In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the notification dated 9.10.1996 issued by the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura terminating her services from the post of Comptroller of Household, Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, with immediate effect and for directing the respondents to declare the petitioner as confirmed in the said post with effect from 3.10.1996 on completion of her probation period. 2. The relevant facts are that on 1.10.1994, the petitioner applied for the post of Comptroller of Household, Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Agartala and on 3.10.1994, the Secretary to the Governor of Tripura issued a memorandum offering the post of Comptroller of Household to the petitioner and by letter dated 3.10.1994, the petitioner accepted the said offer and joined in the post of Comptroller of Household. On 21.10.1994, the Secretary to the Governor of Tripura issued an order dated 19.10.1994 appointing the petitioner as Comptroller of Household, Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Agartala temporarily with effect from 3.10.1994. In the said appointment order it was, inter alia, stated that the petitioner will remain on probation for 2 years with the first probation period being 1 year to be extended by another year of prabation thereafter. On 1.11.1995, the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura issued an order to the effect that the petitioner has successfully completed her first year probation on 2.10.1995 and was allowed to continue her second year probation with effect from 3.10.1995. On-9.10.1996, the impugned notification was issued wherein it was stated that on completion .of the probation period, the case of the petitioner was reviewed and on such review, the competent authority has not been satisfied with the performance of the petitioner. By the said impugned notification dated 9.10.1996, the services of the petitioner were terminated with immediate effect. The said impugned notification was followed up by the memorandum dated 10.10.1996 sanctioning a month's pay in favour of the petitioner with effect from 10.10.1996 in lieu of one month's notice. The petitioner then served a notice dated 11.10.1996 to the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, demanding withdrawal of. The said impugned notification was followed up by the memorandum dated 10.10.1996 sanctioning a month's pay in favour of the petitioner with effect from 10.10.1996 in lieu of one month's notice. The petitioner then served a notice dated 11.10.1996 to the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, demanding withdrawal of. the notification dated 9.10.1996 with retrospective effect but the SA & Joint Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, in his communication dated 18.10.1996 informed the petitioner that the impugned notification had been issued in terms of paragraph 2 (ii) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 of the Governor's Secretariat and as per provisions of Rule 11 (ix) read with item (viii) (a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 for short the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has moved this Court for appropriate reliefs. 3. Mr. PK Bis was, for the petitioner, submitted that a reading of the offer of appointment to the petitioner contained in the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 would show that the appointment of the petitioner Could be terminated at any time by a month's notice by the appointing authority forthwith or before the stipulated period of notice by making payment of sum equivalent to pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpired portion thereof. Hence the appointment of the petitioner even though to a temporary post could only be terminated without notice by making payment of sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice. According to Mr. Biswas, therefore, since the petitioner's services were terminated without a month's notice, such termination could be made by making payment of pay and allowances for one month and not otherwise. But since the pay and allowances for one month was not paid to the petitioner alongwith the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996, the termination is void and is liable to be quashed. He relied on the well settled principle of law as explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Hukam Chand Shyam vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789 , that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. Mr. Mr. Bis was also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Senior Superintendent, RMS, Cochin vs. Gopinath Sorter, AIR 1972 SC 1487 , and Raj Kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 536 , in which the Supreme Court has held that payment of pay plus allowances for the period of notice was a condition of termination of service forthwith under the proviso to Rule 5 (1) of the Central Civil Service (Temporar) Service) Rules, 1965, and that termination of service without such payment to the employee was liable to be quashed. Mr. Bis was also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Singh vs. Committee of Management, Rae Bareili, (1996) 8 SCC 595 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that where the rule provides even by implication that payment to the employee of whatever is due to him should be simultaneous with termination of his service then fulfilment of that requirement has to be regarded as a condition precedent to valid termination. Mr. Biswas stated that in the present case, para (2) (ii) of the offer of appointment contained in memorandum dated 3.10.1994 clearly stipulates payment of a sum equivalent to pay and allowances for the period of notice as expressed condition of termination and thus the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 terminating the service of the petitioner without making payment for the notice period was liable to be quashed as per the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court. Mr. Biswas further explained that even though the petitioner was on probation for two years, her appointment was not for a period of two years and that the services of the petitioner could only be terminated in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (2) (ii) of the offer of appointment contained in office memorandum dated 3.10.1994 either by serving notice of one month or by making payment of sum equivalent to pay and allowances for the period of notice. 