Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. The suit for recovery of possession on the strength of Ext. A20 title deed was decreed. That decree was confirmed by the lower appellate court. Therefore, this appeal by the defendant. 2. The defendant resisted the suit on various grounds including on the ground of adverse possession and limitation. Notice in the Second Appeal has been issued on the question of adverse possession alone. Therefore, only that aspect need be examined in this case. According to the defendant, he obtained title to the property as per Ext. B2 dated 28.1.1975 from one Narayani Amma who got the same property as per Ext. B1 dated 12.2.1969. Ever since 12.2.1969 thus the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant was in possession of the property and continuously thereafter on assignment as per Ext. B2, the defendant continued the possession and enjoyment of the property. The possession thus stretched the statutory period of 12 years, and therefore, t he plaintiff could not have sought for recovery of possession as the defendant had perfected the title on the basis of adverse possession and limitation. The issue regarding the adverse possession was raised as additional issue No. 6 and the finding thereon by the trial court is as follows: "Plaintiff alleged that the defendant trespassed into plaint B schedule on 31.10.1986. Ext.A29 is the plan submitted by the Commissioner in O.S.56/86 and A30 is the report in that behalf. That was a suit instituted by defendants mother against the present plaintiff. Wherein the dispute was in respect of the boundary of R.S.68/8 and R.S.70/6. Northern boundary of R.S.68/8 measures 70-3 metre. The measurement exactly tallies with the measurement of northern boundary of R.S.68/8inExt Cl. The commissioner in O.S.56/86 also reported that R.S.68/8 identified as plot B is undisputedly in the possession of the defendant i.e. the present plaintiff. No satisfactory explanation was given to out weigh this argument of the plaintiffs counsel. Hence it is to be presumed that the plot Al & A2 in R.S.68/8 was trespassed after O.S.56/86. Moreover R.S.68/8 was added in Ext. B2 document in the year 1975. Present suit is filed on 8th January 1987. Ext. B2 is dated 28.1.1975 coconut sapplings are aged 4-5 years only. Hence it is to be presumed that the plot Al & A2 in R.S.68/8 was trespassed after O.S.56/86. Moreover R.S.68/8 was added in Ext. B2 document in the year 1975. Present suit is filed on 8th January 1987. Ext. B2 is dated 28.1.1975 coconut sapplings are aged 4-5 years only. Hence, the plea of adverse possession and limitation is also found against the defendant." The findings of the lower appellate court on this aspect is as follows: "There is nothing on record to show that the defendant was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the disputed plots for the continuous period of 12 years. There is also nothing on record to show that the possession was hostile to the title of the plaintiff. It is deposed of DW1 that the thodu in Al plot was dug by the defendant and her predecesors together. The defendant got property only in 1975 as per Ext. B1 title deed. Ext. B1 is dated 22.2.1975. But the suit herein was filed on 8.1.1987. So the suit is filed within 12 years. The commissioner has noted the age of the kuzhikoors in the disputed property. It is reported that the coconut plants are only 5 years old. So there is nothing on record to hold that the right and title of the plaintiff is barred by adverse possession and limitation." Ext. B 1 dated 12.2.1969 shows that the property had been purchased by the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant and the defendant purchased it as per Ext. B2 dated 28.1.1975. The document disclosed that the properties are comprised in Survey Nos. 68/7 and 68/8. The disputed property is situated in Survey No. 68/8. Merely because the defendant purchased the property on 28.1.1975, it cannot be taken that the suit is within 12 years from that date and that he cannot contend adverse possession and limitation. As held by the Supreme Court in Gurbinder Singh v. Lai Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1553), the defendant can tack on to the period of his possession, the possession of his predecessor-in-interest as well to contend that he had perfected the title on the basis of adverse possession and limitation. The only impediment is that it shall not be independent trespass. The only impediment is that it shall not be independent trespass. As seen from Art.65 in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 the period of 12 years has to be computed from the period when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The term defendant has been defined in S.2(e) as follows: "defendant" includes - i) any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued; ii) any person whose estate is represented by the defendant as executor, administrator or other representatives;" Therefore, when adverse possession is claimed, the possession of the predecessor-in-interest and title, if it is without any interruption, can also be taken note of. Both the courts below were of the opinion that as the suit is filed within 12 years period from the date of Ext. B2, the plea of adverse possession cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court field in the aforesaid decision that: "10. This view has not been departed from in any case. At any rate none was brought to our notice where it has not been followed. Apart from that what we are concerned with is the language used by the legislature in the third column of Art.144. The starting point of limitation there stated is the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff The word "defendant" is defined thus in S.2(4) of the Limitation Act thus: "defendant includes any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued." No doubt, this is an inclusive definition but the gist of it is the existence of a jural relationship between different persons. There can be no jural relationship between two independent trespassers. Therefore, where a defendant in possession of property is sued by a person who has title to it but is out of possession what has to show in defernce is that he or anyone through whom he claims has been in possession for more than the statutory period. An independent trespasser not being such a person the defendant is not entitled to tack on the previous possession of that person to his own possession. In our opinion, therefore, the respondents suit is within time and has been rightly decreed by the courts below. An independent trespasser not being such a person the defendant is not entitled to tack on the previous possession of that person to his own possession. In our opinion, therefore, the respondents suit is within time and has been rightly decreed by the courts below. We dismiss this appeal with costs." In the light of this dictum, the conclusion of the courts below cannot be said to be legally justified. Accordingly, the finding based on that aspect is vacated. 2. But at the same time, the trial court had found on the basis of Exts. A29 plan and A30 commission report filed in O.S. No. 56/86 between the present plaintiff and the defendant's mother with respect to the boundary in dispute of the properties in survey No. 68/8 and 70/6 that the northern boundary of survey No. 68/8 tallied with the measurement of northern boundary in Ext. C1 plan. Based on that evidence the trial court presumed that the plots Al and A2 in R.S. No. 68/8 were trespassed after O.S.56/86. This is not a matter of presumption especially based on Exts. A29 plan and A30 commission report in a different suit concerning a different issue. Such documents could not have been pressed into service to find the plea of adverse possession against the defendant, without examining the commissioner who had submitted such report and plan in that suit. It is discernible from the trial court judgment that the dispute in that suit was with respect to the boundary of separate properties in Survey No. 68/8 and Survey No. 70/6. From Ext Cl plan submitted by the Commissioner in this case it is discernible that the boundary of the property claimed by the defendant on adverse possession is within Survey No. 68/8 itself and that property in Survey No. 70/6 started far south of the boundary of the property claimed by the defendant. Then Ext. A29 plan and A30 Commission report were of no avail to determine whether the possession of the defendant was within 12 years or not. Another aspect considered by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court was the age of the coconut sapplings grown in the property. It cannot be taken that one will plant coconut trees immediately as and when he comes into possession of the property. Another aspect considered by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court was the age of the coconut sapplings grown in the property. It cannot be taken that one will plant coconut trees immediately as and when he comes into possession of the property. But at the same time, the evidence of DW1 and DW2 had not been adverted to at all. DW1 is the son of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant. He was an attesting witness to Ext. B2 and according to him he had dug a channel in the property which has been reported by the commission. In such circumstances it was incumbent on the courts below to refer to that evidence to find out whether the plea of adverse possession can be allowed or not. Thus, according to me, the courts below did not properly examine the evidence on the case. Therefore, setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court with respect to the finding on adverse possession alone, the matter is remitted to that Court to decide that issue on the basis of available evidence, afresh, at any rate before closing of the Court for summer vacation. The parties shall appear before the lower appellate court on 13.12.1999.