JUDGMENT D.P. Kundu, J. 1. All these matters have been heard together by a Bench of five Judges of this High Court because the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this High Court by his order dated 29.10.87 under Chapter XXI Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules read with Rule 48 of the Rules under Article 226 of the Constitution of India determined that the aforesaid two appeals being APO 601 of 1987 and APO 604 of 1987 would be heard by a Bench of five Judges of this Court for, inter alia, following reasons : "These two appeals against the order of the learned Single Judge in Matter No. 1033 of 1984, involve substantial questions of law affecting the administration in the Appellate Side and the Original Side of this Court. Hierarchy, status, pay and allowances admissible to certain categories of employees serving in the Appellate Side and the Original Side of this Court arise for decision." These two appeals being APO 601 of 1987 and APO 604 of 1987 are arising out of a judgment and order dated 14.8.1987 passed by Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J. (as he then was) in Matter No. 1033 of 1984. 2. Subsequently in the year 1987, after the aforesaid judgment and order dated 14.8.1987 was delivered by Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., some Interpretor Officers (Court) on the Original Side of this High Court initiated another writ proceeding being Matter No. 5497 of 1987. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with an order dated 10th March, 1988 passed by Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J., in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 the petitioners in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 preferred an appeal being Appeal No. 187 of 1988. The said appeal and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 had been assigned to this Full Bench for hearing with the aforesaid two appeals because the subject matter involved in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 are similar to those in Matter No. 1033 of 1984. 3. Unfortunately the Bench originally constituted by the Chief Justice by his order dated 19.10.1987 could not complete the hearing of the appeals, therefore, time to time coram of the Bench was altered or modified and lastly the present Bench of five Judges of this Court could complete the hearing of the appeals. 4. 3. Unfortunately the Bench originally constituted by the Chief Justice by his order dated 19.10.1987 could not complete the hearing of the appeals, therefore, time to time coram of the Bench was altered or modified and lastly the present Bench of five Judges of this Court could complete the hearing of the appeals. 4. Two appeals being APO 601/87 and APO 604/87 were preferred by two different group of appellants against the judgment and order passed by the ld. Single Judge Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J. (as he then was) in Matter No. 1033 of 1984. Therefore, before looking at the judgment and order passed by Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., which is subject matter of these appeals, it is necessary to look at the case sought to be made out by the writ petitioners in their writ petitions. 5. In matter No. 1033 of 1984 from paragraph 32 of the writ application it is apparent that the writ petitioners called in question or challenged the legality of (i) State Government Memo. No. 24382-J/J. 1E-56/81 (Pt. II) dated September 19, 1983, (ii) Full Court Resolution/Recommendation dated August 22, 1973 and (iii) Court's letter No. 18235-J, dated December 22, 1981. Prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the writ petition also show that the writ petitioners sought relief in respect of and challenged the legality of (i) State Government Memo. No. 24382-J/J. 1E-56/81 (Pt. II) dated September 19, 1983, (ii) Full Court Resolution/Recommendation dated August 22, 1973 and (iii) Court's letter No. 18235-J, dated December 22, 1981. 6. In Matter No. 5497 of 1987 from paragraph 68 and prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the writ application it is apparent that the writ petitioners called in question or challenged the legality of (i) Full Court Resolution dated 22nd August, 1973, (ii) Recommendation dated 22nd December, 1981 and (iii) Order dated 19th September, 1983. Thus it appears that the subject matter of challenge in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 are same. 7. In Matter No. 1033 of 1984 the writ petitioners stated that they were previously designated as Senior Shorthand Writer and Shorthand Writers respectively in the Original Side of Calcutta High Court and those posts were given gazetted status in the year 1967. Thereafter in or about 1973 the said posts were redesignated as Senior Recording Officer (Court) and Recording Officers (Court) respectively. Thereafter in or about 1973 the said posts were redesignated as Senior Recording Officer (Court) and Recording Officers (Court) respectively. The petitioners stated that Bench Clerks in the Appellate Side at Calcutta High Court were the counter-part of the writ petitioners. These Bench Clerks were subsequently designated as Court Officers and thereafter the Court Officers were redesignated as Assistant Registrars (Court) and have also been enjoying gazetted status since 1967. It is stated that the present nomenclature of Assistant Registrars (Court) was given to the officers on the Appellate Side by virtue of an order dated July 27, 1972 passed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court without any change in their emoluments, scope of duties and status. The said order dated 27th July, 1972 passed by the then Chief Justice of Calcutta High' Court reads as follows : "I direct that the Court Officers on the Appellate Side of the High Court shall henceforth be designated as Assistant Registrar (Court). Their pay and emoluments, duties and status, will, however, remain the same for the present. Substitute the words 'Assistant Registrar (Court)' for the words 'Court Officers' wherever they appear in the High Court Service Rules." 8. The petitioners stated that under the Rules and/or Terms of employment on the Appellate Side of the Calcutta High Court there is a three-tier system in the Stengographers' service with three different scales of pay and three distinct designations. First, Stenographers (commonly called P.A. to Hon'ble Judges) are recruited in the basic grade on the basis of a shorthand test at the rate 120 words per minute. Their minimum educational qualification for such recruitment was Intermediate [now Higher Secondary (10+2)]. On the basis of seniority these stenographers are promoted to the post of Assistant Court Officer (formerly Assistant Bench Clerk) after passing another test in shorthand at the same speed, viz., 120 words per minute. This is a departmental qualifying test. Thereafter on the basis of seniority these Assistant Court Officers are promoted to the post of Assistant Registrar (Court) (formerly Bench Clerk, then Court Officer) as a matter of course without any examination and only at the time of confirmation Assistant Registrars (Court) are required to pass a departmental qualifying test in shorthand at the speed of 140 words per minute and with the working knowledge of procedural rules and laws. The petitioners stated that on the Original Side of this High Court Recording Officers are recruited by a competitive test in shorthand at a speed at least 160 words per minute in deposition matter and that too after Press Advertisements. The petitioners .stated that unlike any other officers performing the job of stenographer, the Recording Officers transcript becomes the original records of this High Court under the Original Side Rules without the' same having been signed by any authority but only with the initials of the Recording Officers who remain responsible for the correctness thereof. The petitioners referred to Rule 1 of Chapter XIV of Original Side Rules and para 4 of Appendix 'P' thereof. The petitioners stated that the Recording Officers are to take down verbatim evidence of fast English speaking witnesses with different intonations including experts in different fields, viz., engineers, medical specialists, scientists, technologists, accountants, marine, mining and other experts coming not only from different parts of the country but also from abroad with 100% accuracy keeping in view the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act as the same form part of the original records without being authenticated by other superior authority but only with the signature or initials of the Recording Officers. According to the writ petitioners this taking down of evidence is performed by the Recording Officers single-handedly and when asked for either by the Hon'ble Judge or by the Counsel appearing for any other parties the Recording Officer is required to read out the evidence taken 'by him then and there in the open Court to avoid any confusion that might have been created. The petitioners stated that for this job a speed higher than 160 words per minute in shorthand and command in English are necessary. The petitioners stated that under the Original Side Rules after delivering a judgment normally the Hon'ble Judge revises and signs the same after the transcript copy is prepared by the Recording Officer but when the Hon'ble Judge' returns the same unsigned then the same will be filed as official note of the judgment and in case the Hon'ble Judge, after delivering the judgment goes on leave or ceases to be a Judge of the Court, then the transcript copy of the said judgment will be revised by' the Recording Officer taking down the same for being filed as official note of the judgment. (Reference was made to Rules 2 and 3 of Chapter XVI 'of the Original Side Rules Volume I). The petitioners stated that apart from taking down judgments' and evidence the Recording Officers are to prepare the minutes of the orders of the Court which are also not revised and/or signed by the Hon'ble Judge and the same minutes are simply noted in the minute book by the Assistant Registrar (Original Side). The petitioners stated that the work-load of the Recording Officer in the whole of the High Court compared to the Officers similarly placed is the highest because of the arduous nature of work. The petitioners are also required to complete transcription of evidence, how much voluminous they may be, in the very same evening by overstaying in office under the Rules of Original Side. Reference was made to Rule 1A of Chapter XIV of the Original Side Rules. 9. The petitioners' case is that in 1970 the Pay Commission recommended a common scale of pay for Recording Officers on the Original Side and the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side and this High Court was also pleased to recommend the same scale of pay for the Recording Officers (then known as Shorthand Writers) as that of Assistant Registrars (Court) viz. Rs. 475-1,150/- with a special pay of Rs. 100 per month. In support of this statement of the writ petitioners they referred to Annexure 'B' of the writ petition which is a communication dated 11th December, 1971 from the Registrar, High Court, Original Side to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. It is the case of the petitioners that prior to 1961 both the Recording Officers on the Original Side and the Assistant Registrar (Court) on the Appellate Side were enjoying a Pay Scale of Rs.. 250-400/- and. after 1961 revision Rs. 500-7,000/- and from October 24, 1968 by interim revision Rs. 300-900/-. 10. The petitioners stated that on or about August 22, 1973 the Full Court of this High Court appeared to have passed a resolution recommending a higher scale of pay for the Assistant Registrar (Court) on the Appellate Side in preference to that of Registrar (Court) on the Appellate Side in preference to that of Recording Officers (Court) on the Original Side. The petitioners grievance is that the said resolution and/or recommendation of the Full Court was made without any reference or affording any hearing or opportunity to the writ petitioners and/or the Recording Officers. According to the writ petitioners the said recommendation of the Full Court was vitiated, inter alia, by reason of violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners stated that on the basis of the said resolution and/or a recommendation of the Full Court a letter was written by the Registrar, Appellate Side of this High Court bearing No. 8947-GS dated August 31, 1973 recommending higher scale of pay for the Assistant Registrar (Court) in supersession of the earlier recommendation of the High Court which was sent to the State Government by the Registrar, Original Side vide letter No. Estb. 4608 dated December 11, 1971. The petitioners stated that as a result of such communication dated August 31, 1973 Government sanctioned a lower scale of pay for the Recording Officers (Court) viz. Rs. 450-1,050/- with a special pay of Rs. 100/- and a higher scalp of pay for the Assistant Registrars (Court) viz. Rs. 475-1,150/- with a special pay of Rs. 100/- per month ignoring the recommendation of the Pay Scale as also the background of their earlier parity and without considering the job performed by the Recording Officers vis-a-vis the Assistant Registrars (Court). 