Honble MATHUR, J.–(1). The grievance voiced by the petitioner Lalita in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that she was appointed on the post of L.D.C. alongwith others on urgent/adhoc temproary basis for a period of six months or till the regularly selected candidates are available, whichever is earlier vide order dated 25.9.1998 (Annex.1) by respondent-High Court in accorda- nce with the provisions of Rule 3-A of the Rajasthan High Court (Conditions of Service of Staff) Rules, 1953, hereinafter referred-to as `the Rules of 1953. Inspite of the fact that the administrative exigency for which she was appointed still exists, her services are sought to be terminated by not extending the term of appointment. It is, thus, prayed that by appropriate writ or direction, the respondent-High Court be directed not to terminate her services and extend the term of appointment till regular tests are conducted by it for recruitment of L.D.Cs. and to allow the petitioner to appear in such test as and when it is held. (2). The say of the respondent-High Court is that the petitioner was appointed purely on temporary adhoc basis for a period of six months. She does not have any legal right to continue on the post of L.D.C. as her appointment comes to an end by afflux of time. The further say of the respondent-High Court is that it is upto the appointing authority to adjudge the administrative exigency and not for the petitioner to visualise the exigency and to claim any right to continue in service. CONTENTIONS: Petitioner (3). S/Shri L.M.Lodha and B.M. Bohra learned counsel appearing for the petitioner have mainly raised the following contentions: i) The termination of the petitioner on the premises that she has been appoin- ted for a period of six months is illegal, as the word ``six month in the order Annex.1 has been used inadvertently. Rule 3-A of the Rules, 1953, contemplates temporary/adhoc appointment, for the period till regularly selected candidates are appointed and for no other term. ii) The wrods `six months used in the orders of appointment (Annexs. 1 and lA) is in the context of pay scale and not in context of term of appointment; iii) The action of the respodent-High Court not to continue the term of appointment until regular appointments are made, is arbitrary and illegal being against the equity/good conscious and settled practice. 1 and lA) is in the context of pay scale and not in context of term of appointment; iii) The action of the respodent-High Court not to continue the term of appointment until regular appointments are made, is arbitrary and illegal being against the equity/good conscious and settled practice. First Intervenor-supporting the petitioner (4). The Rajasthan High Court Non-Gazetted Ministerial Staff Association (an unregistered Association), which has been permitted to intervene in the matter has supported the petition. Their say is that the circumstances under which the petitioner and other persons were appointed on temporary basis by orders dated 23rd and 25th Sept., 1998 are still in existence and the work load of High Court has not come down after their appointment and, as such, there is no justification for not continuing their services until regularly selected candidates are available. Mr. J.P. Joshi Senior Advocate, appearing for the intervenor Rajasthan High Court Non-Gazetted Ministerial Staff Association has invited our attention to para 10 of the reply of the respondent-High Court, wherein it is admitted that there exists number of clear and substantive vacancies in the High Court. He has also invited our attention to para 13 of the reply, wherein it is stated that the particulars of the applicants for regular appointments have already been fed in the computer and within a short time, competitive test shall be held and selected persons shall be recruited. It is, thus, submitted that when respondent- High Court is going to make regular selec- tion very shortly, the equity demands that adhoc/temporary employees, already working, continue until such selections are made, more particularly when it is not the case of the respondent No.1 that there is any budgetary problem. Learned counsel has emphasized that respondent-High Court should not bucke down to the news items appeared in some sections of the Press with respect to the appointme- nts made vide Annex.1 and 2. The authorities must satisfy the adminsitrative exigency as available on record. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of this court in the cases of Mrs. Anita Kothari vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) and Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur vs. N.S. Rathore (2). High Court-Reply (5). Mr. R.P. Dave learned counsel appearing for the respondent- High Court at the outset submitted that first and second ground raised by Mr. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of this court in the cases of Mrs. Anita Kothari vs. The State of Rajasthan (1) and Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur vs. N.S. Rathore (2). High Court-Reply (5). Mr. R.P. Dave learned counsel appearing for the respondent- High Court at the outset submitted that first and second ground raised by Mr. L.M. Lodha should not be entertained as they are beyond the frame of the petition. The learned counsel has also raised preliminary objection that petitioner can not espouse the cause of others. