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1999 DIGILAW 509 (KER)

Chacko v. Jaya Varma

1999-10-15

A.R.LAKSHMANAN, S.SANKARASUBBAN

body1999
Judgment :- S. Sankarasubban, J. This Writ Appeal is filed against the judgment in O.P. No. 18196/99 by the second respondent in the Original Petition. The third respondent in the Original Petition is the Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Ltd., which is a Co-operative Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The election to the third respondent/ Cooperative Bank was notified to beheld on 27.2.1999. The first petitioner in the Original Petition Jaya Varma filed O.P. No. 3762/99 challenging the removal of 1951 members from the final voters list published by the Returning Officer. 2. In C.M.P. No. 16510/99 in O.P. No. 3762/99 this Court allowed casting of votes by the 1951 members subject to the result of the Original Petition. The election accordingly took place on 27.2.1999. By another order in C.M.P. No. 16510/99 a direction was given to declare the results by counting the undisputed votes alone. The results were declared on 26.4.1999. The meeting of the elected persons were held as required under R.38 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules on 11.5.1999. President and Vice President were elected on the same day. O.P. No. 3762/1999 and W. A. No. 786 of 1999 were finally disposed of on 7.7.1999. The court declared that the persons whose votes were collected in separate box could be counted. The court also found that the election of two persons has to set aside. It thereafter directed the Returning Officer to alter the declaration already made to that extent. The Returning Officer thereafter rendered an order cancelling the election of two persons and declaring elected two other persons in their stead. 3. Thereafter, there was a demand for the resignation of the President. Since he did not resign, the members wanted to convene a meeting of the Board of Directors for moving a motion of no confidence. The Original Petition was filed for a declaration to the first respondent, viz., the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Pathanamthitta to convene a meeting of the general body in order to discuss the no confidence motion. The learned single judge considered the question. The learned single judge took the view that since the original election of the President was only provisional and the final declaration of the results was made only subsequently, the President should get himself elected again, since there was a change in the complexion of the Managing Committee. The learned single judge considered the question. The learned single judge took the view that since the original election of the President was only provisional and the final declaration of the results was made only subsequently, the President should get himself elected again, since there was a change in the complexion of the Managing Committee. The learned single judge allowed the Original Petition and directed a fresh election to be conducted for the post of President. It is against the above judgment that the present appeal is preferred by the second respondent. 4. The contention of the appellant is that originally, this Court directed the counting of only those votes with regard to which there was no controversy. The appellant and some other members of the Managing Committee were elected. When the Original Petition was finally disposed of, this Court found that the names of two persons should be deleted and in their place two other members should be substituted. In accordance with the above judgment, the Registrar declared the elections of two members. It is subsequently found that the President was elected at the time when declaration was made originally. The election was provisional. Hence, they could not participate in the election of the President. Now, they want to remove the petitioner by no confidence motion. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the action of the petitioner was malafide and he was trying to take all steps to block the convening of the meeting. 5. Two points arise for consideration in this case: (1) Was the election of the appellant as President only provisional? (2) Is there any provision under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act to move no confidence motion against the appellant? 6. Point No. 1: This point found favour with the learned single Judge. The learned single judge took the view that the results of the election were allowed to be declared provisionally, subject to the result of the Original Petition on the basis of undisputed votes only. Finally, this Court decided the matter and directed to declare the results of the election taking into account the disputed votes also. Accordingly, results of the election were finally declared on 13.7.1999. Earlier declaration of the results was provisional. The members of the Managing Committee were elected after the provisional declaration of the results. Finally, this Court decided the matter and directed to declare the results of the election taking into account the disputed votes also. Accordingly, results of the election were finally declared on 13.7.1999. Earlier declaration of the results was provisional. The members of the Managing Committee were elected after the provisional declaration of the results. But when the results were declared finally, the earlier declaration had to be altered by removing the name of two members and substituting the names of two 'members. The learned single judge has taken the view that when final declaration of the results was made, earlier elected President and Vice President should have resigned for allowing the finally elected committee to elect a President, since the election was finally declared only 13.7.1999 as per R.35(3)(s) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the rules'), a meeting has to beheld immediately under R.38(1) of the Rules. According to us, the reasoning given by the learned single judge is not correct. 