G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application filed by the petitioners accused persons is directed against the order dated 5-12-1998 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Midnapore whereby the learned Sessions Judge cancelled interim bail granted to the petitioners by the learned SDJM, Jhargram in G. R. Case No. 333/ 92 which was initially started under Sections 147/148/326/307/379, I. P. C. and later on Section 302, I. P. C. was also added thereto as the victim succumbed to the injuries later in the hospital: The incident took place on 30-6-1998. The FIR was lodged on 2-7-1998 at 12. 25 p. m. giving explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR. The victim died at the hospital on 2-7-1998 at 6. 30 p. m. On the prayer of the 1. 0. on 4-7-1998 Section 302, I. P. C. was added. On 10-7-1998 an application for anticipatory bail was filed by the petitioners before the learned Sessions Judge, Midnapore and the learned Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail to the petitioners on 10-8-1998. In view of the order of anticipatory bail the petitioners surrendered before the learned SDJM, Jhargram on 13-8-1998 and. 17-8-1998 in batches and they were granted interim bail by the learned SDJM, Jharagram. Against the interim bail the de facto complainant moved an application under Section 439 (2), Cr. P. C. before the learned Sessions Judge, Midnapore praying for cancellation of the interim bail. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 5-12-1998 cancelled the interim bail granted by the learned Magistrate for reasons recorded in the impugned order and directed the petitioners to surrender before the learned SDJM by 14-2-1998. The present revisional application is directed against the said order of the learned Sessions Judge cancelling the interim bail granted by the learned SDJM. ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner has inter alia submitted that the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions Judge after perusing the case diary and he was not justified in cancelling the interim bail granted by the learned SDJM. It has been further submitted that the allegation has been made that the petitioners suppressed the fact that Section 302. It has been further submitted that the allegation has been made that the petitioners suppressed the fact that Section 302. I. P. C. was added in the FIR later, but as a matter of fact the petitioners were not aware of that fact and the question suppression does not arise because the anticipatory bail was granted by the learned Sessions Judge after considering the C. D. and after hearing the learned Public Prosecutor. These are however matters relating to the question of merit, but a threshold objection has been raised on behalf of the opposite parties before this Court that a revisional application against the impugned order is not maintainable at all in as much as an order granting, refusing or cancelling bail is an interlocutory order and therefore no revision lies against such order in view of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. Both sides have made their submissions before us on this point and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has also attracted our attention to the recently reported decision of a three-Judge Special Bench of this Court in Dukhi Shyam Benupani v. Parashmal Ram Puria. On the other hand the learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred to an earlier order of this Bench dated 19-11-1998 in CRR 1781 of 1998 in which a revisional application against an order of cancellation of bail was entertained and disposed of by passing some directions. However it is to be mentioned here that the question of maintainability of the revisional application was not at all raised or considered in that matter. But now the question of maintainability has been specifically raised before us in this matter and we have to consider the same. The Special Bench in the said decision considered the matter elaborately and also the provisions of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. , which says that the powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry trial or other proceeding. In paragraph 12 of the said Special Bench decision it has been observed thus: The order of discharge of an accused is not a judgment or final order as there is no pronouncement of the Court as to the truth or otherwise of the accusation. In paragraph 12 of the said Special Bench decision it has been observed thus: The order of discharge of an accused is not a judgment or final order as there is no pronouncement of the Court as to the truth or otherwise of the accusation. Thus an order setting aside an order refusing to grant bail or an order cancelling bail granted, cannot be taken as a final order. T For the view that the order granting or refusing to grant bail or cancelling bail at a pre-trial stage is an interlocutory order and not a judgment or final order reference bas been made in paragraph 15 of the said Special Bench decision to certain other judgments mentioned therein holding that such order is not revisable under Section 397, Cr. P. C. In view of the said Special Bench decision we are bound to hold as has been held therein that no revision lies against an order granting, refusing or cancelling bail. In paragraph 19 of the said Special Bench decision it has been observed thus: - If the order is not revisable the Courts inherent power can be used only if it is demonstrated that (1) Interference is necessary to undo the abuse of the process of law; and (2) To prevent miscarriage of justice. ( 3 ) IT may be noted here that the Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. The State of Haryana inter alia observed in paragraph 6 that orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for report and such other steps in aid of pending proceeding, may no doubt amount t6 interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. In paragraph 3 of the said decision which is a two Judge Bench decision the Supreme Court also held that if a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply and that it is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter, but where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers. In a later decision in Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra which is a three Judge Bench decision the Supreme Court however modified its earlier decision to the extent that in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or effect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court, although such cases would be few and far between and the High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. In Bhola v. State which is a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court it was held that order cancelling bail is an interlocutory order and revision against such order does not lie in view of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. It was however indicated in the said decision that the High Court has inherent powers to remedy an abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice as laid down in Section 482, Cr. P. C. in an appropriate case where no alternative remedy is open to the aggrieved party. The Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court also interpreted the expression passing orders for bail mentioned by the Supreme Court in Amamath v. State of Haryana (supra) while giving examples of what is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. , to include orders granting, rejecting or cancelling bail. In Nilu v. State a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court also held that order cancelling bail is an interlocutory order and revision against such order is not maintainable in view of Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. It was however held that Section 482, Cr. P. C. might be applied to prevent abuse of the process of the Court despite Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. but such power has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. ( 4 ) UNDER the law as it stands orders granting, refusing or cancelling bail are interlocutory orders and therefore such orders are not revisable in view of Section 397 (2 ). Cr. P. C. but such power has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. ( 4 ) UNDER the law as it stands orders granting, refusing or cancelling bail are interlocutory orders and therefore such orders are not revisable in view of Section 397 (2 ). Cr. P. C. It is only in very exceptional circumstances the Court may however exercise its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P. C. against an order of cancellation of bail if that is absolutely necessary for preventing abuse of the process of the Court or for securing the ends of justice. Ordinarily such power may be exercised when the order has been passed without jurisdiction or in the absence of material in support of the same thereby resulting into miscarriage of justice, but such power should not ordinarily be exercised by reaching a conclusion through reappreciation or reevaluation of materials which may prima facie support the impugned order. The order of the learned Sessions Judge challenged before us is indeed ex-facie an order cancelling interim bail granted by the learned SDJM after the petitioners surrendered before the SDJM on obtaining an order of anticipatory bail in their favour from the learned Sessions Judge, primafacie therefore a revisional application under Section 397 would not be maintainable against the order of cancellation of bail in as much as such order is an interlocutory order in respect of which revision is barred by Section 397 (2) Cr. P. C. We are also afraid whether it would be a fit case for exercise of inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) BUT then this matter has a different dimension which deserves consideration. As we have already mentioned the petitioners obtained an order of anticipatory bail from the learned Sessions Judge on 10-8-1998. The learned Sessions Judge also directed that the order of the anticipatory bail would remain in force for three weeks. In the background of the order of anticipatory bail the petitioners promptly surrendered before the SDJM on 13-8-1998 and 17-8-1998 in batches well within the operational period of the order of anticipatory bail and prayed for regular bail before the learned SDJM. Keeping the application for bail pending the learned SDJM granted interim bail to the petitioners. In the background of the order of anticipatory bail the petitioners promptly surrendered before the SDJM on 13-8-1998 and 17-8-1998 in batches well within the operational period of the order of anticipatory bail and prayed for regular bail before the learned SDJM. Keeping the application for bail pending the learned SDJM granted interim bail to the petitioners. This order of interim bail was challenged before the Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge by elaborate discussion in his impugned order found that this case being one under Section 302. I. P. C. The learned Magistrate granted interim bail to the petitioners without jurisdiction by ignoring the relevant aspects of the provisions of Section 437. Cr. P. C. In our view this is however an erroneous approach in the circumstances of this particular case. It has to be pointed out here that in granting interim bail during the pendency of the application for regular bail after the petitioners surrendered before the learned SDJM in the back-drop of