JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. 1. This first appeal is at the instance of a defendant in a suit for specific performance of contract and is directed against the judgment and decree dated April 26, 1983 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 9th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 87 of 1981 thereby passing a decree for specific performance of contract. 2. The respondent herein filed a suit being Title Suit No. 87 of 1981 thereby praying for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated August 2, 1976 by which the appellant agreed to sell his half share in the suit property at a consideration of Rs. 27,000/-. In the agreement it was specifically recorded that the entire amount of Rs. 27,000/- had already been paid to the appellant. 3. The said suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement thereby denying the material allegations made in the plaint and the defence taken by the appellant was inter alia that the suit was barred by limitation and the same was not maintainable. 4. In the written statement he specifically asserted that he never entered into an agreement on August 2, 1976 at any date for sale of the property. The further defence of the appellant was that the respondent never paid any amount to the appellant in connection with the suit property and as such no question of execution of any sale deed in favour of the respondent arises. 5. Subsequently, at the time of hearing of the suit, the appellant filed an additional written statement thereby taking an additional plea that the said agreement was a mere loan transaction and was a security for repayment of loan amount. 6. The learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record held that there was an agreement entered into between the parties for sale of the property mentioned in the agreement dated August 2, 1976 at a consideration of Rs. 27,000/- and thus decreed the suit with the finding that the said amount of Rs. 27,000/- had already been paid as recorded in the agreement itself. 7. Being dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred the instant first appeal. 8. Mr. 27,000/- and thus decreed the suit with the finding that the said amount of Rs. 27,000/- had already been paid as recorded in the agreement itself. 7. Being dissatisfied, the appellant has preferred the instant first appeal. 8. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant before entering into the merit of the matter drew our attention to Section 6 and Section 7 of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Land (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 and contended that in view of the admitted fact that the subject-matter of the suit property is a thika tenancy right of the appellant and the respondent is an outsider, the said agreement has become void after the coming into operation of the aforesaid Act. Thus, Mr. Banerjee contends that such agreement having been declared void by the aforesaid provision of the Act, was not specifically enforceable and the learned trial Judge erred in passing a decree for specific performance of such agreement. 9. Mr. Das, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent did not dispute the aforesaid provision of law but contended that the suit having been instituted prior to the coming into operation of the aforesaid Act, an accrued right cannot be taken away by the said legislation. 10. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the aforesaid provision we find that although the suit was pending when the aforesaid Act came into operation, by the said Act even an agreement for transfer of the thika tenanted property in violation of provision contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the said Act having been declared void, in the instant suit the respondent cannot get the relief. Therefore, we find substance in the contention of Mr. Banerjee that no decree for specific performance of contract can be passed in the fact of the present case. In course of hearing of this appeal, the respondent filed an application for amendment of plaint thereby praying for granting relief of recovery of earnest money in the event we find that no decree for specific performance can be granted in favour of the respondent. 11. We allowed such application, as under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, a Court can allow such application at any stage of the proceeding. The appellant has filed additional written statement opposing the prayer of refund of earnest money. 12. 11. We allowed such application, as under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, a Court can allow such application at any stage of the proceeding. The appellant has filed additional written statement opposing the prayer of refund of earnest money. 12. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the appellant has seriously disputed the allegation of the respondent that a sum of Rs. 27,000/- was paid and has further contended that the respondent is not entitled to refund earnest money paid pursuant to a void agreement. 13. In view of the agreement between the parties and the execution of agreement having been admitted by the appellant in his deposition, we do not find any reason to hold that no such amount as mentioned in the agreement was paid. Even by additional written statement, the appellant tried to justify the existence of the agreement by describing the same as security for loan. Therefore, on consideration of the entire materials on record we are at one with the learned trial Judge that a sum of Rs. 27,000/- was taken by the appellant pursuant to the agreement. 14. In support of his second contention that the respondent is not entitled to get back any amount paid pursuant to a void contract, Mr. Banerjee has referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P.V. Allirajan vs. A.K. Govindaswami, 1966 (1) MLJ 158 . 15. In the said case, a partnership firm was constituted to run a taxi as its business. It was as stipulated that the permit of the taxi would be in the name of one of the partners viz., the defendant violating Section 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The plaintiff filed a suit for dissolution with a direction to pay a certain amount but having lost in both the Courts below preferred a second appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal, the plaintiff prayed for amendment of plaint thereby praying for restitution of contribution made towards capital of the business. Such prayer was refused by High Court on two fold grounds-firstly, the agreement for partnership being contrary to Section 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to restitution and secondly, such alternative prayer should not be allowed at the second appellate stage. 16. Such prayer was refused by High Court on two fold grounds-firstly, the agreement for partnership being contrary to Section 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to restitution and secondly, such alternative prayer should not be allowed at the second appellate stage. 16. In our opinion, the said decision has no application to the fact of the present case inasmuch as at the time of filing of the suit, the contract was quite valid which becomes void subsequently and as such Section 65 of the Contract Act applies to the fact of the present case. Therefore, the appellant is bound to restore the benefit received pursuant to such contract. Therefore, the second .contention of Mr. Banerjee is unable to impress us. 17. Under the aforesaid circumstances, although we set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and refuse the prayer for specific performance of agreement, we grant a decree for refund of earnest money of Rs. 27,000/- with compound interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of agreement viz., August 2, 1976 till the date of realization. 18. The appeal is thus allowed in part. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge are set aside and instead, we pass a decree for refund of Rs. 27,000/- with 12% compound interest per annum from August 2, 1976 till date of realization. The appeal is thus disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs. I agree.