C. K. THAKKER, A. L. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) CIVIL Application No. 10057 of 1999 is filed by the State of Gujarat. Interim relief is prayed in terms of para 5 which reads as under :"5. THE applicant, therefore, prays that: (A) pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned orders dated 2/08/1999 and 9th August 1999 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 4774 of 1999. (B) be pleased to pass such other and further relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require. " ( 2 ) IN Civil Application No. 10038 of 1999,filed by Gujarat Agricultural University, interim relief prayed is in terms of para 9 which is as under :" The applicant, therefore, prays that:a. PENDING the hearing and final disposal of this Letters Patent Appeal, Your Lordships be pleased to stay the impugned orders dated 2nd August 1999 and 9/08/1999 passed by the learned Single Judge (Mr. M. R. Calla,j.) in Special Civil Application No. 4774/99 and allow to appoint another Officer as a Campus Director of Anand campus. B. ANY other appropriate relief that may be deemed fit and proper be granted in the interest of justice. " ( 3 ) WE were of the view that both the appeals deserved admission and hence, we have admitted them. We have also fixed final hearing. We are of the opinion that the applicants are entitled to interim relief. It would be appropriate to record reasons for grant of interim relief as also why according to us, both the appeals deserved admission. Opponent No. 1 was the original petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 4774 of 1999. He was appointed as Campus Director of Gujarat Agricultural University, Anand ("university" for short) on 15/05/1997. The order of appointment dated 15/05/1997 stated that the petitioner was appointed as Campus Director of the University with effect from 15/05/1997 or from the date of taking over charge by him, for a period of three years in accordance with provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 13 of the Gujarat Agricultural University Act, 1969 (hereafter referred to as "the Act" ). On 30/06/1999, order of suspension was passed by the State Government which was impugned in the petition. On 30/06/1999, order of suspension was passed by the State Government which was impugned in the petition. Whereas according to the University as well as the State Government, an order of suspension was preventive pending inquiry; according to the petitioner, it was by way of punishment and penalty. ( 4 ) THE learned Single Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, observed that a strong prima facie case was made out by the petitioner, that the order was punitive in nature and as balance of convenience was in his favour, the petitioner was entitled to interim relief. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge admitted the petition by issuing Rule. He also granted mandatory interim relief of status quo ante as on 30/06/1999. The present two appeals have been filed by the University and by the State Government against grant of interim relief by the learned Single Judge. ( 5 ) IT appears that the order of suspension was passed on 30/06/1999. On 2/07/1999, a petition was filed. Notice was issued to the respondents. It may be stated that a caveat was filed by the appellants of LPA No. 1183 of 1999. On August 2, the learned Single Judge issued Rule on the petition and made it returnable on 9/08/1999. It was stated on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 that the action was taken in pursuance of the order passed by the Government and hence it would be for the Government to defend the order and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had filed caveat only under the instructions of the State Government. In light of the above submission, the learned Single Judge granted limited interim relief that nobody should be appointed to the post of Campus Director till the matter is heard on 9/08/1999. On the returnable date i. e. on August 9, 1999, Rule was not heard but arguments were advanced by the parties on interim relief. The learned Single Judge granted interim relief. In para 2 ,the learned Single Judge observed:"it is submitted before this court by the learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader under instructions from the officer who is present in court that no charge sheet whatsoever has been served upon the petitioner. Mr. Vakharia submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 30. 6. In para 2 ,the learned Single Judge observed:"it is submitted before this court by the learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader under instructions from the officer who is present in court that no charge sheet whatsoever has been served upon the petitioner. Mr. Vakharia submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 30. 6. 1999 cannot be but be said to be punitive order and therefore, orders are required to be passed staying the order dated 30. 6. 1999. Mr. Desai for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that at this stage, staying the impugned order dated 30. 6. 1999 would amount to final relief and therefore, no order staying the operation of the impugned order dated 30. 6. 1999 may be passed particularly when the additional charge of the post of Campus Director is already being held by Mr. Sharma. Whereas this appointment of Campus Director was given to the petitioner for a limited period of three years, and the term of three years is going to expire in May, 2000, and the hearing of the case may take a long time, and therefore, in case appropriate further interim order is not passed, it may render the whole petition infructuous. It is clear in the facts and circumstances of the case read with relevant provisions that the petitioner has a prima facie case. Balance of convenience also lies in favour of passing the interim order staying the impugned order dated 30. 6. 