4. It was next contended by Mr. 4. It was next contended by Mr. Biswas that it would be clear from the offer of appointment as well as Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules for the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Govt of Tripura, that the maximum period of probation was two years and since the petitioner completed maximum period as provided in the offer of appointment and Recruitment Rules, on 3.10.1996, she was deemed to have heen confirmed in the aforesaid post. In support of his submission Mr. Biswas cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wasim Beg vs. State of UP & others, (1998) 3 SCC 321 , in which the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions held that where Rules provides for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, at the end of the maximum probation period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless the Rules provide to the contrary. He further submitted that assuming that the petitioner continued to be a probationer even after 3.10.1996, since the impugned notification terminating the services of the petitioner contained a stigma, the procedure as laid down in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has to be followed by the authority before termination of the services of the petitioner. He relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 689 , and in case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 , for the proposition that the procedure laid down under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution is to be followed where a probationer is terminated by an order -4 a which casts stigma on the probationer. Mr. Biswas finally submitted that although in the impugned notification it has been stated that the service of the petitioner has been terminated as the competent authority on review has not been satisfied with her work and performance during the period of probation upto 3.10.1996, the termination of services of the petitioner has been done for extraneous consideration. He referred to the copy of the certificate dated 14.6.95 annexed to the writ petition as Annexure E in which the then Governor of Tripura has certified that the petitioner had gained invaluable experience and already proved herself to be both fully competent and efficient. He referred to the copy of the certificate dated 14.6.95 annexed to the writ petition as Annexure E in which the then Governor of Tripura has certified that the petitioner had gained invaluable experience and already proved herself to be both fully competent and efficient. He also referred to copy of the order dated 9.11.1995 annexed to the writ petition as Annexure F to show that the Special Secretary to the Governor- of Tripura had certified that the petitioner had successfully completed her 1st year probation on 2nd October, 1995 and she was allowed to continue her 2nd year probation with effect from 3.10.1995. According to Mr. Biswas, the aforesaid certificate given by the then Governor of Tripura and Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura would show that the petitioner was competent and efficient and that both the Governor and the Special Secretary to the Governor were satisfied with her work and performance even then the impugned notification terminating the services of the petitioner was issued on the ground that her work was not found tp be satisfactory. Mr. Biswas vehemently submitted that the newspaper reports, copies of which have been annexed to the writ petition as Annexures K, L, M, N and O would show that the services of the petitioner were in fact terminated as the petitioner had objected to some of the bills of the Governor. According to Mr. Biswas, therefore, the impugned notification terminating the services of the petitioner was vitiated by malafied and was liable to be quashed. Mr. Biswas referred to paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in which it has been averred that the petitioner entered the service in the post of Comptroller of Household through back door without any advertisement inviting applications for the post and without any sponsoring of name by the Employment Exchange. But this averment made in the counter affidavit has no relevance to the present case, the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Comptroller of Household is not under challenge in this writ petition. He further explained that it would be clear from Rule 14 of the Recruitment Rules for the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Govt of Tripura, that any of the provision of Rules is relaxable at the discretion of the Governor. Mr. He further explained that it would be clear from Rule 14 of the Recruitment Rules for the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Govt of Tripura, that any of the provision of Rules is relaxable at the discretion of the Governor. Mr. Biswas, therefore, submitted that the Governor had absolute discretion in the matter of recruitment to the post of Comptroller of Household and on consideration of the experience of the petitioner as stated in her application dated 1.10.1994 and on consideration of her suitability to the post, the then Governor of Tripura at his discretion has directed appointment of the petitioner to the said post. 5. In reply, the learned Advocate General, Tripura, Mr. BR Bhattacharjee, submitted that although Rule 14 of the Recruitment Rules confers a discretion on the Governor to relax any of the provisions of the Rules, the area in which the Governor can exercise such discretion has also been indicated in the said Recruitment Rules. He pointed out that Rule 6 provides for upper age limits of 35 years which was relaxable in the case of Govt employees. Rule 8 clearly states that age and educational qualification for the recruitment will apply in the case of