Vijender Jain ( 1 ) FILE of this case was missing. I have ordered that the photo-copy of the appeal be taken on record. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller on 6. 9. 1991, the petitioner filed the present petition. The main ground of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and the Addl. Rent Controller erred in coming to the conclusion that the eviction petition was maintainable as all the co-owners of the premises were impleaded. Mr. Duggal, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Addl. Rent Controller committed a grave error in observing that as power Will Ex. AW 2/1 read with admission made by the opposite party in the written statement that respondents 1 to 7 became co-owners of the property in question after the death of original owner Chhamu Mal. Mr. Duggal took great pain in assailing the order of the Addl. Rent Controller on the ground that the Addl. Rent Controller ought to have rejected the Will as Hem Chand who appeared to identify the signature of the witnesses had deposed that there was no person at the time of execution of the Will and has contended that Ex. AW 2/1 was not duly proved. Yet another contention of the Counsel for the petitioner was that no order under Section 14 (1 ) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act could have been passed when the contention was raised on behalf of the petitioner that respondents 8 to 11 were lawful sub-tenants in this respect of the premises and provisions of Section 25b and Section 14 (1 ) (e) were not applicable. ( 3 ) MR. Duggal has relied upon the judgment of SAO No. 280/68 which was filed in this Court when a previous eviction petition was filed by the owner in 1960 to canvass in his support that original Rent Note executed in 1943 has not been withdrawn by the respondent. The finding of the Addl. Rent Controller that the premises were let out for residential purposes was contrary in view of the decision in SAO 280/68. ( 4 ) AGAIN arguments were raised that the. The finding of the Addl. Rent Controller that the premises were let out for residential purposes was contrary in view of the decision in SAO 280/68. ( 4 ) AGAIN arguments were raised that the. admission made by the petitioner in the previous eviction petition regarding the purpose of letting was wrong as that admission, even if it was inade,was limited to those proceedings. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Anr. v. Parwatibai wlo Lachiram and Anr. , (1995) 6 SCC 213 and Sarangdhar Singh and Anr. v. Parvati Kuer and Others, AIR 1955 NUC 229 (Vol. 42 ). Lastly Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide as the premises in question are situated in Dariba Kalan, Delhi which has become commercial area and the respondents only intention is to convert this property for commercial purposes and sell the same by receiving huge Pagaris. ( 5 ) REPELLING the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ishwar Sahai, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent has contended that the original owner Chhamu ivlal bequeathed the property to his seven sons and the Will was duly approved. That Will was Ex. AW 2/1 dated 16. 6. 1963. As both the witnesses to the Will were dead, evidence was led, signatures were proved as per the requirement of. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. He drew the attention of the Court to the order dated 13. 3. 1968 in this regard passed by the Rent Control Tribunal in the previous proceedings, which is Ex. AW 1/3 where these seven sons were the LRs before the Rent Control Tribunal. Mr. Sahai has contended that all the co-owners need not file the eviction petition. Even one co-owner can maintain the eviction petition. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the respondent has cited Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1976 SC 2335 . However, in this case all the seven co-owners have filed the petition, although only Hem Chand has appeared in the witness box to explain the need of bona fide requirement of all the co-owners, which was sufficient in view of the authority cited by learned Counsel for the respondent. Mr. However, in this case all the seven co-owners have filed the petition, although only Hem Chand has appeared in the witness box to explain the need of bona fide requirement of all the co-owners, which was sufficient in view of the authority cited by learned Counsel for the respondent. Mr. Sahai has also rebutted the argument of the Counsel for the petitioner that the property was not let out for residential purposes. Learned Counsel for the respondent has contended that Ex. AX/ay at page 283 of the Trial Court record, which was the eviction petition filed on 30. 11. 1960 previously in which, inter alia, it was mentioned that the property was let out for residential purposes. In reply to the said eviction petition the petitioner filed the written statement and no where it was the case of the petitioner that the property was let out for any other purpose. The said written statement is Ex. A-W at page 267 of the paper-book before the Trial Court. Mr. sahai has further contended that in the absence of the original lease-deed, which was not available with the respondent and that has been the consistent stand of the respondent, the user of the property becomes relevant. In support of his contention. Counsel for the respondent has cited Shri Girdhari Lal v. Shri Laxmi Narain, 1980 (2) Rent L. R 707. Mr. Sahai has further contended that this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction would not interfere or re-appraise or re-evaluate the evidence and the finding based thereon of the Addl. Rent Controller until and unless the findings are perverse that no prudent or reasonable man could arrive at. In support of his contention he has cited Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. , (1998) 8 SCC 119 ^viii (1998) SLT 374 (SC)=76 (1998) DLT 1 (SC ). ( 6 ) REPELLING