JUDGMENT Ruma Pal, J. 1. The respondent was appointed as Official Receiver and Official Assignee on 5th April, 1976. In his capacity of Official Receiver, the respondent was appointed receiver over various properties which were under litigation. Several complaints were made against the respondent alleging irregularity and wrongful dealing with funds in the respondent's hands. The matter was placed before the Full Court. The Chief Justice appointed a Special Committee to look into the allegations. The Special Committee submitted a report before the Full Court which was accepted by resolution dated 23rd February, 1998. The relevant extract of the resolution reads: "The Registrar, Original Side, is directed to write a letter drawing the attention of the appropriate Government Authority to the several complaints against the Official Receiver and his office so far received by the Court in various pending proceedings on the Original Side alleging mal-practice, corruption, mis-appropriation of funds and other irregularities etc. and also urging upon the Government to take appropriate actions forthwith with regard to the said complaints, failing which the Court may have to think of discontinuing the appointment of Official Receiver in the concerned cases and of taking such other steps as the Court may think fit and proper." 2. Pursuant to the resolution, on 31st May, 1998 the Registrar (Original Side) of this Court wrote to the Secretary, Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal drawing the aforesaid facts to the notice of State Government and further stating as follows: "I am also directed to impress upon you that the Official Receiver is an employee of the State Government and not of this Court, and as such this Court is not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him but the State Government may take such steps for his removal in view of the series of allegations of mal-practices, corruption and misappropriation of funds received against him and his office in various proceedings in the Original Side of this Court. In fact there are, amongst other, complaints against the Official Receiver on the grounds as indicated hereinbefore, in respect of the estate of Smt. Golap Desai vs. Ramnath Tegore & Ors., Bank of Commerce Ltd. (In Liquidation) and the Matter No. 64 of 1950 (Official Receiver, High Court and Anr. vs. Radri Prassed Deora), apart from complaints by Sarbashre'e Monoranjan Mandal, Arun Safui and Debosh Bhowmick. vs. Radri Prassed Deora), apart from complaints by Sarbashre'e Monoranjan Mandal, Arun Safui and Debosh Bhowmick. I am, therefore, directed to refer to the observations of the Full Court that in view of the seriousness of the allegations against the Official Receiver the Court may have to think of discontinuing his appointment in the concerned cases and to take such other steps as the Court may think fit and proper. In the circumstances, I am directed by the Full Court to request you to take such immediate and appropriate steps against the Official Receiver as the Government may deem fit and proper in the interest of administration of justice and of the litigant public.". 3. On 17th November, 1988 an order of suspension was issued by the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. The suspension order was stayed on 21st November, 1988 with leave granted to the respondent to take out a formal application by 28th November, 1998. The respondent made a formal application (Matter No. 4561 of 1998) and the stay granted on 21st November, 1988 was continued. 4. The State Government commenced disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. The Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal was appointed the Enquiring Authority. A chargesheet was issued on 20th August, 1996 by which the respondent was called upon to submit a written statement of his defence to the Enquiring Authority. 5. The respondent retired on 31st August, 1996. On 3rd October, 1996, Matter No. 4561 of 1998 was disposed of by directing the respondents to pay the respondents all retiral benefits on the ground that no disciplinary proceedings had at all been commenced against him. 6. An appeal was preferred from the order dated 3rd October, 1996 (APOT No. 175 of 1997) by the State Government. An application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was also filed. The application under section 5 was dismissed for default and consequently the stay application and appeal were also dismissed. 7. The respondent then moved an application before the State Administrative Tribunal under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 against the appellants herein challenging the legality of the charge sheet dated 28th August, 1996. However, on the respondent seeking to withdraw the application, the Tribunal rejected the application as withdrawn by an order dated 12th January, 1998. 7. The respondent then moved an application before the State Administrative Tribunal under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 against the appellants herein challenging the legality of the charge sheet dated 28th August, 1996. However, on the respondent seeking to withdraw the application, the Tribunal rejected the application as withdrawn by an order dated 12th January, 1998. Subsequently the respondent filed a writ application challenging the charge sheet and continuation of the disciplinary proceedings (WP No. 1239 of 98). The matter appeared before the Court on 3rd December, 1998 when the learned Judge quashed the charge-sheet and directed the State Authorities to pay the respondents his retiral and other benefits in terms of the Order dated 3rd October, 1996 (Matter No. 4561 of 1998). 8. This appeal was preferred from the order dated 3rd December, 1998. By an order dated 17th May, 1999 the appeal was admitted after condonation of delay and a stay was granted of the operation of the order dated 3rd December, 1998. 9. Two points were raised by the appellants on the maintainability of the writ application itself. We decided that these two issues would be determined before considering the merits, if necessary, of the appeal. 10. According to the appellants, the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ application at all. It was submitted that the petitioner is a State Government employee and his service conditions were governed under rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. It was further submitted that the petitioner had in fact sought relief only against the State respondents. It was stated that by virtue of section 15 of the Administrative Tribunal's Act the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ application at the first instance. The second issue raised on the question of maintainability of the writ application was based on the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was submitted that as no leave had been granted to institute a fresh proceeding at the time of withdrawal of the application before the State Administrative Tribunal, the respondent was precluded from instituting a fresh proceeding in respect of the same subject matter. 