This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 30.11.87 passed in OS No .46/83/21 -A/87 by the learned Additional District Judge, Manipur. 2. The plaintiff brought a suit for ejectment on .declaration of title and with a prayer for mesne profit. The plaintiff No. 1 is the son of plaintiff No.2 and they are living together. Plaintiff No.2 purchased from one Laishram Chaoba Singh a paddy field under Patta No.51/1376 corresponding to new Patta No.51/ 949. The area of the land is 2.46 acres. The purchase was made by a registered sale deed on 5.12.53 and the land is described in the Schedule of the plaint. It is claimed that the plaintiff was in possession of the land purchased by them. It is stated that by way of family arrangement the land of father was distributed amongst the sons and the land came to the share of the plaintiff No.l. The defendant dispossessed the plaintiff from the land and as such this suit. A written statement was filed wherein the defendant denied all the allegations made in the plaint including the purchase by the plaintiff. It was further stated in paragraph 3 of the written statement that the vendor of the plaintiff had no right, title and interest over the suit land at any point of time and as such by the purchase the plaintiff did not acquire any right, title and interest to the land. It was further claimed by the defendant that he was all along in possession of the land since 1966 getting settlement of the same from the authority. Another written statement was filed subsequently, but I am not so much concerned with issue No. 1 and Issue No.3 only. Issue No. l is with regard to the purchase of the suit land from Laishram Chaoba Singh by registered sale deed 5.12.53. Issue No.3 is whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land. 3. On behalf of the plaintiff the following witnesses are examined : (PW 1) Laisangbam Ibomcha Singh-He is the plaintiff No.2 in the suit. This PW 1 was recalled subsequently. PW 2, Laiphrakpam Shamu Singh. PW 3, Kiyam Sulo Singh. Following defence witnesses were examined: DW 1, Konsam Babulan, (DW 2) Konsam Madhob Singh, (DW 3) Ngangbm Mangoljao Singh. Certain documents were also exhibited. This PW 1 was recalled subsequently. PW 2, Laiphrakpam Shamu Singh. PW 3, Kiyam Sulo Singh. Following defence witnesses were examined: DW 1, Konsam Babulan, (DW 2) Konsam Madhob Singh, (DW 3) Ngangbm Mangoljao Singh. Certain documents were also exhibited. The learned Judge took up issue Nos 1, 3, 4 and 6 for decision together. The sale deed is Ext A5. The learned Judge in paragraph 5 and 6 of his judgment held that the sale deed was not proved and in arriving at this decision, the learned Judge placed reliance on the following cases : (1) AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15 (Bhutkani Nath & others vs. Mt Kamaleswari Nath & another); (2) AIR 1957 SC 857 ; Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. State of Bombay); (3) AIR 1968 Bombay 112 (Sir Mohammed Yusuf & another vs. D & another). 4. AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland (supra) is a Division Bench judgment and in paragraph 6 of the judgment the Court pointed out the following : “... It is, however, well settled that when execution of a document is being challenged the certificate of registration alone will not be sufficient proof of the due execution of the document. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. It is true that a sale deed is not required by law to be attested. Even then, proof of execution of a sale deed when it is denied will have to be furnished as in the case of any other document under section 67 of the Evidence Act.... Execution of a document is not mere signing of it. It is a solemn act of the execution who must own up the recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that he put his signature in a document after knowing fully its contents....” This decision is squarely binding on me. But in the present case the facts are absolutely different as will be highlighted at later point of time. 5. AIR 1957 Supreme Court (supra) is a criminal appeal and there the law laid down with regard to the question of proof is as follows: “The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, of the signature, by one of the modes provided c in sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the documents. This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or a telegram, would be d in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship....” 6. AIR 1968 Bombay 112 (supra) is a case with regard to entries in diary in solicitor's office. The law is laid down in paragraph 42 of the judgment as follows: “42. The reason on which the decision of Bhagawati is based is not far to seek. The evidence of the contents contained in the document is hearsay evidence unless the writer thereof is examined before the Court. We, therefore, hold that the attempt to prove the contents of the document by proving the signature or the hand-writing of the author thereof is to set at naught the well recognised rule that hearsay evidence can not be admitted. This question has been discussed by Halsbury at paragraph 533 at P 294 (Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd Edition Vol 15) under the heading 'Hearsay' says Halsbury : .... Statements in document may also be hearsay. This question has been discussed by Halsbury at paragraph 533 at P 294 (Halsbury's Law of England, 3rd Edition Vol 15) under the heading 'Hearsay' says Halsbury : .... Statements in document may also be hearsay. So, if A had taken counsels opinion before acting, the contents of the opinion would be admissible for the same purpose, but not to prove the truth of any statement of fact therein.” In paragraph 534 Halsbury has discussed the reasons for rejection of hearsay evidence and says: “The reasons advanced for the rejection of hearsay are numerous, among them being the irresponsibility of the original declarant, the depreciation of truth in the process of repetition, the opportunities for fraud which its admission would offer and the waste of time involved in listening to idle rumour. The two principal objections, however, appears to be the lack of an oath administered to the originator of the statement, and the absence of opportunity to cross examined him.” The Advocate General draw our attention to a decision House of Lords in Maria Sturla vs. Filippo