Judgment :- Aruppukkotai Sri Jayavilas Private Limited and United India Insurance Company Limited are the appellants herein. 2. Aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal directing the second appellant to pay the compensation of Rs. 2,77,000/- on behalf of the first appellant, the owner of the vehicle, to the respondents/claimants for the death of the deceased, the husband of the first claimant, this joint appeal has been presented by both the appellants. 3. The first appellant is the owner of the bus bearing registration No. TCM 1010. The said bus was insured by the first appellant with the second appellant, namely. United India Insurance Company. The first respondent, first claimant, is the wife of the deceased. The respondents 2 to 5 are the sons of the deceased. The sixth respondent is the daughter of the deceased. 4. The deceased Alagarsamy was the head of the family. He was originally employed as a Supervisor in a Land Mortgage Bank at Pudukkottai and he later left the job and took his self-employed agriculture. He was the Chief Organiser in Kanmavar Sangam at Aruppukkottai. He was also the leader of “Om Sakthi” cult in the local area. He wanted to go to Madurai for booking the tourist bus for the conveyance of the devotees to witness Adipuram festival at “Melmarm athur Adiparasakthi Temple”. On 10-8-1988 at about 8.00 am, he boarded the bus at Aruppukkottai Bus Stand to go to Madurai. The bus proceeded with a great speed. While it was approaching the Kalkurichi in a rash and negligent manner, proceeding from South to North, hit against the Tamarind Tree standing on the Western side of the road. After the hit, the bus went to the opposite side i.e., eastern side of the road and hit against the dry Tamarind Tree and halted. 5. Due to the heavy impact on the Tamarind tree, about 25 persons sustained serious injuries, and one person by name Andi died on the spot. The deceased Alagarsamy sustained serious injuries all over the body. All the injured persons were taken to Government Hospital at Aruppukkottai. Later, they were referred to Government Hospital at Madurai. But the deceased died at the hospital at 7 p.m. on the same day. 6. The claimants, dependants, six in numbers, filed a petition seeking the award of compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/-, by making both the appellants as parties. 7. All the injured persons were taken to Government Hospital at Aruppukkottai. Later, they were referred to Government Hospital at Madurai. But the deceased died at the hospital at 7 p.m. on the same day. 6. The claimants, dependants, six in numbers, filed a petition seeking the award of compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/-, by making both the appellants as parties. 7. The Tribunal, after enquiry, concluded that the driver of the bus was negligent and the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 2,77,000/- as compensation. As against this award, both the owner of the vehicle as well as the Insurance Company have filed this appeal. 8. Mrs. Kala Ramesh learned counsel appearing for both the appellants, questioning the award on the ground of negligence and of quantum would submit as follows:— “The accident was an inevitable accident occurred beyond the control of the driver and not due to rash or negligent driving on the part of the driver of the bus. The claimants have not proved that the driver alone was negligent. Since another bus was coming in the opposite direction, the driver of the bus had to swerve the bus on the left side whereby the accident occurred. The Tribunal has not assessed the income and the dependency by properly appreciating the exhibits. The monthly income of the deceased, as fixed Rs. 3,500/- by the Tribunal, is not supported by any proper evidence. The income from the agricultural lands cannot be taken for the purpose of computing the pecuniary loss. Admittedly, all the agricultural lands are in the name of the mother of the deceased. The income certificate Ex. A17, marked through PW.2, the manager of the concern, cannot be given due credence since the employer was not examined. Moreover, the account book an d ledger which were admittedly available with the Manager, PW.2, were not produced to prove the contents of Ex. A17. The calculation to arrive at a figure of Rs. 2,77,000/- has been made without any basis” 9. On the other hand, Mr. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-claimants would submit as follows. – “This appeal is not maintainable. The Apex Court in I (1997) ACC 341 (SC) ( Narendra Kumar v. Yarenissa ) would hold that the Insurance Company has no right to prefer an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act to avoid the liability. On the other hand, Mr. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-claimants would submit as follows. – “This appeal is not maintainable. The Apex Court in I (1997) ACC 341 (SC) ( Narendra Kumar v. Yarenissa ) would hold that the Insurance Company has no right to prefer an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act to avoid the liability. Even assuming that the appeal could be proceeded with as far as the owner of the vehicle is concerned, as he is said to be an aggrieved party, this appeal has no merits since all these aspects have been dealt with by the Tribunal, that the reasoning given by the Tribunal for the finding in regard to the negligence and quantum, are perfectly valid, and as such the judgment of the Tribunal does not call for any interference.” 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. I have also perused the judgment impugned and other records. 