AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) THE Court : Originally a suit was instituted by one Sailabala Dassi being widow of one Kalipada Barick, since deceased on 21st July, 1965 as available from the original date of verification of the Plaint. ( 2 ) SAID Shri Kalipada Barick died intestate on 7th November, 1918 leaving behind a Will which was subsequently probated by this Hon'ble Court. ( 3 ) SAID Shri Kalipada Barick survived by his widow Smt. Sailabala Dassi, the original Plaintiff, since deceased, three sons namely; Sambhu, Saroj and Sachin and three daughters all are deceased by now. ( 4 ) THE Probate under the Will prescribes that three daughters will get three houses and three sons would get residue of his properties in equal shares absolutely and forever. ( 5 ) THERE is no provisions for said Smt. Sailabala Dassi, widow of the testator. However, the testator left a very big estate consisting of numerous immovable properties. The original plaintiff was a Pardanasin Hindu lady having little experience in respect of managment of the estate. Although under the Will such original plaintiff as well as one Bholanath Barick were appointed as Executrix and Executor respectively thereunder but Bholanath Barick died in February 1920 leaving aside original plaintiff who when became the sole surviving executrix. The original plaintiff alleged under the Plaint that one of his son Sambhunath was entrusted to manage the estate of his behalf. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 induced the original plaintiff to execute a General Power of Attorney in favour of defendant's son Sambhunath to manage the estate on behalf of the plaintiff. There are various allegations as against the original defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 specially Sambhunath in respect of mis-management of the property. ( 6 ) SINCE original plaintiff expired, one of the member of the bar was appointed as Administrator-ad-litem to proceed with the suit who has now been elevated to the Bench, another member of the Bar is appointed in place and stead of erstwhile administrator-ad-litem, now the plaintiff hereunder. ( 7 ) SUCH suit is pending before this Court after appropriate amendments by incorporating names of the heirs and legal representatives of original plaintiff and defendants. ( 8 ) THE claims in the plaint are as follows :"1. LEAVE under Clauses 12 of the Letters Patent. 1a. ( 7 ) SUCH suit is pending before this Court after appropriate amendments by incorporating names of the heirs and legal representatives of original plaintiff and defendants. ( 8 ) THE claims in the plaint are as follows :"1. LEAVE under Clauses 12 of the Letters Patent. 1a. Declaration that the said 84, Cornwallis Street, now called Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta and No. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, belonging to and from part of th estate of Kalipada Barick, deceased. 1b. Possession of the said premises No. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta. 1c. Declaration that the said Indenture of Conveyance dated 16th November, 1965 is void, illegal and of no effect. 1d. The Indenture of Conveyance dated 16th November, 1965 be ordered to be deliver up and cancelled. 1e. An account be taken and/or enquity be directed to ascertain the amout of rents, issues and profits realised by the defendants Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, and decree for such sum as may be found due and owing to the said estate upon such enquiry. 2. Administration of the estate of Kalipada Barick since deceased. 3. Accounts from the defendants Sambhunath Barick of his dealing with the said Estate; 4. Accounts from the defendants Sarojendra Nath Barick and Sachindra Nath Barick; 5. Decree for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per month; 6. Order for interm maintenance; 7. Decree for arrears of maintenance at the institution of the suit; 8. Suitable house for separate maintenance; 9. Declaration of charge for maintenance upon estate of the said Testator; 10. Receiver; 11. Discovery; 12. Such further and other reliefs as may be necessary in the circumstances of the case. " ( 9 ) IT appears from prayers 1a and 1b of the Plaint that the same relates to 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, which is the subject matter of the application before this Court. ( 10 ) THE petitioner contended that the original defendant's Sachindra Nath Barick, since deceased, formed a company being M/s. Sachin Barick General Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. fully owned and controlled by the present defendant Nos. 3a, 3b, 9, 10 and 11 who are the heirs and legal representatives of said Shri Sachindra Nath Barick. ( 10 ) THE petitioner contended that the original defendant's Sachindra Nath Barick, since deceased, formed a company being M/s. Sachin Barick General Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. fully owned and controlled by the present defendant Nos. 3a, 3b, 9, 10 and 11 who are the heirs and legal representatives of said Shri Sachindra Nath Barick. ( 11 ) THE instant application is made on behalf of such company for the purpose of granting leave by this Hon'ble Court to them to let out the office space measuring 1500 