7. In this case, election notification to conduct election to the new Board of Directors was made on 27.2.1999. The notification was published on 30.1.1999. On 5.2.1999 the Returning Officer removed 1953 voters from the final voters list. On 11.2.1999, O.P.No. 3762 of 1999 was filed challenging the illegal removal of 1953 members. On 23.2.1999, an interim order was passed in O.P.No. 3762 of 1999 to the following effect: "The returning officer will keep a separate box for casting votes of members shown in Ext. P5 excluding members 50881 to 51201. For members 50881 to 51207, another box will be kept. Regarding the other undisputed votes the Returning Officer will maintain another ballot box. The votes kept in the box could be separately counted. The returning officer would declare the result after filing a statement before this Court". On 11.3.1999 election was held and a report was filed by the Returning Officer. The Original Petition was referred to the Division Bench. On 20.4.1999, an order was passed in C.M.P. No. 16510 of 1999 in O.P. No. 3762 of 1999 as follows: "In the facts and circumstances of the case, election may be declared subject to final result of the Original Petition, counting the undisputed votes in Box No.1 only. The question whether the votes contained in Box Nos. On 20.4.1999, an order was passed in C.M.P. No. 16510 of 1999 in O.P. No. 3762 of 1999 as follows: "In the facts and circumstances of the case, election may be declared subject to final result of the Original Petition, counting the undisputed votes in Box No.1 only. The question whether the votes contained in Box Nos. 2 and 3 can be counted or not can be decided only after answering the Reference Order at the time of final disposal of the case. The matter can be considered only after vacation on hearing the full arguments. The Administrator shall hand over charge to the elected committee immediately after declaration of the result. The returning officer may declare the results of election subject to the final result of the O.P. as directed above within one week from today." As per the above order, the Returning Officer declared the results of the election and thereafter on 11.5.1999 the President and Vice President of the Bank were elected based on the above declaration. Final judgment in O.P. No. 3762 of 1999 was passed on 7.7.1999. This Court directed the counting of votes from box Nos.1 and 2 and to declare the results. The Returning Officer declared the results on 13.7.1999 after adding the votes kept in separate boxes. The fifth and seventh respondents in the O.P. were declared elected. The Vice President and another were defeated. The question is whether a new President has to be elected, because the court ordered, declaration of the results was provisional. 8. We perused the orders passed regarding the declaration of election. We are of the view that because the results of the election were ordered to be declared subject to final orders to be passed in the case, it cannot be said that the declaration was not final. The question before this Court was that whether 1654 votes were validly cast or not. Since those votes were doubtful votes, this Court directed the Returning Officer to count the undisputed votes and to declare the results. When this order was there, the Returning Officer was exercising his function under R.35(3)(r) of the Rules. Thereafter, the Managing Committee met and administration was handed over and the Committee elected the President and Vice President. Subsequently when the Original Petition was finally disposed of, it took the view that the disputed votes should also be counted. When this order was there, the Returning Officer was exercising his function under R.35(3)(r) of the Rules. Thereafter, the Managing Committee met and administration was handed over and the Committee elected the President and Vice President. Subsequently when the Original Petition was finally disposed of, it took the view that the disputed votes should also be counted. When those votes were counted, the results of two persons, who were earlier elected, were affected and instead of their place two new persons who secured votes were declared elected. The judgment in O.P. No. 3762/99 is reported in AT. Jaya Varma v. Returning Officer -1999(2) KLT 826 =1999(2) KLJ 120. In this context, it is pertinent to note that in paragraph 14 of the above decision, the Division Bench held as follows: "Ext. P7 in O.P. No. 11459/99 has to be altered and now the result has to be declared according to law forthwith..." Thus, this Court only directed alteration of the earlier results. 