JUDGMENT 1. -Through this criminal miscellaneous petition the petitioners seek quashment of the HR No. 101/96 P.S. Jaisalmer under sections 420, 406, 419, 120-B, 465 & 467 IPC. 2. Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners, pointing out that the complainant-respondent had purchased a truck under the Hire Purchaser Agreement, and he failed to make payment of the instalments, contended that the finance petitioners had a right to repossess the vehicle. The submission of Mr. Garg was that the dispute is of civil nature and the FIR should be quashed. He relied on the cases of Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo, 1979 SC 850 , Manipal Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. T. Bangarappa & Anr., 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 507 & K.A. Mathai @ Babu v. Kora Bibbikutty & Anr., (1996) 7 SCC 212 . 3. Mr. Khatri, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the order hand, urged that the FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offence by the petitioners, and therefore, it should not he quashed. His contention was that the petitioners cheated the complainant when they, against the agreement of supplying old model, supplied new model chassis, which was built by using spurious parts. He further contended that the petitioners took away the vehicle from the respondent-complainant on the pretext that the same would be replaced but instead of replacing or returning the vehicle to the complainant the petitioners have transferred it to someone else. According to Mr. Khatri, the facts constitute offences Ws. 420 & 406 IPC. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor also supported the contentions of Mr. Khatri. 5. Under what circumstances, FIR can be quashed, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SC 604 . After considering the various earlier decisions, their Lordships observed as follows at Para No. 108 of the report:- "108. Khatri. 5. Under what circumstances, FIR can be quashed, came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SC 604 . After considering the various earlier decisions, their Lordships observed as follows at Para No. 108 of the report:- "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power u/Art. 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations made in the FIR and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 6. At para 109, their Lordships recorded a note of caution, which is reproduced hereunder:- "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a. criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extra-ordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." 7. The serious question for consideration is whether the FIR does not at all disclose the commission of cognizable offence/s by the petitioners. At para No. 3 of the FIR it has been alleged that there was an agreement between the parties wherein the complainant was to be supplied the old model of the Ashoka Leyland Chassis; but the petitioners cheated her when they supplied, new model and that too built by spurious parts. At para No. 5 of the FIR, it has been averred that on 21.10.1991 one of the petitioners assured the complainant that he would replace the vehicle. At para No. 7 of the FIR, it has been stated that the accused No. 4 & 5 (petitioners No. 3 & 4) took away the vehicle from the house of the complainant on 20.4.1994, assuring her that the vehicle would be replaced. At para No. 7 of the FIR, it has been stated that the accused No. 4 & 5 (petitioners No. 3 & 4) took away the vehicle from the house of the complainant on 20.4.1994, assuring her that the vehicle would be replaced. It has been also stated in this paragraph that the petitioners have not returned the vehicle as yet and even the notice remained un-replied and the petitioners have sold the vehicle to someone else. The above facts also appear in the statement of Multan Ram, power of attorney holder of the complainant. Some of these facts even appearing in he statement of Deen Dayal, Guarantor. 8. In the presence of the aforesaid allegations in the first information report, it cannot be said that it does not disclose the commission of cognizable offence/s. The allegations against the petitioners are that they had cheated the complainant and further that they had taken away the vehicle promising to replace the same but by not replacing, the same they have committed criminal breach of trust. At this stage, it is not required to be seen as to whether the allegations in the complaint are true or not. At least, it cannot be said that the allegations are not so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners. Their lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 expounded the law as follows : "The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the un-controverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence." As already stated, there are allegations in the FIR which disclose the commission of the cognizable offence/s. 9. The petitioners' case is not required to be seen at this stage. Yet assuming that under the terms of Hire Purchase Agreement, they had a right to repossess the vehicle on non-payment, the FIR cannot be quashed. The petitioners' case is not required to be seen at this stage. Yet assuming that under the terms of Hire Purchase Agreement, they had a right to repossess the vehicle on non-payment, the FIR cannot be quashed. It is a matter of investigation as to whether the petitioners' case that they had terminated the contract on the alleged non-payment of the instalments and they were justified in doing so, is correct or the prosecution version that the petitioners had taken away the vehicle promising to replace the same by another vehicle, is correct. No opinion can be expressed on that aspect of the matter in this order. Looking to the allegations in the complaint, it cannot be accepted that the dispute is purely of civil nature. 10. The cases relied on by Mr. Garg do not help him at this stage. It is possible that the police, after investigation, accepts the petitioners' version, and do not proceed to submit charge-sheet. But it cannot be said that the case comes in any of the category of cases mentioned by the Apex Court, for quashing the FIR. Certainly, it is not a case of the nature, rarest of the rare. 11. It is noticed that the petitioners have already been granted hail under section 438 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it cannot be said that there will be harassment to the petitioners. The investigation of the case could not make headway because of the stay granted by this Court. 12. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed. It is expected that the investigation shall be expeditiously completed.Petition dismissed. *******