JUDGMENT H.L. Dattu, J.—In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner primarily questions the correctness or otherwise of the communication of the respondents dated 14.3.1996 and the other ancillary question posed for an answer is the legality or otherwise of the condition No. 1 of the Personal Accident Policy of the Oriental Insurance Company Limited (for short 'Insurance Company') as unreasonable, arbitrary and opposed to constitutional provisions. 2. Facts and legal issues raised lie in a very narrow compass. They are: Petitioner's husband late Sri Thimmegowda had taken Personal Accident Policy with the respondent-Insurance Company, while he was alive. He met with an accidental death on 20.9.1992. Petitioner approached the respondents by her application dated 17.7.1995 inter alia claiming the amount under the policy. The claim is rejected by the Insurance Company on the sole ground that the claim is highly belated. Aggrieved by this communication dated 14.3.1996, petitioner is before This Court inter alia seeking a writ to quash the impugned communication and further to direct the Insurance Company to pay the amounts assured in policy bearing No. 422803/3/NTB/92/0351. The other incidental prayer is to strike down condition No. 1 of the Personal Accidental Policy of the Insurance Company as unreasonable and arbitrary. 3. The learned Counsel Mr. R.S. Ravi reiterates the grounds urged in the petition and in support of the reliefs sought, relies upon the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of The Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Maharaj Singh and Another, AIR 1976 SC 287 , Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1184 : 1 (1987) ACC 413, and the latest view of the Supreme Court in the case of B.V. Nagaraju Vs. M/s. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan, (1996) 5 AD SC 105. 4. Mr. S.P. Shankar, learned Counsel, an exponent of the insurance laws of the respondent-Insurance Company submits that in view of condition No. 1 in the Insurance Policy, petitioner may not get any relief and, therefore, suggests a liberal interpretation to the benevolent provisions by This Court not only to the person insured and his dependents but also to the public at large. 5. This Court appreciates the deep concern of the learned Counsel not only towards the policy holders but also to their dependents. 5. This Court appreciates the deep concern of the learned Counsel not only towards the policy holders but also to their dependents. The learned Counsel even suggests that the condition No. 1 in the policy deserves to be read down by This Court, but cautiously adds that it should not be taken as his suggestion but view of the Court--"this is an extraordinary legal mind". 6. Let me first take up the incidental question for an answer. Condition No. 1 in the Personal Accident Policy is as under: Upon the happening of any event which may give rise to a claim under this Policy, written notice with full particulars must be given to the Company immediately. In case of death written notice also for the death must, unless reasonable cause is shown, be so given before interment cremation, and in any case, within one calendar month after the death, and in event of loss of sight or amputation of limbs, written notice thereof must also be given within one calendar month after such loss of sight or amputation. (Emphasis supplied) 7. Condition No. 1 in the policy prescribes the period within which a claim application is to be filed before the authorities. It envisages that it should be filed within one calender month, upon the happening of an event which may give rise to a claim under the policy or the death of the life insured. The discretion is vested with the authorities to condone the delay, if any, in not preferring the claim within the prescribed time, if reasonable cause is shown. Condition No. 1 does not expressly exclude the filing of claim application beyond the period prescribed. The language of the clause is not imperative. It vests in the authorities a discretion. The proof of a 'reasonable cause' is a condition precedent for the exercise of their jurisdiction. All that condition No. 1 requires in express terms as a condition for the exercise of discretionary power for admission of a claim presented after the prescribed time is sufficient cause for not presenting the claim within the prescribed time. If such cause can be shown, the authority in its discretion, which is of course a judicial and not an arbitrary discretion, may admit the claim. If such cause can be shown, the authority in its discretion, which is of course a judicial and not an arbitrary discretion, may admit the claim. Keeping in view that the procedure is meant for advancing the cause and not for obstructing the cause of justice, the authorities have rightly provided discretionary clause in the condition No. 1 of the Insurance Policy. If such discretion is not vested in them, the petitioner's learned Counsel could have successfully contended that condition No. 1 of the policy as either unreasonable or arbitrary in view of benevolent nature of the provisions and also in view of the purpose and policy of the Personal Accident Policy. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no arbitrariness or unreasonableness in condition No. 1 of the Insurance Policy. Accordingly, the prayer to strike down the condition No. 1 of the policy in rejected. 8. Now coming to the impugned communication dated 14.3.1996, the authorities of the Insurance Company have rejected the claim of the petitioner for payment of amounts under the policy solely on the ground that the claim is beyond the period prescribed in condition No. 1 of the policy, forgetting for a moment that they have discretion under certain circumstances to condone the delay in filing the claim application. The discretion is deliberately conferred on them in order that discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. In the instant case, the insurance authorities have not considered the cause shown by petitioner in approaching them nearly after 33 months from the date of death of her husband. Since they have the discretion to condone the delay in preferring the claim application after prescribed time, the authorities should have considered the cause shown by the petitioner before mechanically rejecting the claim of an illiterate, ignorant person. Since that has not been done, the impugned communication dated 14.3.1996 requires to be set aside by This Court. 9. In the result, petition requires to be allowed. Accordingly, it is allowed to the extent noticed earlier. Rule made absolute to that extent only. The impugned communication dated 14.3.1996 is quashed. A direction is issued to respondent Insurance Company to reconsider the claim petition filed by the petitioner in accordance with law and keeping in view the purpose of life insurance policies. All the other contentions of both the parties are left open. Ordered accordingly.