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed purely on adhoc and temporary basis for a period of six months, which comes to an end by afflux of time. She has no right to coninue in the post. It is further submitted that the administration is the best Judge of its requirement. The justification of the administrative exigency to continue or not to continue the services of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons cannot be examined by this court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Other Intervenors-opposing the petition (6). There are three more intervenors, who have opposed the writ petition. The say of Mr. Kapil Kumar, intervenor, is that on 9.1.98, an advertisement was issued by the respondent-High Court in which forty seven temporary posts of L.D.Cs. were advertised. As per the Rules of 1953, there is a provisions for conducting examination in three steps and Hindi/English Type Test. The applicant fulfills all the minimum qualification. The respondent- High Court has not conducted any sort of examination in pursuance of the said advertisement dt. 9.1.98 and without conducting the examination, has given appointments to 104 persons as temporary L.D.Cs. vide orders dated 23rd and 25th September, 1998. Before passing these appointment orders, nearly thirty five thousand persons applied for the said posts. The respondent-High Court ignoring all those applications has given appointments to 104 persons by the said orders. Thus, there is unrest among the unemployed educated youths, from the day one when they were appointed. Mr. Mahesh Boda learned counsel appearing for the intervenor, Kapil Kumar, submitted that it is still a mystery as how said 104 fortunate persons like the petitioner came to be appoin- ted. Thus, there is unrest among the unemployed educated youths, from the day one when they were appointed. Mr. Mahesh Boda learned counsel appearing for the intervenor, Kapil Kumar, submitted that it is still a mystery as how said 104 fortunate persons like the petitioner came to be appoin- ted. It is further argued as the petitioner and similarly situated persons have managed their appointment illegally, as such, equity can not be tilted in their favour by further continuing them in service. (7). Mr. P.S. Bhati learned counsel appearing for the intervenor Peeyush Sharma submitted that they are not challenging the validity of the orders of appoint- ment Annexs.1 and IA but they oppose to extension of term of appointment of 104 persons as that affects their rights guaranteed u/Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in the matter of employment in public service. It is submitted that initial entry of the petitioner and similarly situated persons is not in accordance with rules and, as such, they are not entitled to extension of their services. He has placed re- liance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar vs. State of Bihar (3). He has invited our attention to the following observations of the court : ``However, there would never arise any occasion for regularising the appointment of an employee whose initial entry itself is tainted and is in total breach of the requisite procedure of recruitment and especially when there is no vacancy on which such an initial entry of the candidate could ever be effected. Such an entry of an employee would remain tainted from the very beginning and no question of regularising such an illegal entrant would ever survive for consideration, however competent the recruiting agency may be. (8). It is contended by Mr. Bhati that the appointments under Annexs. 1 and 1A are illegal on the single undisputed ground that they were made without calling the applications or even calling the names from Employment Exchange. Such an illegality can not be perpetuated by giving extension at the cost of educated unemployed youths. He has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur vs. Veer Singh Rajput (4) and invited our attention to the following observations: ``One such problem relates to irregularities in appointments. Such an illegality can not be perpetuated by giving extension at the cost of educated unemployed youths. He has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur vs. Veer Singh Rajput (4) and invited our attention to the following observations: ``One such problem relates to irregularities in appointments. Candidates who are sought to be regularised may be neither sponsored by the employment exchange nor appointed after issuing a proper advertisement calling for applications. (9). He has also referred to a decision of the Apex Court in State of Orissa vs. Sukanti Mohapatra (5), wherein the court held that the appointments of the candidates made dehors the rules cannot be allowed to be regularised. (10). Mr. Kuldeep Mathur learned counsel appearing for the intervenor submitted that the doctrine of equality before law and equalk opportunity in the matter of employment enshrined in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India demanding