9. Merely because the results were declared subject to the result of the Original Petition, it cannot be said that the earlier declaration of the results was not a valid one. As a matter of fact, as per the declaration, the Committee took charge and has taken certain decisions and also elected President and Vice President. Thus de facto that Committee had functioned under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The Court has not declared the functioning of the Committee as illegal. If we peruse the Rules. It only provides for one declaration after final counting. According to us, merely because subsequently the court found that the election of two of the members was not valid, it does not infringe upon the validity of the earlier Committee constituted. The learned single judge took the view that the two new members could not take part in the meeting of the election of President and Vice President and hence those two office bearers should be elected again. We don't agree with the above view. It was because of the pendency of the litigation that such things happened. We take the view that there is no necessity for conducting an election of the President again, merely because the earlier constitution of the Committee was on the basis of the interim order of this Court. 10. We don't agree with the above view. It was because of the pendency of the litigation that such things happened. We take the view that there is no necessity for conducting an election of the President again, merely because the earlier constitution of the Committee was on the basis of the interim order of this Court. 10. Point No.2 :Now ,this point has to be considered because the Original Petition was decided on point No.1 with which we don't agree. The petitioners in the Original Petition have prayed for a writ directing the first respondent to convene a meeting of the Board of Directors to discuss the no confidence motion against the second respondent, who is the appellant, and to elect the President and Vice President of the Bank. The contention taken by the appellant is that the law does not enable the moving of a no confidence motion against the President of the Board. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on two decisions of this Court in support of their contention that even though there is no provision in the Act or Rules, the President can be removed by a no confidence motion. The first decision is Narayanan Nairv. Joint registrar-1982 KLT 602. In that case, Bhaskaran, J. (as he then was) took the view that the principles of S.16 of the General Clauses Act can be applied and hence, the President can be removed by the Committee. His Lordship relied on the decision of a learned single judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in N. Venkataratnam Naidu v. District Collector Nellore - AIR 1972 A.P. 349. The next decision is Gregory v. Secretary Manimala Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. -1990(1) KLT 374. In the latter decision, in paragraph 7, Viswanatha Iyer, J. observed thus: "The power of the managing committee to remove the President, after passing a motion of no confidence, has been upheld in the decision in Narayanan Nair v. Joint Registrar, 1982 KLT 602, with which I am in full agreement. If the managing committee could elect a President equally it must be within their power to undo their action by cancelling the appointment in appropriate proceedings. It is well within their purview to undo an act done by them, which stands recognised in S.16 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125". 11 . If the managing committee could elect a President equally it must be within their power to undo their action by cancelling the appointment in appropriate proceedings. It is well within their purview to undo an act done by them, which stands recognised in S.16 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125". 11 . Advocate Shri. P. Ravindran appearing for the appellant contended that in the above two decisions, this Court applied the principles in S.16 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act 1125 which corresponds to S.16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central Act). Learned counsel pointed out that as per the General Clauses Act, only the power of appointment gives the power of termination also. But so far as the President of the Committee is concerned, he is not appointed, but he is elected. Appointment and election are different. The appointment shall take place in the course of employment and in such cases always the services can be terminated. He also brought to our notice that the decision in N. Venkataratnam Naidu v. District Collector Nellore - AIR 1972 AP 349 - which was relied on by Bhaskaran, J, (as he then was), was reversed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v. The Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Eluru - ILR 1975 Andhra 242. Shri. Ravindran further cited the decisions in Hindurao v. Krishnarao -AIR 1982 Bombay 216 stndJagdev v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Haryana and Ors. - AIR 1991 Punjab & Hariyana 149, which have taken the view that in the absence of a provision in the Act and Rules, the President cannot be removed by a no confidence motion. Shri. T.R. Ramachandran Nair and Shri. George Poonthottam appearing for the respondents brought to our notice the decisions in Mohan Chandra v. Institute of C.A. India - AIR 1972 Delhi 91, Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India - AIR 1975 Delhi 200, Bar Council of Kerala v. Thankappan Pitted -1985 KLT 986, Bool Chand v. Kurukshetra University - AIR 1968 SC 292 and Union of India v. Gurbakesh Singh and Anr. - AIR 1975 SC 641. 12. Before we deal with the rival contentions, we shall have a view of the relevant provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-laws. The Society in question is the Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Ltd., Eraviperoor. - AIR 1975 SC 641. 