S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) AS these first appeals and civil application filed therein arise from the common judgment and award of the 2nd Extra Assistant Judge, Kheda at Nadiad, passed in group of Land Reference Cases No. 981/91 to 991/91, decided on 27th November, 1997, and further, as these matters arise out of one and same land acquisition, same are taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) BEFORE taking up these matters for consideration, I find that Civil Application No. 5264 of 1998 is not an application with prayer to condone delay caused in filing of the appeal. This civil application is filed in the first appeal No. 3044 of 1998 arising out of first reference Case No. 980/91 and prayer has been made therein for stay of the execution, operation and implementation of the award of the reference Court. Civil application No. 5250/98 is the application which has been filed by the appellants for condonation of delay caused in filing of First Appeal No. 3044/98 arising out of land reference case No. 980/91. So that is the mistake which is there in the record of these civil applications, and placing of the same in the file. If we go by these facts, then Civil application No. 5250/98 has to be numbered as 5264/98 and Civil Application No. 5264/98 should have been numbered as 5250/98. These facts have been mentioned only to point out how casually and mechanically matters are being taken and dealt with by the registry of this Court. However, from the record I find that in all these appeals there are civil applications for condonation of delay and for stay of execution of the decree. Ignoring this wrong registration of civil application as aforesaid, I proceed to consider these matters on merits. ( 3 ) THE aware in this case has been passed on 27th November, 1997 and these appeals are presented in this Court on 15th June 1998. Office has reported that these appeals are barred by 38 days. The office has pointed out another objection that proper and full Court fees is not paid on memo. This is another set of appeals where the same have not only been presented beyond limitation, but only a Court fees stamp of Rs. 5 has been affixed on the memo of these appeals. The office has pointed out another objection that proper and full Court fees is not paid on memo. This is another set of appeals where the same have not only been presented beyond limitation, but only a Court fees stamp of Rs. 5 has been affixed on the memo of these appeals. This way of filing of appeals in the High Court, which is a court of record, by the State of Gujarat is nothing but as if throwing waste papers to the dust bin. What the State of Gujarat has considered this Court is clearly borne out from the manner in which they are presenting appeals in this Court. ( 4 ) THE land of the respondents- claimants has been acquired for public purpose by the appellants. The lands are situated in village Mulaj, Taluk Nadiad District Kheda. These lands have been acquired for Khumarvad Vishakha of Mahi Canal, Thasra Division. Section 4 notification was published on 15th October, 1998; whereas Sec. 6 notification was published on 11. 9. 1989. The award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 26th December, 1990, and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 375/- per Are. Considering this amount of compensation awarded to the claimants-repondents to be inadequate, on their request reference have been made to the Civil Court. Under the impugned order the Civil Court has awarded compensation to the claimants respondents at the rate of Rs. 1118/- per Are. Hence these appeals before this Court by the appellants. ( 5 ) AS these appeals are barred by limitation, application have been filed praying for condonation of the delay. Another set of civil application have been filed for stay of the execution of the award made by the learned reference Court. The learned reference Court has passed the impugned award relying on its previous awad in Land Acquisition reference Case No. 955/93 decided in the year 1998. One of the claimants in these matters has been examined as witness. The reference Court found that as a matter of fact village Devapura is adjoining to village Mulaj, and the lands of these two villages are of equal fertility. One of the claimants in these matters has been examined as witness. The reference Court found that as a matter of fact village Devapura is adjoining to village Mulaj, and the lands of these two villages are of equal fertility. The reference Court has noticed an important fact as to whether the lands of village Sapla, Bagdu or Kesra are of equal fertility or not; and whether these villages are equally developed or not; and to establish these facts the appellants herein have not examined any witnesses before the reference Court. The reference Court found on evidence of the claimants that the lands of village Devapura have also been acquired for khumarevad Vishakha of Mahi Canal, and these lands are adjoining to each other. However, the reference Court has found that village Mulaj is not a big village and not a developed village. Even the population is not too much. It is not touching the high