11. Before appreciating the materials available on record, it would be appropriate to refer to the question as to whether the appeal by the Insurance Company is maintainable or not since the learned counsel for the respondents has raised this issue as a preliminary objection. This aspect has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Court in the decision reported in I (1997) ACC 341 (SC) (cited supra). The following is the relevant observation:— “It is, therefore, obvious on a plain reading of the aforesaid three Sub-sections of Section 96 that before any insurer can be saddled with the liability to answer judgment he must have notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend on all or any of the grounds enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 96, if the same, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is or are available to the insurer? Once that opportunity is made available Sub-section (6) of Section 96 says that the insurer shall not be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment otherwise than in the manner provided by Sub-section (2).” 12. Once that opportunity is made available Sub-section (6) of Section 96 says that the insurer shall not be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment otherwise than in the manner provided by Sub-section (2).” 12. The entire reading of the Apex Courts judgment would clearly show that the Insurance Company has no right to prefer an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act unless it was impleaded and allowed to defend on one or more of the grounds set out in Sub-section (2) of Section 96 or in the situation envisaged by Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C of the Act. If then the insurer and the owner of the offending vehicle file a joint appeal and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the insurer had no right to prefer an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act because none of the defences mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 96 were available to him nor had a situation of the type envisaged by Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-D arisen, it cannot be permitted to file an appeal whether on its own or in association with one or more owners of the vehicle, against whom the award is made which the insurer is liable to answer as if a judgment debtor. 13. In view of the above judgment, it is clear that the Insurance Company did not defend on the grounds set out in Sub-section (2) of Section 96 or in the situation envisaged by Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C of the Act and that the Insurance Company is not entitled to file an appeal. But the Supreme Court would hold that if such a joint appeal is preferred, it need not be dismissed in toto but the owner of the vehicle can be permitted to pursue the appeal while rejecting the appeal of the insurer. In that view of the matter, this Court though rejecting the appeal filed by the Insurance Company on the aforementioned reasons, it is constrained to go into the merits of the appeal, since the first appellant happens to be the owner of the vehicle. 14. Let us now go into the factual aspects of the appeal. In that view of the matter, this Court though rejecting the appeal filed by the Insurance Company on the aforementioned reasons, it is constrained to go into the merits of the appeal, since the first appellant happens to be the owner of the vehicle. 14. Let us now go into the factual aspects of the appeal. According to the claimants, when the deceased, at about 8 a.m. on 10.8.1988, was travelling in the bus belonging to the first appellant-Corporation, the bus proceeded towards South to North, hit against the Tamarind tree standing on the Western side of the road and after the impact, it again went to the right extreme and dashed another Tamarind tree Standing on the eastern side, as a result of which, 25 persons sustained injuries and one person died at the spot. Among the injured, the deceased, in the present case, who was taken to the Aruppukkattai hospital and then to Rajaji Hospital, Madurai, died in the evening on the same day, inspite of the treatment. Immediately after the accident, the FIR has been registered by the Police on the complaint of one Ramachandran, Village Talayari. Ex. A1 is the F.I.R. 15. In the said case, the Police investigated the matter and found that the driver of the bus was rash and negligent in driving and therefore filed a charge sheet. This has been marked as Ex. A2. PW.2 has been examined in the present case as eyewitness. His name is also mentioned as one of the witnesses in Ex. A2. the charge sheet. The contents of the FIR, Ex. A1 and the charge sheet, Ex. A2, would clearly corroborate with the deposition given by PW.2 regarding the manner of the occurrence as stated above. Further more, Ex. A4. Observation Mahazar, would also clearly reveal that what PW.2 has stated before the Tribunal is perfectly true. 16. On the other hand, on behalf of the appellants, namely the Transport Corporation and Insurance Company, a counter has been filed stating that in order to avoid hitting the bus coming in the opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner, the driver had to swerve the bus to the extreme left and thereby the accident had taken place which was beyond his control. This defence plea has not been established either by examining any witness or by producing any document. 17. This defence plea has not been established either by examining any witness or by producing any document. 