promotees but is relaxable. Rule 10 provides that the recruitment may be made either by promotion or by transfer on deputation or by direct recruitment as may be decided by the Governor at his discretion. Finally, Rule 12 provides that DPG may be constituted at the discretion of the Governor. A comprehensive reading of the said rule would show that composition of DPC is at the discretion of the Governor. According to the learned Advocate General since the post is selection post, there has to be a DPC and the Governor cannot possibly relax the Rules and direct that the appointment to the post would be made without any selection and without any DPC. Similarly Rule 7 stipulates that essential-qualification for direct recruitment is a Degree from a recognised University and experience in administr­ation/management in official household of a Minister/Go vernor/Lt Governor and the Chief Commissioner. These qualifications cannot be relaxed by the Governor. Similarly Rule 7 stipulates that essential-qualification for direct recruitment is a Degree from a recognised University and experience in administr­ation/management in official household of a Minister/Go vernor/Lt Governor and the Chief Commissioner. These qualifications cannot be relaxed by the Governor. Despite the aforesaid provisions in the Recruitment Rules no advertisement was issued inviting applications to the post, no DPC was constituted for making the selection to the post and the petitioner who did not have any experience whatsoever in administration/management in office/household establishment of the Minister/Governor/Lt Governor/Chief Commissioner was appointed to the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Govt of Tripura. The learned Advocate General submitted that the records would further show that the petitioner submitted an application on 1.10.1994 and she was issued with the offer of appointment on 3.10.1994 and the petitioner joined in the post on 3.10.1994. He further submitted that although the petitioner joined on 3.10.1994, the appointment order was issued retrospectively on 21.10.1994. All these facts got to show that the very appointment of the petitioner was a nullity and if the impugned notification terminating the services of the petitioner is quashed, the illegal order of appointment of the petitioner would be revived. He further submitted that the Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution would not quash the impugned notification terminating the service of the petitioner so as to revive an illegal appointment order. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. SP Kapoor vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 2181, wherein the Supreme Court having found that the process of selection and appointment of Deputy Director and Director of Health Services was completed in a hasty manner, expressed the view that the matter required to be considered afresh. He also relied on the case of Krishan Yadav & vs. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 165 , in which the Supreme Court having found that the selection and appointment to public office were arbitrary and held that the entire selection was vitiated and for the purpose of cleansing the public administration set aside the appointment even though the appointees have been serving for four years. He also cited the case of Ashwini Kumar vs. State of l Bihar, (1997) 2 SCC 1 , for the proposition that if the initial entry itself is a nullity the question of regularising or confirming the incumbent is an exercise in nullity. 6. The learned Advocate General next submitted that at any rate the petitioner having been appointed on probation had no right to the post unless she was confirmed in the post after her work during the period of probation was found satisfactory. He further explained that the satisfaction regarding performance of the petitoner during the period of probation was to be not of the Governor but the Secretariat and, therefore, the certificate dated 14.6.1995 issued by the then Governor has no relevance. He referred to the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 and submitted that it would show that the competent authority on review of her work and the assessment report of her prerformance during the period of probation upto 3.10.1996 did not find her work and performance to be satisfactory. According to him, the aforesaid conduct of the employer would show that the employer was not willing to confirm the services of the petitioner on completion of the period of probation on 3.10.1996. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chief General Manager, State Bank of India vs. Bijoy Kumar Mishra, (1997) 7 SCC 550 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that the effect of permitting the employee to continue in the post even on completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation results is the only logical inference that he has been confirmed in the post by implication and that this is only a rule of evidence to be applied to the facts of each case and that the inference can only be drawn from a positive act of the employer permitting the employee to continue to work in the post even after completion of maximum period of probation. According to learned Advocate General since on the facts of the present case there is no positive act of the employer to permit the petitioner to continue beyond the maximum period of probation and instead the employer has terminated the services of the petitioner by the impugned notification on the ground that her work and performance were not found to be satisfactory, this is not a case where the Court should draw an inference of a deemed confirmation on expiry of the period of probation. The learned Advocate General further explained that the employer was of the view that the period of two years probation will have to be counted from 19.10.1994 and not from 3.10.1994 and it is for this reason that the impugned notification was issued on 9.10.1996 terminating her services on the ground that her work and performance during the period of probation was not found to be satisfactory. 