, the petitioner examined in all seven witnesses in his defence, the first of whom is Dr. Gandhi, a Private Medical Practitioner from Ahmednagar who stated that the petitioner was his patient and that, he was suffering from Hyper Tension, Acidity and Gastritis. This witness and in fact, all the witnesses examined by the petitioner, could not be cross-examined as no presenting officer was appointed by the High Court. The Inquiry Officer put some formal questions in order probably, to bring on record certain clarifications or complete facts. To Dr. Gandhi, he asked, whether the petitioner was his indoor patient and whether he had maintained any register of outdoor patients. He also asked him whether he had brought any documents to show that the petitioner was taking his treatment. We do not think that such type of questions are in the nature of cross-examination to discredit the witness. In our opinion, the questions put to the petitioner's witness Dr. Gandhi were for the purpose of obtaining clarifications. 27. The second witness of the petitioner is Advocate Shri Puradupadhye of Akot who stated that the petitioner while working at Akot, was performing his duties properly. He also stated that on 8-1-1992, District Judge Shri Asmar paid a surprise visit to Akot Court and that, on that day, this witness had on board 18 cases. The Inquiry Officer put certain questions to this witness and asked him as to how many of the 18 cases were fixed for hearing and in how many cases actual evidence was recorded on that day. The Inquiry Officer put certain questions to this witness and asked him as to how many of the 18 cases were fixed for hearing and in how many cases actual evidence was recorded on that day. He also asked him as to how many of his cases were decided by the petitioner after recording evidence during the period from June, 1991 to March, 1992. The Inquiry Officer further asked him whether on 8-1-1992 the petitioner was not in a condition to stand straight. 28. The third witness on behalf of the petitioner was Advocate Shri Jaltare of Akot who stated that the petitioner was doing the Court work regularly and sitting overtime. He further stated that the petitioner never came on dails in drunken condition. To this witness, the Inquiry Officer asked a few questions including whether the petitioner was not keeping good health during his tensure at Akot and whether on 8-1-1992 the petitioner came to the Court in drunken condition. The fourth witness on behalf of the petitioner is Advocate Shri Patwari from Vaijapur who stated that the petitioner was working properly and was in good physical condition. It may be noted that this witness is a signatory to the resolution passed by the Board of Association of Vaijapur which was to the effect that the petitioner on account of his ill health, was unable to work and, therefore, the entire Court work had come to a stand still. By the said resolution, the petitioner's transfer from Vaijapur was sought. It was, therefore, natural for the Inquiry Officer to ask this witness whether he was a signatory to the said resolution and whether the contents of the said resolution were correct. The witness replied the questions in the affirmative. It will thus, be seen that if the Inquiry Officer had not put any such questions to the witness, the true and material facts would not have come on record. The questions put to the witnesses are only in the nature of seeking clarifications. The fourth witness is Advocate Bilolikar from Vaijapur who also stated that the petitioner was punctual in attending the Court and he never came to the Court in drunken condition. He further stated that the Court work was being conducted regularly. The Inquiry Officer put him some questions, some of which were in connection with the resolution passed by the Bar Association, Vaijapur. He further stated that the Court work was being conducted regularly. The Inquiry Officer put him some questions, some of which were in connection with the resolution passed by the Bar Association, Vaijapur. He also asked the witness as to how many of his cases were decided by the petitioner after recording evidence during the relevant year. The object of these questions does not appear to be to discredit the witness but to have on record full facts. The 6th witness is Shri Jadhav, Senior Clerk working at Vaijapur who stated that the petitioner was not keeping well mental and physical health. It appears that, Shri Jadhav was working as petitioner's Criminal Bench clerk. Therefore, the Inquiry Officer asked him some questions about the Court working and alleged addiction of the petitioner to the vice of drinking. The 7th and last witness examined by the petitioner is Shri Puhal who was at the relevant time working as Sweeper in Vaijapur Court. It may be pointed out that one of the allegations made in the complaint dated 7-12-1990 of Advocate Shri Kadam was to the effect that the petitioner used to drink liquor in the Court also and throw away the liquor bottles out of the window of the chamber. This witness stated that he did not find any liquor bottles lying outside near the window of the chamber. The Inquiry Officer did not ask him any question. 29. It cannot be ignored that the Inquiry Officer himself was a Judicial Officer of the rank of a District Judge. An Inquiry Officer is not merely a recording machine and he cannot passively watch the proceedings going on before him. He has to play a role since it is he who has to decide the case with a judicious mind and ascertain whether or not the charges framed against the delinquent are proved. More responsibility lies upon the Inquiry Officer particularly, when no Presiding Officer is appointed by the department. In our opinion, in such a situation, the Inquiry Officer, in the interest of justice and fair play, can ask certain questions to the witnesses to elicit certain material information or clarification. Having regard to the nature of the questions put by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner's witnesses, it cannot be concluded that the Inquiry Officer acted as prosecutor. In our opinion, in such a situation, the Inquiry Officer, in the interest of justice and fair play, can ask certain questions to the witnesses to elicit certain material information or clarification. Having regard to the nature of the questions put by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner's witnesses, it cannot be concluded that the Inquiry Officer acted as prosecutor. The cases relied upon by Shri Gursahani in this respect are not applicable to the present case. In those cases, there were Presiding Officers appointed by the department. In M.S. Rane's case, although the delinquent was entitled to have assistance of other Government servant to present his case, his application was wrongly rejected by the Inquiry Officer. Although, there was a Presenting Officer, still the Inquiry Officer in his enthusiasm, appears to have asked many questions in great details and virtually assumed the role of a cross-examiner. This is however, not so in the present case. As pointed out above, the questions put by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner's witnesses aimed at bringing certain clarifications from the witnesses as the same were necessary for deciding the issues in the case. We, therefore, do not think that the Inquiry Officer has, in any way, exceeded his powers and done anything to cause prejudice to the petitioner. Consequently, we reject the contention of Shri Gursahani that the enquiry is vitiated as the Inquiry Officer assumed the role of prosecutor. 