the anticipatory bail granted to them by higher Court the learned Magistrate was indeed not acting under Section 437. Cr. P. C. , strictly speaking and he was rather at that stage acting in consonance with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sallauddin v. State of Maharashtra and K. L. Venna v. State. The following observations of the Supreme Court in K. L. Verma v. State (supra) deserves notice: This Court further observed that anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in non-bailable cases but that does not mean that the regular Court, which is to try the offender is sought to be by passed. It was, therefore, pointed out that it was necessary that such anticipatory bail orders should be of a limited duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or extended duration the Court granting anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence placed before it after the investigation has made progress or the charge-sheet is submitted. By this, what the Court desired to convey was that an order of anticipatory bail does not enure till the end of trial but it must be of limited duration as the regular Court cannot be by passed. By this, what the Court desired to convey was that an order of anticipatory bail does not enure till the end of trial but it must be of limited duration as the regular Court cannot be by passed. The limited duration must be determined having regard to the facts of the case and the need to give the accused sufficient time to move the regular Court for bail and to give the regular Court sufficient time to determine the bail application. In other words, till the bail application is disposed of one way or the other the Court may allow the accused to remain on anticipatory bail. To put it differently, anticipatory bail may be granted for duration which may extend to the date on which the baa application is disposed of a or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to move the higher Court if they so desire. This decision was not intended to convey that as soon as the accused persons are produced before the regular Court the anticipatory bail ends even if the Court is yet to decide the question of bail on merits. The decision in Sallauddins case has to be so understood. (Emphasis supplied ). ( 6 ) SO the position of law is very clear in view of the said Supreme Court decisions in Sallauddin and K. L. Verma (supra) that the protection of the order of anticipatory bail continues till the application for regular bail is finally disposed of by the learned Magistrate provided, of course, the petitioners have surrendered before the learned Magistrate within the time limit fixed by the order of the anticipatory bail. The act of the learned Magistrate in granting interim bail to the petitioners on surrender within time after obtaining anticipatory bail must not be construed as an independent exercise of the power to grant bail by the Magistrate under Section 437, Cr. The act of the learned Magistrate in granting interim bail to the petitioners on surrender within time after obtaining anticipatory bail must not be construed as an independent exercise of the power to grant bail by the Magistrate under Section 437, Cr. P. C. It is rather only an act in compliance or in consonance with the order of anticipatory bail, passed by the higher Court, because in view of the Supreme Court decisions aforesaid in Sallauddin and K. L. Verma (supra) the protection of the order of anticipatory bail continues till the final disposal of the application for regular bail by the Magistrate and even a few days thereafter as may be fixed so as to enable the petitioners to move the higher Court (for bail) if so desired. Therefore it is not proper to test the order of the interim bail passed by the Magistrate, on the anvil of Section 437, Cr. P. C. in such a situation. There is no doubt that the Magistrate while finally disposing of the application for regular bail will have to exercise his power and jurisdiction regarding bail strictly within the parameters of Section 437, Cr. P. C. , but in granting interim bail during the pendency of the application for regular bail the Magistrate is not exercising his power under Section 437, Cr. P. C. and is only giving effect to the order of anticipatory bail granted by the superior Court. The learned Magistrate was therefore not only within his power to grant interim bail to the petitioners during the pendency of the application for regular bail which the petitioners filed before him after surrendering within limit, but it was rather even obligatory for him to grant interim bail at that stage to the petitioners to give effect to the order of anticipatory bail although at the time of final disposal of the application for regular bail he would be entitled to make an independent assessment of the materials on record and to dispose of the application for regular bail by exercising his judicial discretion within the contours of Section 437, Cr. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge by his impugned order cancelled the interim bail granted by the learned Magistrate by testing the same on the anvil of the power available to a Magistrate under Section 437, Cr. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge by his impugned order cancelled the interim bail granted by the learned Magistrate by testing the same on the anvil of the power available to a Magistrate under Section 437, Cr. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge, we must say, was not justified in doing that when the order of anticipatory bail which was earlier granted was yet in operation in view of the Supreme Court decision in K. L. Verma (supra ). It was not an application before the learned Sessions Judge for cancelling the anticipatory bail earlier granted by him as a matter of fact he also did not pass any order cancelling the anticipatory bail. He rather considered the question whether the learned Magistrate was justified in granting interim bail under Section 437, Cr. P. C. Since at that stage the learned Magistrate in passing the order of interim bail was not at all exercising his power under Section 437, Cr. P. C. As discussed above and was rather only giving effect to the order of anticipatory bail pending the disposal of the application for regular bail filed before him the order of the learned Sessions Judge cancelling the interim bail granted by the learned Magistrate was for all practical purposes and in effect a preemptive order disposing of the application for regular bail pending before the learned Magistrate. And at any rate K. L. Verma decision of the Supreme Court (supra) has made it clear that even after refusal of bail after grant of anticipatory bail the accused however has to be allowed to continue under the protection of the order of anticipatory bail for a few days so that he may move the higher Court (provided of course he surrendered and applied for regular bail within the operative period of anticipatory bail ). ( 7 ) SINCE the order of the learned Sessions Judge virtually amounts to a preemptive disposal of the application for regular bail filed before the learned Magistrate and at any rate such order amounts to refusal of bail while the petitioners were under the protection of the order of anticipatory bail and since in view of the Supreme Court decision in K. L. Verma (supra) the aggrieved party may approach the higher Court after facing an order of refusal of bail while he was enjoying the continuing protection of an order of anticipatory bail the present application filed before the high Court is to be construed as an application for bail within the scope of the Supreme Court decisions in Sallauddin and K. L. Verma (supra) after refusal of regular bail. We will therefore treat the present application accordingly not as a revisional application but as an application for bail filed by the petitioners on suffering an order of refusal of bail in the Court below while under the protection of an order of anticipatory bail. ( 8 ) THE case diary also has been produced before us. As we have seen, originally the case was started at the P. S. under Section 147/148/326/307/ 379. I. P. C. Section 302 was subsequently added on the prayer of the 1. 0. after the victim expired in the hospital. It would also appear that neither the Sessions Judge while granting anticipatory bail nor the Public Prosecutor appearing before him noticed that Section 302, 1. P. C. had been added. The petitioners also did not mention in their application that Section 302. I. P. C. was subsequently added which indeed they should have done. But it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners before us that at that time the petitioners were also not aware that subsequently Section 302. I. P. C. had been added and there was no mala fide intention in the matter on the part of the petitioners. The plea seems to be plausible particularly when even the learned Sessions Judge and the learned P. P. also at that stage did notice inspite of perusal of the C. D. that Section 302, I. P. C. had been subsequently added. The plea seems to be plausible particularly when even the learned Sessions Judge and the learned P. P. also at that stage did notice inspite of perusal of the C. D. that Section 302, I. P. C. had been subsequently added. But any mistake or omission on the part of the Court in the matter of taking notice of any material fact by itself indeed cannot grant any immunity to the accused at a subsequent stage so as to thwart the course of justice. In the present case however Section 326 and Section 307. I. P. C. were already there. Both those sections are also serious sections. That the victim sustained grievous injury was already before the learned Sessions Judge when he considered that prayer for anticipatory bail in a case under Section 326/307. I. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge however. The learned Sessions Judge however found that the main accused who struck on the head of the injured by spade was Madai Mahato (not a petitioner before him or here before us) and it was also submitted before him that there was no specific overt act against others except Madai Mahato. In the circumstances, the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions Judge. The victim succumbed to the injury sustained by him, as it appears, as a result of the assault by spade on his head by Madai Mahato. The Postmortem report which is in the C. D. also does not indicate any other injury. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the petitioners may be granted bail now. Accordingly, we direct the petitioners to surrender before the SDJM. Jhargram immediately and at any rate within a week from this date and on such surrender within the aforesaid period the learned SDJM. Jhargram will release them on bail of Rs. 3. 000/ - each with two surities of life amount each one of whom shall be a local surity to satisfaction of the Learned SDJM. With a view to allaying any apprehension of interference on the part of the petitioners it is further directed that while on bail the petitioners shall stay outside the jurisdiction of the Jhargram P. S. and shall notify their address to the Investigating Officer before being released on bail and attend the concerned P. S. twice a week within the jurisdiction of which they will stay. They shall not enter the jurisdiction of Jhargram P. S. except for the purpose of attending the Court in connection with this case. The present application stands disposed of accordingly. Application allowed.