Judgment :- J.B. Koshy, J. This Original Petition is filed to quash Ext. P5 order refusing sanction to prosecute second and third respondents, namely, Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police respectively. Petitioner is a practising advocate. There is some matrimonial differences between the petitioner and his wife after the birth of a male child. Petitioner along with his father filed a petition before the second respondent Superintendent of Police alleging apprehension of their life in the hands of the relatives of the petitioner's wife. Instead of filing the petition to the local police. it was filed before the Superintendent of Police and it is stated in the counter affidavit that father and son requested intervention of the second respondent for a settlement of matrimonial dispute and they did not press for registering a crime. The second respondent forwarded the petition to the third respondent Deputy Superintendent of Police and he, in turn, forwarded the same to the Circle Inspector of Police, Vakathanam and a case was registered as Crime No: 384/98 under Ss.448, 506(ii) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code on 9.12.1998 in Kottyam East Police Stateion after a lapse of 29 days based on a petition dated 10.11.1998. 2. Crime No: 369/98 was registered at the instance of the wife of the petitioner under Ss.498-A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the Police on 2.12.1998 against the petitioner and his parents. According to the petitioner, since the complaint of the petitioner was registered subsequently, serious difficulties have caused to him. In the above circumstances, petitioner wants to prosecute second and third respondents for offences under Ss.166 and 34 IPC for having violated the mandatory provisions contained in S.154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since respondents 2 and 3 are public servants, petitioner approached the Government under S.197(i)(b) of Cr. P.C. for sanction to prosecute them. The above application for sanction for prosecution was rejected by Ext. P5 which is a one-line order which merely states that the application does not merit any consideration. According to the petitioner, there is no application of mind and an order without stating any reasons for the order is violative of the principles of natural justice. It is also submitted that it is not enough that a statutory authority passes an order and justification of the same is made in the counter affidavit. According to the petitioner, there is no application of mind and an order without stating any reasons for the order is violative of the principles of natural justice. It is also submitted that it is not enough that a statutory authority passes an order and justification of the same is made in the counter affidavit. Grounds for rejecting the petition should be stated in the order itself. Reasons cannot be suppllanted by filing a counter affidavit when correctness of the order is challenged. 3. Petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mohlnder Singh Gill and Ann v. Chief Election Commissioner and Ors. (AIR 1978 SC 851) and other cases to support his point. It is also submitted that delay caused by the police in registering the case will spoil the case and police was bound to register the case as held by the Division Bench in Joseph Thomas v. Sabu George (1998 (1) KLT 126). Therefore, it is contended that action of the Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police was aimed at spoiling his case and sanction for prosecution of respondents 2 and 3 for offence under S.166 and 34 IPC should have been granted. Since Ext. P5 is not a speaking order, petitioner wants to quash Ext. P5 order and to direct the first respondent to pass a revised order in his petition for sanction. 4. It can be seen that the alleged incident in the complaint filed by the petitioner is said to have been occurred on 4.11.1998. He did not intimate the nearest police station regarding the same immediately. But, he took one week's time to file a complaint before the second respondent Superintendent of Police. Under S.154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence even if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station it shall be reduced to writing by him and it shall be registered. If the complaint is refused to be registered, he can file a petition under S.154(3) of Cr. P.C. S.2 of Cr. P.C. defines 'officer-in-charge of a police station.' Superintendent of Police is not the officer-in-charge of a police station. The informant can approach the Superintendent or higher officers if an FIR is no registered by the officer-in-charge of the police station. P.C. S.2 of Cr. P.C. defines 'officer-in-charge of a police station.' Superintendent of Police is not the officer-in-charge of a police station. The informant can approach the Superintendent or higher officers if an FIR is no registered by the officer-in-charge of the police station. Petitioner has no case that he has approached the police officer concerned and he has refused to record the information and, therefore, petitioner was constrained to approach the Superintendent of Police under S.154(3) of Cr.P.C. Petitioner is an Advocate. His father who is a co-complainant is a retired Chief Judicial Magistrate and was aware of the provisions of S.154(3). It is true that this will not debar from filing claim before the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police forwarded the same to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He, in turn, forwarded the same to the Circle Inspector of Police and finally. the crime was registered. Wife of the petitioner directly filed a complaint before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kottayam. It is stated in the counter affidavit that petitioner submitted the representation on 10.11.1998 and the same was forwarded to the third respondent on the same date itself. The Superintendent has taken charge only six days prior to the submission of the petition and no malafides can be inferred from the circumstances of the case as on the same date of receipt of the complaint he forwarded the same to the third respondent. Third respondent, in turn, referred the matter to the Circle Inspector of Police and finally, action was taken, Representation filed before the Superintendent of Police itself was after one week of the alleged incident. According to the petitioner, he lived with the wife only up o 5.6.1997 and second respondent Superintendent of Police took charge only on 5.11.1998. 