7. Regarding non-payment of pay and allowances for the notice period, the learned Advocate General submited that the petitioner was terminated from service on 9.10.1996 and that her termination really took effect from 10.10.1996 and on 10.10.1996, the Special Secretary to the Governor issued a memorandum sanctioning one month's pay in favour of the petitioner with effect from 10.10.1996 in lieu of a month's notice and that the petitioner could have collected the one month's pay and allowances from Governor's Secretariat. He relied on Black's Law Dictionary for his submission that the word 'forthwith' in the offer of appointment means promptly or reasonable despatch depending upon circumstances. According to him, therefore, a reasonable and not technical interpretation has to be given to para (2) (ii) of the offer of appointment letter providing for terminating the services of the appointee forthwith by making payment of a sum equivalent to pay and allowances for the notice period. In support of his aforesaid submission, he cited the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Dinanath Rai, 1969 SLR 646, wherein the Supreme Court held that the payment of salary in lieu of notice need not be simultaneous with the order of termination. In support of his aforesaid submission, he cited the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Dinanath Rai, 1969 SLR 646, wherein the Supreme Court held that the payment of salary in lieu of notice need not be simultaneous with the order of termination. He also relied on the case of State of UP vs. Adya Prasad Pandey, 1995 (7) SLR 55, in which the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 4 (2) of the UP Temporary Govt Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, and held that by the said rule, the Govt servant was entitled to termination without a notice to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of notice. He sought to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent, RMS, Cochin vs. Gopinath Sorter (supra) and Raj Kumar vs. Union of India (supra) cited by Mr. Bis was by stating that in the said cases the delay in making payment of pay and allowances to Govt employee whose services have been terminated without notice was not one day but was for several days. But in the instant case, the learned Advocate General explained that there was hardly any delay in sanctioning the payment of pay and allowances of the petitioner for the notice period. 8. Since both the parties have relied on the terms of appointment as contained in (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994, the said para (2) is extracted herein below: “2. The terms of appointment are as follows : (i) The appointment is purely on temporary basis and will not confer any title to permanent employment. (ii) The appointment may be terminated at any time by a month's notice given by either side, namely the appointee or the appointing authority without assigning any reason. The appointing authority however, reserved the right of terminating the service of appointee forthwith or before the expiration of the stipulated period of notice by making payment of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice of the unexpired portion thereof. (iii) The other conditions of service will be governed by the relevant ruled and order in force from time to time. (iv) No time scale of increment will be allowed till the appointee completed training/probation. (v) The appointee shall have to undergo any training if required by the Govt. (iii) The other conditions of service will be governed by the relevant ruled and order in force from time to time. (iv) No time scale of increment will be allowed till the appointee completed training/probation. (v) The appointee shall have to undergo any training if required by the Govt. The services of the appointee failing to successfully completed the taining/probation shall be liable to termination.” Sub-para (i) of para 2 quoted above states that the appointment is purely on temporary basis and does not confer any title to permanent employment Sub para (ii) of para (2) quoted above , owever , provides that the appointing authority or the appointee could terminate the appointment at any time by a month's notice vut if the appoiniting authority terminates the services of the appointee forthwith or before the expiration of the stipulated period of notice, such termination could be done by :making payment of a sum wquivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpired portion therof' The words 'forthwith' and “ by making payment of sum equivalent ot the pay and allowances for the period of notice” are similar to the language used n the proviso to sub-rule (b) of Rule (5) of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Services) Rues 1965(for short the Rules), before its amendment in the year 1972 The said proviso prior to its amendment in the year 1972 stated that the service of a temporary Govt. servant who was not in quasi-permanent service could be terminated'forthwith' by making payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowance for the period of notice' 9. In Senior Superntendent, RMS Cochin vs Gopinath Sorter (supra), the Sureme Court held that the said proviso to sub - rule (b of Rule 5(1) of the Tules was capable of the only interpretation the the requisite amount in terms of the Rule was paid into the hands of the employee or made available to him at the same time as he was served with the order. In other words, to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment ot the employee of whatever is due to him. In other words, to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment ot the employee of whatever is due to him. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 536 But the said case of Raj Kumar vs Union of India was again was again considered and in the decision of the supreme court as reported in AIR 1975 SC 1116 it was found that the proviso to subrule (b) of t Rule 5 (1) of the Rules had been amended with retrospective effect and it was provided instead that the service could be terminated forthwith and on such termination the Govt. servant was entitled to claim a sum equivalent to his pay plus allowances for the period of notice. The Supreme Court held that the effect of the amendment was that the services of temporary Govt. servant who was not in quasi - permanent service could be terminated forthwith andit was not obligatory to pa a sum equivalent to his pay and allowances for the period of notice but the Govt servant concerned is entitled to claim the said sum equivalent to his pay and allowances for the period of notice. This interpretation of the amended proviso to sub - rule (b) of 5(I) of the Rules has been reiterated in the case of Union of India vs. Arun Kumar Roy, (1986) 1 SCC 675 , in which the Supreme Court held that after the amendment as aforesaid a probationer who is a temporary Govt. servant is terminated from service forthwith is only entitled to claim a sum equivalent to his pay and allowances for the period of notice. In the said case of Arun Kumar Roy (supra), the Supreme Court further held that the terms and conditions of service of an employee under the Govt. who enters into the service on contract will,once he is appointed be governed by the rules governing the service condition and it will not be permissible after his appointment to rely upon the terms of contract which are not in consonance with Rules governing the service. who enters into the service on contract will,once he is appointed be governed by the rules governing the service condition and it will not be permissible after his appointment to rely upon the terms of contract which are not in consonance with Rules governing the service. Since the Central vivil Service (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 are applicable to the Govt servants in the State of Tripura, I called upon the learned consel for the parties to appraise the Court if the aforesaid amendment ot the proviso to sub rule (b) of the Rule also are applicable to the Govt. servants in the State of Tripura. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, produced befor the Court a copy of the order dated 21.1.1972 of the Govt. of Tripura adopting Rules, Regulations and Orders relating to recruitment and conditions of service which were applicable before 21.1.1972 to the Union Terriutory of tripura and submitted that since the amendmenbt to the proviso to sub rule 9b) of Rule 5 (I) of the Rules was made after 21.1.1972 vide notification dated 23.6.1972, the said amendment was not applicable to Govt servants in the State of Tripura. Mr. UB Saha, GA Tripura, on the other hand, cited the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kanta Das vs. State of THpura, 1991 (2) GLJ 233, in which an order dated 8.12.1993 of the Director General of Police. Tripura has been extracted to show that the amended proviso has been followed while terminating the services of a Govt servant of Tripura. From the aforesaid extract of the order passed by the Director General of Police, Tripura, in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Laxmi Kanta Das vs. State of Tripura alone the Court cannot come to the conclusion that the amendment to the proviso to sub-rule (b) of Rule 5 (1) of the Rules has been adopted by the Govt of Tripura. The Court, therefore, has no option but to fall back on the very language employed in sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 on which reliance has been placed by both the parties as well as in the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 terminating the services of the petitioner. 10. The Court, therefore, has no option but to fall back on the very language employed in sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 on which reliance has been placed by both the parties as well as in the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 terminating the services of the petitioner. 10. The language employed in the said sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 is that the termination of the services of the petitioner could be made forthwith without notice "by making payment of sum equivalent to pay and allowances for the period of notice". The language is almost the same as in the proviso to sub-rule (b) of Rule 5 (1) of the Rules prior to its amendment by notification dated 23.6.1972. Thus, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Senior Superintendent, RMS, Cochin vs. Gopinath Sorter (supra), the termination of the petitioner could only be made if the sum equivalent to the pay and allownaces for the period of notice was paid into the hands bf the petitioner or make available to her at the same time as she was served with the order of termination. In other words, this is a case where sub-para (ii) of para (2) provided for payment to the petitioner whatever is due to her simultaneously with her termination and hence fulfilment of the aforesaid requirement was a condition precedent to valid termination of her service. This is not a case of a rule which only entitles the employee to pay for the period of notice on her termination without notice as found by the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP vs. Dinanath Rai and State of UP vs. Adya Prasad Pandey (supra) on which reliancce was placed by the learned Advocate General, Mr. BR Bhattacharjee. The impugned notification of termination was issued on 9.10.1996 and it states that the Governor had been pleased to terminate the services of the petitioner from the post of Comptroller of Household with immediate effect. The impugned notification was followed by the memorandum dated 10.10.1996 issued by the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura sanctioning a month's pay in favour of the petitioner with effect from 10.10.1996 in lieu of one month's notice. The impugned notification was followed by the memorandum dated 10.10.1996 issued by the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura sanctioning a month's pay in favour of the petitioner with effect from 10.10.1996 in lieu of one month's notice. Such sanction of one month's pay in favour of the petitioner did not satisfy the requirement of sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 because the amount of pay and allowances for the notice period was not actually paid into the hands of the petitioner or made available to her simultaneously with the order of termination. Hence the impugned notification terminating the services of the petitioner was contrary to sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the offer of appointment of the peitioner contained in the memoraundum dated 3.10.1994. 