JUDGMENT Gupta, J. In this appeal the order dated 12th January, 1994 passed by the learned City Civil Court, Calcutta, 10th Bench in Title Suit No. 2003 of 1992 is assailed by the appellant. The appellant has filed the aforesaid suit in the aforesaid Civil Court and in that the made an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction restraining the defendant-respondent from evicting him from the suit premises by execution of the decree passed by the learned 2nd Judge, Small Cause Court in S.C.C. Suit No. 963 of 1989. The learned Trial Judge, after hearing the parties and on detailed consideration, rejected the prayer for grant of temporary injunction and dismissed the application. 2. The appellant’s main contention is that the learned Trial Judge wrongly held that the decree passed by the Small Causes Court in S.C.C. Suit No. 963 of 1989 operated as res judicata in so far as the question relating to the title of the appellant qua the property in question was concerned. It may be mentioned that the appellant claimed to be a tenant of title suit property. The respondent undoubtedly is the owner. Both the appellant and the respondent are real brothers. The respondent contention, however is that the appellant is not the tenant of the suit property, but was only a licensee. 3. We agree with a submission of the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant that the learned Court went wrong in holding that in view of the decree passed by the Small Causes Court, the Trial Court cannot go into any issue relating to the title of the appellant qua the property in question. We are of the view that the Civil Court in an independent suit is entitled to go into all such questions irrespective of any order passed by a Small Causes Court because proceedings under Section 41 of the presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 are not in the nature of a suit and an order passed therein does not amount to a decree as might be passed by a Civil Court. In the view of ours, we are fortified by a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of (1) Debabrata Mukherjee v. Kalyan Kumar Roy reported in AIR 1983 Cal 241 . In the view of ours, we are fortified by a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of (1) Debabrata Mukherjee v. Kalyan Kumar Roy reported in AIR 1983 Cal 241 . To the same effect is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Nalinakhya Bytack v. Shyam Sunder Halder & Ors. reported in AIR 1953 SC 148 . In the aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of this Court it has clearly been held that the proceedings under Section 41 of the said Act are not in the nature of suit and that the order passed therein does not amount to a decree. The following observation are opposite :- “In the view, we must uphold the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the decision of the Small Causes Court in the proceeding under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act would not conclude the issue on the question of title claimed by the plaintiff as a tenant and his subsequent suit based on such a claim would not be barred either under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under the general principles of the res judicata. In this view, it is not necessary for us to consider the other ground taken by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, viz., that on the terms of Section 11 of the Code itself the Court of Small Causes not being a Court competent to adjudicate title between the parties its decision on a question of title would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit over title before a competent Court or decide it finally. The learned Judge, however, was carried by the Explanation-VIII added to Section 11 of the Code which merely incorporates the well settled general principal of res judicata independent of Section 11 but the said principle or the provision codifying it cannot override the specific provision made in Sections 47 and 49 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act. This aspect was unfortunately overlooked by the learned Judge, when he held that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the decision in the Small Causes Court proceedings.” 4. In the case of Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halder & Ors. This aspect was unfortunately overlooked by the learned Judge, when he held that the plaintiff’s claim is barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the decision in the Small Causes Court proceedings.” 4. In the case of Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Halder & Ors. (supra), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were clearly of the view that the proceedings arising out of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 are not in the nature of suit. The following observation in Paragraph 3 of the judgment are relevant which we quote as under :- “Although under the rules framed under the Act this application under Section 41 is initiated by a plaint there is no dispute that the proceeding is not a suit and the order for delivery of possession does not strictly speaking amount to a decree for recovery of possession. See (3) Meherbai v. Pherizehaw Sarabji, AIR 1927 Bom 556 (8). Indeed, Section 19 of the Act peremptorily provides, inter alia, that the Small Causes Court shall have no jurisdiction in suits for recovery of immovable property. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether Section 18(1) of the Act 17 of 1950 applies to an order for possession made under Section 43 of the Presidency Small Causes Act, 1882.” We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the learned Court below want wrong is holding that the order passed by the Small Causes Court shut out any adjudication in so far as the question of title was concerned. This however, does not conclude the dispute between the parties. 5. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the learned Court below. After discussing the res judicata question that related to the binding effect of the order passed by the Small Causes Court, the learned Court below went on, independent of that, to consider whether even otherwise, the appellant had any prima facie case to support his contention that he was not a licensee and was in effect a tenant in respect of the property in question. Upon considering various relevant aspect of this issued and in the light of the contentions raised by both the sides, learned Court below came to a conclusion, in relation to be disposal of the application for temporary injunction that the appellant had indeed failed prima facie to prove that he was a tenant in respect of the property in question and that he was a license as was being claimed by the respondent. No material has been placed before us by the appellant nor has anything been urged before us which would warrant taking a contrary view by us. We, therefore, have no hesitation in upholding the finding of the learned Court below in so far as the appellant having failed to establish a prima facie case is concerned. We agree with the view of the learned Court below and we ourselves hold, in the facts and circumstances of this case, that the appellant had failed to establish that he was a tenant in respect of the property in question and that he was not a licensee, as was being claimed by the respondent. Based on our aforesaid discussion, therefore, we find that the appeal has no merit and the same in accordingly dismissed. No formal decree need be draw up. Sen, J : I agree.