sq. ft. on the third floor of Premises No. 8, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta to one Easy Call Communication India Private Limited, in terms of its letter dated 20th April, 1999 being annexure 'e' to the petition. ( 12 ) QUESTIN before this Court is that if one is the Owner of the property, what is the necessity of obtaining any leave for the purpose of induction of tenant in such premises. The dispute lies therein which has been thoroughly considered hereinbelow for the purpose of coming into an appropriate conclusion. ( 13 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, said Shri Sachindranath Barick, the original defendant No. 3 was the lessee in and from 1948 of Premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, under the General Assurance Society Limited and the premises then consisted of a vacant plot land. ( 14 ) ON 21st September, 1962 such original defendant No. 3 purchased the premises from the Life Insurance Corporation of India personally in his own name and with his own funds. It is to be remembered that original company was converted to Life Insurance Corporation of India. ( 15 ) SAID original defendant No. 3 had mortgaged such property in favour of the Corporation for obtaining loan to pay for the purchase of the property. ( 16 ) SUBSEQUENT to such purchase, said original defendant entered into several contracts with diverse persons/companies for the purpose of letting out floorwise space of the building. ( 17 ) ON 6th Jully, 1965, the aforesaid company was incorporated. ( 16 ) SUBSEQUENT to such purchase, said original defendant entered into several contracts with diverse persons/companies for the purpose of letting out floorwise space of the building. ( 17 ) ON 6th Jully, 1965, the aforesaid company was incorporated. This is a pure and family company of said Shri Sachindranath Barick, original defendant No. 3 No other members of different branches i. e. from the branch of Sambhu or Saroj owned any share in the said company nor has any control over the same and none else apart from Sachin's family members are in possession, custody or control of the said Company or of the said Premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, on 16th November, 1965, the premises being Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue Calcutta, was transferred to the above incorporated Company. ( 19 ) IN furtherance, the petitioner stated that on 25th January, 1973, the original plaintiff made an application for amendment of the plaint for declaration that the Premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, belongs to the estate of Kalipada Barick as alleged, was purchased out of the funds of the estate in the benam of said Shri Sachindranath Barick, since deceased, the original defendant No. 3. Such amendment was allowed. ( 20 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the original plaintiff, has also made an application for appointment of Receiver in respect of such premises when a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was pleased to pass only an order of injunction restraining the original defendant No. 3 and his group including the Company from dealing with or disposing of or alienating or encumbering or interfering with or transferring or charging or mortgaging or selling in any manner whatsoever the said premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, until further orders of this Court. The said application dated 9th February, 1994 is stil pending and has not been finally disposed of. ( 21 ) ON 29th July, 1977 on an oral application on behalf of the Company, a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant them leave to let out the 4th floor of Premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, to M/s. New India Assurance Company Limited, notwithstanding the ad interim order dated 8th July, 1974 i. e. the order of injunction. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, to M/s. New India Assurance Company Limited, notwithstanding the ad interim order dated 8th July, 1974 i. e. the order of injunction. ( 22 ) AGAIN an oral application of some of the parties dated 9th July, 1982 similar leave was granted in respect of the 4th floor of the premises. ( 23 ) AGAIN on 4th October, 1992 in an oral application of some of the parties leave was granted to let out 5000 sq. ft. of the space on the 3rd floor of the premises in favour of the tenant. ( 24 ) ON 2nd May, 1984 again on an oral application of some of the parties similar leave was granted to the petitioner to let out 3500 sq. ft. of the 6th floor of the said premises in favour of the tenant. ( 25 ) ON 23rd December, 1992 an order was passed by this Court granting similar leave as aforesaid. ( 26 ) ON 8th March, 1994, the petitioner also made an application in writing for leave to let the office space of 3500 sq. ft. on the 6th floor in favour of the tenant and for the first time in an order dated 8th April, 1994, when a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court refused to grant leave as prayed for. The learned Judge was pleased to hold that it is settled law that an inter- locutory order passed in a suit continues to govern all the rights of the parties until the suit is concluded and the successive applications