12. Before we deal with the rival contentions, we shall have a view of the relevant provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-laws. The Society in question is the Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Ltd., Eraviperoor. It was a Society established in 1953. Bye-law 28 speaks of Board of Directors. It is as follows: "The Board of Directors shall consist of 11 Directors elected from among the members from different wards as specified in the election sub-rules of which one shall be a woman and one shall be Scheduled Caste/Scheduled tribe member. The term of office of the Board shall be five years from the date of election. However, the term of office shall expire on 31st December of the 5th year". Bye-law 29 speaks of Chairman and Vice Chairman. Under Bye-law 29(i) "When a Board of Directors is constituted it shall elect its President and other office bearers within one week from the date of its constitution. It shall also by a resolution authorise the officer concerned to take charge from the outgoing office bearers. The Chairman shall preside over all meetings of the Board and also over the Annual General Body meeting and special general body meeting when such meetings are called for". Under Clause (ii), the Chairman of the meeting shall have a casting vote. Bye-law 30 speaks of eligibility for election as Director. Bye-law 31 speaks of vacation of office by a Director. It states that a Director shall be deemed to have vacated his office before the expiry of his term on certain reasons. Bye-law 32 states that if vacancies occur in the Board of Directors through death, removal, resignation or any other reasons, it shall be filled by fresh election as provided for in the Rules a framed under the Act. Under Bye-law 34, the quorum for the Director Board is stated. Bye-law 35 speaks of powers of the Board of Directors. The powers of the Chairman are prescribed under Bye-law 38. His powers are to preside over the General Meeting, meeting of the Board of Directors, sub-committee meetings and meetings of any other committee and to supervise the general working of the Bank. 13. Now, coming to the Act. S.16 deals with membership of the Society. The powers of the Chairman are prescribed under Bye-law 38. His powers are to preside over the General Meeting, meeting of the Board of Directors, sub-committee meetings and meetings of any other committee and to supervise the general working of the Bank. 13. Now, coming to the Act. S.16 deals with membership of the Society. S.27 states that subject to the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws, the final authority of a society shall vest in the general body of the members. Under S.28, the general body of a Society shall constitute a committee for a period not exceeding three years in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the Society to such committee. S.32 speaks of super session of committee on certain conditions. S.31 deals with nominees of Government on committee of an apex or a central society. Clause (3) of S.31 states that such person cannot take part in the discussion of any no confidence motion or vote on any such motion. S.109 is the rule making section. S.109(1) gives power for framing rules for election of the members of the Committee by the general body of a Society. S.109(2) (xxxviii) gives power to frame rules in any other matter required or allowed by this Act; or be prescribed. 14. R.35 is the Rule which deals with the procedure regarding election of members to the Committee. R.39(1) says that the bye-laws of every society shall pro vide for the term of its Committee. R.39(2) says that all the members of the Committee (including those elected in casual vacancies) shall vacate their office on the expiry of the term of the Committee irrespective of the date on which they were elected as members of the Committee. R.43 gives the procedure for election of President and Vice President by the members of the Committee. R.44 deals with disqualification of membership of Committee. It states that no member of the Society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the Committee of the Society under S.28, if he is disqualified as per R.44 or as per S.28. R.48 deals with the payment of travelling allowance, daily allowance and sitting fees to the members of the Societies and of the Committee. R.49 deals with the payment of remuneration to Committee members of the Societies. R.48 deals with the payment of travelling allowance, daily allowance and sitting fees to the members of the Societies and of the Committee. R.49 deals with the payment of remuneration to Committee members of the Societies. Chapter XIII of the Rules deals with Co-operative Unions. R.161 states that the Chairman may be removed from his office by a non-confidence motion. 