way, and the village is backward. The Reference Court has further found that villages devapura and Arandiapura are adjoining to each other. However, the Court has recorded finding that the market price cannot be assessed on the basis of the previous award of village Anandipura totally. As this village is found to be fully developed and surrounded by development in respect of nonresidential purpose also. Considering the previous award in respect of lands of village Kesra in the year 1988 at the rate of Rs. 548/ per Are, the court has observed that village Kesra is too much interior rather than village Mulaj. After giving this finding the reference Court has made reference to its previous award given in case of the lands of village Devapura in LAR 955/93 at the rate of Rs. 1648/ per Are. This award has been made in the year 1998. However, taking into consideration the fact that village Devapura is developed and having all facilities in comparison to Mulaj village, reasonable deduction for assessing the market for the lands in question has been made. Out of this amount of Rs. 1648/- per Are awarded in the year 1998 for the Lands of village Devapura, 28% thereof has been deducted and after doing so, reference Court has reached the figure of Rs. 1312/- which has been made round figure of Rs. 1310/- per Are. Out of this amount of Rs. 1648/- per Are awarded in the year 1998 for the Lands of village Devapura, 28% thereof has been deducted and after doing so, reference Court has reached the figure of Rs. 1312/- which has been made round figure of Rs. 1310/- per Are. Then the Court has dealt with the difference of the period in between Sec. 4 notifications in the present case and in the case of acquired land of village Devapura. That difference has been found to be of two years, and as such further reduction has been made from the figure arrived at as aforesaid to the extent of 15%, and the net figure of Rs. 1114/- (for the sake of convenience rounded off to Rs. 1110/-) was taken to be the reasonable, adequate and just figure for the purpose of awarding compensation to the claimants-respondents in these cases. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that in the presence of these facts the education which has been given from the figure of the amount at which compensation has been awarded to the holders of land of village Devepura is towards the lower side. I have given my thoughtful consideration to this contention, and suffice it to say that it is difficult to find out definite scales on the basis of which the reference Court could have determined the question of what should have been just, adequate and reasonable amount of compesation to be awarded in a given case on the basis of the previous award. The appellate Court may have very limited powers of interference in these matters and only where on the face of it the aware is found to be perverse or the rate at which compensation has been awarded for the acquisition of land could not have been determined on the basis of material which is placed on record by a man of reasonable understading this Court may interfere. In the matter of arriving at the figure of just, adequate and reasonable compensation to be awarded to the claimants some time the reference Court and even appellate Court has to make some guess work or some time there may be some arbitrariness in arriving at the figure. In the matter of arriving at the figure of just, adequate and reasonable compensation to be awarded to the claimants some time the reference Court and even appellate Court has to make some guess work or some time there may be some arbitrariness in arriving at the figure. But these are matters to be considered in the context of the facts which have been brought on the record on the basis of the evidence of the parties. I do not say that on the basis of the giving facts two Courts dealing with these matters there may not be any difference in the percentage of eduction to be made from the rate at which compensation has been in case of lands of village devapura and the rate which has been awarded in the present case. But it is equally true that the other may have considered this deduction towards higher side also. So even if on the basis of same set of evidence two views are possible, then normally the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the view taken by the reference Court. The way and manner in which reference Court has proceeded in the case in hand it cannot be said that its award is perverse or the rate at which the compensation has been awarded to the claimants -respondents is towards higher side or totally unreasonable could not have been reached by the Court. The tenor of the judgment of the reference Court clearly gives out that while dealing with these matters it has kept in mind the necessary requirements to be gone into in the case where it relies on its previous decision for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation for the land acquired. After going through the award of the reference Court I am of the considered opinion that it is just and reasonable award to which no exception can be taken. In such matters there cannot be any scientific or mathematic