Judgment :- 1. The civil revision petition has been filed against the order of the Executing Court, viz, the Principal District Munsif Court, Tirunelveli, dismissing the application of the revision petitioner in E.A. No. 349 of 1996 in E.P. No. 254 of 1994 in O.S. No. 1263 of 1981 on his file for amendment of the description of the property to be proceeded against in execution of the decree in the suit. 2. Notice of motion was ordered in the Civil revision petition on 12. 1998. Though the respondents were served, they have not chosen to appear through counsel and contest the case. Mr.V. Raghavachari was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the court in the matter. The learned counsel also appeared and rendered valuable assistance by citing several authorities in support and against. 3. The revision petitioner filed suit O.S. No. 1263 of 1981 before the principal District Munsif Court, Tirunelveli, for recovery of Rs. 1939. 84 with 6% interest as arrears of lease amount due to it from the respondents. The suit was decreed for Rs. 3719.82 with interest on 27. 1982. The revision petitioner filed E.P. No. 254 of 1994. The Executing Court on 23. 1996 ordered attachment of the property at Door No. 12, Mutharamman Koil Street. The bailiff however returned the attachment stating that there was no such person in Door No. 12, Muthuramman Koil Street, Palayamkottai. Thereafter, E.A. No. 349 of 1996 came to be filed in the E.P. for amendment of the suit schedule as far as the street name was concerned. The lower court by order dated 110. 1997 dismissed the application accepting the case of the respondents that the very property was changed by reason of the amendment order. Aggrieved, the present revision has been filed. 4. It is contended by Mr.P. Srinivas, learned counsel for the revision petitioner that by amending the description there is no change of the property and in fact, the respondents had not taken any serious objections with regard to the description of the property in the execution petition till the property was attached on 23. 1996. The lower court erred in holding that the entire cause of action would change by reason of the amendment of the mere description of the property. The character of the execution petition for attachment and sale of the property did not change by reason of the amendment sought for. 1996. The lower court erred in holding that the entire cause of action would change by reason of the amendment of the mere description of the property. The character of the execution petition for attachment and sale of the property did not change by reason of the amendment sought for. The respondents had suffered a decree and were liable to pay the amount and the revision petitioner was entitled to recover the same by bringing the property of the respondents to sale and the revision petitioner was entitled to have amendment. 5. Mr.V. Raghavachari, learned counsel acting as amicus curiae, has already stated that there were conflicting views in this regard and the amendment application had been filed more than 12 years after the decree and was clearly barred by limitation. 6. This is not a case where any property is sought to be recovered. The revision petitioner had obtained a decree for money and in execution of the decree, the property belonging to the respondents was sought to be brought to sale. There is really no change of cause of action. There is no decree for any property. The property belonging to the respondents is sought to be proceeded against for realising the decree amount. The street name had been wrongly given and it does not lie in the respondents to say that the street name cannot be changed, particularly, when if the street name is changed, the description would tally with the property belonging to the respondents. 7. In Sri Raja D.K. Venkata Lingama Nayanim etc., AIR 1967 Mad. 216 it was held by a Bench of this Court that, “a decree holder cannot be allowed to amend a previous execution petition by including fresh properties more than twelve years after the date of the decree and the court has no discretion in the matter.” This is not a case where the decree holder seeks amendment by including fresh properties. What it seeks is only an amendment of the description by changing the name of the street. 8. In Manindra Nath Biswas v. Radhasyam Biswas , AIR 1953 Cal. 676 “a decree holder applied for execution of his decree by proceeding against his bills and security deposits standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor. What it seeks is only an amendment of the description by changing the name of the street. 