Judgment :- S. Sankarasubban, J. This C.R.P. is filed by the Additional 4th defendant in O.S.344/92 on the file of the Additional Munsiff s Court, Kochi. The Additional 4th defendant is District Executive Officer, Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board, Ernakulam. The revision is filed against the order dated 6.4.94 on the preliminary finding on issue No. 1. Issue No.1 was whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit was filed by the first respondent V.K. Pradeep for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from initiating revenue recovery proceedings against the plaintiff with regard to the amount due to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board. The plaintiff was the owner in possession of Tata stage carriage vehicle model 1984 having registration No. KBE567. The above said bus was having a route permit from Edacochin to Manakkakadavu. The plaintiff operated the above bus from 1984 to 3.7.86. On 4.7.86 the plaintiff sold the above bus to the third defendant. Thus third defendant is in possession of the vehicle and owner of the same and he was operating the bus service from 4.7.86. The plaintiff received a notice dated 25.6.92 for an amount of Rs. 10,486/- and Rs. 11,367/- as contribution to the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board for the period during which the service was operated by the third defendant. As the plaintiff has no ownership after 4.7.86 he is not liable to pay the amount. Hence the suit was filed to declare that revenue recovery proceedings against the plaintiff was null and void and for an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from initiating any revenue recovery steps and for other reliefs. 2. Originally the present petitioner was not impleaded. Thereafter the present petitioner was impleaded as Additional 4th defendant. The 4th defendant filed a written statement which is as follows:- It was contended that the plaintiff was operating the stage carriage during the assessment years 1986-90. The defendant denied the contention of the plaintiff that the said stage carriage was sold to the third defendant. It was further averred as follows:- The plaintiff was assessed as the employer of the stage carriage for the assessment year 1986-88. That amount was remitted by the plaintiff. Now the dispute is regarding assessment years 1988-90. No document was produced before the authority to prove that the said stage carriage has been sold. It was further averred as follows:- The plaintiff was assessed as the employer of the stage carriage for the assessment year 1986-88. That amount was remitted by the plaintiff. Now the dispute is regarding assessment years 1988-90. No document was produced before the authority to prove that the said stage carriage has been sold. As per para 37 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Scheme, every employer has to intimate the District Executive Officer of the Board regarding any change of employer ship within 15 days of such change in the prescribed form. The plaintiff has not so far informed this respondent of any such change. Hence the plaintiff is liable to pay contribution towards motor transport workers welfare fund. In paragraph 3, it is averred that before issuing revenue recovery notices, a provisional determination order dated 31.12.90 and a final determination order dated 29.4.91 for the assessment years 1988-1990 was passed and served on the plaintiff and an enquiry notice was also issued earlier. All statutory formalities were complied before initiating revenue recovery proceedings. But the plaintiff failed to avail them. As per the records of the defendant, the plaintiff was the employer of the stage carriage KBE 567. The plaintiff failed to remit the contribution towards the defaulter. A copy of the order has been served on the third defendant as he has been assessed as one of the employees. In paragraph 4 it was contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction for entertaining the suit in view of S.23 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 3. The court below heard the matter as a preliminary issue and by order dated 6.4.94 held that the suit was maintainable. The Court below took the view that additional 4th defendant had not produced the provisional and final determination orders. Since they were not produced the court below took the view that the revenue recovery notice was issued before the issue of the notice under the Act. Thereafter the court went on to discuss the fact that the plaintiff had transferred the vehicle in 1986 and seems to be the owner of the bus for the relevant period and held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted. Before the lower court, the plaintiff had produced Ext. Al dated 4.7.86 vehicle sale agreement and Exts. Thereafter the court went on to discuss the fact that the plaintiff had transferred the vehicle in 1986 and seems to be the owner of the bus for the relevant period and held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted. Before the lower court, the plaintiff had produced Ext. Al dated 4.7.86 vehicle sale agreement and Exts. A2 and A3 are demand notices. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that the additional 4th defendant had produced seven documents. Of course it appears to have been filed subsequent to the order passed by the court below. Hence I called for the records of the court below and it is found that these records are produced. I perused those records. Document No.1 produced by the additional 4th defendant is the determination order under S.8 of the Act. That shows that enquiry notice and other procedures were complied with and that the plaintiff had given his statement and objections ie. for the year 1987-88. Document No. 2 is an acknowledgment card by which the petitioner had acknowledged on 21.4.89. The document No. 3 is a letter from the plaintiff to the District Executive Officer in which he had acknowledged the notice from the 4th defendant. In that he had prayed for six months time to pay the welfare fund. Document No. 4 is a provisional determination order for the period 1987-88 with regard to the plaintiff. Document No. 5 is an acknowledgement for the same and document No. 6 is the final determination order dated 29.4.91. Thus it is seen that for the years in question authority under the Act had invoked proceedings against the plaintiff and determined the liability and it is only subsequent to that revenue recovery notice is issued. 4. Inspite of this, learned counsel for the plaintiff in the lower court contended that the court has got jurisdiction. It is true that normally unless there is specific exclusion a Civil Court has jurisdiction under S.9 of the CPC. But if the liability as well as the remedies for the same are created by an Act, normally the Civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded unless there is a case that the proceedings before the authorities were not done in accordance with the Act or against the principles of natural justice. The Act in question is the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985. The Act in question is the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985. That was enacted for the purpose of constitution of a fund to promote the welfare of motor transport workers in the State of Kerala. Employer has been defined as a person who has the ultimate control or authority over the affairs of the motor transport undertaking. Under S.4 of the Act, every employer shall pay contribution 8% of the wages for the time being to each of the employees and employees' contribution shall be equal to the contribution payable by the employer. S.8 of the Act deals with determination of amount due from the employers. It is stated as follows: (1) The Chief Executive Officer or any other officer appointed under sub-s.