15. Thus, the salient features which appear after going through the provisions of the Bye-laws, Act and Rules are that the management of the Co-operative Societies vests in the general body. The general body elections of the Managing Committee are for a fixed term. The Managing Committee can be terminated only by super session, under S.32 of the Act. Disqualification's are laid down under the Rules and if a member disqualifies, he will cease to be a member of the Managing Committee and he can be removed from the membership of the Managing Committee. Neither the Act nor the Bye-laws give any provision for removing a Managing Committee by no confidence motion. The Bye-laws provide for electing a President and Vice President. The President is to preside over the meetings of the Board and over all supervision of the Society. R.43 deals with the procedure for election of the President and Vice President. Excepting for this, neither the Bye-laws nor the Act nor the Rules speak anything about the President and Vice President. From the Rules, it appears that even the travelling allowance and sitting fee are given only to the members of the Managing Committee. So far as apex society and unions are concerned, there is a provision for moving a no confidence motion against the Chairman. It is in this background that we shall to consider the question whether a President can be removed by a no confidence motion. 16. S.16 of the General Clauses Act was relied on in the two decisions, viz., Narayanan Nair v. Joint Registrar -1982 KLT 602 - and Gregory v. Secretary Manimala Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. 1990(1) KLT 374. S.16 of the Central Act is akin to S.16 of the Interpretation of General Clauses Act, 1125. Under the above Section, if a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed in exercise of that power. S.16 of the Central Act is akin to S.16 of the Interpretation of General Clauses Act, 1125. Under the above Section, if a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed in exercise of that power. The interpretation of the above clause came for consideration before the Federal Court in Kutoor Vengayil Rayarappn Nayanar v. Kutoor Vengayil Valia Madhavi Amma and Ors. - AIR (37) 1950 Federal Court 140. The question there was whether a receiver appointed under 0.40R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be removed by the court. 0.40, R. l(a) states thus: "Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree". In Paragraph 6, the Federal Court stated thus: "The statute has codified the well understood rule of general law as stated by Woodroffe on Receivers, Edn. 4, that the power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power-to create. In other words, it is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to, or consequence of, that power; the authority to call such officer into being necessarily implies the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no' longer necessary, or to remove the incumbent for an abuse of those functions or for other causes shown. It seems that it was because of this statutory rule based on the principles above mentioned that in 0.40, R.1, Civil P.C., no express mention was made of the power of the Court in respect of the removal or suspension of a receiver. The General Clauses Act has been enacted so as to avoid superfluity of language in statutes whenever it is possible to do so. The legislature instead of saying in 0.40, R.1, that the Court will have power to appoint, suspend or remove a receiver, simply enacted that wherever convenient the Court may appoint a receiver and it was implied within that language that it may also remove or suspend him..." Now, the question is whether the election of a President is appointment. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon. Reprint Edition 1987, the distinction between 'appointment' and 'election' is stated, which states as follows: "The term "appointment" is to be distinguished from "election". The former is an executive act, whereby a person is named as the incumbent of an office and invested therewith, by one or more individuals who have the sole power and right to select and constitute the officer. Election means that the person is chosen by a principle of selection in the nature of a vote, participated in by the public generally or by the entire class of persons qualified to express their choice in this manner". In Dr. Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University - AIR 1968 SC 292 -the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the interpretation of S.14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, which is similar to S.16 of the General Clauses Act 1887. There, the question was with regard to the termination of tenure of office of Vice Chancellor. The argument was raised on the ground that there was no provision regarding the termination of office of the Vice Chancellor. But that was rejected by stating that the Chancellor as the appointing authority has every power to remove the service of the Vice Chancellor. In Union of India v. Gurbaksh Singh and Anr. - AIR 1975 SC 641- also the same question arose. There also the appellant, who was appointed as Assistant Settlement Commissioner was dismissed from service. This was justified under S.16 of the General Clauses Act. The decision in Mohan Chandra and Ors. v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Ors. - AIR 1972 Delhi 91- deals with the case of President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants under the Chartered Accountants Act. In that case, the facts are as follows: On 23.5.1971 there was a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India at Calcutta. The Committee considered the correspondence received regarding a world tour organised of which Shri. M.C.Bhandari, President of the Institute was supposed to be the International Chairman. One of the letters of which particular attention was invited was a letter dated 5.5.1971. It was allegedly written by the President. The Committee considered the correspondence received regarding a