8. In Manindra Nath Biswas v. Radhasyam Biswas , AIR 1953 Cal. 676 “a decree holder applied for execution of his decree by proceeding against his bills and security deposits standing to the credit of the judgment-debtor. The decree holder could realise only a part of the decretal amount and found that he would be able to realise only a moiety of the amount due from the properties attached and that too not in the near future. He therefore applied for amendment of his execution application by praying for sale of the immovable properties charged under the decree.” It was held in that case by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that, “in the circumstances the prayer for amendment should be allowed under inherent powers as it had not the effect of changing the original character of the execution application and as no question of limitation came in the way. Even if the prayer for amendment is treated as an independent execution the Court would be justified in the circumstances to allow simultaneous execution in the exercise of its discretion. A Court has inherent power to allow amendment of pending execution application in proper cases apart from the express provisions of Order 21, Rule 17. The matter is one of discretion of the executing Court and except where the law of limitation raises an insuperable bar or where the decree holder has been guilty of gross negligence and where no equitable consideration stands in the way, the power of amendment should be liberally exercised.” .9. In Dineshwar Prasad Singh and others v. Deoniti Prasad Singh and others , AIR 1959 Pat. 199 the execution petition was sought to be amended by addition of some more properties to the properties, which were sought to be proceeded against in the first instance. It was held by a Bench of the Patna High Court that, .“the amendment which the decree- holders sought to make in the execution petition was not an amendment contemplated by Order 21, Rule 17 and that the application for amendment must be treated as a fresh application for execution and the decree was, therefore barred by limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” .10. In Sheodhyan Singh and others v. Mst. In Sheodhyan Singh and others v. Mst. Sanichara Kuer and others , AIR 1963 SC 1879 the Supreme Court allowed an application for amendment holding that, .“it was a case of misdescription and the identity of the property sold was not in doubt.” The present position is not any different. The mistake in the name of the street must be treated as a mere misdescription not affecting the identity of the property sought to be proceeded against. .11. It has been held by a Bench of this Court in C.T.A. CT. Nachiappa Chettiar v. M.G. Ramaswami Pillai , 1963 (II) MLJ 180 following the decisions in Leach & Co., Ltd. v. M/s. Fardine Skinner & Co. AIR 1957 S.C. 357 and P.M. Patil v. K.S. Patil , AIR 1957 SC 363 that, .“the Court should be liberal in permitting amendments, whether of pleading in a suit or of pending execution proceedings in the interests of justice. If there is no injustice to the other side, and the amendment of pleadings or enlargement of reliefs of execution is necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, the amendments should be permitted and not refused.” .12. In The Firm of Fakirthai Karsanji and others v. Gulabbhai Khandukhai Desai and others it has been held that, .“Under Order 21 Rule 17 there could be no amendment of execution application to add more property to be sold or attached. But, however, if such amendment application is filed within the prescribed period of limitation for a new application for execution, can be treated as an independent application and decree holder directed to pay extra court fees.” .13. It has been held in Kumar Taran and Sinha v. Thakur Chandra Bhusan Pd, Singh and others , AIR 1968 Pat. 458 that, .“an amendment for deleting the property originally mentioned and substituting by another property would amount to a fresh application and if presented beyond 3 years mentioned in Article 182, the bar of limitation cannot be saved as it did not date back the original execution petition even if the judgment debtor had not objected to execution inspite of notice under Order 21, Rule 22, is entitled to object subsequently after order of amendment.” 14. In Bhoganadham Seshaiah v. Budhi Veerabhadrayya (died) and others , AIR 1972 A.P. 134 it has been held by a Full Bench of the Andhra High Court that, “it is a mistake to think that section 48 of the C.P.C. lays down any inflexible rule in not allowing any amendment whatever may be in the circumstances of the case, to the execution petition merely on the ground that if permitted it would be contrary to section 48 or Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The amendment would not normally be allowed if the effect of the amendment is to deprive the other side of a valuable right to plead limitation. Nevertheless there can be exceptional cases where special circumstances demand that in order to do substantial justice between the parties and with a view to settle all disputes necessary for the effective disposal of the cases amendment may be allowed. The question of limitation is one of the factors to be taken into account in the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed. It would be erroneous to confuse this discretion of the court with its power to permit amendment. It does not affect the power of the court to order amendment, if that is required in the interests of justice. Whether there are any special circumstances or not is a question of fact and like any other fact it has to be decided on the material on record and keeping in view the circumstances of the case.” In deciding the question the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred to several decisions of this Court and in particular to the decision in Nachiappa Chettiar v. Ramaswami Pillai , AIR 1964 Mad. 226 : 1963 (2) MLJ 100. “The Court always has jurisdiction to allow amendment in the execution petition. It is however altogether a different thing to say that in the absence of special circumstances the Court should not normally allow amendment after twelve years of the decree. This rule, which is normally followed, does not mean that the Court has no jurisdiction, but the Court in such cases will normally reject the applications filed after twelve years, if there are no special reasons. That is done in the exercise of the jurisdiction and not for lack of jurisdiction.” 