for the same inter locutory relief are not permitted unless changed circumstances so justify. ( 27 ) ON 10th June, 1994 an application was made for modification of the earlier order which was allowed subsequently on 6th July 1995 by this Hon'ble Court wich was earlier refused by granting leave to let out some of the portion of the property notwithstanding the earlier order of dismissal dated 8th April, 1994. ( 28 ) AN appeal was preferred from such order which was resolved on 31st July, 1995 when the order passed by a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was up-held by the appellate Court and both of the said application and appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. ( 28 ) AN appeal was preferred from such order which was resolved on 31st July, 1995 when the order passed by a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was up-held by the appellate Court and both of the said application and appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. ( 29 ) THEREAFTER on 31st January, 1999, the petitioner issued an advertisement in a Newspaper for letting out the office space measuring 1500 sq. ft. on the 3rd floor of the premises by inviting offers for the same. In response thereto, the party has come forward to take the said space on lease for a period of nine years on payment of rent as they have proposed to pay. ( 30 ) ON 26th April, 1999, the petitioners' Advocates communicated the above offer to the respective Advocates of other two branches and wanted to know their views and one of the party expressed his objection and other has not raised any objection in connection thereto. ( 31 ) THIS application for granting leave before the Court is out-come of such objection. ( 32 ) APART from the factual submission Mr. P. K. Das. learned senior counsel, appearing in respect of this application, contended two fold submission of law. This application cannot be hit by res judicata or principles analogous thereto and by virtue of section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, the property of the Company cannot be treated as copercenery property now. ( 33 ) FROM enquiry it appears that the branch of Saroj is taking an independent role i. e. neither to oppose nor to support the contention of the petitioner's as I have come from Mr. Utpal Bose, learned counsel appearing for them. ( 34 ) MR. Das, learned senior counsel, has emphasised repeatedly in respect of the question of res judicata or principle analogous thereto leaving aside big hardle about the question of applicability of section 4 (3) (a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 as well as right to appoint an independent person by the Court. However, I have no conflict of opinion and I am holding in favour of the petitioner, so far as the point of res judicata is concerned with a prima facie view. Therefore, much discussion in respect of AIR 1977 SC 392 (Y. B. Patil and Ors. However, I have no conflict of opinion and I am holding in favour of the petitioner, so far as the point of res judicata is concerned with a prima facie view. Therefore, much discussion in respect of AIR 1977 SC 392 (Y. B. Patil and Ors. v. Y. L. Patil) in its paragraph 4 therein, AIR 1977 SC 789 (Lal Chand v. Radha Kishan) in its paragraph 19, AIR 1974 SC 1380 (M/s. Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Ratan Lal Singh) in its paragraphs 10 and 15 and also AIR 1998 SC 2046 (Ashok Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.) in its paragraph 14 are not necessary to avoid the prolixty. However, I am clarified that this Court, in the facts situation, no conflict or difference of opinion in respect of such judgment and its applicability so far. ( 35 ) REAL contesting respondents are the defendant Nos. 1c to 1g, a group of heirs and/or representatives of Sambhunath Barick for whom Mr. Indrajit Sarkar, learned counsel is appearing. I called upon Mr. Sarkar, learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents to make his respective submissions. ( 36 ) MR. Sarkar has drawn my attention to the factual aspects once again before going into the question of law. He contended that on 30th September, 1991 and application was made by Sachindranath Barick, since deceased, orignal defendant No. 3 along with others for expunging and/or striking out premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, from the list of properties set out in the schedule of the plaint. Such application came up for hearing before a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 13th March, 1992 but no order was passed. ( 37 ) THEREAFTER, as already indicated before, a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was pleased to reject the prayer for granting leave to induct a tenant as far back as on 8th April, 1994, wherein a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that it is settled law that an interlocutory order passed in a suit continues to govern all the rights of the parties until the suit is concluded and the successive applications for the same interlocutory relief are not permitted unless changed circumstances so justify. ( 38 ) THEREFORE, the application is barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto. ( 38 ) THEREFORE, the application is barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto. However, on his usual fairness he also contended that by virtue of the order of modification, subsequently made by a single Bench of this Hon'ble Court and by order of the appellate Court it is very difficult for them to establish the case of res judicata or principles analogous thereto. ( 39 ) I have to clarify one aspect herein that there cannot be any bar in respect of successive applications in this respect before a Court of law for making several interlocutory applications when the suit is pending. Not only the law is permitting the same but also fact is permitting the same. If the spaces are different, tenants are different, considerations are different then how a Court restrain the hands of the petitioner in getting relief by making serveral applications is unknown to this Court. Moreover, the part of the order of the single Bench dated 8th April, 1994 as I have already indicated also speaks several interlocutory applications are not permissible to govern all rights of the parties unless changed circumstances so justify. Admittedly no appeal was preferred. Therefore, the portion of the order unless changed circumstances so justify is helping the cause of the petitioners. Granting of lease or tenancy right in favour of one under different consideration in respect of different sapace cannot be same with regard to the earlier one. This is not in respect of the final relief between the parties in the suit or in respect of the application between the parties in respect of the same cause. Let me forget about the pendency of one suit and/or appliation for the time being for hypothecal analysis. Can I say that cause of action in between coparcener or not in one hand and a tenant or lessee in other hand will be the same in respect of other tenant or lessee of some other premises? My answer is 'no'. ( 40 ) THEREFORE, when question of granting lease or tenancy right come forward, several applications have to be made on the basis of the several considerations. ( 41 ) IN the premises the question of res judicata or principle analogous thereto cannot be applicable in this particular case but the argument on Benami transaction is open for him. ( 40 ) THEREFORE, when question of granting lease or tenancy right come forward, several applications have to be made on the basis of the several considerations. ( 41 ) IN the premises the question of res judicata or principle analogous thereto cannot be applicable in this particular case but the argument on Benami transaction is open for him. In support of the Benami transaction he had drawn my attention to section 4 (3) (a) of such Act. ( 42 ) THE Act being the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 came into force. Section 1 of such Act prescribes that sections 3, 5 and 8 shall come into force at once i. e. 5th September, 1988 from the date of taking effect but the remaining provisions of the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 19th May, 1988 i. e. with retrospective date. An analysis of the Act says that virtue of AIR 1989 SC 1247 (Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare), the same has retrospective effect and is applicable to pending suits also. ( 43 ) THEREFORE, it appears that question of benami transaction is, in effect, applicable by virtue of such Act in respect of the premises which the petitioner is claiming to be the properties of the company but not the coparcenery property. Under this context, the scope and ambit of section 4 (3) (a) of such act has to be analysed. ( 44 ) FIRST part of section 4 i. e. sub-sections (1) and (2) prescribe that no suit, claim or action to enforce a right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other persons shall lie by by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. In addition thereto, no defence based any right in respect of any property held benami, whether agaisnt the person in whose name the property is held or against any other persons, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of the property. ( 45 ) THEREFORE, by analysis of the above two sub-sections, it is clear that no action or defence can be taken in respect of the property held benami. ( 45 ) THEREFORE, by analysis of the above two sub-sections, it is clear that no action or defence can be taken in respect of the property held benami. ( 46 ) UNDER this context, sub-section (3) is playing a very interesting role in this respect. Sub-section (3) says nothing in this case shall apply under Clause (a) i. e. where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family. ( 47 ) UNDER such circumstances, it can be impelled that sub-section 3 (a) is an embargo in respect of the other parts of section 4 provided where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family. ( 48 ) IN the instant case, the rival contentions are that it is not a coparcener property but property of a company, on the other hand the defence is, it is not a coparcenery property construction of which was made out of funds of the estate. ( 49 ) THEREFORE, unless it is decided finally in the suit, one cannot finally decide that it is not the coparcener property. In otherwords if this Court to-day, finally decides such issue, the same will be finally resolved although I have not