1999 as in the absence of interim order, the petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable loss. The fixed term of appointment as has been given to the petitioner cannot be curtailed in such a case on the basis of impugned order which has been passed on absolutely undisclosed material and prima facie, it appears to be punitive order passed without giving any action inspired of notice". (emphasis supplied ). ( 6 ) IN the light of the above observations, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner was entitled to interim relief and accordingly, interim relief was granted by allowing the petitioner to function as Campus Director as he was functioning prior to passing of the order of suspension on 30/06/1999. The prayer regarding stay of the order by the authorities was declined by the learned Single Judge. Lengthy arguments were advanced by the learned counsel of both the sides. The prayer regarding stay of the order by the authorities was declined by the learned Single Judge. Lengthy arguments were advanced by the learned counsel of both the sides. As Rule is issued in the main matter and it awaits final hearing, it would neither be appropriate nor desirable to make wider observations which may affect either party. We would, therefore, not enter into larger controversy at this stage. A short question, in our opinion, would be whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge was right in granting mandatory relief at admission stage. ( 7 ) THE main contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner is preventive and not punitive by way of penalty or punishment. During the pendency of regular inquiry which will be held against the petitioner as a preventive measure, an order is passed placing him under suspension and such order ought not to have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge and that too at interim stage. It is submitted that as the order is not penal, question of application of principles of natural justice and affording opportunity of hearing would not arise. ( 8 ) RELYING upon several decisions, it was submitted that suspensions are of two types- (i) suspension by way of penalty i. e. as punitive measure and (ii) suspension pending inquiry or prosecution as preventive step. Reading the order impugned in the petition, according to the appellants, there is no manner of doubt that the order cannot be said to be punitive but it is merely preventive. Such action could have been taken under Section 16 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. It was further argued that if the petitioner is an employee or servant of the University, and in accordance with statutory rules, he can be placed under suspension,and in that case, he would be entitled to subsistence allowance in accordance with rules in force. But it appears that prima facie, the learned Single Judge was satisfied,in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act as well as Statutes, that the petitioner could not be said to be an employee or servant of the University. We are also told that an order was passed by the learned Single Judge to that effect and the matter was treated as "non-service matter". We are also told that an order was passed by the learned Single Judge to that effect and the matter was treated as "non-service matter". In view of the said order, it was submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General as well as by Mr. Patel, senior advocate appearing for Mr. Desai for the University that the petitioner would be entitled to salary as it is the University which does not allow the petitioner to discharge his duties during suspension. A statement was also made at the time of hearing of these appeals that the petitioner would be paid salary during suspension period. Our attention was invited to several decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court by both the sides but we do not intend to burden this order by referring all of them. A reference may, however, be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Bool chand vs. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1968 SC 292 . Reliance was placed by both the sides on that decision to support their respective contentions. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that if facts in Dr. Bool Chands case are appreciated in their proper perspective, an action taken against the petitioner is clearly legal and valid. Almost in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the University to take action against the Vice- Chancellor and no complaint could be made against such action. In Dr. Bool Chand, the appellant was a member of Indian Administrative Service and on charges of gross misconduct and indiscipline, he was compulsorily retired. Thereafter, he was appointed as Vice Chancellor of Kurukshetra University. Later on, the University came to know that the appellant was in Indian Administrative Service and was compulsorily retired but the said fact was not disclosed by the appellant. ; he was, therefore, suspended and by a separate order, his services were terminated. It was argued before the Apex Court that that the Vice Chancellor ( UP KULPATI ) was to hold office "ordinarily" for a period of three years which could be renewed and hence, he could not have been terminated during the intervening period and such action was illegal, contrary to law and unlawful. It was argued before the Apex Court that that the Vice Chancellor ( UP KULPATI ) was to hold office "ordinarily" for a period of three years which could be renewed and hence, he could not have been terminated during the intervening period and such action was illegal, contrary to law and unlawful. The Supreme Court held that it was necessary to issue notice before terminating services of Bool Chand and as notice was issued and thereafter the action was taken , it was legal and valid,being in consonance with the principles of natural justice and fair play. ( 9 ) IT was contended by Mr. Vakharia that as in the instant case, no notice was issued ,no explanation was sought and no opportunity was afforded, the action was illegal. But according to the appellants, in the case before the Supreme Court, two actions were taken against Dr Bool Chand , one after the other. Initially, Dr Bool Cand was placed under suspension and thereafter, his services were terminated. The observations regarding affording opportunity of hearing would apply only against termination of services but not against suspension. We are impressed by the said argument and in our opinion, it deserves to be upheld. ( 10 ) IT is also necessary to bear in mind the provisions of