30. The next contention of Shri Gursahani relates to the alleged non-supply of the copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer. In this respect, he relied upon the decision in (Managing Director, E.C.I.L., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar)15, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 764, wherein it was held that it is the right of the employee to have the report of the Inquiry Officer to defend himself effectively before the Disciplinary Authority. However, in the instant case there is really no scope for any such grievance because the record and proceedings placed for our perusal clearly shows that the petitioner was supplied with a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer and that, the petitioner had filed a detailed representation dated 5-10-1993 pursuant to the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary Authority. 31. Shri Gursahani then made a grievance about the non-supply of the copy of the recommendations made by the High Court to the Government for dismissing the petitioner from service. 31. Shri Gursahani then made a grievance about the non-supply of the copy of the recommendations made by the High Court to the Government for dismissing the petitioner from service. He relied upon the decision in (Hari Datt v. State of H.P.)16, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1426, wherein the facts were that the appellants had requested the High Court to produce the proceedings which culminated in the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for appointment of respondents as District and Sessions Judges/Additional District and Sessions Judges. However, no action was taken on that request and no record was produced before the Court. The Apex Court while disapproving the said conduct, remarked,--- "Such silence militates against fair adjudication of the issues. Just and fair adjudication must not only inform the administrative side of the High Court but in order to put its record beyond the slightest pale of controversy it must avoid and secrecy in this behalf consistent with public interest." It is not disputed before us by Shri Karmarkar that no copy of High Court recommendations made to the Government was supplied to the petitioner. Shri Grusahani therefore, argued that on account of non-supply of such a copy, the petitioner could not apply to the Governor for review of its order dismissing him from service. As already pointed out, Shri Karmarkar made available to us the entire proceedings of the departmental enquiry including the papers relating to the follow up action pursuant to the report of the Inquiry Officer. The recommendation made to the Government for issuing necessary order regarding dismissal of the petitioner from service is in accordance with the decision taken by the disciplinary committee in its meeting held on 12-1-1994. The minutes of this meeting are reproduced in the affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court. The impugned order dated 18-3-1994 dismissing the petitioner from service was issued by the order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. It may be noted that under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1979, no appeal lies against any order made by the Governor. However, Rule 25 empowers the Governor to revise any order made under the Rules, 1979 against which no appeal lies or no appeal is preferred. The Governor, in the exercise of his revisional power, can modify or set aside the order. However, Rule 25 empowers the Governor to revise any order made under the Rules, 1979 against which no appeal lies or no appeal is preferred. The Governor, in the exercise of his revisional power, can modify or set aside the order. Similarly, Rule 25-A enables the Governor to review his order in the circumstances which are akin to those mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We however, do not think that for filing a revision or review application, the petitioner would need a copy of the recommendations made by the disciplinary committee of the High Court. He could have filed a revision on the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer. So also he could have filed review application to the Governor by making out a case of availability of new evidence, if any, which could not be earlier produced. It is not the petitioner's case that certain new material or evidence became available to him which he could not produce during the enquiry. In fact, as seen above, the petitioner was given full opportunity by the Inquiry Officer to produce all his evidence and accordingly, the petitioner examined seven witnesses in his defence. We, therefore, do not think that there is any substance in the petitioner's grievance about the non-supply of the copy of the recommendations made by the disciplinary committee of the High Court to the Government. As observed in Baldev Raj's case (supra), the recommendations made by the High Court are binding on the Government and, therefore, there is little scope for any revision or review of the impugned order. 33. We have thus, carefully considered the rival submissions in the light of the peculiar facts of the present case and the settled legal position. We do not think that there is any scope for this Court to interfere with the impugned order. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are based on sufficient evidence regarding the charges framed against the petitioner. The enquiry was conducted in a fair manner without any procedural flaw and the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The disciplinary committee appears to have considered the record of enquiry, report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation made by the petitioner before arriving at the conclusion to make a recommendation of the penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. The disciplinary committee appears to have considered the record of enquiry, report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation made by the petitioner before arriving at the conclusion to make a recommendation of the penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. In our opinion, there is no illegality or error in the entire departmental enquiry. So also there was no violation of any of the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the challenge given by the petitioner to the impugned order of his dismissal must fail. 34. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, parties to bear their respective costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----