11. But sub-para (v) of para (2) of the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 stipulated that the services of the petitioner failing to successfully complete the probation shall be liable to termination. In the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996, it has been mentioned that on completion of the probation period the case of the petitionner was reviewed and on such review, the competent authority has not been satisfied with her work during the period of her probation upto 3.10.1996. Thus, the termination of the petitioner appear to have been in terms of sub-para (v) of para (2) of the offer of appointment contained in memorandum dated 3.10.1994. According to Mr. Bis was, the learned counsel for the petitioner, this is not the real reason for the Termination of the services of the petitioner and the real reason is the objection raised by the petitioner to the bills of the Governor as published in the newspapers and hence the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 was issued on extraneous considerations and was vitiated by malafides. In view of the said submission made by Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, I called upon the respondents to produce the records. On perusal of the records, it appears that after the completion of the two years of probation on 3.10.1996 by the petitionner, the question of her confirmation was taken up by the Governers Secretariat and on 9.10.1996, the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura put up the following note to the Governor : “Smti Aditi Choudhury was appointed as Comptroller of Household (COH) wef 3.10.1994 and was placed on probation for two years. She has completed her period of probation on 3.10.1996. 2. Her performance as COH has been reviewed in 1994-95 directly by the then Governor (though the first part relating to Reporting Officer should have been filled in by the then Secretary to Governor). I have completed the assessment report for the second year of probation and the same has also been reviewed by Governor. 3. After completing her first year of probation, Smti Choudhuri was allowed to contiue the second year of probation also wef 3.10.1995. However, during the past one year it has been noticed that there has been a sharp decline in the level of her performance which has on serveral occasions led to verbal complaint about her functions as well as her management of the household affairs by even Governor and Lady Governor. On some occasions, HE and Lady Governor have even personally reprimanded her and asked her to improve her functions. However, this did not have the desired result. Performance of the COH during the period of probation has not been found to be upto the mark, specially during the last year. 4. As per provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, services of an employee can be terminated if the probation is deemed to have not been completed successfully. Under the circumstances, kind orders are solicited about continuance of the services of Smti Choudhury after completion of her probation period.” On the aforesaid note, the Governor appears to have passed the order that as the probation of the petitioner has been unsatisfactory, her services may be dispensed with immediate effect,. It is thus clear from the aforesaid note of the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura quoted above with which the Governor agreed that after completing her first year probation the petitioner was allowed to continue her second year probation with effect from 3.10.1995, but during the second year probation it was noticed that there had been sharp decline in the level of her performance which on several occasions led to verbal complaints about her functions as well as management of the household affairs even by the Governor. If further appears from the aforesaid note of the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura that on several occasions the Governor has personally reprimanded her and asked her to improve the functions, but this did not have the desired result and the performance of the petitioner was not upto the mark particularly during the second year. Hence, as per the records, the ground for which the service of the petitioner was terminated by the impugned notification is that her performance had not been satisfactory during the second year of probation. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, disputed the aforesaid assessment of the petitioner's performance made by the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura and has relied on the certificate granted by the the Governor on 14.6.1995, a copy of which has been annexed to the writ petitions as Annexure E, and the order dated 9.11.1995 of the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure F, but the aforesaid certificate contained in Annexure E granted by the then Governor and the aforesaid order of the Special Secretary to the Gvernor of Tripura relate to the first year of probation of the petitioner. It is during the second year of probation that the performance of the petitioner has not been found satisfactory by the Special. Secretary to the Governor of Tripura as per his note dated 9.10.1996 quoted above. Sub-para (v) of para'(2) of the offer of appointment contained in memorandum dated 3.10.1994 requires the petitioner to successfully complete the probation which will include the second year of probation. The said assessment of the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura with regard to performance of the petitioner during the second year of probation cannot be set aside by the Court merely on the ground that during the first year of probation the performance of the petitioner had been found to be satisfactory by the then Governor and the Special Secretary. Nor can it be set aside by the Court on the ground of some reports in the newspapers to the effect that the petitioner had raised objections to some of the bills of the Governor. Nor can it be set aside by the Court on the ground of some reports in the newspapers to the effect that the petitioner had raised objections to some of the bills of the Governor. On these facts as available in the records, it is also difficult to hold that the impugned notification terminating the service of the petitioner was passed on extraneous considerations and was vitiated by malafides. 