the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner regarding bonafide requirement of the respondent, Mr. Sahai has contended that the property in dispute is situated not in the main road of the Dariba Kalan but its number is 1639, Phatak Mor Wala, Dariba Kalan, which is a small street at Dariba Kalan. He has further contended that keeping in view the family size of the respondent which comes to 35, the accommodation available at Gali Anar is too meagre to meet their requirement. He has further contended that keeping in view the family size of the respondent which comes to 35, the accommodation available at Gali Anar is too meagre to meet their requirement. He has further contended that the property in question is a bigger house which can be used for some members of the family. He has further contended that there is no res judicata in pursuing a subsequent eviction petition, if the previous eviction petition has been dismissed. What has been argued by Mr. Sahai is that the previous eviction petition which was filed on the ground of sub-letting and bona fide requirement in i960 did not find favour with the then Addl. Rent Controller. However, it cannot be said that because of the dismissal of one eviction petition, the landlord/owner of the property in question is debarred from filing any eviction petition m future, even if the size of the family has increased and other subsequent events have taken place. The previous eviction petition was filed in 1960 and the eviction petition in question was filed in the year 1982, i. e. after a lapse of about 22 years. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the respondent has cited Surajmal v. Radheyshyam, 1988 (2) RCJ 20. ( 7 ) I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for both the parties. I need not go into the various arguments which have been advanced in view of the fact that what was concluded in SAO 280/68 which was a second appeal field by the respondent arising out of the eviction petition filed in 1960, was that sub-tenants who were inducted by the petitioner were lawful. Mr Duggal tried to argue that this Court should interpret the order passed by the Courts in that proceeding so as to conclude that the premises were let out for residential purposes. ( 8 ) I am afraid nowhere there is categorical finding in those proceedings that the premises were let out for residential purposes. On the contrary the record shows that there was unequivocal and unambiguous admission by the petitioner that the premises were let out for residential purposes. Let us take a look at Ex. AW/ay. It was a eviction petition filed on 30. 11. 1960. In that eviction petition in paragraph 4 it has been mentioned "premises are residential". On the contrary the record shows that there was unequivocal and unambiguous admission by the petitioner that the premises were let out for residential purposes. Let us take a look at Ex. AW/ay. It was a eviction petition filed on 30. 11. 1960. In that eviction petition in paragraph 4 it has been mentioned "premises are residential". In paragraph 2 of paragraph 18 of the said eviction petition, it has been mentioned : "the petitioner who is the owner bonafide requires the said premises for occupation as residence for himself and for other members of his family dependent upon him and he has got no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation. The premises are let out to the respondent No. I for residential purposes. " ( 9 ) HOW the petitioner has replied in the written statement to the said eviction petition is Ex. AX at page 267 of the Trial Court. The same is as follows : "4. Para 4 of the petition is correct. " ( 10 ) IN reply to para 5, specifically the petitioner had mentioned : ". . . . . . . . . RESPONDENT No. I and the families of the lawful sub-tenants, who are respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and respondent No. 6 who was a lawful sub-tenant and against whom a decree for ejectment has been passed in favour of the respondent No. I are residing in the premises. " ( 11 ) NOT only this, in the additional relevant information nowhere it is mentioned that the premises ii) question were let out for residential purposes or were ever used for composite purposes. That falsifies the stand of the petitioner with regard to the argument that the property was not let out for residential purposes. ( 12 ) THERE was a clear and unambiguous admission which has been rightly taken into consideration by the Addl. Rent Controller in determining the purpose of letting. The law on admission is very clear. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 , Supreme Court held : "an admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. The law on admission is very clear. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 , Supreme Court held : "an admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. " ( 13 ) NO effort was made by the petitioner before the Trial Court that admission in those proceedings was either wrong or passed on erroneous circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be held that the purpose of letting was other than residential as has been held by the Addl, Rent Controller on the ground of bona fide requirement. No site plan was filed by the petitioner to controvert the site plan filed by the respondent to show that the respondents were having suitable accommodation. In view of the uncontroverted testimony of AW-Hem chand no site plan was filed by the petitioner to-show that the respondents were having more accommodation in view of the fact that the accommodation available to the respondents at Gali Anar was only a plot of 72 sq. yards. ( 14 ) I do not find any infirmity with the order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller regarding the requirement of the respondent. This revision petition was filed in the year 1991. Eight years have elapsed in this Court. I do not see any infirmity with the impugned order. Interim order stands vacated.