11. The petitioners further stated and contended that the aforesaid recommendation of the Full Court is not and was not intended to extend beyond the revision of pay scales of 1970 of Recording Officers on the Original Side and the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side of this High Court. The petitioners stated that implementation of the said recommendation of the Full Court even at this stage after the publication of the recommendation of the Second Pay Commission on a consideration of all the materials placed before it would lead to and result in serious anomaly and patent injustice. The petitioners further stated that under the revision of Pay and Allowance Rules, 1981 the pay scales recommended by the Second Pay Commission and proposed by Government had been implemented in this High Court for a number of categories of employees and officers including the Assistant Registrar on the Appellate Side. These Assistant Registrars include Assistant Registrar-III [now designated as Dy. Registrar (Court)] which post is held by the senior-most Assistant Registrar (Court). These Assistant Registrars include Assistant Registrar-III [now designated as Dy. Registrar (Court)] which post is held by the senior-most Assistant Registrar (Court). The petitioners stated that the scale of pay introduced by these Assistant Registrars is the same as that introduced for the Recording Officers on the Original Side under the Revision of Pay and Allowance Rules, 1981 and, therefore, any recommendation by the High Court authorities including that contained in Court's letter No.18235-G dated December 22, 1981 and/or sanction of any scale of pay and/ or special pay higher than those recommended by the Second Pay Commission for the Assistant Registrars (Court) without the same being allowed to the Recording Officers (Court) would amount to discrimination. 12. The writ petitioners in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 stated that petitioner No.1 in the said writ proceeding was a Senior-most Interpreting Officer (Court) and the petitioners No.2 to 19 hold posts of Interpreting Officers (Court) on' the Original Side of this High Court. The petitioners stated that the Senior Interpreting Officer (Court) exercises supervisory and controlling functions in relation to the Interpreting Officers (Court). It has been stated that the petitioner No.1 was known as Chief Interpreter until 1929-30 and thereafter as "Senior Interpretor and Translator" and thereafter as Senior Interpretor till 1973 when the post was redesignated as Senior Interpreting Officers (Court). The petitioners further stated that the petitioners No. 2 to 19 were formerly designated as "Interpretor and Translators" and then as Interpretors and these posts were conferred gazetted status in or about March, 1967. The petitioner stated that thereafter in or about 1973 these posts of interpretors were redesignated as Interpreting Officers (Court). 13. The petitioners stated that the nature of work performed by Interpreting Officers (Court) are of a specialised nature which calls for a high degree of knowledge expertise and experience and also proficiency in a number of Indian and foreign languages and for these reasons such job is not comparable to the nature of job performed by any other officers of this High Court. The petitioners stated that the Interpreting Officers (Court) have to perform the work of interpreting evidence in Court unaided and single handedly. He has to administer oath to witnesses and take undertakings from litigants. The petitioners stated that the Interpreting Officers (Court) have to perform the work of interpreting evidence in Court unaided and single handedly. He has to administer oath to witnesses and take undertakings from litigants. The petitioners' case is that the Interpreting Officers (Court) has also to interpret evidences given before the Registrar himself and other officers of the Court and for this purpose the Interpreting Officers are required to have knowledge and proficiency in four languages. 14. The petitioners' case is that to become eligible for recruitment as Interpreting Officers (Court) the minimum academic qualification for a candidate is that he must be a graduate. Recruitments are made after advertisement in common newspapers for the purpose of holding the test for selection of Interpreting Officers (Court) and they must know three Indian languages one of which must be Bengali and also English so that they may be able to translate evidence spoken in these languages in English into those languages and they must be able to translate vernacular documents of those languages into English or vice versa. 15. The petitioners stated that amongst their various functions and duties they have to plead cases and litigants appearing in person, assist the quasi-judicial officers in quasi-judicial enquires, explain pleadings to be filed in the Supreme Court, explain bonds to sureties and certify the translation made by him under signature and date. 16. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants in APO 601/87 and APO 604/87 argued and contended that all the employees of the High Court including the writ petitioners are paid their salaries and allowances in accordance with the pay scales prescribed by the Chief Justice of this High Court by framing rules in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution. The ld. senior Counsel further argued that none of these rules framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution is under challenge either in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 or in Matter No. 5497 of 1987. The ld senior Counsel argued that since the writ petitioners are getting their salaries and allowances strictly in accordance with the Rules framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of Constitution and since there is no allegation of violation of the said rules. The writ petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatsoever. The ld. The writ petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatsoever. The ld. Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court in Karam Pal vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1985 SC 774 , in paragraph 13 of the reported decision laid down-"In the absence of challenge to the rules and regulations, resultant situations flowing from the compliance of the same are not open to attack." In Karam Pal case (supra) the applicants were covered by Central Secretariat Service Rules, 1962 and challenged the select list for the grade of Section Officers for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 and the common seniority list dated August 21, 1980. The applicants in Karam Pal case (supra) further prayed that the select list and seniority list be republished on the basis of length of continuous service in the grade of Assistants and promotion to the grade of Section Officers be granted from the dates when Assistants junior to them were promoted as Section Officers. In Karam Pal case (supra) the applicants however chose not to challenge the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution which came into force from October 1, 1962 but they challenged the resultant situations flowing from the compliance of the said rules framed under proviso to under Article 309 of the Constitution. In that context of the matter it was held by Supreme Court- "In the absence of challenge to the Rules and Regulations, resultant situation flowing from the compliance of the same are not open to attack." The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants argued that the subject matters of challenge in both the writ petitions .are nothing but the resultant situations flowing from the compliance of the rules framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution. The ld. senior Counsel for. the appellants further argued that subject matters of challenge in both the writ applications were/are not rules framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the communications and the decision of the Full Court which are subject matters of the challenge did not and do not guide or govern the service condition including the salaries and allowances of the writ petitioners. The ld. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants further argued that the petitioners failed to make out even a prima facie case in the writ petitions. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment and order of Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 was not a judgment at all. According to ld. Counsel for the appellants it is an essay written by the ld. Judge. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants went on arguing that in a judgment a Court is bound to consider the arguments made on behalf of both the parties, cases made out by both the parties in their pleadings and weigh them and then a judgment is to be delivered. The ld. Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that, the judgment and order passed by Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., in Matter No,1033 of 1984 does not contain the arguments made on behalf of the appellants who were respondents in the Trial Court. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants further argued that the Trial Court in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 in its judgment and order passed certain comments or remarks which ought to have been avoided because those are humiliating and related to some of the then sitting Judges of this High Court. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants also argued that Recording Officers of the Original Side though claiming to be equal with Assistant Registrars of Appellate' Side which is carrying the same pay scale of that of Assistant Registrars, Original Side yet the Recording Officers are not claiming to be equal to the Assistant Registrars in Original Side because Recording Officer is a feeder post of Assistant Registrar in Original Side and, therefore, the claim of the Recording Officer is not at all maintainable. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants further argued that it is not the business of the Court to fix the pay scales, he argued that so long as it is not a case of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution, abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work as envisaged by Article 39(d) of the Constitution has no manner of application. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants argued that power conferred by Article 229 (2) of the Constitution is a legislative power and the rules framed under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution have statutory and binding force. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants argued that power conferred by Article 229 (2) of the Constitution is a legislative power and the rules framed under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution have statutory and binding force. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants further argued that while exercising legislative power principles of natural justice has no manner of application. 16. The ld. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in matter No.1033 of 1984 and the ld. senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in Matter No.5497 of 1987 did not at all controvert the submissions made by the ld. Counsel for the appellants. I, for several times, wanted to know from the ld. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners that whether they have challenged any rule framed by the Chief Justice of this High Court in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution. The ld Counsels for the writ .petitioners could not give any answer and remained silent on this question. In course of hearing of the matter I also wanted to know categorically from the ld. Counsels appearing for the writ petitioners that whether the writ petitioners alleged that in respect of their salaries and allowances there had been or has been any breach of rules framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. The ld. Counsels appearing for the writ petitioners could not give any answer to this question also and remained silent so far this question is concerned. The ld. Counsel for the writ petitioners repeatedly drew the attention of the Court to (i) communication No. 24382-J/J1E-56/81 (Pt. Il) dated 19th September, 1983 issued by Jt. Secretary, Government of West Bengal addressed to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Calcutta, (ii) Decision of Full Court contained in Memo No. 8947-GS dated 31.8.1973 and containing the decision of Full Court and (iii) Issue No. 18235-G dated 22.12.81 issued by Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Calcutta addressed to Shri R. Banerjee, Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department. The ld. Counsel for the writ petitioners argued that decisions contained in the aforesaid documents and the decision of the Full Court referred to hereinabove had been taken in violation of principles of natural justice because the writ petitioners were not given any opportunity to say their case. 17. The ld. Counsel for the writ petitioners argued that decisions contained in the aforesaid documents and the decision of the Full Court referred to hereinabove had been taken in violation of principles of natural justice because the writ petitioners were not given any opportunity to say their case. 17. In course of argument the following rules framed by the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution were brought to the notice of the Court. (i) Calcutta High Court Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1971, (ii) Calcutta High Court Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1971 (Original Side), (iii) Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side) Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1981 which partially modified the Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side) Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1971. The private respondents working in the Appellate Side of this High Court were paid their salaries and allowances in compliance of these Rules of 1981 with effect from 1.4.1981, (iv) Calcutta High Court Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1981 (Original Side) which partially modified the Calcutta High Court Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1971 (Original Side). The writ petitioners were paid their salaries and allowances in compliance of these Rules of 1981 with effect from 1.4.1981, (v) Calcutta High Court (Appellate Side and Original Side) Services (Revision of Pay and Allowances) Rules, 1990, which deemed to have come into force on 1.1.1986 and made applicable to persons who were in service on 31.12.1985 as well as to those entering the service thereafter. It is important to mention here that the pay and allowances of the writ petitioners in both Matter No.1033 of 1984 and Matter No.5497 of 1987 were paid in accordance and in compliance with the abovementioned Rules and no allegation has been made to the effect that in the matter of payment of salaries and allowances to the writ petitioners the above mentioned Rules were breached or violated. The validity of the abovementioned Rules has not been challenged by the writ petitioners. Those above mentioned Rules were framed in exercise of legislative power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution and had statutory and binding force. The validity of the abovementioned Rules has not been challenged by the writ petitioners. Those above mentioned Rules were framed in exercise of legislative power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution and had statutory and binding force. In my opinion, in view of Supreme Court decision in Karam Pal case (supra), in absence of challenge to the above mentioned Rules the resultant situations flowing from compliance of the said Rules were/are not open to attack. 18. For proper appreciation of the arguments made by the ld. Counsel for both the parties and for proper appreciation of the subject matters involved in these cases it is necessary to consider Article 229 of Constitution of India. Article 229 of the Constitution reads as follows : "229. (1) Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct : Provided that the Governor of the State........may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service' Commission. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service' of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose : Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State. (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including all salaries, allowances and pension payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other money taken by the Court shall form part of that fund." 19. (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including all salaries, allowances and pension payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court, shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other money taken by the Court shall form part of that fund." 19. In order to appreciate and understand the status, powers, and authority of the Chief Justice as also his constitutional position, it is necessary to look back and see the relevant provisions of law which led to framing of Article 229 of the Constitution of India. The British Government established the Supreme Court of Calcutta by a Charter issued in 1774. Clause 10 of the Charter, inter alia, reads-"..... authorised and empowered from time to time, as occasion may required, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice." The Supreme Court of Calcutta was replaced by High Court established under the High Courts' Act, 1861. Section 9 of the Act provided- "Each of the High Courts to be established under the Act shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts abolished under the Act." Letters Patent was granted to the Calcutta High Court in 1865. Clauses 4 and 8 of the Letters Patent, as amended in 1919, provided- "4. We do hereby appoint and ordain, that every clerk and ministerial officer of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal appointed by virtue of the said Letters Patent of the Fourteenth of May, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, shall continue to hold and enjoy his office and employment with the salary there into annexed, until he be removed from such office and employment; and he shall be subject to the like power of removal, regulations, and provisions as if he were appointed by virtue of these Letters Patent. 8. 8. We do hereby authorise and empower the Chief Justice of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from time to time, as occasion may require, and subject to any rules and restrictions which may be prescribed by the Governor General-in Council, to appoint so many and such clerks and other ministerial officers as shall be found necessary for the administration of justice, and due execution of all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the High Court by these our Letters Patent and it is our further will and pleasure and we do hereby, for us, our heirs and successors give, grant direct and appoint, that all and every of the officers and clerks to be appointed as aforesaid shall have and receive' respectively such reasonable salaries as the Chief Justice shall, from time to time appoint for each office and place respectively, and as the Governor General-in-Council shall approve of........" These clauses, thus, gave power of appointment and removal of the staff to the Chief Justice. The power was to be exercised, subject to such rules and restrictions as may be made by the Governor General-in-Council. When Government of India Act, 1915 was enacted the above position was continued by virtue of section 106 of the Act which, inter alia, provided"106. (1) The several High Courts....... have ....... all such powers and authority over or in relation to the administration of justice, including the power to appoint clerks and other ministerial officers of the Court, as are vested in them by Letters Patent......" This position was not altered even by the Government of India Act, 1935. It may be mentioned that section 241 of Act of 1935 specified the various authorities who could make appointments of persons holding civil posts under the Crown in India, and frame rules relating to their conditions of service. Sections 242 (4) of the Government of India Act, 1935 specifically provided-"242 (4). It may be mentioned that section 241 of Act of 1935 specified the various authorities who could make appointments of persons holding civil posts under the Crown in India, and frame rules relating to their conditions of service. Sections 242 (4) of the Government of India Act, 1935 specifically provided-"242 (4). In its application to appointments to, and to persons serving on, the staff attached to the federal Court or the staff attached to a High Court, the' last preceding section shall have effect as if, in the case of the Federal Court, For any reference to the Governor General in paragraph (a) of subsection (1), in paragraph (a) of sub-section (2) and in sub-section (5) there were substituted a reference to the Chief Justice of India and as if, in the case of a High Court, for any reference to the Governor in paragraph (b) of sub-section (1), in paragraph (a) of sub-section (2) and in sub-section (5) there were substituted a reference to the Chief Justice of the Court: Provided that-(a) the Governor may in his discretion require that in such cases as he may in his discretion direct no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the provincial Public Service Commission; (b) rules made under the said sub-section (2) by a Chief Justice shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions require the approval of the Governor General or, as the case may be, the Governor," Thus the Chief Justice continued to be the highest authority so far as the High Court staff was concerned. When the Constitution came into existence, the powers and status of the Chief Justice, as available under both the Government of India Acts, 1915 and 1935 were maintained. Chapter V of the Constitution relates to the "the High Courts in the States." Under the constitutional scheme, there has to be a High Court for each State. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as may be appointed by the President from time to time. Chapter V of the Constitution relates to the "the High Courts in the States." Under the constitutional scheme, there has to be a High Court for each State. Article 216 provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as may be appointed by the President from time to time. Article 223 provides that when the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or any Chief Justice, by reason of absence or otherwise, is unable to perform the duties of his office, such duty shall be performed by such one or other Judges of the Court as the President may appoint. Article 229 of the Constitution of India makes the Chief Justice of the High Court the supreme authority in the matter of appointments of the High Court officers and servants. This article also confers rule making power on the Chief Justice for regulating the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court subject to the condition that if the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to have the approval of the Governor of the State. If the legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice would operate subject to the conditions made in that' law. Under Article 229, the power of appointment can also be exercised by such other Judge or officer of the Court as may be authorised in that behalf by the Chief Justice. So also the rule making power can be exercised by some other Judge or officer of the Court provided he is authorised in that behalf by the Chief Justice. Under the constitutional scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play either in the administrative side or in the legislative side unless authorised by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The power available to the Chief Justice of High Court under Article 229 is akin to the power of the Chief Justice of India under Article 146 of the Constitution. The power available to the Chief Justice of High Court under Article 229 is akin to the power of the Chief Justice of India under Article 146 of the Constitution. Just as the Chief Justice of India is the supreme authority in the matter of Supreme Court establishment including its office staff and officers, so also the Chief Justice of the High Court is the sole authority in these matters and no other Judge or officer can legally usurp those administrative functions or powers. [See High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, (1998) 3 SCC 72 ]. 