17. Strangely, on behalf of the appellants, no person was examined. Therefore, there is no material whatsoever available on record to show that the driver of the bus was not negligent except the counter affidavit. On the contrary, the version in the counter is quite contradictory to the contents of the FIR, Observation Mahazar and the evidence of PW.2, the eye-witness. According to counter affidavit, the driver went to the extreme left and hit against the Tamarind Tree. But, according to PW.2 and the Exhibits A1, A2 and A4. the driver first went to the left, hit against the Tamarind tree and thereafter, straight away went to the opposite side and hit against the another Tamarind tree and only thereafter, the bus was stopped. Moreover, the Motor Vehicles Report. Ex. A3 would clearly show that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect. Under these circumstances, the case put forward by the counsel for the appellants before this Court, on the strength of the counter, has to be rejected. 18. Regarding the quantum, it is argued that the award of compensation of Rs. 2,77,000/- is not based on the well laid principles formulated by the Apex Court. It is also submitted on the strength of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court and reported in 1982 ACJ (Supp.) 408 (M.G. Bros. Lorry Service v. S. Andalammal ), that the agricultural income cannot be taken into account for determining the loss of income for the reasons that those are sources which will continue to exist even after the death of the deceased. 19. In the instant case, the Tribunal has assessed Rs. 3,500/- as the monthly income of the deceased i.e., Rs. 2,000/- from agricultural sources and Rs. 1,500/- from the Real Estate business and multiplied by 20 on the basis of the longevity theory and concluded that the deceased would have earned around Rs. 8,40,000/-. However, on the basis of the judgment reported in 1987 A.C.J. 536 (Hariyana State through the Collector, District Rohtak and another v. Kailash Kanna and others ), in which the quantum was fixed as Rs. 2,56,000/- for the deceased aged about 47 years, the Tribunal concluded that the legal representatives of the deceased in the present case also would be entitled to Rs. 2,56,000/-. 2,56,000/- for the deceased aged about 47 years, the Tribunal concluded that the legal representatives of the deceased in the present case also would be entitled to Rs. 2,56,000/-. This is clearly a wrong approach. 20. As per the decisions reported in 1994 ACJ 1 (SC) ( General Manager, Kerala State Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas ) and 1996 ACJ 931 = 1996-2-L.W. 266 (SC) ( U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilock Chandra ), the Supreme Court would hold that the proper method for assessment of loss of income would be the multiplier method by which the annual dependency has to be fixed after deducting the amounts towards the personal expenses of the deceased and it has to be multiplied by the various figures as per the schedule, on the basis of the age of the deceased. 21. In view of the above legal situation, it would be more appropriate to adopt the method aforementioned, to compute the compensation which could be awarded in the present case. PW.2, the manager of the company, was examined to establish that the deceased was getting about Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 2,000/- under one Kamatchi Chettiar, who is doing the Real Estate business. Apart from Ex. A17, there are other documents which would show that he was also separately doing Real Estate Business. According to PW.1, the wife, that her deceased husband was earning Rs. 3,500/-per month and he used to give the entire amount towards the family expenses. It is true that so many documents have been filed to show that the deceased was an agriculturist and he was paying the kist for which kist receipts and revenue records were also produced. Most of the documents are in the name of one Akkammal, the mother of the deceased. 22. According to claimant, the income which the deceased got from agriculture was Rs. 2,000/-. Even if Rs. 2,000/- has been eschewed from consideration, then we get the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2, who would state that in other business he was getting about Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,000/-. This was also supported by Ex. A17. When those documents are available, it is not necessary to seek for corroboration through the account books etc. As a matter of fact, no material was placed by the appellants to show that the deceased was not drawing such a sum as income. 22a. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,000/-. This was also supported by Ex. A17. When those documents are available, it is not necessary to seek for corroboration through the account books etc. As a matter of fact, no material was placed by the appellants to show that the deceased was not drawing such a sum as income. 22a. It is also seen from the records that all the six persons, namely, wife. 4 sons and one daughter are all the dependants of the deceased. In the light of these materials, it can be safely decided that the deceased would have spent atleast Rs. 1,250/- for the family. The maximum multiplier is 18. Therefore, the total works out to Rs. 2,70,000/- (i.e., 1250 12 18). Besides this, we can also add an amount of Rs. 20,000/- towards conventional damages on other heads including funeral expenses. Therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal is modified as Rs. 2.90,000/- instead of Rs. 2,77,000/-. 23. Since the amount of award passed by the Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 2,77,000/-to Rs. 2,90,000/- by invoking Order 41 Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code, the respondents-claimants are directed to pay the Court fee in respect of the balance amount of compensation. With these observations, the appeal is disposed of. No costs.