13. Mr. Biswas learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has submitted that no enquiry was conducted and no opportunity was given to the petitioner before the impugned notification terminating her services was issued and hence the impugned notification is violative of Article 31.1 (2) of the Constitution and has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore (supra) and Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra). In State of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore the Supreme Court found that the service of a probationer was terminated on the ground that while he was posted in Jamshedpur and Nawadah his work and conduct had raised grave doubts about his integrity and indicated that he was a corrupt and unreliable officer and on these facts the Supreme Court held that he was discharged from his service by way of punishment and, therefore, he was entitled to protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In the said case, the Supreme Court, however, observed that if the Govt came to a conclusion that the probationer was not fit and proper person to hold the post in the public service of the State, it can discharge him without holding any enquiry into his alleged misconduct. Similarly, in the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court found that the termination of Ishwar Chandra Agrawal, PCS, Judicial Branch, on probation, was based on the findings of the Vigilance Department in an enquiry in which the said Ishwar Chandra Agarwal was not given any opportunity as provided under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court held that the order of termination of the services of Ishwar Chandra Agrawal was by way of punishment on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. In the said case of Samsher Singh, the Supreme Court further found that the service-of Samsher Singh, Subordinate Judge on probation was terminated on four grounds relating to his behaviour towards Bar and litigants, his leaving office early, abuse of his position and complaints made by the litigants that he did not give full opportunity to lead evidence and the Supreme Court held after considering the facts of the case that order of termination was one of punishment. In paragraph 64 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that before a probationer is confirmed, the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of a porbationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post and in absence, of any rule governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for a job or for any temperamental or other object not involving any moral turpitude, the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. In such a case no punishment was involved and the provisions of Article 311 (2) were not attracted. The question, in the present case, is when the service of a probationer is terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory work during the period of probation, whether the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution are required to be followed. 14. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 , the probationer who was the SI of Cuttack District was discharged from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct and the Supreme Court held that he had no right to the post and he could be discharged from his service under the terms of his employment for unsatisfactory work and conduct and such a discharge did not cast any stigma affecting his future career. In the case of Staya Narayan Athya vs. High Court of MP & another, 1996 (1) SLR 52 , Satya Narayan Athya was appointed on probation as Civil Judge but his performance during the period of probation was not satisfactory and the High Court discharged the probationer from his service during the period of his probation and the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that there.should be a charge and enquiry on his conduct since he was only a probationer and during the period of probation it would be open to the High Court to consider whether he was suitable for confirmation or should be discharged from his service. It is thus clear that where service of a probationer is terminated on the ground that his performance was not found satisfactory during the period of probation, the termination is not punitive in nature and the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution need not be followed. In the instant case the impugned notification as well as note from the file extracted above would show that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that her performance during the second year of probation was not satisfactory and such a termination cannot be held to the punitive or to cast any stigma so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 15. Coming now to the submission of Mr. Biswas that the petitioner's service should be held to have been confirmed before the impugned notification was issued on 9.10.1996, the offer of appointment contained in memorandum dated 3.10.1994 as well as Rule 9 of the recruitment rules provide for a maximum period of probation of two years. There is no provision in the recruitment rules for continuation of such probation beyond the aforesaid maximum period of two years. The recruitment rules also donot provide that after completion of the aforesaid period of two years, specific orders have to be passed by the competent authority for confirmation of the service of the probationer to the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan. Thus, as per tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Wasim Beg vs. State of UP (supra) cited by Mr. Thus, as per tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Wasim