formula to reach to a definite, precise and firm figure of compensation. ( 7 ) AS on merits the award does not call for any interference, it is not necessary for this Court to go on examining the prayer made for by the appellants for condonation of delay caused in filing of the appeals. Otherwise also it will not serve any purpose. ( 7 ) AS on merits the award does not call for any interference, it is not necessary for this Court to go on examining the prayer made for by the appellants for condonation of delay caused in filing of the appeals. Otherwise also it will not serve any purpose. Still I consider it to be proper to examine the matter whether the appellants have made out any case to the satisfaction of the Court that they have been prevented from filing the appeal within limitation by sufficient cause. From reading of the applications I do not find any explanation for this delay, what to say any sufficient cause by which it can be said that the appellants were prevented from filling these appeals within limitation. From the tenor of these applications for condonation of delay I find that the insistence is only that these are appeals filed by the State Government and the Court should take lenient view and condone the delay. The limitation for filing appeals in these cases has expired on 4th May, 1998, i. e. much before this Court was closed for summer vacation. The appeals were prepared before starting of the summer vacation, but still the same have not been presented. The office has given set off of 36 days, i. e. the period of vacation to the appellants, and still thereafter the appeals are barred by 38 days. In view of this fact there is no relevancy of the period during which the Court has remained closed for summer vacation. At the cost of repetition it has to be stated that after giving set off of summer vacation period, still the appeals are barred by 38 days and that delay has not been explained. As the period for filing appeal within limitation had not expired during the summer vacation, the office could not have given set off of period of summer vacation while calculation the time taken in presentation of the appeals. That appears to be an error. So in fact the delay in filing of these appeals is 38 + 36 = 74 days. ( 8 ) THERE is yet another ground on which these appeals deserve to be dismissed. A l these appeals have been filed on Court fee stamp of Rs. 5/ -. These appeals were filed beyond limitation and still requisite Court fees has not been paid. ( 8 ) THERE is yet another ground on which these appeals deserve to be dismissed. A l these appeals have been filed on Court fee stamp of Rs. 5/ -. These appeals were filed beyond limitation and still requisite Court fees has not been paid. Not only this, these appeals were not properly presented on the day on which the same were filed. The office has erroneously taken the date of presentation of these appeals to be relevant date of presenting the appeal. In fact these appeals are not proper till date. The appellants have not filed application for extension of time to make good the deficiency of Court fee stamp on the memo of these appeals. More than two months time has expired after presentation of these appeals. Still the appellant has not cared to make good of deficiency of Court fee. The judgment has been delivered by the reference Court in the month of November, 1997. These appeals have been filed in the month of June, 1998. These appeals has come up for orders before this Court on 21st August, 1998. Though this long period was there, still the appeals have been filed on Court fee stamp of Rs. 5/- and the deficit has not been made till date. If the appeals are not presented on requisite and proper Court fees and deficit thereof has also not been made good within reasonable time with permission of the Court, on this ground also the same deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) LASTLY out of this group of 12 matters, I find that in six appeals the amount of additional compensation awarded by the reference Court is less than Rs. 15,000/ -. So otherwise also these six appeals deserve no admission in view of the decision of Division bench of this Court in the First Appeal No. 4877/96 and allied matters decided on 8. 9:1997 and Civil Application No. 7868/97 (Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Shantaben Chhitubhais widow and Others) and other civil application in First Apeal No. 2274 of 1997 and allied matters, decided on 10. 9. 1997. ( 10 ) IN the result all these civil applications for condonation of delay in filing of the appeals fail and same are dismissed. Consequent to the dismissal of these civil applications for condonation of delay, the First Appeals are dismissed as barred by limitation. 9. 1997. ( 10 ) IN the result all these civil applications for condonation of delay in filing of the appeals fail and same are dismissed. Consequent to the dismissal of these civil applications for condonation of delay, the First Appeals are dismissed as barred by limitation. ( 11 ) AS the First appeals have been dismissed, the civil applications for stay of execution of the award do not survive, and these are also dismissed. .