11. The respondent on the other hand submitted that section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act did not at all apply to the petitioner. 11. The respondent on the other hand submitted that section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act did not at all apply to the petitioner. According to the petitioner section 15(1)(b) conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal in respect of service matters concerning a person appointed to a Civil post under the State which pertain to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State. According to the respondent the respondent's duties did not come within the phrase "affairs of the State". It was said that the functions to be discharged by the Official Receiver relate to properties which are the subject matter of litigation and not to any State activity. It was further submitted that the individual items of the charge did not pertain to the affairs of the State. 12. In reply the appellants have submitted that the phrase "affairs of the State" did not mean governmental activity. It was submitted that the word "State" should be considered according to the definition of the word in Article 12 of the Constitution of India, in terms of which even the activity of the Court would come within the affairs of the State. In support of this argument the Court's attention was drawn to section 2 of the Administrative Tribunals Act by which the breadth of the Tribunal's jurisdiction was curtailed with reference to certain classes of persons who would otherwise have come under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These classes included Officers, staff of the Supreme Court, High Court and the Subordinate Judiciary. 13. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties section 15(1)(b) is quoted verbatim. It provides: "15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals. - (1)(b) all service matters concerning a person not being a person referred to in clause (c) of this subsection or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14 appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the State Government." 14. Analyzed the State Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of (i) all service matters; (ii) of persons appointed to any civil service or civil post under the State [except those mentioned in section 14(1)(b) and section 15(c)] and (iii) which pertain to his service in connection with the affairs of the State. 15. It is clear that all the three factors must co-exist before the Tribunal can be said to have the jurisdiction in the matter. There is no dispute that the subject matter of challenge by the respondent in the writ petition was a service matter. 16. There can also be no doubt that the Official Receiver is a person appointed to a civil post under the State. Section 3(2) of the Calcutta Official Receivers Act, 1938 initially provided: "The office of the Official Receiver and of Dy. Official Receiver, if any, shall be civil post under the Crown in India." 17. This provision was amended in 1950 by substituting the word "Government" in place of the word "Crown." 18. The State Government appointed the respondent as Official Receiver. The appointment letter of the respondent reads as follows: "The Governor is pleased to appoint Shri Arun Kumar Sen, son of Shri Manoranjan Sen, as the Official Receiver, High Court, Calcutta and Official Assignee, Calcutta, temporarily until further orders." 19. In the writ petition filed by the respondent, State of West Bengal, Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal and the Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries had been made parties. In the grounds the petitioner has also described himself as a Government servant. 20. That an Official Receiver is "under the State" is apparent from the provisions of the Calcutta Official Receivers Act, 1938. The Act provides for the administration and control of the office of Official Receiver of the High Court in Calcutta. The respondent emphasised section 4 of the Act to contend the Official Receiver is subject to the control of the Court. Section 4 of the Act provides : "4. The Act provides for the administration and control of the office of Official Receiver of the High Court in Calcutta. The respondent emphasised section 4 of the Act to contend the Official Receiver is subject to the control of the Court. Section 4 of the Act provides : "4. Appointment of Official Receiver as receiver and his duties, rights and liabilities as such.- Subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder but notwithstanding the provision of sub-section (2) of section 3, the Official Receiver may be appointed a receiver by the Court in respect of any property, and save as provided in this Act, he shall have the same powers, duties and liabilities, shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges and shall be subject to the same control by the Court as any other receiver so appointed." 21. This section gives a discretion to Court to appoint the Official Receiver as a Receiver. If the Official Receiver is so appointed by Court, he will be subject to the same controls as other Receivers. This does not mean that the Official Receiver is a servant or employee of the High Court. His position and service as the Official Receiver is subject to the Government control. 22. Section 6 provides that the consolidated fund of the State of West Bengal shall be liable to make good of sums required to discharge any liability which the Official Receiver may, as a Receiver appointed by the Court, be personally liable to discharge. Section 6 sub-section 3 also provides for the right of the State Government to recover any sum paid by it from the Official Receiver liable personally to pay the said sum. 23. Section 8(1) provides the Official Receiver shall transfer and pay into the Consolidated Fund of the State of West Bengal all fees received by him. Apart from any fees the Official Receiver is also required under section 9(1) to transfer and pay into the public account of the State of West Bengal all moneys received by him in the administration of any property in respect of which he has been appointed a receiver by the Court. Those arguments are subject to the control of the State Government. Those arguments are subject to the control of the State Government. Sub-section 2 of section 9 allows the Official Receiver to withdraw, invest or such monies subject to the control of the State Government or in accordance with procedure as may be prescribed. Section 10 sub-section 1 provides : "10. Suits by or against the Official Receiver.- (1) Nothing in section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to any suit against of Official Receiver in which no relief is claimed against him personally." 