world tour organised of which Shri. M.C.Bhandari, President of the Institute was supposed to be the International Chairman. One of the letters of which particular attention was invited was a letter dated 5.5.1971. It was allegedly written by the President. This correspondence was regarded as having brought down the image of the Institute and although the President had offered an explanation, the Executive Committee were not satisfied with the explanation and therefore sent a letter to him stating that "there is no more scope for trust and confidence in the President. We will now seek the guidance of the Council in the matter". The Council decided to drop the matter. It also noted that Bhandari was tendering his resignation. There, one of the questions considered was whether the President could be removed. In paragraph 42, the Division Bench held as follows: "When a member of the Council is elected President he is so elected because the Council wants him to hold that office. The Council is thus the appointing authority in the case of the President and it is well recognised that the power to appoint includes the power to suspend or dismiss (see S.16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). If the Council as the appointing authority could therefore suspend or remove the President from his office the holder of that office could also tender his resignation and the fact that there is no provision in S.12 which provides for any such resignation will in no way preclude the Council from accepting such resignation". 17. In the case reported in Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India - AIR 1975 Delhi 200 - the question that came up for consideration was that whether the Chairman of Bar Council is holder of office and whether he can be removed by a no confidence motion. In that case, actually the Chairman had resigned. So, the question whether a no confidence motion can be moved against him did not arise for consideration. But the court considered the question whether the Bar Council could make rules for removal of the President. S.15 is the rule making power. Under R.15(2)(c) the Bar Council is enabled to make rules in the manner of election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Bar Council. But the court considered the question whether the Bar Council could make rules for removal of the President. S.15 is the rule making power. Under R.15(2)(c) the Bar Council is enabled to make rules in the manner of election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Bar Council. The court held as follows: "The Chairman of Bar Council is holder of office which is distinct from employment and he is not employee of anyone. The power to elect Chairman conferred on the Bar Council also carries with it power of removal of holder of an office. The silence of the Act on the point of his removal remains unchanged. The power to elect Chairman given to the Bar Council is only codification of a part of the common law and that codification does not change the other part of the common law implying the removal of the elected Chairman. Just as rules can be made under the section to carry out the powers of the Bar Council, rules also may be made on such implied power. The two powers are inseparable except by statutory intervention without which they remain connected even if only one of those powers have been made statutory". In his context, it is relevant to note that the decision in Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India - AIR 1975 Delhi 200 - did not approve the decision in Mohan Chandra and Ors. v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Ors. - AIR 1972 Delhi 91- when it observed in paragraph 10 as follows: "But the occupation of an office by the holder thereof even by appointment and much more so by election is an entirely different process. The distinction between the two is not found to have been made by a Division Bench of this Court in Mohan Chandra v. Institute of Chartered Accountants, AIR 1972 Delhi 91, when it was observed obiter that the principle of S.16 was relevant to the consideration of the removal of the elected President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. Nor can it be said that every appointment results in an employment". N. Venkataratnam Naidu v. District Collector Nellore and Ors. - AIR 1972 AP 349 - is also a case where S.16 of the General Clauses Act was invoked. Nor can it be said that every appointment results in an employment". N. Venkataratnam Naidu v. District Collector Nellore and Ors. - AIR 1972 AP 349 - is also a case where S.16 of the General Clauses Act was invoked. But this was not approved by a Division Bench of that Court in Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Elu.ru, West Godavari District and Ors. - ILR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 242. In that case, the petitioner was the President of the Managing Committee of the Eluru Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. Differences arose between the President of the Managing Committee and the members of the Managing Committee. The President was supported by two members and those opposed by him were supported by two members with the result the members were evenly divided. It would appear that one of the supporters of the President was later disqualified and another defected. The four members, who were opposed to the President sent a requisition to the petitioner requesting him to convene a meeting of the Managing Committee within fifteen