appointment in public service strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit also applies to the temporary urgent/adhoc appointments. He has referr- ed-to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 1986 Lab.I.C. 75 (6), wherein the court held that even adhoc appointments are not bounties to be conferred on the chosen few. The court further held that mere absence of statutory rules does not provide any justification for making arbitrary and discriminatory appointments violating Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. L.M. Nath vs. Dr. S.K. Kacker (7), it is submitted that in case of appointment on a tenure post on expiry of the term, the incumbent has no right to continue thereafter. (11). Mr. Bhanu Prakash Mathur learned counsel appearing for intervenors Manish Mathur and Varsha Mathur submitted that the word used in Rule 3-A of the Rules of 1953 is `suitable, therefore, an appointment under Rule 3-A can be made only after proper adjudging the suitability. He has referred-to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P. (8), wherein the court held that even the temporary and adhoc appointment made in transgression of the procedure is illegal, void and confers no right on the appointees. (12). Dealing with the contention of equity, it is submitted by Mr. He has referred-to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P. (8), wherein the court held that even the temporary and adhoc appointment made in transgression of the procedure is illegal, void and confers no right on the appointees. (12). Dealing with the contention of equity, it is submitted by Mr. Bhanu Prakash that a human approach did not imply tilting in favour of one party only. He has referred-to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dharm Bir (9), wherein the court, repelling the contention not to disturb a person who has already been working on the post for some time, on human approach, he- ld that in dispensing justice to the litigating parties, the courts not only go into the merits of the respective cases, they also try to balance the equities so as to do complete justice between them. (13). Before we proceed further, it is made clear that we are not entering into the question of legality of the orders dt. 23rd and 25th Sept., 1998 (Annexs.1 and 2), whereby the petitioner and other similarly situated persons were appointed on the post of L.D.C. on temporary/adhoc basis. CONSIDERATION OF CONTENTIONS: (14). In order to appreciate the first contention of Mr. Lodha that Rule 3-A of the Rules of 1953 only provides for temporary/urgent appointments until regular appointments are made and it does not contemplate a specific period like six months or so, it would be apt to read Rule 3-A, which is reproduced as follows: ``3-A Temporary Appointments: (a) Where it is necessary to fill a vacancy in any post and undue or administrative inconvenience is expected in filling up that post on the regular basis, the appointing authority may appoint any other suitable person temporary until a regular appointment is made in accordance with these rules. (b) (i) A person appointed under sub-rule (a) shall be required to replaced as soon as possible by a candidate appointed on the regular basis under these rules. (ii) A person appointed under sub-rule (a) shall not be regarded as a probationer holding the post nor such appointment shall confer upon him any right to claim appointment to such post on regular basis, unless he does clear the recruitment test conducted by the department. (15). (ii) A person appointed under sub-rule (a) shall not be regarded as a probationer holding the post nor such appointment shall confer upon him any right to claim appointment to such post on regular basis, unless he does clear the recruitment test conducted by the department. (15). A reading of the rule shows that it only provides outer limit of temporary/adhoc appointment. It does not prohibit appointment for a shorter period. The appointing authority has power to make appointment under Rule 3-A for suitable term not beyond the outer limit provided therein. Thus, there is no substance in the first contention of Mr. Lodha and the same is accordingly rejected. (16). It is next contended by Mr. Lodha that the word `six months used in the orders of appointment in Annexs.1 and 2 in the context of pay scale and not in the context of term of appointment. In order to appreciate the contention, it would be apt to read the order Annex.1, whereby the petitioner was appointed as L.D.C. on temporary/adhoc basis, which is reproduced as follows: ANNEX.1 RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT, JODHPUR ORDER No. Estt/HC/98/310 Dated 25/9/1998 The following persons are hereby appointed as Lower Division Clerks on urgent/adhoc temporary basis in the pay scale of Rs. 3050-4590 on a fixed amount of Rs. 3050/- + D.A. as admissible per month for a pe- riod of six (six) months or till regularly selected candidates are available whichever is earlier, subject to the verification of their original certificate regarding age and qualifications. They are posted at the place shown against their names. S.No. Name of persons with Fathers/Husbands Name Date of birth