20. In State of Rajasthan vs. Prakash Chand & Ors., reported at (1998) 1 SCC 1, a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court, in paragraph 59 of the reported decision mentioned "broad Conclusions" which emerged from the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs of the reported decision but their Lordship cautioned that those "broad Conclusions" should not be treated' as summary of the judgment and the conclusions should be read with the context of the judgment. Paragraph 59 of the reported decision laid down some of the administrative powers of the Chief Justice of a High Court. Only the relevant administrative powers of the Chief Justice of High Court as mentioned in paragraph 59 of the reported decision are quoted herein below : "(1) That the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone. On the judicial side, however, he is only the first amongst the equals. (2) That the Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches so constituted. (3) That the puisne Judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions. (4) That till any determination made by the Chief Justice lasts, no Judge who is to sit singly can sit in a Division Bench and no Division Bench can be split up by the Judges constituting the bench themselves and one of both the Judges constituting such bench sit singly and take up any other kind of judicial business not otherwise assigned to them' by or under the directions of the Chief Justice. (5) That the Chief Justice can take cognizance of an application laid before him under Rule 55 (supra) and refer a case to the larger bench for its disposal and he can exercise this jurisdiction even in relation to a part heard case. (6) That the puisne Judges cannot 'pick and choose' any case pending in the High Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief Justice. (7) That no Judge or Judges can give directions to the Registry for listing any case before him or them which runs counter to the directions given by the Chief Justice. (8) ........................................................... (9) ........................................................... (10) .......................................................... (11) ............ ............................................... (12) ......................... .................................. (13) .......................................................... (14) ...........................................................” 21. Under the Constitution of India Article 229 (2) is the only provision which deals with conditions of service of officers and servants of High Court including their salaries, allowances, leave or pensions. There is no other provision either in the Constitution or elsewhere in respect of this subject and therefore, salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of the officers and servants of a High Court can only be determined by the Chief Justice of the High Court, subject to the three restrictions mentioned hereinafter by making rule in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India. No other authority or person can frame such rule or prescribe salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of the officers and servants of a High Court except authorised by the Chief Justice. In High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal (supra) a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 36 of the reported decision laid down-"The Constitution, therefore, treats them as two separate entities inasmuch as 'control over subordinate Courts' vests in the High Court, but High Court administration vests in the Chief Justice". Again in paragraph 23 of the reported decision it was held-"Just as the Chief Justice of India is the supreme authority in the matter of Supreme' Court Establishment including its office staff and officers, so also the Chief Justice of the High Court is the sole authority in these matters and no other Judge or officer can legally usurp those administrative functions or power." 22. The power of the Chief Justice to make rules regulating the conditions including the scale of salary of the officers and servants of the High Court also include the power to revise the scale of pay. (See- High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal (supra), para 25). When pay scales are prescribed by the Chief Justice by making rule in exercise of power under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India then any revision, amendment or alteration of such pay scale can only and should also be made by the Chief Justice of the High Court by making a rule under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. 23. The rule making power of the Chief Justice of a High Court under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution of India is subject to three restrictions. The Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan vs. Ramesh Chand Paliwal (supra) in paragraph 19 of the reported decision stated as' follows : "The rule-making power of the Chief Justice is subject to three restrictions : (i) If the rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they have to be approved by the Governor of the State. (ii) If the legislature of the State has made any law, the rules made by the Chief Justice will operate subject to that law. (iii) If the Governor of the State has, by rule, provided that no person, not already attached to the Court, shall be appointed to any office connected with the court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. The Chief Justice while making appointment on such post shall first consult the State Public Service Commission." 24. Power conferred upon the Chief Justice of High Court under Article 229 (2) of the Constitution is a legislative power which is akin to the power of Chief Justice of India under Article 146 (2) and can be compared with that of the Governor of a State conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Article 309 reads as follows : "309. Article 309 reads as follows : "309. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State : Provided that if shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of such Act." 25. Proviso to Article 309 clearly lays down that the Governor of a State or such person as the Governor may direct are competent, in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under Article 309, any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of such Act. Similarly clause 2 of Article 229 lays down that the Chief Justice of a High Court or some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice are competent to make rules for the purpose of the conditions of service of officers and servants of that High Court and any rules so made shall be subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State provided that the rules made under clause 2 of Article 229 shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State. This proviso to clause 2 of Article 229 is needed because executive Government is the custodian of State finance and since salaries, allowances, leave or pensions directly relate to State finance so by this proviso approval of the Governor of State has been made a condition for the purpose of rules relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 334 , M.M. Dutt, J. (as he then was) in paragraph 46 of the reported decision while considering Article 146 (2) of the Constitution, inter alia, observed-"It, is apparent from Article 146 (2) that it is primarily the responsibility of Parliament to lay down the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court, but so long as Parliament does not lay down such conditions of service, the Chief Justice of India or some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India is empowered to make rules for the purpose. The legislative function of Parliament has been delegated to the Chief Justice of India by Article 146 (2). It is not disputed that the function of the Chief Justice of India or the Judge or the officer of the Court authorised by him in framing rules laying down the conditions of service is legislative in nature. The conditions of service that may be prescribed by the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India under Article 146(2) will also necessarily include salaries, allowances, leave and pensions of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court. The proviso to Article 146(2) puts a restriction on the power of the Chief Justice of India by providing that the rules made under Article 146(2) shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the President of India. Prima facie, therefore, the conditions of service of the employees of the Supreme Court that are laid down by the Chief Justice of India by framing the rules will be final and conclusive, except that with regard, to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions the approval of the President of India is required. In other words, if the President of India does not approve of the salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, it will not have any effect. In other words, if the President of India does not approve of the salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, it will not have any effect. The reason for requiring the approval of the President of India regarding salaries, allowances, leave or pensions is the involvement of the financial liability of the Government." Thommen, J., (as he then was) the other ld. Judge of the Bench of two Judges agreed with the judgment of M.M. Dutt, J., It is important here to refer to a Supreme Court decision in State of U.P. & Anr. vs. C.L. Agrawal and Anr., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 1 , wherein a Bench of five Judges of Supreme Court, at paragraph 8 of the reported decision approved and endorsed the observation made in paragraph 7 of the Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra). Paragraph 18 of State of U.P. & Anr. case (supra) reads as follows: "There is a passage in the judgment in the case of Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association that, in the context of the matters before us, deserves to be set out. We endorse what is observed and commend it to the States so that they may deal with proposals made by their Chief Justices with due deference and respect." (SCC P. 221) "57. So far as the Supreme Court and the High Courts are concerned, the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, are empowered to frame rules subject to this that when the rules are framed by the Chief Justice of India or by the Chief Justice of the High Court relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, the approval of the President of India or the Governor, as the case may be, is required. It is apparent that the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court have been placed at a higher level in regard to the framing of rules containing the conditions of service. It is apparent that the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court have been placed at a higher level in regard to the framing of rules containing the conditions of service. It is true that the President of India cannot be compelled to grant approval to the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, but it is equally true that when such rules have been framed by a very high dignitary of the State, it should be looked upon with respect and unless there is very good reason not to grant approval, the approval should always be granted. If the President of India is of the view that the approval cannot be granted, he cannot straightway refuse to grant such approval, but before doing so, there must be exchange of thoughts between the President of India and the Chief Justice of India." 26. I am of the view that, except the proviso to clause 2 of Article 229, the power conferred upon the Governor of a State under proviso to Article 309 can be compared with the power conferred upon the Chief Justice of a High Court under Article 229(2) Chief Justice of a High Court deals with the officer and other employees of the High Court whereas the Governor deals with the employees of the State Government. One of the reasons for empowering the Chief Justice of a High Court under Article 229 of the Constitution is to maintain independence of judiciary which is evident from Article 229(3) which is akin to Article 146 (3) of the Constitution. In Supreme Court Employees; Welfare Association case (Supra) M.M.Dutt, J., in paragraph 47 of the reported decision observed- “One important thing that is to be noticed is that under clause (3) of Article 146 the administrative expenses of the Supreme Court including all salaries, allowances, leave and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India. In view of the provision of clause (3), such administrative expenses shall not be submitted to the vote of Parliament, as provided in Article 113 of the Constitution. In view of the provision of clause (3), such administrative expenses shall not be submitted to the vote of Parliament, as provided in Article 113 of the Constitution. It is apparent that in order to maintain the independence of the judiciary, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise and expedient to make such a provision as contained in clause (3) of Article 146.” 