5. Next contention of the petitioner is that even though some explanation in rejecting the complaint is mentioned in the counter affidavit, it is not mentioned in the order. Therefore, since the order is not a speaking order it has to he set aside and the matter has to be reconsidered. Therefore, the question to he considered in this case is whether an order refusing sanction to prosecute the second and third respondents under S.197(1)(b) of Cr. P.C. should contain reasons. 6. Therefore, since the order is not a speaking order it has to he set aside and the matter has to be reconsidered. Therefore, the question to he considered in this case is whether an order refusing sanction to prosecute the second and third respondents under S.197(1)(b) of Cr. P.C. should contain reasons. 6. S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to guard against vexatious proceedings against public servants and to secure the opinion of superior authority whether it is desirable that there should be a prosecution. The object of the protection conferred on public servants by the section is to secure them against vexatious proceedings and unless there are good reasons to support the charges sanction is not generally given. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (AIR 1956 SC 44) the Supreme Court held that public servants have to be protected from harassment in discharging their official duties and the discretionary power is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. It is also held that no question of sanction can arise under S.197 unless the act complained of is an offence. What is to be considered is whether the act is committed in the discharge of official duties. In Kakarla Chinna Chendrayya v. Maddukkuri Subbarayudu (1923 (XXIV) Crl. L.J.116) it is held that order of sanction under S.197 of Cr.P.C. is more of the nature of an executive order than a judicial order. In K. Jayarama Iyer In Re (1957 (1) MLJ Crl. 700) it was held that order under S.197 is purely an executive act and no detailed order need be passed. 7. Ext. P5 order of the Government that application for sanction does not merit consideration is only an executive order and I am of the view that when request is made for sanction under S.197, being an executive act, there is no necessity to pass a detailed order and therefore Ext. P5 cannot be quashed on the ground that it is not a speaking order. When quasi-judicial orders are passed, it is necessary to state reasons and as held by the Supreme Court (Mohinder Singh's case supra) it is not enough that reasons are supplanted in the affidavit filed. but. order refusing sanction or granting sanction under S.197 is merely an executive act and not a quasi-judicial function. Hence, no detailed order is necessary. When quasi-judicial orders are passed, it is necessary to state reasons and as held by the Supreme Court (Mohinder Singh's case supra) it is not enough that reasons are supplanted in the affidavit filed. but. order refusing sanction or granting sanction under S.197 is merely an executive act and not a quasi-judicial function. Hence, no detailed order is necessary. Apart from the above, the circumstances stated in the counter affidavit justify the executive act of declining sanction. Since I am satisfied that reasons stated in t he counter affidavit are sufficient In declining sanction, especially considering the object of S.197, no purpose will be served by setting aside the same and pass a fresh order stating the very same reasons now averred in the counter affidavit. 8. Even though allegations are made, no prima facie materials are produced to show malafides. As held by the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 124) provisions with regard to sanction must be strictly observed and sanctioning authority has to be satisfied after considering the prima facie nature of the offence. In R.R. Chart v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1573) also it was held that appropriate Government must be satisfied that there is a prima facie case for starting prosecution and sanction has been interposed as a safeguard before the actual prosecution commences. The person who seeks sanction for prosecution must be able to satisfy the sanctioning authority about the prima facie nature of the case. Ingredients of S.34 as well as S.166 of IPC have to be pleaded. Second respondent who took charge in office at Kottyam only on 5.11.1998, received the complaint on 10.11.1998 regarding an incident occurred on 4.11.1998 and he on the same date sent the same to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police (third respondent) sent "the same to the Circle Inspector of Police for investigation without delay. Subsequently, crime was registered by the local police station. It is not explained before me or in the complaint how S.166 of IPC is attracted. To attract the same it must be proved that the public servant not only disobeyed any particular direction of the law but also that such disobedience was intended to cause injury to any person to the knowledge of the public servant. (Bihar State Electricity Board v. Nanda Kishore Tamakhuwala - AIR 1986 SC 1653). To attract the same it must be proved that the public servant not only disobeyed any particular direction of the law but also that such disobedience was intended to cause injury to any person to the knowledge of the public servant. (Bihar State Electricity Board v. Nanda Kishore Tamakhuwala - AIR 1986 SC 1653). Furtherance of common intention to satisfy ingredient of S.34 was also not prima facie made out in the complaint and without a prima facie case made out to the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority if sanction is given the public servant will have no time to do their normal duties but only will have time to defend such cases. Since I am satisfied on merit also, I am unable to accept the prayer that solely on the ground that Ext. P5 order is not a speaking order it should be set aside. In any event, even if speaking order is necessary, this Court will not in the discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution direct the Government to reconsider the matter unless it is satisfied that there is prima facie substance in the complaint and petitioner failed to prove so. 9. I also refer to the decision reported in All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employee's Union v. Union of India and Ors. (1997 SCC (&ri.) 303). There, the Supreme Court held that if police is not taking any action on the complaint when a petition is filed under S.154 before the Police, a complaint can be filed before the Superior Officer or the complainant can approach the Magistrate's Court under S.190 read with S.200. Petitioner, an advocate and second complainant, a retired Chief Judicial Magistrate who are presumably aware of the legal position did not approach the Magistrate's Court also. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I see no ground to interfere with Ext. P5 and the Original Petition is dismissed.