Place of posting 1 2 3 4 43 Miss Lalita Gehlot D/o Keshu Singh 02.07.77 Principal Seat at Jodhpur They will submit the Medical certificate issued by competent author- ity according to Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 rule-10, before joining their service in prescribed performa and join their service within 15 days otherwise appointment order will be automatically cancelled. BY ORDER Sd/- JOINT REGISTRAR GENERAL (VIGILANCE) (17). It emerges from the analysis of the order that- a. the appointment has been made on the post of L.D.C., on urgent/adhoc, temporary basis; b. in the pay scale of Rs. 3050-4590 on a fixed amount of Rs. BY ORDER Sd/- JOINT REGISTRAR GENERAL (VIGILANCE) (17). It emerges from the analysis of the order that- a. the appointment has been made on the post of L.D.C., on urgent/adhoc, temporary basis; b. in the pay scale of Rs. 3050-4590 on a fixed amount of Rs. 3050/- + D.A. as admissible per month; c. the term of appointment is six months or till the regularly selected candidates are available, whichever is earlier. (18). Thus the order of appointment indicates the nature of appointment as urgent/adhoc temporary. It also provides the pay scale of Rs. 3050 -4590 and thirdly, it provides the tenure of appointment i.e. six months or till the regularly selected candidates are available, whichever is earlier. (19). Mr. L.M. Lodha learned counsel has tried to read the order to indicate that the words ``period of six months has been used in the context of pay scale. It is submitted by Mr. Lodha that there is no coma after the word `as admissible per month and before `for a period of six months and, therefore, the words `six months has been used only in the context of pay scale. Mr. Lodha relying on a decision of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandan Bhanji (10), submits that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. The ratio laid down in the said case has no application to the facts of the present case. The respondent-High Court has read the order Annex.1 as it is, as such there is no question of giving explanation subsequently. A plain reading of order Annex.1 clearly shown that the term of temporary appointment is six months or until regularly selected candidates are made available, whichever is earlier. Having read the order carefully, in our view, there can be no other meaning of the order Annex.1 except as indicated above. In fact, the petitioners own case is that she has been appointed for a period of six months and not extending the term clearly amounts to termination of services. Having read the order carefully, in our view, there can be no other meaning of the order Annex.1 except as indicated above. In fact, the petitioners own case is that she has been appointed for a period of six months and not extending the term clearly amounts to termination of services. The petitioner has categorically stated in para 5 of the petition that ``the petitioner was appointed as LDC alongwith other persons, on adhoc basis in the pay scale of Rs. 3050-4590 initially for the period of six months or till regularly selected candidates are available. In para 9 of the petition, she has stated that ``infact not extending the term of the petitioner clearly amounts to termination of her services and that too without any notice. The petitioner has made a prayer in para 22 sub clause (2) which reads thus ``issue appropriate orders extending the term of appointment of the petitioner till regular tests are conducted. Thus, the ingenious argument of Mr. Lodha learned counsel appearing for the petitioner deserves be to rejected. (20). The last and the most important controversy raised in the present writ petition is as to whether in the facts of the case, direction should be given to respondent-High Court to continue the petitioner and other similarly situated persons in service until regular appointments are made. (21). While Mr. Lodha and Mr. Joshi have vehemently argued that there is no valid reason for the High Court not to extend the service of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons when the administrative exigency for which they were appointed, still continues viz.; that the regularly selected candidates are not available. Learned counsel has cited number of decisions of the Apex Court and this court, wherein in the similar circumstances, direction has been given to continue the appointment of temporary/adhoc appointees till regularly selected candidates are available. (22). On the other hand, Sh. R.P. Dave learned counsel appearing for the respondent-High Court and other learned counsel appearing for the intervenors viz. S/Shri Mahesh Bora, P.S. Bhati, Kuldeep Mathur and Bhanu Prakash Mathur vehemently argued that the petitioner and other similarly situated persons have been appointed for a fixed term and they have no right to continue in the post. Mr. R.P. Dave learned counsel appearing for the respondent-High Court and other learned counsel appearing for the intervenors viz. S/Shri Mahesh Bora, P.S. Bhati, Kuldeep Mathur and Bhanu Prakash Mathur vehemently argued that the petitioner and other similarly situated persons have been appointed for a fixed term and they have no right