24. In other words, where a suit is filed claiming relief against the Official Receiver personally section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Section 80 sub-section 1 of the Code provides for the institution of the suit against the Government or "against a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity only after notice." 25. Finally section 11 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying into effect the objects of the Act in regard to the functions of the Official Receiver including the distribution of work, the payment or recovery of any sums by the State Government, the fees to be charged, the audit of accounts, the insurance of properties and assets, the mode of making withdrawals, the investment of monies etc. 26. Having regard to the scheme of the various provisions of the 1938 Act therefore it would appear that the discharge of functions by the Official Receiver is under the State Government. The State Government by appointing an Official Receiver officially provides a facility which mayor may not be availed of by the Court. The Official Receiver remains a Government employee and is subject to control by the State Government. 27. The further question however is whether the Official Receiver's duties are "in connection with the affairs of the State" within the meaning of section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. A clear distinction has been drawn in the Administrative Tribunals Act between the State and the State Government from which it may be deduced that the word "State" for the purpose of the Act is not limited to the State Government. The word "State" has been used in other provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act as the geo-political entity and not the State Government. The word "State" has been used in other provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act as the geo-political entity and not the State Government. Thus section 1(4) provides : "The provisions of this Act, in so far as they relate to an Administrative Tribunal for a State, shall come into force in a State on such date as the Central Government may, by notification, appoint." Again section 3(aa) says : "Administrative Tribunal, in relation to a State, means the Administrative Tribunal for the State or, as the case may be, the Joint Administrative Tribunal for the State and any other State or States;" 28. Besides the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was enacted in pursuance of Article 323A of the Constitution. Applying the principle of interpretation recognised under section 20 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (although not strictly applicable) to the effect that : "Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue any notification, order, scheme, rule, form, or bye-law is conferred, then expressions used in the notification, order, scheme, rule, form, or byelaw, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act or Regulation conferring the power." 29. It is reasonable to hold that the definition of the word "State" in Article 12 of the Constitution would apply to the provisions of the 1985 Act. It may be remembered that "State" has been defined in Article 12 as including "the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". Incidentally the word "State" has also been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897 as: '(58) "State" (a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B State or a Part C State; and (b) as respects any period after such commencement, shall mean a State specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union Territory.' 30. This would bring within the ambit of the word State not only persons employed in the Courts but also the defence establishments as well as the State Legislature. This would bring within the ambit of the word State not only persons employed in the Courts but also the defence establishments as well as the State Legislature. Had they not otherwise come within the definition of the word "State" in section 15, of the 1985 Act it would not have been necessary to exclude them expressly. This has been done by section 2 which provides that the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 shall not apply to members of the defence establishment persons appointed to the secretarial staff of the Parliament or the State Legislature or any officer or servant of the Supreme Count or of any High Court or Courts subordinate thereto. Therefore, the phrase "in connection with the affairs of the State" can cover a situation where the Official Receiver acts as an Officer of Court. 31. Finally, Article 309 uses the phrase in providing for the appropriate legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts "in connection with the affairs of the .................. of any State". The respondent has not claimed that the West Bengal Services, Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1971 framed under Article 309 do not apply to him. Under Rule 3 sub-rule (viii) of the 1971 Rules "service or post" has been defined as meaning "service or post in connection with the affairs of the State of West Bengal." 32. The conclusion therefore is that the respondent's case is covered by section 15(1)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the State Tribunal was the competent forum to decide the grievance raised in the writ petition. It was not argued before us that if section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act applied, the High Court still retained the jurisdiction to entertain the application. In any event having regard to the decision in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 , the High Court could not have entertained the respondents writ petition at the first instance at all. 33. This finding is sufficient to allow this appeal. As such we do not express any view on the question of applicability of Order 23 Rule 1. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the learned Single Judge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. S.N. Bhattacharjee, J.: I agree. 33. This finding is sufficient to allow this appeal. As such we do not express any view on the question of applicability of Order 23 Rule 1. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the learned Single Judge is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. S.N. Bhattacharjee, J.: I agree. Later The stay of the operation of this Judgment and Order is prayed for by the respondents. Such stay is granted for a period of four weeks. It is, however, made clear that the interim order of stay of this Court will operate during the pendency of this order of stay. Let a xerox certified copy of this Judgment duly signed by the Assistant Registrar of this Court be made available to the parties within 48 hours upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy thereof on payment of usual charges. Ruma Pal, J. S.N. Bhattacharjee, J. Appeal allowed.