27. In B.S. Yadav vs. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1981 SC 561 a Bench of five Judges of Supreme Court held that the power exercised by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 is a power which the legislature is competent to exercise but has in fact not yet exercised. Supreme Court held that it partakes of the characteristics of the legislative, not executive, power. "It is legislative power". In paragraph 45 of the reported decision in B.S. Yadav case (supra) Supreme Court held-"The power of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 to make appropriate rules is of the same kinds. It is legislative power." Similarly it is apparent from clause 2 of Article 229 that for the matters mentioned in the said clause Legislature of the State can make law and the rules which may be framed by the Chief Justice of a High Court shall be subject to the provisions of any such law made by the Legislature of the State but in absence of any such law made by the Legislature of the State the rules framed by the Chief Justice of High Court in exercise of power under clause 2 of Article 229 shall have full application. On the same analogy as stated by Supreme Court in B.S. Yadav case (supra), the power of the Chief Justice to frame rules under clause 2 of Article 229 is also legislative power. It has already been stated hereinabove that the power available to the Chief Justice of the High Court under Article 229 is akin to the power of the Chief Justice of India under Article 146 of the Constitution. It has already been stated hereinabove that the power available to the Chief Justice of the High Court under Article 229 is akin to the power of the Chief Justice of India under Article 146 of the Constitution. In' Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 334 , a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court while considering Article 146, M.M.Dutt, J., (as he then was) in paragraph 46 of the reported decision observed-"It is not disputed that the function of the Chief Justice of India or the Judge or the officer of the Court authorised by him in framing rules laying down the conditions of service is legislative in nature." In paragraph 48 of the reported decision M.M. Dutt, J., observed-"The rules framed by the Chief Justice of India though it is a piece of subordinate legislation, it is not a full fledged legislative Act requiring assent of the President of India." Thus M.M. Dutt, J., held that the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India in exercise of his power under Article 146 is a piece of subordinate legislation. Thommen, J., (as he then was) while agreeing with the judgment rendered by M.M. Dutt, J, recorded his observations with particular reference to scope and ambit of clause 2 of Article 146 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 98 of the reported decision Thommen, J., observed-"Rules made under Article 146 being subordinate legislation do not partake of the character of Ordinances which are legislation in the true sense for the limited period of their operation.' Therefore, both the ld. Judges in Supreme Court' Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) held that rules framed by Chief Justice of India under Article 146 is a subordinate legislation. On the same analogy the rules framed by the Chief Justice of a High Court under clause 2 of Article 229 is a subordinate legislation. The rules framed by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 is also a subordinate legislation. Power to make subordinate legislation is a legislative power, therefore, I am of the view that the power of the Chief Justice to frame rules under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India is a legislative power. The rules framed by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 is also a subordinate legislation. Power to make subordinate legislation is a legislative power, therefore, I am of the view that the power of the Chief Justice to frame rules under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India is a legislative power. I am of the view that the learned senior Counsel for the appellant was right in contending that Article 229(2) of the Constitution conferred legislative power upon the Chief Justice of a High Court while empowering him to frame rules. 28. In J. Kumar vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1064 , a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court considered the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. Those rules related to fixation of seniority. In paragraph 36 of the reported decision it was observed-"The next point urged by the appellant is that since the impugned rules disturb the previously fixed seniority, it is quasi-judicial in nature and they ought to have been issued only after giving notice to all the affected persons: We have already found that no alteration in the pre-existing policy relating to determination of seniority in the R&D has been brought about by the impugned rules. Quite apart from that the promulgation of a statutory rule governing seniority is not a quasi-judicial function. It is the exercise of a legislative power and in respect thereof the principles of natural justice have no application at all." Thus the law is that in the exercise of legislative power the principles of natural justice have no application at all. 29. In H.S.S.K. Niyami vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 2128 , a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the reported decision, inter alia, held-"In Laxmi Khandsari vs. State of U.P.; (1981)3 SCR 92 : ( AIR 1981 SC 873 ), the facts are that in exercise of power in clause 8 of Sugarcane' (Control) Order, 1966, a notification was issued prohibiting crushing during particular hours of the day. It was contended to be violative of the principles of natural justice. It was held that it is legislative in character and the rules of natural justice would stand completely excluded and no question of hearing arises. In Union of India vs. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987)2 SCC 720 at pp. It was contended to be violative of the principles of natural justice. It was held that it is legislative in character and the rules of natural justice would stand completely excluded and no question of hearing arises. In Union of India vs. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987)2 SCC 720 at pp. 734 and 735: ( AIR 1987 SC 1802 at pp 1805 and 1806), Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court held that legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self evident. In the case of subordinate legislation, it itself provides for a notice and for a hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Company's case ( AIR 1990 SC 1277 ), it was reiterated that fixation of price for sugar is a legislative policy and the principles of natural justice would not apply." Thus it is well settled that while an authority is exercising legislative power he is not required to follow principle of natural justice because principle of natural justice have no manner of application in the exercise of legislative power. Therefore, while Chief Justice of a High Court exercises power under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution, such power being legislative power, principles of natural justice have no manner of application. The rule framed by the Chief Justice of a High Court under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India being a subordinate legislation may be struck down only on such grounds which may invalidate a legislative measure. In my opinion the learned senior Counsel for the appellant rightly contended that the Chief Justice of a High Court while exercising legislative power under Article 229 (2) is not required to follow principles of natural justice. 30. In Prafulla Kumar Swain vs. Prakash Chandra Misra, reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 181. A Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 24 of the reported decision held-"Even at the outset we may point out that the Tribunal has grossly erred in holding that the Orissa Forest Service Class II Recruitment Rules of 1959 are mere administrative instruction. (3) SCC 181. A Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 24 of the reported decision held-"Even at the outset we may point out that the Tribunal has grossly erred in holding that the Orissa Forest Service Class II Recruitment Rules of 1959 are mere administrative instruction. On the contrary, these rules were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and they are statutory in character." Again in paragraph 42 of the reported decision it was reiterated-"Further, as pointed out above, the Orissa Rules were framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and have statutory and binding force." On the same analogy the rules framed by the Chief Justice of a High Court under clause 2 of Article 229 have statutory and binding force. 31. In V.K. Sood vs. Secretary, Civil Aviation and Ors., reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 9, a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court while considering qualifications prescribed by Rules framed under Article 309: in paragraph 6 of the reported decision held-"The rules thus having been made in exercise of the power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, being statutory, cannot be impeached on the ground that the authorities have prescribed tailor made qualifications to suit the stated individuals whose names have been mentioned in the appeal. Suffice to state that it is settled law that no motives can be attributed to the Legislature in making the law." On the same analogy the rules framed by the Chief Justice of a High Court under clause 2 of Article 229 being statutory cannot be impeached on the ground that the rules have been framed with improper motives to suit some individuals. 32. In P. Murugesan and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1993)2 SCC 430, a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court while considering rule making power under proviso to Article 309, in paragraph 16 of the reported decision, inter alia, stated-"It must be remembered that the power of rule making under the proviso to Article 309 has been held to be legislative in character (Vadera). If so, the test is whether such a restrictive view is permissible vis-a-vis a legislature. If not, it is equally impermissible in the case of the rule-making authority under the proviso to Article 309. If so, the test is whether such a restrictive view is permissible vis-a-vis a legislature. If not, it is equally impermissible in the case of the rule-making authority under the proviso to Article 309. The only test that such a rule has to pass is that of Articles' 14 and 16 and to that aspect we may turn now." In P. Murugesan case (supra) Supreme Court relied upon B.S. Vadera vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1969 SC 118 . On the same analogy the rules framed by Chief Justice of a High Court in exercise' of power under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution have to pass the test of Articles 14 and 16 only. It is important to mention here that the writ petitioners did not challenge any rule framed under Article 229(2) either by Chief Justice or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules. 33. In R.L. Bansal vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1993 SC 978 , a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court in paragraph 21 of the reported decision observed-"Now it is true that Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India being legislative in character cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks that they are unreasonable, and that they can be struck down only on the grounds upon which a legislative measure can be struck down." On the same analogy rules framed by the Chief Justice of High Court under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution being legislative in character cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks that they ate unreasonable. These rules can be struck down only on the grounds upon which a legislative measure' can be struck down namely violation of fundamental rights or other provisions of Constitution. 