days for considering and passing a vote of no confidence against him and for electing a new President. After considering the various provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, their Lordships held that there was no provision enabling the members of the Managing Committee to move a no confidence motion against the President. The decision inN. Venkataratnam Naidu v. District Collector Nellore and Ors. - AIR 1972 AP 349 - was considered. Their Lordships disagreed from the above decision and held as follows: "We may say at once that with great respect to our learned brother, we are not in agreement with the view expressed by him. Omissions in statutes are not to be lightly inferred. And pointed out at page 33 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, twelth edition: "It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. And pointed out at page 33 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, twelth edition: "It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. Lord MERSEY said "It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words, which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do" "We are not entitled said Lord LOREBURN L.C., "to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the form corners of the Act itself. In Paragraph 11 of the judgment, it is observed as follows : "In coming to the conclusion that there is such an implied power, our learned brother Sambasiva Rao, J., in Venkataratnam's case relied upon the case of Foster v. Foster. The defendant company in that case was governed by several Articles of Association. It may be seen that Art.99 provided that the Directors of the company shall have power from time to time to appoint any one or more of their body to be Managing Director or Directors and if they are dissatisfied with the person whom they have appointed as Managing Director it was open to them to substitute him by appointing another as the Managing Director in place of the old one. The office-bearers of a Society, under the Act are not appointed by the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors or the governing body of a committee by whichever name it... elects the office-bearers. When they are elected in accordance with the procedure prescribed in R.11 C of the Rules, they cannot be removed except in accordance with the procedure prescribed if any and in accordance with the Rules. As already noticed, no such procedure is prescribed. We are, therefore, of the view that the case of Foster v. Foster, where it was held that a Managing Director could be removed by the Board and another appointed in his place can have no application to these cases as the President and the office-bearers of the committee are elected in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules". Thus, it can be seen that the Division Bench judgment took the view the office bearers of a Society are not appointed by the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors or the governing body select the office bearers when they are elected in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules. They cannot be removed except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Thus, their Lordships made a distinction between 'appointment' and 'election'. 18. In Hindurao v. Krishnarao (AIR 1982 Bombay 216) the Bombay High Court had to consider the same question under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. The court said thus: "It cannot be forgotten that the Co-operative Societies Act has been enacted having regard to the directive principles of the State policy as enshrined in the Constitution of India. Cooperative movement is a socio-economic and moral movement. To say the least it is a part of the scheme of decentralisation and deconcentration of power. Collective power intoxication cannot be equated with co-operation. In the very nature of the said movement it must not be only self-regulated but the constraints and restraints are inherent in the movement itself. The rights conferred or created by the statute are coupled with duty. Fixity of tenure helps proper administration and management of the society. Co-operative movement cannot be permitted to be polluted or chocked by internal or individual strike nor it can be permitted to be polluted by party politics. Co-operative capitalism despotism is not co-operation. On the other hand co-operation is a substitute for self interest of an individual or a group of individuals for the benefit of whole community. Therefore, if the society itself while framing and adopting its own code of conduct in the form of bye-laws, which are to be duly approved by the Registrar, has not made any provision for removal of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman by passing a vote of no confidence, it cannot be said that the step taken by the Society or Registrar in that behalf is not a regulatory one nor is in the interest of the society or the general public. The so-called mandate theory cannot be pushed to ridiculous extremes to convert co-operative movement into an arena or akhada of power politics. Whenever the legislature thought that a person is not fit to continue as a member of the board, specific provisions are made for his removal. The so-called mandate theory cannot be pushed to ridiculous extremes to convert co-operative movement into an arena or akhada of power politics. Whenever the legislature thought that a person is not fit to continue as a member of the board, specific