(1) of S.7 authorised by him in this behalf may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of this Act or of the scheme and for this purpose, may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (2) Any officer conducting the inquiry under sub-s.(1) shall for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (central Act5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (3) Any inquiry under tin's section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Ss.193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 45 of 1860) and for the purposes of S.196 of that Code. (4) No order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under sub-s.(1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s.(1) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the Government or any other authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf and the decision of the Government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s.(1) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the Government or any other authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf and the decision of the Government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final. S.9 deals with provisional assessment of contribution and it is as follows: "Every employer shall, pending determination under S.8 of the amount due from him, pay every month by way of advance contribution an amount equivalent to one-twelfth of the amount payable annually in respect of his motor transport undertaking, according to the latest determination under the said section or, if the amount due from him has not been previously determined under the said section, an amount equivalent to one-twelfth of the amount which, according to the assessment of the employer is payable by him annually in respect of his motor transport undertaking." S.23 of the Act is as follows: "No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act or the scheme required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Government or the Board or the Chief Executive Officer or any other officer appointed under sub-s.(1) of S.7." Thus it can be seen that under S.8 appeal has been provided to the Government or the authority constituted by the Government. Under S.23 of the Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question on any matter which is under this Act or Scheme required to be settled by the Government or the Board or the Chief Executive Officer. Thus going by the Act and the Scheme, a complete Code has been described with regard to the determination of liability of the employer for payment of the contribution. The perusal of document shows that notices were issued by the authorities to the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the plaintiff then submitted that the Act and scheme do not show that the question whether a person is an employee or not cannot be decided by the constituted authority under the Act. I do not agree. Employer and employee have been defined. Learned counsel for the plaintiff then submitted that the Act and scheme do not show that the question whether a person is an employee or not cannot be decided by the constituted authority under the Act. I do not agree. Employer and employee have been defined. If a person is not an employer and he has received notice under the Act, certainly he can take the contention that he is not an employer and the authorities will have the jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the person is an employer or not. According to me, it is a jurisdiction conferred by the authorities in order to discharge the function of the Act; otherwise in all cases the employer can escape by saying that the authority has no jurisdiction to decide the question. A similar question arose for consideration under the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1969. A Division Bench of this Court decided the question in the decision reported in Raman Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1990 (1) KLT 269. Section that was to be interpreted was S.17a of the act. S.17A is similar to S.23 of the present Act. Sukumaran, J. on behalf of the Division Bench held as follows: "A Tribunal of limited jurisdiction has the duty and authority to decide on matters connected with its very jurisdiction. When internal remedies are adequately provided, a party has to work out his remedies, ordinarily, under the frame work of that enactment. He has also a constitutional facility for redressal of grievance by invocation of Art.226 of the Constitution. Implied bar of jurisdiction can therefore, be inferred in given situations. The bar is attracted if the matter to be decided is one which comes within the range of matters to be settled, decided or dealt with under the enactment. The range is paraded by the provisions of S.B. The existence of employer-employee relationship is also within its purview. If that be so, S.17A is immediately and easily attracted. Even in cases where employer-employee relationship is in dispute, the decision of the authorities under the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, which have attained finality under the Act or the otherwise, will totally bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court". The same issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Toddy Worker's W,F. Inspector v. Madhavan Nair 1990 (1) KLT 662. The same issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Toddy Worker's W,F. Inspector v. Madhavan Nair 1990 (1) KLT 662. The Supreme Court held that the question whether the plaintiff-respondents are employers is a collateral fact which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Act. Under S.23, the authority has got jurisdiction to decide all questions to be dealt with under the Act. This gives the collateral jurisdiction to decide the question of employer-employee relationship. In the above view of the matter, I set aside the impugned order of the Court below and hold that the suit is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the plaintiff then submitted that all along his client was of the view that the suit will be maintainable and hence he did not invoke the remedies under the Act. Under S.8(5) of the Act, any person aggrieved by an order has to file an appeal within sixty days. Here even though that period is over, I give an opportunity to the plaintiff to file an appeal provided he deposits half the amount demanded under Exts. A2 and A3 within a period of one month and file an appeal within a period of six weeks from today. If such amount is deposited and appeal is filed, the revenue recovery proceedings will not be continued till the disposal of the appeal. C.R.P. is disposed of as above.