JUDGMENT Arijit Pasayat, C.J. 1. Rajan and Nagappan, hereinafter referred to as 'accused' by name, questioned legality of judgment of conviction and sentence passed by learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. Accused Rajan was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for offence punishable under S.302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'); rigorous imprisonment for five years in respect of offence under S.449 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. He has also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under S.324 IPC. Accused Nagappan has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, two years and one year respectively in respect of offences punishable under S.323, 324 and 451 IPC. Sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case, as unfolded during trial, is as follows: Lalitha (PW 1) was residing at Kuttaraviala Kunnil Puthen Veedu, Keasavadev Road, Mudavanmugal Ward, Thirumala Village along with her husband, Thankappan. They had three children - Latha (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased'), Usha (PW 2) and Suma. Chellamma (PW 12) is the wife of Thankappan's younger brother, late Maniyan. Accused are brothers, who are children of Thankappan's elder brother, namely Kuttan. PW 12 and her children were residing in a building situated adjacent to the house of Lalitha. Accused claimed some personal rights over the said building in which PW 12 was residing and wanted to evict her and her children. This demand led to frequent quarrels when accused came to the house of PW 12. Thankappan used to render help to PW 12. Perplexed by action of accused, PW 12 lodged a complaint before police and accused were taken into custody on 16,9.1993. On 17.9.1993, accused threatened Thankappan of bodily harm. PW 1 lodged a complaint before police on 24.9.1993 about the said threat by accused. Police came in search of them. On 26.9.1993, accused Rajan came with a handle of spade and accused Nagappan with a stick, trespassed into verandah of PW 1's house. Rajan asked PW 1 as to whether she will file a further complaint before police and tried to hit her on the head which was warded off. He again inflicted another blow which hit her left side and she sustained an injury. Hearing her cry, deceased came to verandah and tried to obstruct the accused from further assault. Rajan asked PW 1 as to whether she will file a further complaint before police and tried to hit her on the head which was warded off. He again inflicted another blow which hit her left side and she sustained an injury. Hearing her cry, deceased came to verandah and tried to obstruct the accused from further assault. Accused Rajan inflicted a blow on her head, thereby causing fracture of the skull and contusion on the head. She fell down. Accused Nagappan stabbed on various parts of her body. PW 1 and deceased were taken to General Hospital from where they were referred to Medical College Hospital. Deceased succumbed to the injuries on 28-9-1993 around 12-45 p.m. Information was lodged with police and investigation was undertaken. Accused persons were committed for alleged commission of offences punishable under S.449,307 and 302 IPC read with S.34 IPC. Accused persons pleaded innocence. 3. During trial, 14 witnesses were examined to further prosecution version. Placing reliance on the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, learned trial Judge held accused persons guilty, convicted and sentenced them as aforesaid. 4. In support of appeal, Mr. B. Krishna Mani, submitted that learned trial Judge should not have placed reliance on the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, after having doubted version of PW 12 on the ground of unreliability. Additionally, PWs 1 and 2 are related to deceased and PW 3 is only a chance witness. Their evidence has not been analysed and scrutinised in a proper manner. Alternatively, it is submitted that there was no intention to kill anybody. Even if prosecution case is accepted, it was PW 1 who was supposed to be the target of assault. Nature of injuries alleged inflicted on her does not show existence of an intention to do away with her life. There is no reason as to why any intention to cause death of deceased would exist. That being position, application of S.302 IPC so far as deceased is concerned is clear ruled out. In any event, according to learned counsel, at the most, an offence under S.326 IPC can be said to have been committed on accepting prosecution version in its entirety. Mr. K. Gopalakrishna Kurup, learned State Public Prosecutor, however, supported the judgment, conviction and sentence imposed on accused persons. 5. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. In any event, according to learned counsel, at the most, an offence under S.326 IPC can be said to have been committed on accepting prosecution version in its entirety. Mr. K. Gopalakrishna Kurup, learned State Public Prosecutor, however, supported the judgment, conviction and sentence imposed on accused persons. 5. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. 6. In Dilip Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1953 SC 364 ), it has been laid down as under: "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has caused such an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not in sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts." 7. This decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and others v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1974 SC 276 ) in which Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras ( AIR 1957 SC 614 ): was also relied upon. 8. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. 8. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by apex court as early as in Dilip Singh's case (supra) in which apex Court expressed its surprise over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J., the apex court observed: "We are unable to agree with learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rules. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1950 SC 54). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the courts, at any rate, in the arguments of counsel." In this case, apex court further observed as under: "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has caused such an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal causes for enmity, that there is tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth." 9. Again, in Masalti v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1965 SC 202 ), apex court observed: "Again it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ... Again, in Masalti v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1965 SC 202 ), apex court observed: "Again it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure, of justice." 10. To the same effect is the decision of apex court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 1407). 11. In the case at hand, evidence of PWs 1 and 2 has been analysed at length and found to be credible and cogent. Therefore, learned trial Judge was justified in placing reliance on their evidence. There is no dispute that a person lost his life. That being so, normal human behaviour would be to expose the real culprits and not to shield them. A relative, instead of being a partisan witness, is normally supposed to be impartial and bring real culprits to face trial and not to-let loose them to rope in innocent persons. 12. It is to be noted that PW 3 is an independent witness. There was not even a suggestion to the witness that she had any animosity towards accused. In a murder trial by describing independent witness as chance witness it cannot be implied thereby that his or her evidence is suspicious and his or her presence at the scene is doubtful Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. The expression 'chance witness' is borrowed from countries where everyman's home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual. 13. The further question is whether the case is covered under S.302 IPC Clause thirdly of S.300 views the matter from a general standpoint. It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 13. The further question is whether the case is covered under S.302 IPC Clause thirdly of S.300 views the matter from a general standpoint. It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The emphasis here is on sufficiency of injury in the ordinary way of nature and when this exists and death ensues and causing of such injury is intended the offence is murder. The clause has two parts. The first part is a subjective one which interdicted that injury must be an intentional one and not accidental one and the second part is objective one in the sense that looking at injury intended to be caused, court must be satisfied that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. These two parts are disjunctive and separate. Sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature is the gist of clause, irrespective of an intention to cause death. Analysing the clause, apex court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1952 SC 465), which has become locus classicus, laid down that the prosecution must prove following facts: i) It must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; ii) The nature of injury must be proved. These are partly objective investigations; iii) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further; and iv) It must be proved that the injury of the type described made up of three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the inquiry is purely objective. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under S.300 clause 'thirdly'. 14. It is pleaded that fact situation does not indicate that the particular bodily injury was intended. Only one blow was given. There is no probation that whenever a single blow is given resulting in death, S.302 IPC will not be applicable. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under S.300 clause 'thirdly'. 14. It is pleaded that fact situation does not indicate that the particular bodily injury was intended. Only one blow was given. There is no probation that whenever a single blow is given resulting in death, S.302 IPC will not be applicable. Though the number of injuries is one of the circumstances which court may take into account for coming to a finding about intention or knowledge of the offender, it is not determinative factor. It would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of weapon used, background facts leading to assault, place of injury have to be kept in mind. Considering these aspects, the case at hand does not appear to be one where clause 'thirdly' would be applicable. Conviction under S.302 IPC is to be altered to one under S.304 Part II, IPC. In the circumstances, custodial sentence of eight years would be adequate. 15. So far as other offences and sentences imposed are concerned, learned counsel for accused has fairly conceded that convictions are proper. However, he made a prayer for reduction of sentence. In the alternative, it was prayed that sentences imposed may be directed to run concurrently with benefit of set off. 16. Considering the nature of dispute and background facts highlighted, we do not accept the plea for reduction of sentence. However, we direct that sentences imposed shall run concurrently. Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.