JUDGMENT 1. This revisional application is directed against a judgment and order dated 17.12.98 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sixth Court, Midnapore in Criminal Revision No. 248 of 1996 affirming the judgment and order dated 2.9.95 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk in Claim Case No. 70 of 1994 under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The relevant facts leading to the revision are as follows: – Panchanan, the present Opposite Party No.2, filed a petition before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for an order giving the seized paddy and straw in question to their custody. He claimed that he was the owner in respect of 89 decimals of land in plot no. 1156 under Mouza Banakhana and was in possession of 48 decimals thereof by cultivating paddy in every year. In the year 1993 also he cultivated paddy in the said land with the help of his men. But, surprisingly, Narayan Bera and others (the present revision-petitioners) harvested that paddy and took the same to their house and then Panchanan Pal informed police and the seized paddy was kept in the Zimma of one Sudhamoy Mondal and Sita Bera who were the members of the local Gram Panchayat. Similarly, as regards the plot Nos. 1236 and 1237 of the said mouza which belonged to Panchanan's brother. Panchanan used to possess the same and cultivate the same every year, but in the year 1993 he having been sick and being in need of money, permitted Sankar Prosad Maity and others to cultivate that land on contract-basis. But the Opposite Parties wrongfully harvested the paddy grown on these lands also and took away and misappropriated the same. Another police case was lodged over this incident and police seized the paddy and straw in dispute under a Seizure List and here also Panchanan made a prayer for return of the seized paddy to his custody. Thereafter, Panchanan filed the petition under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk for getting custody of the paddy in question. 3. Thereafter, Panchanan filed the petition under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk for getting custody of the paddy in question. 3. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tamluk, after perusing the documents filed by both the sides and hearing the learned Advocates of both the parties, came to the conclusion that the claim of Panchanan that he had cultivated the lands in question with the help of his men or hired labourers and the Opposite Parties (Narayan Bera and others) were not the Bargadars in respect of the same had been substantiated from the materials-on-record and the claim of the Opposite Parties that they were Bargadars and they cultivated the disputed crops as share crops had not been established. Accordingly, learned Magistrate allowed the prayer of the petitioner, Panchanan and directed the Zimmadar to return the seized paddy and straw to him immediately. 4. Being aggrieved by this order, the Opposite Parties, namely, Narayan Bera and others filed a revisional application before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Midnapore. Learned Additional Sessions Judge after hearing both sides, dismissed the revisional application on the ground that he did not find any illegality or irregularity in the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and the revision-petitioners before him failed to prove that they were the Bargadars in respect of the disputed lands. 5. Being aggrieved that judgment and order the said Narayan Bera and others have preferred the present revisional application before this Court challenging the orders of both the Courts below as erroneous and improper and not sustainable. 6. It has been urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that with regard to a question as to whether any person is a Bargadar or not, the verdict of the Bhagchas Officer will be final; but, ignoring this well-settled principle, the learned Courts below have fallen into errors and arrived at a wrong finding, namely, that the petitioners should not be treated as Bargadars in respect of the disputed land for the relevant period. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate Mr. Mukherjee refers to the Special Bench decision reported in Raich Ali Khan vs. Haji Sadak Ali & other, 1977 (2) Cal LJ 1. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate Mr. Mukherjee refers to the Special Bench decision reported in Raich Ali Khan vs. Haji Sadak Ali & other, 1977 (2) Cal LJ 1. In this case, their Lordships have held that whenever in course of any proceeding in Civil or Criminal Court any question arises as to whether a person is or is not a Bargadar, that question is to be referred to the Officer mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act for decision and, further, that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the said Act would apply to pending proceedings before any Civil or Criminal Court. On a perusal of the judgments of the Courts below, I find that the reasoning given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in arriving at his conclusion is fallacious. Towards the bottom of page 3 of his judgment, he observes that he fully admits that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has no authority to call into question the order passed by the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (Bhagchas Officer) who is the competent authority, but even then, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not ready to deliver the property in dispute in the hands of the petitioners who claim to be the Bargadars on the strength of the order of the Bhagchas Officer, because, according to him, from the facts and circumstances, it transpired that the Barga cases in question had been started long after the alleged incident and their names as Bargadars were inserted in the record-of-rights subsequently. Learned Court below was of the view that from the documents it was established that the owner of the land was in possession of the disputed plots which were under his personal cultivation during the relevant period and there was nothing to show that the Bargadars cultivated and reaped the produce during the relevant year. But this reasoning does not impress me at all. The order of the Bhagchas Officer dated 4th July, 1994 (Annexure-A) passed in Opposite Parties Case Nos. But this reasoning does not impress me at all. The order of the Bhagchas Officer dated 4th July, 1994 (Annexure-A) passed in Opposite Parties Case Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of 1994 clearly shows that he was satisfied with the materials-on-record before him and was of the view that the circumstantial evidences indicated that the petitioners were cultivating the disputed lands as Bargadars since 1982 and accordingly, passed an order for recording the names of the petitioners as Bargadars into the relevant record-of-rights. It is not understood how, on the face of this order of the Bhagchas Officer who was the competent authority in respect of such a matter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge would hold that the land was under personal cultivation of the owner. 7. The impugned order is palpably erroneous and unsustainable. 8. One question, however, arises touching the legal maintainability of this revisional application. In view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a second revision is not maintainable. The present revisional application is no doubt a second revision being filed against the order of the Sessions Court passed in revision. The learned Advocate for the petitioners argues that there is no absolute bar against a second revision. Of course, according to him strictly, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petition cannot be filed, but the Court's inherent jurisdiction will definitely come in aid of the situation; since under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court will be fully empowered to correct any erroneous order in order to prevent grave miscarriage of Justice. Mr. Mukherjee relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in this respect. In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 , their Lordships have held that in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of Justice, interference by the High Court becomes an absolutely necessity, then nothing contained in Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court, but such cases should be few and far between and the High Court must exercise such an inherent jurisdiction very sparingly. It was further held in this case that the bar under Section 397 (3) will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of Justice and the label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial and in an appropriate case, the High Court can examine the matter under its inherent powers even if it is assumed that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. 9. In the other ruling cited, namely, 1997 Cr. LJ 1519, the Apex Court has held that the revisional power of the High Court conserves to the power of the High Court to see that Justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that its subordinate Courts do not exceed the jurisdiction or abuse the power vested in them under the Court or to prevent abuse of the process of the inferior Criminal Courts or to prevent miscarriage of Justice and the High court is clothed with the revisional power in case of necessity when it notices that there has been failure of Justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure or there has been any incorrectness in any order and then it is the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of Justice or to correct irregularities or incorrectness committed by the inferior Criminal Courts. Relying upon these principles enunciated by the Apex Court, I am of the view that it can be held that a revisional application preferred before this Court against an order of the Sessions Court passed in revision will be clearly maintainable under the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the reasons discussed above, I am to hold that the findings arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge or for that matter the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot be accepted. The Bhagchas Officer having held that the petitioners were Bargadars in respect of the disputed land and they were Barga cultivating the same since 1982, this finding of that authority have to be accepted in view of the settled position of law discussed above. In the result, the revisional application is allowed. The impugned order be set aside. The Bhagchas Officer having held that the petitioners were Bargadars in respect of the disputed land and they were Barga cultivating the same since 1982, this finding of that authority have to be accepted in view of the settled position of law discussed above. In the result, the revisional application is allowed. The impugned order be set aside. The seized paddy and straw in dispute be returned to the petitioners from the custody of the Zimmadar.