provisions are made for his removal. A person is elected as Chairman or Vice-Chairman for a particular term. His office is controlled by the provisions of the Act. It is not an office at will and therefore, to such an office S.16 of the General Clauses Act cannot apply. It is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter in detail in view of the decision of this Court in Jehangir Bhikaji v. Corporation of City of Nagpur, 1960 Nag. LJ 99. A similar view seems to have been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Kanta Devi v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 Raj. 134. Similarly, in Jagdev Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Haryana - AIR 1991 Punjab & Haryana 149 - it was held that the President of the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society cannot be removed by a no confidence motion. It was further held that S.16 of the General Clauses Act does not apply. In paragraph 14 of the above decision, it was held as follows: "Identical provision is contained in S.16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, according to our considered view. S.14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 (equivalent to S.16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897), only talks of inherent power of removal in an authority which had the power of appointment. This Section is not applicable to an office-bearer or a person who is elected to an office. S.14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act is to be applied in cases of appointments made in the public service and not to an elected office". In Jamuna Prasad v. Lachi Ram - AIR 1954 SC 686 - it was observed as follows "The right to stand as a candidate and contest an election is not a common law right. It is a special right created by the Statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute". This was reiterated in Thampanoor Ravi v. Charupara Ravi & Ors. 1999 (3) KLT 48 = JT 1999(7) 231. It is a special right created by the Statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute". This was reiterated in Thampanoor Ravi v. Charupara Ravi & Ors. 1999 (3) KLT 48 = JT 1999(7) 231. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, it was observed thus: "Under what circumstances and subject to what limitations a person could be declared to have incurred disqualification is a matter of policy of law and the courts have cautioned themselves by stating that right to vote, right to elect or contest an election is a creature of status and circumscribed by the limitations contained therein". Learned counsel for the respondents then brought to our notice the decision of this Court reported in Bar Council of Kerala v. Thankappan Pillai 1985 KLT 986 which is a judgment of five Judges. There also, S.15 of the Advocates' Act was considered. There, as a matter of fact, the question whether a no confidence motion could be moved or not was not considered, because the term of office of the member of Bar Council was already expired. The next question that was considered was whether as per S.15, any rule can be framed for the purpose of removing the President. The five Judges Bench relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court reported in Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar Council of India- AIR 1975 Delhi 200 - and held that the proposed Rules were incidental to the purposes of Sub-ss.3 and 4 of the Advocates' Act and were within the general power conferred on the State Bar Council under S.15(1) of the Advocates' Act. No such question arises in the case at hand. On a consideration of all the decisions, we are of the view that S.16 of the General Clauses Act cannot be made applicable. Since there is no provision for moving a no confidence under the Act, Rules or Bye-laws, there cannot be an implied power to move such a motion. 19. Another contention was raised with regard to the removal of the Directors under the Companies Act. We are afraid, we cannot refer to the provisions of the Companies Act, because S.107 of the Co-operative Societies Act says that the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 shall not apply to any Co-operative Society. 19. Another contention was raised with regard to the removal of the Directors under the Companies Act. We are afraid, we cannot refer to the provisions of the Companies Act, because S.107 of the Co-operative Societies Act says that the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 shall not apply to any Co-operative Society. Another argument that was advanced was that in Common Law, the body which selects a person is entitled to remove the same person. We are afraid, whether we can apply the principles of Common Law in the present case because of the following observations of the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta - AIR 1967 SC 997 - which are as follows: "To sum up: some of the doctrines of common law of England were administered as the law in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The Common Law of England was not adopted in the rest of India. Doubtless some of its principles were embodied in the Statute Law of our country. That apart, in the Muffasil, some principles of common law were invoked by courts on the ground of justice, equity and good It is, therefore, a question of fact in each case whether any particular branch of a pan of the law of India or in any particular part thereof. 19. Hence we allow the Writ Appeal Judge and dismiss the Original Petition.