Freccia (1879) 5 AC 623. In the case the report of a committee appointed by a public department in a foreign State was admitted in evidence as a public document. It was however, held that it was not admissible as evidence of all the facts stated therein. In that case the facts were : The document in question, a report of certain persons called the Ginunta di Mariana at Genoa, was sought to be put in evidence for the purpose of proving that person who was formerly consul for the Genoese Republic in London, and the succession to whose daughter, Mrs. Brown, was in question, was a native of Quarto near Genos and at the time that report was made, aged about forty five years. The document was tendered for that purpose and for that purpose only.” In this case the document which was exhibited was introduced in evidence without objection and the learned Judge did not take into consideration section 90 of the Evidence Act. The other finding of the learned Judge is that the vendor of the plaintiff had no saleable interest in the land and accordingly he dismissed the suit. Hence, this appeal. 7. The other finding of the learned Judge is that the vendor of the plaintiff had no saleable interest in the land and accordingly he dismissed the suit. Hence, this appeal. 7. The points for determination in this appeal are as follows: (1) Whether Ext A5 was proved as required by law : (2) Whether the vendor of the plaintiff had saleable interest to the land. If these two points are determined in favour of the plaintiff then this appeal is to be allowed and the suit will have to be decreed inasmuch as it was found by the trial Court that the suit was not barred by limitation and rightly so as the suit is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and the burden will be on the defendant. 8. I have heard Sri Nakulsana Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Sri Komol Singh, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Sri Nakulsana Singh draws my attention to section 90 of the Evidence Act. Section 90 of the Evidence Act without illustration is quoted below : “90. Presumption as! to documents thirty years old-Where any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the hand writing of any particular person, is in not person's hand writing, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation: Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in place in which, and under the care of the persons with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to bad a legitimate origin, or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. 10. As a general rule if a document is produced before a Court its execution must be proved by a witness and if the document is required by law to be attested, its attestation must also be proved by some witness and when this formality has been observed then and there alone the document will form part of the record and can be looked into. If the documents produced in Court are not proved they cannot be relied upon. But circumstances may arise when the documents are produced before the Court long after they have been executed and the time elapsed between execution and the production of documents in the Court may a be so long that all the persons in whose presence the document was executed might have died. If the method of proof mentioned above is strictly to be followed in such cases, a great hardship would be caused and a number of genuine documents will remain unproved. Section 90 of the Evidence Act is a provision for this kind of emergency. The section is founded on necessity and convenience. Section 90 of the Evidence Act gives the power to the Court to draw presumption b about the document which is 30 years old. The conditions for presumption are as follows: (i) It must have been in existence for 30 years or more. (ii) It must be produced in Court from proper custody. (iii) The document must be in appearance free from suspicion. (iv) Which purports to be in the hand writing of person and should not be anonymous. The period of 30 years is to be reckoned, not from the date on which the deed is filed in Court but on the date on which it has been tendered in evidence, its genuineness or otherwise becomes the subject of proof. Generally, there is no presumption about the recitals in such a document but in such circumstances a recital of consideration, legal necessity etc may be presumed under section 90. No doubt, presumption of the section 90 is rebuttable but in such a case burden will be on the defendant. That being the position of law and the document having been introduced in evidence without objection the trial Court was wrong in holding that Ext A5 was not proved. I hold that Ext A5 the sale deed was properly proved and I set aside the finding of the trial Court on this point. 11. The next point for determination is regarding whether vendor of the plaintiff had saleable interest. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant draws may attention to Ext A3. I hold that Ext A5 the sale deed was properly proved and I set aside the finding of the trial Court on this point. 11. The next point for determination is regarding whether vendor of the plaintiff had saleable interest. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant draws may attention to Ext A3. From that exhibit it is seen that this land originally stood in the name of two persons, namely, Raothang Kuki and Laicham Chaoba and the areas of land was as mentioned in exhibit is 7 bigha 3/katha and 13 lecha equivalent to 1.459 acres. So, it is not understood how the vendor of the plaintiff could transfer an area of land measuring 2.64 acres, at best he can transfer only half of that land, even if a presumption is made that both these persons had equal share to the land. Accordingly, by the sale deed the plaintiff will acquire right to half of this land i.e. 3 bigha 4 katha 16 lecha equivalent to .729 acres. The plaintiff will have the right to this area of land alone and 8 accordingly this appeal is partly allowed holding that the plaintiff will have the right, title and interest to an area measuring .729 acres (3 bigha 4 katha 16 lecha). The plaintiff only will be entitled to joint possession with regard to the land and not for recovery of possession. 12. The appeal is partly allowed by modifying the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Draw up the decree accordingly. No costs.