Beg vs. State of UP (supra) cited by Mr. Biswas, after completion of probation of maximum period of two years on 3.10.1996 the Court should come to the conclusion that the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed in the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan. But in the case of Chief General Manager, State Bank of India vs. Bijoy Kumar Mishra (supra), the Supreme Court has held that this is only an inference to be drawn from the conduct of the employer in permitting an employee to continue in the post even on completion of maximum period of probation and was a rule of evidence. In para 7 of the judgment reported in (1997) 7 SCC 550 , the Supreme Court in particular held : “It is significant that the effect of permitting the employee to continue in the post even on completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation results in the logical inference that he has been confirmed in the post by implication. In other words, for drawing such inference, it is necessary that the employer should allow the employee to continue on the post even after expiry of the maximum period of probation which is consistent only with the fact of his confirmation on the post. This inference is drawn from the conduct of the employer which is consistent only with the fact of confirmation of the employee. In short, it is a rule of evidence applied to the facts of the case because the continuance in employment after the maximum period of probation is consistent only with the confirmation, and that follows from the employer's conduct of permitting the employee to continue to work on that post after the maximum period of probation.” Where, therefore, the facts before the Court show that on completion of the maximum period of probation, the employer was not satisfied with the performance of the probationer and terminated his service, the inference cannot possibly be drawn by the Court that the employee is deemed to have been confirmed on completion of maximum period of probation. The facts of this case as discussed above would show that soon after completion of the period of probation of the petitioner on 3.10.1996, the question of the confirmation was initiated on 8.10.1996 in the relevant file and the Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura put up a note in the file that during the second year of probation her level of performance had declined and was not upto the mark and that her services can be terminated after which the services of the petitioner were terminated by the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 with immediate effect. In the facts of the present case, therefore, it is not possible for the Court to infer from the very fact of continuance of the petitioner in the post even on completion of maximum period of probation without any express order of confirmation that the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed in the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Tripura. 16. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the petitioner has failed to successfully complete her period of probation and was therefore, liable to be terminated form service in terms of sub-para (v) of para (2) of the offer of appointment contained in the memorandum dated 3:10.1994 which she has accepted. But the termination of her service by the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 was invalid as the said termination was not made by making payment of a sum equivalent to her one month's pay and allowances for the period of notice in terms of sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the offer of appointment contained in the memorandum dated 2.10.1994. The Court, therefore, would normally grant the petitioner the relief of reinstatement by an appropriate writ, but such grant of relief would be an exercise in futility and would not serve any useful purpose as on such reinstatement, the petitioner would have to be terminated from her service by following the procedure as laid down in sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the aforesaid offer of appointment for not having successfully completed the period of probation in terms of sub-para (v) of para (2) of the aforesaid offer of appointment. Normally moreover, on reinstatement, the petitioner would be entitled to back wages for the period from 10.10.1996 till such reinstatement, but it appears from paragraph 33 A the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in this case that the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis as Public Relation Officer in the ex-cadre post on a consolidated pay of Rs.6,160 and was posted at the Advance Research Centre, Calcutta by order dated 7.1.1997 of the Managing Director of the Gharowal Mandal Bikash Nigam Ltd. Since the petitioner was gainfully employed after her termination by the impugned notification dated 9.10.1996 and has in fact not worked under the respondents during the period out of service, I am not inclined to grant any back wages to the petitioner keeping in mind the financial predicament of the State Govt of Tripura. The Special Secretary to the Governor of Tripura, however, is directed to ensure payment of the sum equivalent to her one months pay and allowances for the period of notice by cash or by an accounts payee Bank Draft to the petitioner in terms of sub-para (ii) of para (2) of the offer of appointment contained in the memorandum dated 3.10.1994 within a month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Since no relief of reinstatement with back wages has been granted to the petitioner, it is not necessary to deal with the contention of the learned Advocate General, Tripura, Mr. BR Bhattacharjee, that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Comptroller of Household in the Governor's Household, Raj Bhawan, Tripura was a nullity and should not be revived by the Court by grant of appropriate relief. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid direction and the interim orders dated 19.11.1996 and 3.12.1996 passed in Civil Misc (GR) No.584 of 1996 are vacated. Considering, however, the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.