to continue in the post. Mr. Dave has further submitted that whether the administrative exigency exists or not, to continue the petitioner and other similarly situated persons, is a matter for the consideration of the authority concerned and a decision thereon cannot be a matter of judicial review by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Cons- titution of India. (23). We shall first deal with the contention of Mr. Dave that the petitioner and similarly situated persons being appointed purely on temporary and adhoc basis for a maximum period of six months, have no right to continue in service. (24). In Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava (11), the writ petitioner was appointed on a contract basis for a period of three months. The said order was further extended for a period of three months in August with effect from 2nd Aug., 1988. The term of appointment was extended from time to time. Lastly, by order dated 1.9.90, she was appointed on a contract basis for a period of six months. Before the expiry of six months period i.e. on 28.2.91, she preferred a writ petition with a prayer for mandamus to continue her in service. The petition was allowed by the High Court and a direction was given to continue her in service. The Apex Court analysing the order of appointment held that where the appointment is contractual and by afflux of time, it comes to an end, the writ petitioner had no right to continue in the said post. The Apex Court having arrived-at the said conclusion, posed a question as to whether the writ petitioner being continued from time to time on adhoc basis for more than a year is entitled to regularisation. The answer was in negative. The Court held thus: ``The appointment was purely ad hoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end. (25). The answer was in negative. The Court held thus: ``The appointment was purely ad hoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end. (25). In Committee of Management Vasanta College for Women vs. Tribhuwan Nath Tripathi (12), the court held that an adhoc appointee has no subsisting right to continue in service after the expiry of the period of such appointment. (26). In State of H.P. though the Secretary (Rural Development) to the Govt. of. H.P., Shimla vs. Ashwani Kumar and others (13), the writ petitioners were engaged on daily wages on muster-roll basis in Central Scheme and were paid out of the funds provided by the Central Govt. The scheme was closed as such. Their services were dispensed with. The High Court by interim direction directed them to be re-engaged elsewhere. The Apex Court held that the High Court was not right in giving direction to regularise them or to continue them in other places. The court held that no vested right is created in temporary employment. (27). In Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Devendra Ku- mar Jain and ors. (14), the writ petitioner was appointed on the post of Junior Manager on purely temporary basis and his services were liable to be terminated at any time without notice or assigning any reasons. The High Court quashed the order on the ground that services of the writ petitioner were terminated without giving any opportunity of hearing in consonance with the rules of natural justice. The Apex Court on reading the order of appointment found that appointment was made purely on temporary basis and, as such, his appointment was liable to be terminated at any time without notice or assigning any reasons. The court also held that in case of appointment on temporary basis, the employee does not acquire any substantive right to the post even if the post itself may be permanent. The court further held that it is an implied term of appointment that it may be terminable at any time and without notice. (28). Thus, a person appointed on temporary/adhoc basis for a specified period has no indefeasible right to continue in service even if there exists vacancy or administrative exigency. The court further held that it is an implied term of appointment that it may be terminable at any time and without notice. (28). Thus, a person appointed on temporary/adhoc basis for a specified period has no indefeasible right to continue in service even if there exists vacancy or administrative exigency. Service of persons appointed on temporary basis can be terminated in terms of letter of appointment. In the instant case, the respondent-High Court has made its stand very clear that inspite of the fact that vacancies exist, it is not considered appropriate to extend the term of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons. The petitioner and other similarly situated persons have been appointed for a fixed term of six months or till the suitable candidates are av- ailable, whichever is earlier. Thus, we do not find any illegality in termination of services of the petitioner and similarly situated persons as the same has come to an end in terms of their appointment. (29). The next question which falls for consideration is whether in the facts of the case, a direction be given to the respondent High Court to continue the services of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons till regularly selected candidates are available, more particularly when on behalf of the respondent- High Court, statement has been made that there exists vacancies and that by the end of July, process of regular selection shall be complete? (30). It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Apex Court in number of cases while holding that the writ petitioner has no right to continue in service, has given a direction to continue them in service until the regularly selected candidates are available. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Smt. P.K. Narayani vs. State of Kerala (15). In the said case, the writ petitioner workmen within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act continued in service for a number of years. When a regular selection was to be made, many of writ petitioners had become barred by age. In the peculiar facts of the case, the court directed to continue them in service provided vacancies exist for the posts on which they are to be continued in service. (31). In Dr. When a regular selection was to be made, many of writ petitioners had become barred by age. In the peculiar facts of the case, the court directed to continue them in service provided vacancies exist for the posts on which they are to be continued in service. (31). In Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (16), the writ petitioner was recruited as Doctor on adhoc basis. He continued in service for 13 years. While giving direction for making regular selection through the P.S.C., the court directed that till the State Govt. receives the list of selected candidates from the P.S.C., the writ petitioner be continued in service on adhoc basis. (32). In J & K Public Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan (17), the Apex Court deprecated the practice of continuing the adhoc appointments for long period. While giving a direction for regular selection in accordance with the relevant rules, the court directed to continue them in service till appointment of regularly selected candidates. While giving such direction, the court took note of the fact that affected persons had continued in service on adhoc basis for number of years. (33). In Rajbinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (18), the writ petitioner complained that there is a practice of appointing Lecturer for a fixed period & discontinuing their services at the end of the academic session and then give them fresh appointment every year for the fresh academic session. In peculiar facts of the case, the court directed that the adhoc teachers be continued in service until the regularly selected candidates by the P.S.C. are appointed in the posts. (34). In Jacob M. Puthuparambil vs. Kerala Water Authority (19), the court held that the employees, who have been working on the establishment for long period and who possess the requisite qualification, should be allowed to continue on their job and their services should be regularised. The court also observed that families of the employees, which have settled down and accommodated its needs to the emoluments received by the bread winner, will face economic ruination if the job is suddenly taken away. The court also observed that families of the employees, which have settled down and accommodated its needs to the emoluments received by the bread winner, will face economic ruination if the job is suddenly taken away. This case has no application to the facts of the present case as only six months back, petitioner and other similarly situated persons were appointed and they knew very well that their appointment is only for a period of six months or may be for a lesser period in case the selected candidates are made available. Therefore, there is no question of their having been settled down on the basis of orders Annexs.1 and 2. (35). In State of Haryana vs. Piara Singh (20), the court held that mere continuation of an ad hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for a regular post. The court further held that such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. The court also held that there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. (36). Thus, it is evident that in none of the cases, the Apex Court or this Court has laid down a general rule that in all cases, where adhoc appointments are made, they should be continued till selected candidates are made available. The Court may give such direction in a fit case where equity is created in favour of the writ petitioner on account of long continuance in service and the initial appointment has not been under cloud. We do not find any justified reasons or the equity in favour of the petitioner for giving direction to continue her and other similarly situated persons in service till regularly selected candidates are available. (37). With respect to the petitioners prayer for permitting her to appear at the competitive test for regular selection on the post of L.D.C, it is always open for the petitioner or any other person to approach the respondent-High Court by way of representation. If such a representation is made, the same shall be considered in accordance with the relevant rules. (38). In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.