Section 16 of the Bombay General Clauses Act which enact that the power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss. It was no doubt submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that provisions of Section 16 would not apply as the petitioner cannot be said to be an employee of the University. It was further argued that such action can be taken only by way of punishment or penalty. If the action is punitive, as per settled principle of law, even in the absence of statutory provisions, before taking such action, principles of natural justice must be observed. In this connection, our attention was invited to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani AIR 1967 SC 1269 . In Dr Bool Chands case, observations in Dr Beenapani were quoted with approval. It was urged that in the instant case also, civil consequences would ensue and the ratio of above decisions would apply. (Miss) Binapani AIR 1967 SC 1269 . In Dr Bool Chands case, observations in Dr Beenapani were quoted with approval. It was urged that in the instant case also, civil consequences would ensue and the ratio of above decisions would apply. ( 11 ) IN our opinion, however, the principle laid down in Dr Beenapani would not apply to the facts of the present case nor certain observations in Dr. Bool Chand. Both the cases were of termination of services, the former on the ground of superannuation and the latter on the ground of tenure appointment which was "ordinarily" for a period of three years and the tenure was sought to be curtailed. Mr. Vakharia is right in his submission that the phraseology in the Statute in question is different than the phraseology used in Clause (4) (vii) of the Kurukshetra University and that the case of the petitioner is on a stronger footing as appointment of Campus Director was made for a period of three years. The expression "ordinarily" does not find place in the Statute of the Agriculture University. Mr. Vakharia, however, forgets that the action taken against the petitioner is not punitive and his services are not terminated. He is merely placed under suspension and if the suspension is not by way of penalty but merely preventive in nature, then, it could be taken without affording opportunity of hearing. ( 12 ) THE question , therefore, is whether the order dated June 30, 1999 impugned in the petition can be said to be an order of suspension by way of penalty or punishment. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Vakharia that no such point was taken before the learned Single Judge by the University even though an affidavit was filed by the University. No such contention was also raised by the State and hence, a new plea cannot be permitted to be raised before LPA Bench. Our attention in this connection was invited by the learned counsel to various decisions including a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Jenusan Textiles vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation; 1999 (1) GLR 460 . ( 13 ) IN our opinion, however, the contention is not well founded. The reason is that the order of suspension was challenged before the learned Single Judge and the entire controversy was before the court. ( 13 ) IN our opinion, however, the contention is not well founded. The reason is that the order of suspension was challenged before the learned Single Judge and the entire controversy was before the court. In fact, the learned Single Judge has noted in para 2 that the order was punitive in nature. The Single Judge stated:"in the facts and circumstances of the case,the impugned order dated 30. 6. 1999 cannot but be said to be a punitive order and therefore orders are required to be passed staying the order dated 30. 6. 1999". AT another place, the learned Single Judge observed:"the fixed term of appointment as has been given to the petitioner cannot be curtailed in such a case on the basis of impugned order which has been passed on absolutely undisclosed material and prima facie it appears to be punitive order passed without giving any action inspired of notice"thus, there is no doubt in our minds that the learned Single Judge granted relief in favour of the petitioner since he was satisfied that the order was penal and punitive. The question of giving opportunity of hearing or disclosure of material would only arise if the order is punitive and not otherwise. Therefore, the controversy before the learned Single Judge was as to whether the order was preventive or punitive. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the appellants, reading the order as a whole, it cannot be said that it is punitive. Our attention in this connection was invited to the order impugned in the petition wherein it was alleged that several complaints had been received by the State Government against the petitioner. Considering the seriousness of the allegations levelled against him, one Ms Gaurikumar was appointed to look into the matter and to hold preliminary inquiry and to submit a report. She accordingly held preliminary inquiry and submitted a report before the State Government. In her report, she had stated that prima facie, ( ) the allegations against the petitioner were established. Those allegations were also mentioned in the order of suspension. After taking note of those allegations, it was stated in the order that a number of irregularities were committed by the petitioner and there was insubordination on his part. In her report, she had stated that prima facie, ( ) the allegations against the petitioner were established. Those allegations were also mentioned in the order of suspension. After taking note of those allegations, it was stated in the order that a number of irregularities were committed by the petitioner and there was insubordination on his part. It was alleged that there was every possibility that the petitioner may tamper with University record if he would be permitted to continue as Campus Director. He may also cause hindrance in the inquiry and with a view to see that inquiry can be properly held, it was decided to place him under suspension with immediate effect. ( 15 ) THE contention of the petitioner was that the order was punitive. It was submitted that the expression " --" does not mean "prima facie", but "very apparently" or "ex facie". In