15. This rule, which is normally followed, does not mean that the Court has no jurisdiction, but the Court in such cases will normally reject the applications filed after twelve years, if there are no special reasons. That is done in the exercise of the jurisdiction and not for lack of jurisdiction.” 15. It has been held in Rameshwar Lal Amar Chand Choudhary v. Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. Ajmer and others , AIR 1972 Raj. 46 that, 16. In Ravindran and another v. Dandayudhan and others , AIR 1988 Ker. 32 dealing “in an execution application where the list of properties were not attached, the list could be filed even after 12 years from the date of decree.” with amendment of execution petition where the schedule of properties sought to be delivered was not incorporated in execution petition and the decree holder made application for amendment after noticing the defect. It was held that, “amendment at any stage other than those mentioned in Order 21, Rule 17, C.P.C. or Rule 280 of the Civil Rules of Practice was not prohibited and that it should be allowed in the interests of justice.” The Kerala High Court held that “the provisions were only enabling provisions and they were not intended to affect the rights of parties or the powers of the court to make such orders as might be necessary for the ends of justice and section 151 specifically saves such powers which were already there. It was the duty of the Court to ascertain any defect in the E.P. as provided in Order 21, Rule 17, and allow it to be remedied, Courts existed for dispensation of justice and not for its denial on technical grounds.” 17. In Sameera Rasheed by her Power Agent v. Amina Bai and others , 1992 (I) MLJ 420 it was held that, “the execution petition filed against the deceased judgment debtor within time was not barred by limitation though the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor were impleaded beyond the period of limitation.” 18. It has been held in Pentapati China Venkanna and others v. Pentapati Bangararaju and others , AIR 1964 SC 1454 as follows: “The application mentioned in S. 48 is a fresh substantive application and not an application to revive or continue a substantive application already pending on the file of the court. It has been held in Pentapati China Venkanna and others v. Pentapati Bangararaju and others , AIR 1964 SC 1454 as follows: “The application mentioned in S. 48 is a fresh substantive application and not an application to revive or continue a substantive application already pending on the file of the court. Where the previous execution petition is “closed” for statistical purposes because the High Court stayed the execution pending the appeal filed by the judgment-debtors and the decree- holders were not in a position to proceed with the execution petition, the execution petition must be held to be pending on the file of the executing Court and the subsequent application is only an application to continue the previous application and not a fresh one.” In that case, the decree holders had omitted some of the properties in the subsequent application. It was held that the subsequent application was not a fresh application. 19. In the instant case, as already noticed, what is sought to be amended is only the name of the street. The bailiff went there and found that the respondents were not there. The mistake was realised and the amendment was sought. It is not disputed that the description as amended would fit in with the description of the property belonging to the respondents. The respondents had suffered a decree .They were liable to satisfy the decree against them. They cannot rely on mere technicalities to defeat the claim of the revision petitioner. The view taken by the lower court that the amendment sought for changes the very property is not correct. The lower court ought to have exercised its discretion to permit the amendment. The respondents cannot be allowed to take unfair advantage and deprive the decree holder and its legitimate claim. 20. Consequently the civil revision petition succeeds. The order of the lower court is set aside. The application for amendment filed by the revision petitioner will stand allowed and the execution will proceed. There will be no order as to costs. The stay petition C.M.P. No. 889 of 1998 is closed. 21. I place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Mr.V. Raghavachari, the amicus curiae appointed by this Court on behalf of the respondents.