Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and also learned Counsel for the complainant opposite party No. 2. 2. By this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order taking cognizance dated 9-11- 1991 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banka in complaint case No. C 59/90 under Secs. 147, 148, 149, 302 and 436 of the Indian Penal code. 3. The brief facts giving rise to this application are as under: The opposite party No. 2 filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banka stating therein, inter alia, that on 15-11-1989 at 6O clock a mob consisting of Muslims came towards his village armed with lethal weapons including bomb and fire-arms and they also started exploding bombs and firing from their firearms and seeing the mobs the villagers started fleeing away and in the meantime, the petitioner along with 25 armed police forces came there and at the be best of the petitioner, the armed forces opened fire on the villagers as a result of which his son and another villager sustained injuries and they succumbed to the injuries and the complainant learnt that for death of his son, first information report has already been lodged by the petitioner in Amarpur police station. 4. On the basis of the complaint petition, the learned Magistrate after examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation made inquiry under Sec. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") and ultimately issued processes against the petitioner and other accused persons under Sec. 204 of the Code. 5. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the petitioner along with a number of armed forces was deployed to maintain law and order and also public order and seeing the violent mob of Muslim as well as Hindu Community, the armed police forces opened fire to disperse the mob after obtaining due permission from the Magistrate accompanying the armed forces as a result of which some persons sustained injuries. 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that since the petitioner is alleged to have acted in purported exercise of his official duty, as complained of, the order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed as the same is barred under Sec. 197(2) read with Sec. 197 (3) of the Code. 6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that since the petitioner is alleged to have acted in purported exercise of his official duty, as complained of, the order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed as the same is barred under Sec. 197(2) read with Sec. 197 (3) of the Code. Learned Counsel further submitted that there is reasonable nexus between the act complained of and discharge of the official duty and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get the protection of subsection (2) of Sec. 197 read with subsection (3) of Sec. 197 of the Code. 7. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 197 and Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 197 of the Code run as follows: "(2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government, By notification, direct that the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of the public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving and thereupon the provisions of that subsection will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein the expression "State Government" were substituted. 8. Sec. 197 (3) of the Code lays down that the State Government may by notification direct that the provisions of Sub-sec. (2) of the said section shall apply to such class or category of the members of the forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving and there upon the provisions of that Sub-sec. will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein the expression "State Government" were substituted. 9. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that necessary notification as required under Sec. 197 (3) of the Code has already been published by the Government of Bihar in Bihar Gazette dated 24th May 1980. In this connection learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied upon the case of Ram Swarath Yadav and another V/s. Dr. Rajeshwar Prasad Sinha and another, to show that the necessary notification as required under Sub-sec. In this connection learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied upon the case of Ram Swarath Yadav and another V/s. Dr. Rajeshwar Prasad Sinha and another, to show that the necessary notification as required under Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 197 of the Code has been issued by the State Government. 10. According to the notification issued by the State Government as referred to above the provisions of subsection (2) of Sec. 197 of the Code shall apply to all the officers and men belonging to Bihar Police Force charged with the maintenance of public order who are working at any place within the" State of Bihar and whose appointing authority is .either the Inspector-General of Police. Bihar, the equivalent post of which now is Director- General-cum Inspector-Genaral of Police or such other officer specially authorised to appoint any person to such force under the Police Act. Admittedly, the petitioners appointing authority is Director-General-cum-Inspector-General of Police. Therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid notification, one of the pre-requisites for application provisions of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 197 of the Code is attracted to the case of the petitioner as he is such member of Bihar Police Force who is charged with the maintenance of public order. 11. Now, the question as to whether officer-in-charge of the police station can be said to be member of armed force charge with the maintenance of public order has already been set at rest by a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Bhikhaji Vaghaji V/s. L.K. Barot and others. 12. The other pre-requisite for application of Sec. 197(2) of the Code is that the offence complained of must be committed by such an officer of Bihar Police Force while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. 13. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 submitted that though the petitioner is a member of the Bihar Police Force, it cannot be said that he committed the offence while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. Learned Counsel further submitted that no magisterial order was obtained allowing the members of the armed forces to open fire upon the rioters. Learned Counsel further submitted that no magisterial order was obtained allowing the members of the armed forces to open fire upon the rioters. The learned Counsel in this context has referred to the evidence of the Magistrate who has been examined as one of the complainants witness No. 6 in course of the inquiry under Sec. 202 of the Code. 14. From bare perusal of the case of the complainant, as stated above, it would appear that the offence in question was committed by the accused persons while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duties. From the evidence of the complainants witness No. 6 who is said to have been vested with the power of Magistrate and was accompanying the petitioner and patrolling armed forces has simply stated that permission for firing was obtained by the petitioner by exercising coercion and out of fear he granted permission to open fire. There is nothing in the evidence of this witness to suggest that the petitioner was not on official duty to maintain public order. 15. From the materials on record in my opinion, it cannot be said that the act committed by the accused was not in discharge of their official duties. From the facts enumerated above, it appears to me that there is reasonable nexus between the act complained of and discharge of official duty so far as the petitioner is concerned and thus, it must be held that the offence was committed while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duties. 16. Thus, I am of the view that both the conditions precedent for application of Sec. 197 (2) of the Code are fulfilled in the case at hand and as such the order taking cognizance becomes wholly unwarranted and prosecution of the petitioner cannot be allowed to continue as its continuance would amount to an abuse of process of the Court. 17. In the result, this application is allowed and the order taking cognizance against the petitioner dated 9-11-1991 in complaint case No. C/59/90 is hereby quashed.