other words, according to the counsel, a finding was recorded by the State Government against the petitioner and action was taken which was held to be punitive by the learned Single Judge. Such view cannot be said to be illegal or unlawful. ( 16 ) IN our opinion , however, reading the order, there is no doubt that the action taken against the petitioner is only preventive in nature. It is also clear from the fact that preliminary inquiry was held and report was submitted stating therein that certain irregularities were committed by the petitioner. It was, therefore, considered necessary by the State Government to hold regular inquiry. ( 17 ) ACCORDING to us, the expression " --" which is used in Gujarati language also makes it clear that satisfaction was merely "prima facie" on the basis of findings of preliminary inquiry which necessitated regular departmental inquiry to be instituted. This is further clear from the fact that there was formation of opinion reflected in the order that if the petitioner would be allowed to continue on his post, there was every likelihood that he may tamper with University record or may create hindrance in regular departmental inquiry. Therefore, with a view to seeing that inquiry is conducted against the petitioner in accordance with law, it was necessary to place him under suspension with immediate effect. Therefore, with a view to seeing that inquiry is conducted against the petitioner in accordance with law, it was necessary to place him under suspension with immediate effect. ( 18 ) IN light of all these facts, there cannot be two opinions that the action was preventive and the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in holding that the order was punitive in nature and as no opportunity was afforded before taking action of suspension , the order was illegal and unlawful. ( 19 ) IT was contended by Mr. Vakharia that the learned Single Judge granted interim relief after hearing both the parties. He has exercised his judicial discretion. The matter is already admitted and awaits final hearing. If interim relief will be granted, virtually, LPAs will stand allowed at this stage. This cannot be done in view of the fact that the main matter is pending before the learned Single Judge. Mr. Vakharia , in this conneiction, strongly relying upon Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786 submitted that the Apex Court has observed to take into consideration certain principles while dealing with orders passed by a Single Judge. He, particularly, referred to the following observations in para 119 of the reports in which it was stated" (1) That the trial Judge being a senior court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the Trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he possesses must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. "he also referred to another decision of the Apex Court in Wander Limited and another vs. Antox India P. Ltd. (1990) (Suppl.) SCC 727 particularly the following observations made therein:"9. "he also referred to another decision of the Apex Court in Wander Limited and another vs. Antox India P. Ltd. (1990) (Suppl.) SCC 727 particularly the following observations made therein:"9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal rights asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated-". . . IS to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. "the interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo,the rights of parties which may appear on prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal rights but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scale, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. " ( 20 ) IN the instant case, however, as the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in holding that suspension was by way of penalty and since action was taken without affording opportunity of hearing, the petitioner was entitled to interim relief and interim relief was granted. In our opinion,however, the order was merely preventive and no opportunity of hearing was necessary. Hence, by granting mandatory relief in favour of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law and exceeded his jurisdiction and hence, the applicants are entitled to interim relief. In our opinion,however, the order was merely preventive and no opportunity of hearing was necessary. Hence, by granting mandatory relief in favour of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law and exceeded his jurisdiction and hence, the applicants are entitled to interim relief. Accordingly, interim relief against the order passed by the learned Single Judge is granted. The next question is as to the benefits to which the petitioner will be entitled during the period of suspension. . ( 21 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the applicants that in case where there is a statutory provision for placing an employee under suspension pending inquiry or trial, he would be entitled to get subsistence allowance in accordance with the rules in force and nothing more. But even in absence of such provision, an action of suspension can be taken by the master and the employee cannot insist that he must be allowed to exercise his rights and discharge his duties. The only consequence would be that in the later class of cases, as employee is prevented by the employer from performing his functions, he cannot be deprived of his salary, remuneration or wages which he is getting on the day of taking action. In this connection, our attention was invited by the counsel to the following decisions: (1) R. P. Kapur vs. Union of India); AIR 1964 SC 787 ; (2) B. R. Patel vs. State of Mahrashtra, air 1968 SC 800 ; (3) V. P. Gindroniya vs. State of M. P AIR 1970 SC 1494 (4) Jammu University vs. D. K. Rampal AIR 1977 SC 1146 ; (5) J. S. Solanki vs. Chief Conservator of Forest 1986 (1) GLR 41 mr. Vakharia, however, submitted that reading the provisions of Section 13 (3) of the Act and Statues 8 to 11, the petitioner would be entitled to all the benefits,which he was getting prior to the passing of the impugned order and not merely salary. Statues 8 to 11 read as under;"8 (a) The Director of Campus shall receive a fixed salary of Rs. 1,800. 