34. In A.K. Bhatnagar & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1991) 1 SCC 544 , a Bench of three Judges of Supreme Court, in paragraph 13 of the reported decision observed as follows : "On more than one occasion this Court has indicated to the Union and the State Governments that once they frame rules, their action in respect of matters covered by rules should be regulated by the rules. The rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are solemn rules having binding effect." The same principle also applies in respect of a rule framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. I am of the view that once rules in respect of salaries, allowances of the officers and staff of the High Court are framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution, salaries and allowances of the officers and staff of the High Court can only be paid in accordance 'with the rules so framed, and the rules so framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution can not be altered or amended or modified otherwise than by any other rule framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. 35. In Ashif Hameed vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1899 , Supreme Court relying upon Narender Chand Hem Raj vs. Lt. Governor, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2399 and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla, reported in AIR 1985 SC 910 , at paragraph 5 of the reported decision in Narender Chand Hem Raj case (supra) observed "The Constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise to executive in matters of policy or to surmonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive." This observation of Supreme Court in Ashif Hameed case (supra) was relied upon by a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court in Mallikarjuna Rao vs. State of A.P., reported in AIR 1990 SC 1251 . 36. In paragraph 12 of the reported decision of Mallikarjuna Rao case (supra) it was observed-"The power under Article 309 of the Constitution to frame rules is the legislative power. This power under the Constitution has to be exercised by the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be. The High Courts or the Administrative Tribunals cannot issue a mandate to the State Government to legislate under Article 309 of the Constitution. The Courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the' executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its rule making power in any manner. The High Courts or the Administrative Tribunals cannot issue a mandate to the State Government to legislate under Article 309 of the Constitution. The Courts cannot usurp the functions assigned to the' executive under the Constitution and cannot even indirectly require the executive to exercise its rule making power in any manner. The Courts cannot assume to itself a supervisory rule over the rule making power of the executive under Article 309 of the Constitution." Similarly the Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot assume itself a supervisory role over the rule making power of the Chief Justice under Article 229(2) of the Constitution or direct or advise or sunnonize the Chief Justice in respect of exercise of his legislative power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. 37. In B.N. Nagarajan vs. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1942 , a Bench of five Judges of Supreme Court while considering effect of proviso to Article 309 vis-a-vis Article 162 of the Constitution, in paragraph 5 of the reported decision held-"It is hardly necessary to mention that if there is a statutory rule or an Act on the matter, the executive must abide by that Act or rule and it cannot in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act." Admittedly Article 162 has no manner of application so far the area covered by Article 229 is concerned. But no one can act in violation of statutory rules, in other words rules framed under Article 229(2) having statutory force of law everyone must abide by the said rules,' and no one not even Chief Justice can ignore or act contrary to those rules in the purported exercise of administrative power. 38. Having found out the law relating to Article 229(2) of the Constitution now it is to be considered where and how the law was breached in connection with (i) State Government Memo No. 24382-J/J. 1E-56/81 (Pt. II) dated September 19, 1983, (ii) Full Court Resolution/Recommendation dated August 22, 1973 and (iii) Court's letter No. 18235J, dated December 22, 1981. What is the content of State Government's Memo. No. 24382-J/J1E-56/81 (Pt. II) dated September 19, 1983, which is annexure 'H' of the writ application? II) dated September 19, 1983, (ii) Full Court Resolution/Recommendation dated August 22, 1973 and (iii) Court's letter No. 18235J, dated December 22, 1981. What is the content of State Government's Memo. No. 24382-J/J1E-56/81 (Pt. II) dated September 19, 1983, which is annexure 'H' of the writ application? By the said Memo dated 19th September, 1983 the State Government replied to a D.O. Letter sent by the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Calcutta regarding proposals for revision of pay scales of certain categories of employees of the High Court on its Appellate Side. By the said Memo dated 19th September, 1983 the Government communicated the decision in respect of the aforesaid proposals for revision of pay in the following terms : "In respect of the post of the Assistant Registrar (Court) the Government agrees to grant one scale of pay of Rs. 660-1,600/- plus a special pay of Rs. 150/- per month. Regarding the post of Superintendent, Grade-I the Government agrees to the scale of pay of Rs. 660-1,600/- plus a special pay of Rs.100/- p.m. being allowed to that post. The other proposals of the Court for revision of the existing scales of pay attached to the posts of Assistant Court Officers, Stenographers to the Judges, Stenographers to the Additional Registrars and Inspecting Judicial Officers and Stenographer to the Registrar, Appellate Side, have been carefully examined by the Government, but the Government regrets its inability to accede to the same. I am now to request you kindly to move the Court to furnish Government with draft rules incorporating therein the revised scales of pay as agreed to by the Government for conveying to the Court the approval of the Governor to the issue of the said draft rules." 39. It is evident from the said memo dated 19th September, 1983, that the Rule under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India had not then been the subject matter of the memo. The communication of the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Calcutta referred to in the said memo dated 19th September, 1983 and the memo dated 19th September, 1983 itself, at best, form the components of the chain of process of consultation preceding the rule making act of the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court. Even assuming that the Registrar, Appellate Side of this High Court made the communication (referred to in the said memo. Even assuming that the Registrar, Appellate Side of this High Court made the communication (referred to in the said memo. dated 19th September, 1983) under the direction of the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court then also it was not more than a step taken in a consultative process. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 334 , a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court was considering the prayer made by the employees of the Supreme Court for their pay hike. In course of argument in the said case the employees referred to certain proposals made by the Registrar General of Supreme Court. Article 146 of the Constitution is akin to Article 229. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) Supreme Court was considering Article 146 and in paragraph 64 of the reported decision M.M. Dutt, J., (as he then was) inter alia, observed-"The most significant fact is that no rules were framed by the Chief Justice of India in accordance with the provision of Article 146(2) of the Constitution. Instead, what was' done was that the Registrar General made certain proposals to the Government and those proposals were turned down as not acceptable to the Government. There is a good deal of difference between rules framed by the Chief Justice of India under Article 146(2) and certain proposals made by the Registrar General of the Supreme Court may be under the instructions of the Chief Justice of India. The provision of Article 146(2) requires that rules have to be framed by the Chief Justice of India and if such rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, the same shall require the approval of the President of India. This procedure was not followed. So, the stage for the consideration by the President of India as to the question of granting approval, as required under the proviso to Article 146(2), had not then reached. Indeed, it is still in the preliminary stage, namely, that the rules have to be framed by the Chief Justice of India." Thommen, J., (as he then was) agreed with the judgment of M.M. Dutt, J., and in paragraphs, 109 and 110 of the reported decision held"109. As stated earlier, the constitutional process envisaged under Article 146(2) has not been completed. Initial steps had indeed been taken in that regard and to that end. As stated earlier, the constitutional process envisaged under Article 146(2) has not been completed. Initial steps had indeed been taken in that regard and to that end. Constituting the Committee of Judges and their suggestion to refer the question to the Pay Commission, the decision to' refer the matter to. the Pay Commission, and consideration of the same by the Registrar General and his letter to the Government containing certain suggestion from the components of a link in the chain leading to the ultimate end; which means the making of the rules by the Chief Justice and submitting the same to the President for approval, and the final decision of the President in that behalf. The Registrar General's letter and the Government's reaction to that letter were at best only the process of consultation preceding the rule making Act." "110. The ultimate authority in this regard being the Chief Justice of India, he alone is competent to make, or authorise the making of the rules. Until the rules are made by him (or by a Judge or officer of the court authorised by him), the question of approval or disapproval by the President does not arise. In making the rules, the Chief Justice would no doubt take into account the recommendations of the Pay Commission or of any other body of experts he may have consulted. He will also take into account the objections raised by the Government to the suggestions made by the Registrar General who of course, acted as an agent of the Chief Justice. But the refusal of the Government to accede to the proposals of the Registrar General is not a refusal of the President under Article 146(2); for such refusal or approval can arise only upon submission to him of duly framed rules." This being the position in law the contents of the memo dated 19th September, 1983, under no stretch of imagination, guide or govern the service conditions including the salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners had no occasion to be worried at all because the said memo dated 19.9.1983 or the contents thereof are not the rules framed under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India. 40. What was the resolution/recommendation of the Full Court dated August 22, 1973? The writ petitioners had no occasion to be worried at all because the said memo dated 19.9.1983 or the contents thereof are not the rules framed under clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution of India. 