Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing of the orders dated 30-7-92 (Annexure 7) by which petitioner had been dismissed from service by the respondent No.4; dated 17-7-92 passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner; and dated 22-2-95 (Annexure 11) by which his review under Rule 34 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ``the Rules) has been dismissed. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner was working as Constable in Police Department in the State of Rajasthan and was posted in district Udaipur. He had completed 17 years of service at the relevant time and a charge-sheet was given to him alleging that on 20.3.91, at about 11:45 a.m., petitioner went in a drunken state in the Roll Call and on being questioned by the Reserve Inspector of the Police Lines, he shouted and when the Reserve Inspector asked him to get medically examined, he threatened the Reserve Inspector and refused to obey him. After medical examination, as the petitioner was found having consumed liquor, a case under Section 34 of the Rajasthan Police Act was registered against him on 12.9.91 (Annexure 2). Disciplinary enquiry under rule 16 of the said Rules was proposed and charge-sheet dated 12.9.91 (Annexure 1) was served upon him. Petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to defend himself but he did not co-operate with the enquiry for one reason or the other and enquiry was held-ex-parte Enquiry Officer submitted the report dated 20.7.92 to respondent No.4 the Disciplinary Authority. The said Authority, after completing the formalities, pas- sed the order of punishment dated 30.7.92 (Annexure 7), by which petitioner was dismissed from service. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner preferred an appeal on 26-8-92 (Annexure 8), which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 17-7-93. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the appellate order, petitioner preferred review under Rule 34, which has also been dismissed by the Competent Authority vide order dated 22-4-95 (Annexure 11). As the petitioner could not get relief from any source, he preferred this writ petition. (3). Heard Mr. Chaitanya Gehlot, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.P. Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. (4). Mr. As the petitioner could not get relief from any source, he preferred this writ petition. (3). Heard Mr. Chaitanya Gehlot, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.P. Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. (4). Mr. Gehlot could not point-out any lacuna in the procedure adopted while holding the enquiry or violation of principles of natural justice which may warrant interference by this Court in a limited scope of judicial review. It is settled proposition of law that the Court cannot sit in appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Authority as an appellate forum as judicial review is permissible only against the decision-making process and not against the decision itself. The finding of facts re- corded by the statutory authorities cannot be disturbed. (5). The only question, which has seriously been agitated by Mr. Gehlot, is the quantum of punishment. According to him, it was not the case of the respondents that petitioner had been a habitual offender or had ever been punished prior to this incident and as such the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is highly dispro- portionate to the delinquency committed by him. On the other hand, Mr. Vyas has submitted that the petitioner was a member of the disciplined force and he had committed a serious misconduct and has been found guilty of indiscipline and insubordination. Thus, liberal view is not warranted. (6). The issue of quantum or punishment has been considered by the Honble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary and thus would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, being illegal, it cannot be enforced. (Vide Bhagat Ram vs. State of U.P. (1); S.K. Giri vs. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and others (2); Union of India vs. Giriraj Sharma (3); Bishan Singh and others vs. State of Punjab (4); Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and others (5); and B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others (6). (7). In view of the above, the Court can review only the ``decision making procedure and not the ``decision of the competent authority. Thus, the Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority. (7). In view of the above, the Court can review only the ``decision making procedure and not the ``decision of the competent authority. Thus, the Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in such ``exceptional circumstances, (Vide Union of India vs. Parmanand (7); State Bank of India vs. Samerandra Kishore Endow (8); State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh (9); State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Singh (10); State of U.P. vs. Nand Kishore Shukla and another (11); Transport Commissioner, Madras vs. Thiru ARK Moorthy (12); Rai Bareilly Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Bhola Nath Singh and others (13); and State of Punjab vs. Bakshish Singh (14). (8). However, in Ranjeet Thakur (supra), the Honble Apex Court observed as under:- ``But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to con- clusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on the aspect, which is otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from cor- rection. In the present case, the punishment is so stringently disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review. (9). The said judgment has been approved and followed by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham (15), and after examining elaborately the concept of reasonableness, rationality and proportionality, the same view has been reiterated. (10). In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial view, the Court cannot ``normally substitute its own conclusion or penalty. (10). In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial view, the Court cannot ``normally substitute its own conclusion or penalty. How- ever, if the penalty imposed by an Authority ``Shocks the conscience of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself ``impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of proportionality, court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced him to do so, though he had no intention to do so. (Vide Giriraj Sharma (supra). The Court may further examine the effect, if order is set aside or substituted by some other minor penalty. (11). In State of U.P. vs. Nand Kishore Shukla (supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed that the Court is not an appellate authority and, therefore, the Court will be loath to interfere with that part of the order. In the Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. B. Ashok Kumar (16), the Court held that in case of accepting the illegal gratification and refraining from prosecution against the offender, the dismissal of service is warranted. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Committee, Vallabhgarh vs. Krishna Bihar (17), the Apex Court has held that once an employee is found guilty of embezzlement, the minimum punishment is dismissal and Court should not interfere in such cases. (12). In State of Tamil Nadu vs. S. Subramaniam (18), the Apex Court has held that as the High Court has power of judicial review of the administrative action on complaint relating to service conditions of the employee, it is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application in the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, the Court ``has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application in the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, the Court ``has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion whichthe authority reaches, is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or the Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, the Court or the Tribunal is devoid of power to re- appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proved charges. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has, in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record and support the finding, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. (13). In Union of India vs. G. Ganayutham (supra), the Apex Court has considered the entire law on the subject and compared the Indian Law with English, Australian and Canadian Laws and held that in case the court comes to the conclu- sion that the punishment awarded is disproportionate or the Disciplinary Authority was irrational in imposing the punishment, the punishment cannot be quashed as even then the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration and it is only in very rare cases that the Court might to shorten the litigation-think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in pla- ce of punishment awarded by the Competent Authority. In General Court Martial and others vs. Aniltej Singh Dhadiwal (19), and U.P.S.R.T.C. and others vs. A.K. Paul (20), the Apex Court has taken the same view. (14). In the General Court Martial (supra), the Honble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, in its limited power of exercise of judicial review, may interfere by appreciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to consider the relevant evidence. (14). In the General Court Martial (supra), the Honble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, in its limited power of exercise of judicial review, may interfere by appreciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to consider the relevant evidence. Similarly, in Rajendra Kumar Kindra (supra), the Court observed as under:- ``It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal....records finding based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjecture and surmises, the enquiry suffers from additional infirmity of non- application of mind and stands vitiated...viewed from either angle, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer...are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. Between ``appraisal of evidence and ``total lack of evidence, there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight off and the High Court ought not to have short- circuited the writ petition. (15). Lord Diplock, in Council of Civil Services Union vs. Minister for Civil Service (21), observed that anything disproportionate should be discarded. It has been observed in the said case that judicial review is permissible only on limited grounds, namely, illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and proportional- ity. The concept of irrationality has been explained as a decision which is so outrag- eous in its deviation of logic or accepted moral stand that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided would have arrived at. Procedural impropriety has been explained as failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the persons who would be affected by the decision. The requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made. (16). Similar view has been reiterated in Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police (22). The requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made. (16). Similar view has been reiterated in Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police (22). In Apprail Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra (23), the Honble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the Court as the High Court cannot sit as appellate forum for the factual finding recorded during the disciplinary proceedings for the reason that it exercises a very limited power of judicial review and in exercise of such power, the High Court should not substitute its own conclusion with regard to the guilt or delinquency, for that of the departmental authority. The Court further observed as under:- ``Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or Departmental Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and imposed some other punishment or penalty. (17). Similarly, in Syed Jameer Hussain vs. Union of India and others (24), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under:- ``In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the punishment of dismissed from service is too harsh and on the contrary it is required to be substituted by appropriate lesser punishment..... In our view, ends of justice will be served if we set-aside the order of dismissal of the appellant and instead direct reinstatement of the appellant in service with continuity and with all other benefits save and excepting withdrawing 50% of back wages from the date of dismissal..... till today. In our view, this punishment will involve sub- stantial monetary loss to the appellant, will meet the ends of justice and will be a sufficient corrective measure for the appellant. (18). till today. In our view, this punishment will involve sub- stantial monetary loss to the appellant, will meet the ends of justice and will be a sufficient corrective measure for the appellant. (18). Thus, from the above, the inescapable conclusion can be drawn that in exercise of limited power of judicial review, the High Court can interfere with finding of fact if it comes to the conclusion that the authority arrived at the conclu- sion without considering the relevant material or by considering some irrelevant material or the finding recorded is not based on any evidence, or has been recorded for some extraneous consideration, and it can also interfere with the quantum of punishment if it is found to be disproportionate to the delinquency committed by the delinquent. (19). In the instant case, the charges against the petitioner had been that he attended the Roll Call in a drunken state, when questioned by the officer therein, he shouted at him and told that his relative was Inspector and the officer cannot ask him like this and he would not go for medical examination. It is nobodys case that petitioner has committed any delinquency in the past or was a habitual in atten- ding the duty after consuming liquor. In such a state of affairs, I am of considered opinion that the punishment imposed is too harsh and totally disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The matter, in normal course, ought to have been remanded to the Authority concerned for substituting a proper and proportionate punishment, but keeping in view that the matte is very old and the punishment of dismissal had been awarded in 1992 and it may again take a very long time for the reason that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority, may give further rounds of litigation to the Appellate and Reviewing Authorities, remand is not warranted, rather it is a fit case where, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, which a Writ Court possesses requires to be dealt-with. The Honble Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath vs. Income Tax Officer (25), observed as under:- ``Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex-facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Honble Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath vs. Income Tax Officer (25), observed as under:- ``Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex-facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised (20). This view has been approved and reaffirmed in Mewa Singh vs. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committee (26). (21). In the facts and circumstances of the case, the ends of justice will meet if the impugned order of dismissal is quashed and instead it is substituted by compulsory retirement with effect from today without giving any back wages to the petitioner for the interagnum period. (22). Thus, the impugned orders dated 30.7.92, 17.7.92 and 22.2.95 are hereby quashed. Petitioner shall be deemed in service and the punishment of dismissal is substituted by the punishment of compulsory retirement with effect from today, i.e. 09.4.1999. The petitioner shall be entitled for consequential benefits of the said order, i.e. retiral benefits but not for back wages. Respondents are directed to process the case for grant of retiral benefits to the petitioner strictly in accordance with law within six months from today and make payment thereof accordingly.