00 per month. (B) He shall reside in the campus and shall be entitled to free furnished residential accommodation. (C) He shall receive Rs 200/- per month as car allowance provided he maintains his own car. "" 9. Statues 8 to 11 read as under;"8 (a) The Director of Campus shall receive a fixed salary of Rs. 1,800. 00 per month. (B) He shall reside in the campus and shall be entitled to free furnished residential accommodation. (C) He shall receive Rs 200/- per month as car allowance provided he maintains his own car. "" 9. The Director of Campus shall hold office for a term of three years and shall be eligible for reappointment to that office for one additional term of three years. "" 10. (a) Director of Campus shall be entitled to leave on full pay, for a period equal to 1/11th of the period spent on active service. He may avail himself of this leave whenever he finds it necessary to do so during his tenure and when he avails himself of such leave, he shall make report thereof to the Board who may make arrangements for the carrying out his duties during his absence. Provided that he will cease to earn such leave when the leave due to him amounts to 90 days. (B) In addition to the leave referred to in sub-clause (a), the Director of Campus shall be entitled in case of illness or on account of affairs to leave without pay for a period not exceeding 3 months during the period of his tenure. Provided that any such leave without pay may be subsequently converted into leave on full pay to the extent to which such leave may have become due under sub clause (a) above. ""11. The Director of Campus shall be entitled to receive daily and travelling allowances at such rates as provided in the statutes. "mr. Vakharia strenuously argued that the judgments referred to by the applicants would not apply to the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner cannot be said to be an employee or servant of the University. ( 22 ) IN our opinion, however, the principle laid down by the Apex Court would apply. In Dr Bool Chands case, the Supreme court considered the provisions of the General Clauses Act and observed that the expressions "suspend" and dismiss" must be construed in broader sense and its application cannot be restricted to employment. It cannot be forgotten that the concept of dismissal from public employment was comparatively a `recent development after the enactment of Government of India Act, 1935. It cannot be forgotten that the concept of dismissal from public employment was comparatively a `recent development after the enactment of Government of India Act, 1935. There was, therefore, no warrant for assuming that General Clauses Act, 1898 would be limited in its application to service matters. In para 6, Their Lordships observed:" Counsel also urged that under Section 14 of the Act power to appoint includes power to dismiss,but not to determine employment. In support of that contention, he urged that in relation to the tenure of service of a public servant, the expression "to dismiss" has come to mean to determine employment as a measure of punishment. But Section 14 of the General Clauses Act is general provision; it does not merely deal with the appointment of public servant It deals with all appointments and there is no reason to hold, having regard to the context in which the expression occurs, that the authority invested with the power of appointment as a penalty , but not otherwise. The expression "dismiss" does not in its etymological sense necessarily involve any such meaning as is urged by counsel for the appellant. The implication that dismissal of a servant involves determination of employment as a penalty has been a matter of recent development since the Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted. By that Act, certain restrictions were imposed upon the power of the authorities to dismiss or remove members of the civil services form employment. There is no warrant however for assuming that in the General Clauses Act, 1898, the expression "dismiss" which was generally used in connection with the termination of appointments was intended to be used only in the sense of termination of employment as a measure of punishment". (emphasis supplied) ( 23 ) IN our opinion, therefore, the petitioner would be entitled only to salary which he was getting on June 30, 1999 i. e. the day on which he was placed under suspension. It was, however, stated by Mr. Shelat, learned Additional Advocate General that the petitioner is occupying a quarter in the University campus and he will be allowed to occupy the same during the pendency of the proceedings against him. In view of the said statement, the petitioner is permitted to occupy the quarter during the pendency of LPS. He will, however, not be entitled to other benefits. In view of the said statement, the petitioner is permitted to occupy the quarter during the pendency of LPS. He will, however, not be entitled to other benefits. For the foregoing reasons, both the civil applications deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge on August 9, 1999 in Special Civil Application No. 4774 of 1999 is hereby stayed. It is, however, clarified that this order will be subject to final outcome of LPAs as also subject to further orders to be passed by this Court. At this stage, on behalf of the University, a prayer was made that the petitioner may be ordered to hand over charge to Mr Sharma It was also stated that certain records are with the petitioner and he may be directed to hand over the said record to the University. ( 24 ) MR. Vakharia disputed this fact. He further said that the order was already passed on 9/08/1999 and the petitioner is at present holding the charge. He also stated that the petitioner intends to approach the Apex Court. Mr. Vakharia, therefore , prayed that order passed by us may be kept in abeyance for some time so as to enable the petitioner to approach higher forum. This is strongly opposed by the learned counsel for the appellants. ( 25 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, ends of justice will be met if the order passed by us is kept in abeyance upto 4/10/1999 provided the petitioner proceeds on leave and will not attend the office. Applications are accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances , no order as to costs. .