40. What was the resolution/recommendation of the Full Court dated August 22, 1973? The resolution/recommendation dated August 22, 1973 of the Full Court can be found out from a Memo. No. 8947-GS dated 31.8.1973 written by the Registrar, Appellate Side, addressed to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department. The relevant portion of the said Memo is quoted herein below : "To The Secretary, Judicial Department, Sir, With reference to the observation of the Finance Department re: pay scale..................... I am directed by the Chief Justice to inform you that the matter was referred by him to Full Court meeting of all Hon'ble Judges. The Hon'ble Judges having fully considered the observations of the Finance Department and duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side vis-a-vis those of the Shorthand Writers and the Interpreters on the Original Side have unanimously resolved as follows : "The Assistant Registrars (Court), Appellate Side, be given the same salary, scale of pay, emoluments and status as those of the Assistant Registrars, Original Side, in supersession of the previous recommendations sent to the Government, more particularly, letters of the Original Side-one dated 6th January, 1971 and the other dated 23rd March, 1971 relating to the pay of the Shorthand Writers and Interpreters. * * * * * * * * (iii) That the designation of the Shorthand Writers on the Original Side be changed to Recording Officers (Court) and (iv) That the designation of the Interpreters of the Original Side be changed to Interpreting Officers (Court). The Recording Officers and the Interpreting Officers (Court) be not treated at par with the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side and they be not equated with the Assistant Registrars on the Original Side or the Assistant Court Officers on the Appellate Side in matters of salary, scale of pay, emoluments and status. The Hon'ble Chief Justice accordingly recommends that the question of recommendation of pay scale of the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side may be re-considered by Government in the light of the above resolution of the Full Court. The Hon'ble Chief Justice accordingly recommends that the question of recommendation of pay scale of the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side may be re-considered by Government in the light of the above resolution of the Full Court. I am to request that the decision of the Government in the matter may be communicated to the Court as early as possible." It is evident from the said Memo that in connection with certain observations made by the Finance Department in respect of the pay scales of some officers or staff of Calcutta High Court, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court referred the matter to Full Court meeting of the Hon'ble Judges and the Full Court having fully considered the observations of the Finance Department and duties and responsibilities of Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side vis-a-vis those of the Shorthand Writers and Interpreters on the Original Side had unanimously adopted a resolution and the Chief Justice recommended that the question of recommendation of pay scale of the Assistant Registrars (Court) on the Appellate Side may be reconsidered by the Government in the light of the resolution of the Full Court contained in the said memo dated 31.8.1973 and the Government was requested that the decision of the Government in the matter might be communicated to the High Court as early as possible. Thus it is apparent that the memo dated 31.8.1973 did not contain any rule framed by the Chief Justice under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) M.M. Dutt, J., in paragraph 74 of the reported decision, inter alia, observed-"Further, before laying down pay structure of the employees of the Supreme Court, it may be necessary to ascertain the job contents of various categories of employees and the nature of duties which are performed by them. There can be no doubt that at the time of preparing the rules for prescribing the conditions of service including fixing of the pay-scales, the Chief Justice of India will consider the representations and suggestions of the different categories of employees of the Supreme Court also keeping in view the financial liability of Government as pointed out by the learned Attorney General. All this can be done by the Chief Justice of India or by some other Judge or officer of this Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India. All this can be done by the Chief Justice of India or by some other Judge or officer of this Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India may appoint a Committee of Judges to submit a report relating to all relevant matters and, thereafter, the Chief Justice of India may frame rules after taking into consideration the report of the Committee. It will be absolutely in the discretion of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee as to how and in what manner the rules will be framed." The same principle also applies in case of Chief Justice of a High Court while exercising rule making power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. The Chief Justice of a High Court can get the matter relating to pay structure of the employees of High Court examined by some other Judge or officer of his High Court authorised by him, even the Chief Justice of a High Court may appoint a Committee of Judges to submit a report relating to all relevant matters and thereafter, the Chief Justice of a High Court may frame rules after taking into consideration the report of the Committee. In the instant case Chief Justice requested the Full Court to consider the matter. Full Court considered the matter and adopted a resolution. But the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court did not frame any rule under Article 229(2) of the Constitution, instead he forwarded the said resolution of the Full Court to the Government for reconsideration. As discussed earlier this is only a step in the chain of consultative process. Question of violation of principles of natural justice did not and does not arise at all. The resolution of the Full Court had/has no binding nature and the resolution of the Full Court which is under challenge did not and could not guide or govern the service conditions of the writ petitioners so far the same relates to the salaries, allowances of the writ petitioners are concerned. The writ petitioners had no reason to challenge the resolution of the Full Court contained in the Memo dated 31.8.1973. Elaborate discussions have been made while dealing with Government's Memo dated September 19, 1983. The same reasons also apply in respect of the communication dated 31.8.73 and the resolution of the Full Court contained therein. I am not repeating the same here. 41. Elaborate discussions have been made while dealing with Government's Memo dated September 19, 1983. The same reasons also apply in respect of the communication dated 31.8.73 and the resolution of the Full Court contained therein. I am not repeating the same here. 41. What is the content of the communication being Issue No. 18235-G dated 22nd December, 1981 issued by Registrar, Appellate Side, High Court, Calcutta addressed to the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department? The relevant portion from the said communication dated 22nd December, 1981 is quoted herein below : "The Court, therefore, desires that the recommendation made in respect of Assistant Registrar III should be accepted by the Government fully and a special pay of Rs. 175/- be granted to him, and the special pay of Rs. 125/- granted to the senior most Assistant Registrar (Court) should be withdrawn and he should be given the same special pay as other Assistant Registrars (Court). * * * * * * On a consideration of the duties and responsibilities of different categories of officers, the scales have been recommended for them as above and I would request you kindly to consider the recommendations of the Court and move the Government for giving early decision in the matter so that these officers may not be deprived of the benefits extended by Government order already referred to above." It is evident from the said communication dated 22nd December, 1981 that no rule framed by the Chief justice under Article 229(2) of the Constitution was sent to the Governor of the State for approval as required under proviso to Article 229(2) of the Constitution. It is evident from the said communication dated 22nd December, 1981 that the Court desired that the recommendation made in respect of the Assistant Registrar-III should be accepted by the Government. What communicated was the "recommendation of the Court" and not the rule framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of his power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. "Recommendation of the Court" have no status under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. What is required is the rule framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India or the rules framed by some other Judge or officer of the High Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. What is required is the rule framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India or the rules framed by some other Judge or officer of the High Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. "The recommendation of the Court" is of little value for the purpose of Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. "Recommendation of the Court" does not guide or govern the service conditions of the writ petitioners including their salaries and allowances. 42. In view of the discussion made hereinabove I am of the opinion that the ld. Counsel for the appellants rightly contended that both the writ petitions in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 have no merit. Writ petition in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 ought to have been dismissed by the trial Court. 43. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants argued that the Court has no business to fix the pay scales of the employees of any institution in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ld. senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that if there be violation of any fundamental right by any rule framed under Article 229(2) of the Constitution then the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review can strike down the same but surely it is not within the province of this High Court to fix the scale of pay of any employee in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of his contention the ld. Counsel for the appellants referred to and relied upon Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra), in paragraph 36 of the reported decision it was, inter alia, observed-"It is not the business of this Court to fix the pay-scales of the employees of any institution in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. If there be violation of any fundamental right by virtue of any order or judgment, this Court can strike down the same but, surely it is not within the province of this Court to fix the scale of pay of any employee in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article. 32 of the Constitution." The ld. If there be violation of any fundamental right by virtue of any order or judgment, this Court can strike down the same but, surely it is not within the province of this Court to fix the scale of pay of any employee in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article. 32 of the Constitution." The ld. Counsel argued that the same principle also applies while High Court exercises of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ld. Counsel for the appellants also referred to State of U.P. vs. J.P. Chaurasia, reported in AIR 1989 SC 19. At page 25 of the reported decision of J.P. Chaurasia case (supra), Supreme Court observed" The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale admissible to Section Officers should not detain us longer. The answer to the question depends upon several factors. It does not depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secretaries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. The equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Government. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission. They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the Court should normally accept it. The Court should not try to tinker with such equivalent unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration." The ld. Counsel for the appellants also referred to Umesh Chandra Gupta vs. Oil & Natural Gas Commission & Ors., reported in AIR 1989 SC 29 , wherein it had been observed by Supreme Court that the nature of work and responsibilities of the posts are matters to be evaluated by the management and not for the Court to determine by relying the averments in the affidavits in the interest of parties. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) in paragraph 42 of the reported decision M.M. Dutt, J., observed- "It is really the business of the Government or the management to fix the pay-scales after considering various other matters and the Court can only consider whether such fixation of pay-scales has resulted in an invidious discrimination or• is arbitrary or patently erroneous in law or in fact." In C.G. Govindan vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 625 , a Bench of two Judges of Supreme Court considered Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) and divergent views were expressed by two Judges on the following issues.- (i) Chief Justice's power vis-a-vis Governor's power under Article 229(2) and the proviso, in regard to salary and other entitlements of High Court staff, (ii) Propriety of passing a judicial order under Article 226 compelling State Government to accept particular pay scale for High Court staff, (iii) Whether the case involved application of the principle 'equal pay for equal work' or it was a case of arbitrariness and discrimination, (iv) whether upgraded pay scale was a promotional grade in this case, (v) whether judgment of Delhi High Court granting higher pay scale to all the Private Secretaries in that High Court, against which SLP was dismissed by the Supreme Court, was a binding precedent for Gujarat High Court on the judicial side, (vi) Whether Private Secretaries of Gujarat High' Court could seek parity with Private Secretaries of Delhi High Court, or parity could be sought only with Private Secretaries of Gujarat Government Secretariat, (vii) whether the Supreme Court has laid down in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case, (1989) 4 SCC 187 that Court cannot fix pay scales or the Supreme Court in effect fixed pay scales in that case, (viii) whether direction given by Gujarat High Court on judicial side for consideration of Private Secretaries' case stood complied with when the Chief Justice's recommendation was considered by the State Government but not accepted, or the Chief Justice's recommendation could not be turned down by the State Government. In view of the difference of opinion the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench. In view of the difference of opinion the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench. Therefore, it appears that the question whether the Supreme Court has laid down in Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra) that Court cannot fix pay scales or Supreme Court in effect fixed pay scales in that case has been referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger bench. 44. I have already quoted herein above the relevant paragraphs from Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association case (supra). It has also been noticed hereinabove that in State of U.P. vs. J.P. Chaurasia (supra) and Umesh Chandra vs. Oil & Natural Gas Commission case (supra), Supreme Court laid down that the quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different. That cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. It had clearly been laid down by Supreme Court in those two cases that the equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Government. It had been laid down that the responsibilities of the posts are matters to be evaluated by the arrangement. In the instant case the same function can be discharged only in exercise of power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution of India. Since that has not been done, Court cannot, in my opinion, fix a pay scale. I have already recorded hereinabove that power conferred upon the Chief Justice by Article 229(2) of the Constitution is a legislative power. From the scheme of Article 229 it is apparent that the Constitution laid down that conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court including salaries, allowances, leave or pensions have to be guided and governed by law made by Legislature of a State and subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State by the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by some other Judge or officer of the High Court authorised by the Chief Justice in exercise of the legislative power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, mandate of the Constitution is that conditions of service including salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of the officers and servants of a High Court should be guided and governed by provisions having statutory force of law which should be framed in exercise of legislative power. When a procedure has been particularly laid down by Article 229 as to how the conditions of service including salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of officers and servants of a High Court shall be framed then such conditions of service should be framed following that procedure only and not otherwise. The Court cannot in guise of judicial review usurp the legislative power conferred by Article 229(2) of the Constitution and fix up a pay scale different from that prescribed in exercise of power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution. No doubt, arms of the High Court, while exercising power of judicial review, are long enough but court can stretch arm no further than the sleeve of it will reach and the sleeve is tailored by constitutional and statutory provisions and also by self-imposed restrictions as laid down by Supreme Court in catena of decisions. High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review, under no circumstances, can usurp the legislative power conferred by Article 229(2) of the Constitution. If according to the Court a pay scale fixed in exercise of power under Article 229(2) of the Constitution violates Article 14 or any other provisions of the Constitution then the Court can strike it down, but certainly by usurping the legislative power Court cannot fix up a pay scale which it thinks to be just and proper. 45. Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., in his judgment and order dated 14.8.1987 in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 did not at all consider the effect of Article 229 of the Constitution and also did not consider the rival submissions made by the contesting parties. That apart the decision rendered by Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J., which is subject matter of the appeals being APO 601 of 1987 and APO 604 of 1987 is not good in law because it is against the law laid down by Supreme Court referred to hereinabove in connection with Article 229 of the Constitution as a result the judgment under appeal is set aside. The ld. The ld. Advocate appearing for the appellant is right in contending that both the writ petitions in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 had/has no merit at all and writ petition in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 ought to have been dismissed by the trial Court. All interim orders are vacated. For the reasons discussed hereinabove the Matter No. 5497 of 1987 and Appeal No. 187 of 1988 are also dismissed and interim order passed in those matters are also vacated. 46. While the appeal being Appeal No, 601 of 1987 was pending before the Division Bench of this High Court, on 17.9.87 the Division Bench passed the following order : "The Court: There will be an ad-interim order as follows : In the event the judgment and order dated the 14th August, 1987 is implemented, the contesting respondents, the writ petitioners, will accept the increased special pay without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the appeal and in the event the proceedings are finally disposed of in favour of the appellants, the contesting respondents undertake to refund the extra amount paid to them in the judgment and order under appeal. The extra amount paid will be adjusted in a suitable manner from their salary or other emoluments. It is made clear that we have not adjudicated on the merits of the controversy including the controversy regarding the status of the respective parties. Let this matter appear as Application (Adjd) on 10.11.87 Affidavits, if any, in the meantime. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on usual undertaking." In terms of the said ad-interim order the writ petitioners in Matter No.1033 of 1984 received extra amount which they undertook to refund by the aforesaid order dated 17.9.87. It was made clear that the extra amount paid to the petitioners in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 would be adjusted in suitable manner from their salary or other emoluments. Extra money paid to the writ petitioners in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 should be recovered from them as directed by order dated 17.9.87 passed by the Division Bench in Appeal No. 601 of 1987. Extra money paid to the writ petitioners in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 should be recovered from them as directed by order dated 17.9.87 passed by the Division Bench in Appeal No. 601 of 1987. Similarly in Appeal No. 187 of 1988, on 5.7.1988 the Division Bench of this High Court passed the following order: "The Court: There will be an interim order as follows: The writ petitioners be paid the increased special pay of Rs.50/- without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the appeal upon an undertaking that in the event the proceedings are finally disposed of against the writ petitioners the amount paid shall be recovered from them by way of adjustment against the salaries of the writ petitioners and/or their post retirement benefits. Let it be recorded that we have not gone into the merits of the claim. Such payments will be without prejudice to the rights of the private respondents. We place on record that on behalf of the State a correct stand has been taken by stating that in this matter the Government does not want to take any particular stand in favour of any particular party. For the time being, such payment be made with effect from 1st January, 1986. The two appeals being Appeal No. 604 of 1987 (The Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side & Ors. vs. Vivekananda Goswami & Ors.) and the Appeal No. 601 of 1987 (Baidyanath Mukherjee & Ors. Vs. Vivekananda Goswami) both arising out of Matter No. 1033 of 1984 which have been referred to the larger Bench be heard along with the writ application herein being Matter No. 5497 of 1987 (Osman Ghani Dwan & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal ). It is desirable that the same be heard as soon as possible. In view of the order we pass, let the appeal be treated as on day's list and disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Notice of appeal is waived. Settlement of index is dispensed with. Undertaking is discharged. All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertakings." Thus it appears that in this case also the writ petitioners in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 received increased special pay of Rs. Notice of appeal is waived. Settlement of index is dispensed with. Undertaking is discharged. All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertakings." Thus it appears that in this case also the writ petitioners in Matter No. 5497 of 1987 received increased special pay of Rs. 50/- without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the appeal upon an undertaking that in the event the proceedings are finally disposed of against the writ petitioners the amount paid shall be recovered from them by way of adjustment against the salaries of the writ petitioners and/or their post retirement benefits. 47. Since the writ petitions in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 are dismissed and since both the Appeals being No. 601 of 1987 and No. 604 of 1987 are allowed, extra payments paid to the writ petitioners in Matter No. 1033 of 1984 should be recovered from the writ petitioners in terms of the aforesaid order dated 17.9.87 passed by the Division Bench. Similarly in case of the petitioners in Matter No.5497 of 1987 the extra amount received by the writ petitioners in view of the aforesaid order dated 5.7.88 should be recovered as directed by the aforesaid order dated 5.7.88 passed by the Division Bench of this High Court. 48. In these terms, the appeals being APO 601 of 1987 and APO 604 of 1987 are allowed and Appeal No. 187 of 1988 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 are dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. However, there shall not be any order as to costs. Tarun Chatterjee, J.: I agree. Gitesh Ranjan Bhattacharjee, J.: I agree. Vinod Kumar Gupta, J.: I agree. Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.: I agree. APO No. 601 of 1987 and APO No.604 of 1987 are allowed. APO No. 187 of 1988 and Matter No. 5497 of 1987 are dismissed.