been called upon for the same. In this context one other aspect can be high lighted that one of the single Bench of this Hon'ble Court did not accept that the property should be eleminated from the joint family properties. The respondent has also cited a decision being AIR 1973 Calcutta 378 (Smt. Sailabala Dassi v. Sambhunath Barik and Ors.) in respect of the same suit where the Court also held that since it is an administrative suit and the averments of benami transaction made in the Plaint but relief of declaration did not sought for, for effective adjudication amendment ought to be allowed despite delay. ( 50 ) THUS being the position, the tenancy or the lease agreements ought to be granted by the Court during the pendency of the suit, as pointed out by the petitioner but with pertain riders as given by this Court upon visualising the situation. ( 50 ) THUS being the position, the tenancy or the lease agreements ought to be granted by the Court during the pendency of the suit, as pointed out by the petitioner but with pertain riders as given by this Court upon visualising the situation. ( 51 ) THE question of giving rider is coming forward upon visualising the situation specially the scope and ambit of section 4 (3) (a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and balancing factor of the case. I do not agree with the argument as emphasised on behalf of the petitioner that as because several orders were passed by several single Benches of this Court either in an oral application or in written application, passing of an order under the similar circumstances is mere formality. This is because of further reason that I accept the argument of the petitioner that res judicata or principles analogous thereto will not be applicable in this case. ( 52 ) MR. Sarkar, learned counsel, in opposing, cited a judgment reported in AIR 1976 Patna 366 (Kamal Chaudhary v. Rajendra Chaudhary) wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that in a partition suit when co-owner occupies the whole property and excludes other co-owners from the shares of rents and profits of the property, a case of appointment of Receiver is made out although no waste or mis-management by the other co-owners in possession is made. The appointment of the Receiver cannot be opposed on the ground that some of the properties alleged by a party to be joined belonging to others. It is firmly settled that by appointment of a Receiver, the Court takes upon itself management of the property during continuation of the litigation. Receiver's possession is on behalf of all parties to the action. Therefore, the title of the real owner is in no way affected either in theory or on principle by the appointment of a Receiver. Relying upon another Division Bench as reported in AIR 1959 Mysore 35 (Ishwara Joisha v. Saraswathi Amma and Ors.) the respondent in his defence contended that if the Court come to the conclusion that it is just and covenient to appoint a Receiver to take possession and manage the property in dispute the Court can appoint Receiver suo motu. No application in that behalf from the parties would be necessary. No application in that behalf from the parties would be necessary. ( 53 ) I do not find any unreasonableness in making such submission by the respondent. On the contrary, I found that the petitioner by virtue of obtaining several orders from the Court engrafted in the mind that order of grating of leave is a matter of course, as well as a matter of right which according to me is not tenable. ( 54 ) THEREFORE, I have no hesitation in my mind to come to a conclusion that the petitioner has right to induct the tenant or lessee in respect of the property or properties in question and entitle for the leave but an account of the rent, issues and profits not only in respect of inducting this tenant/lessee alone but in respect of other tenants/lessee have to be submitted to a Special Officer to be appointed by this Court hereunder. ( 55 ) ACCORDINGLY the application stands disposed of by granting leave to the petitioner to let out the office space measuring 1500 sq. ft. in the third floor of Premises No. 8, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, to a third party in terms of letter dated 20th April, 1999 in annexure 'e' to the petition or in favour of better or other offerer or offerers but with a rider that from now as and when any of the portion of the premises in question being Premises Nos. 8 and 12, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta, is/are let out to any third party/parties, an account in respect of rents, issues and profits ought to be submitted before a Special Officer. Hence I appoint Mr. Amlayan Jyoti Sengupta for the same. Such Officer will keep such accounts secretly in his custody and if the parties require any inspection in respect of the accounts of rents, issues and profits he will allow the same. Such officer will be entitled for a month remuneration of 60 G. Ms. which will come out from the income of the building and ultimately will be adjusted as against the cost of the suit. This application is thus disposed of. No order is passed as to costs. Parties are entitled to act on a signed copy minute of the operative parts of the judgment and order. Application disposed of.