Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15.1.88 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in F.A. No. 38/78, whereby the appeal filed by the defendant-respondent has been allowed and judgment and decree dated 27.7.76 passed by the 3rd Additional Sub Judge, Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 39/76 has been set aside and consequently the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for specific performance of contract has been dismissed. 2. The fact of the case lies in a narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff-appellant instituted the aforementioned suit for a decree of specific performance of contract with a prayer that the defendant may be directed to execute and register a sale deed on accepting balance consideration in respect of the suit property appertaining to plot no. 7018/7866 of Khata No. 566 having an area of 0.07 decimals of village Chas, P.S. Chas, District Dhanbad (hereinafter referred to as the suit property). A further relief for declaration has been sought for that the registered sale deed dated 29.1.73 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 in respect of the suit property is collusive, void and sham transaction. 4. The plaintiffs case is that the suit property originally belonged to the defendant no.1, who offered to sell the same and the plaintiff agreed to purchase the said property. Accordingly, ah agreement was entered into on 1.12.70 by and between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 whereby the suit property was agreed to be sold at Rs. 11200/- and a sum of Rs.1601/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as earnest money in terms of the agreement. The property was agreed to be sold within four months from the date of agreement and defendant no.1 further agreed to deliver possession of the land in question to the plaintiff. Plaintiffs further case was that in pursuance of the agreement when he went to the suit property to take possession it was found that the defendant no.2-appellant was in occupation of the portion of the land as a tenant of defendant no.1. The plaintiff informed the defendant No.2 about the agreement dated 1.12.70 and requested him to pay monthly rent to him but the appellant though agreed to pay the rent to him, put up the matter on one pretext or the other. The plaintiff informed the defendant No.2 about the agreement dated 1.12.70 and requested him to pay monthly rent to him but the appellant though agreed to pay the rent to him, put up the matter on one pretext or the other. The plaintiff further alleged that though he has tendered the balance consideration of Rs. 9600/- but the defendant no.1 on one pretext or other refused to receive the consideration amount and failed to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff thereafter sent advocate notice dated 6.7.71 asking defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed within a fortnight on receipt of the balance consideration money and a copy of the said notice was also sent to the defendant no.2, who was in occupation of the portion of the land as a tenant. The defendant no.1 received the said notice but defendant no.2 refused to accept the notice. Inspite of service of notice defendant no.1 failed to execute a registered sale deed The plaintiffs further case was that he apprehended that the defendant no.1 might sell the suit property in favour of some persons and therefore he got notice of agreement published in the newspaper namely, Awaj dated 11.7.71. However, the plaintiff subsequently learnt that the defendant no.1 executed a sale deed on 29.1.73 in favour of the defendant no.2 for a consideration of Rs.2000/- only. The plaintiff, therefore, alleged that the sale deed executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the defendant no.2 is collusive and void and without payment of consideration solely for the purpose to defeat the existing right of the plaintiff under the agreement. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant no.2 had full knowledge about the agreement dated 1.12.70 and he is not a bona fide purchaser without notice. The plaintiff, therefore, sought a relief for a decree of specific performance directing the defendants to execute and register sale deed in his favour. 5. In spite of service of notice of summons defendant no.1 neither appeared in the suit nor filed any written statement. However, defendant no.2 filed a written statement denying and disputing that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant no.1 for the sale of the suit land on 1.12.70 and any earnest money was paid to the defendant no.1. However, defendant no.2 filed a written statement denying and disputing that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant no.1 for the sale of the suit land on 1.12.70 and any earnest money was paid to the defendant no.1. Defendant no.2 denied that he was living in the suit property as a tenant under the defendant no.1 and there was no occasion for the appellant to agree to pay rent to the defendant after the agreement. It was alleged by the defendant no.2 in the written statement that there was an agreement for sale of the suit land between him and the defendant no.1 as early as in the year 1965, at. that time a sum of Rs. 500/- (five hundred) was paid to the defendant no.1 as earnest money and defendant no.1 delivered possession of the suit property to the appellant and after that in the year 1973 the sale deed in question was executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the appellant. 6. When the suit was fixed for hearing the plaintiff examined his witnesses but defendant no. 2 did not examine any witness nor participated in the hearing. The defendant no.1 also neither appeared nor cross examined the plaintiffs witnesses and led any evidence. The trial court, therefore, after hearing the plaintiff, decreed the suit ex parte against both the defendants. 7. From perusal of the judgment of the trial court, it transpires that the trial court framed the following issues for consideration : "(1) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (2) Has the plaintiff got any valid cause of action for the suit? (3) Whether there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 for sale of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff for consideration of Rs. 11200/- and the defendant no.1 has received the earnest money of Rs. 1601/- on 1.12.70? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of specific performance of contract regarding the execution of the sale deed by both the defendants in respect of the suit as alleged? (5) Whether the sale deed dated 29.1.73 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 is collusive, sham and is binding upon the plaintiff? (6) Whether the plaintiff is only entitled for damages to the tune of Rs.11101/- from the defendant no.1? (5) Whether the sale deed dated 29.1.73 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 is collusive, sham and is binding upon the plaintiff? (6) Whether the plaintiff is only entitled for damages to the tune of Rs.11101/- from the defendant no.1? (7) To what relief or reliefs, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?" 8. The trial court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and after considering the evidences both oral and documentary came to a finding that there was a valid concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 for the sale of the suit property, The trial court further came to a finding that the defendant no.2 had the notice about the agreement and is not a bona fide purchaser without notice. The trial court further held that the sale deed executed by the defendant no.1 in favour of the appellant is a collusive, void and sham transaction. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte and directed the defendant to execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. The defendant no.2, instead of preferring an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court, filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree which was registered as Misc. Case No. 8/76. The said application was allowed and ex parte decree was set aside by the Second Additional Sub Judge, Dhanbad in terms of the order dated 4.2.77. The plaintiff then challenged the said order by filing civil revision before this Court being Civil Revision No. 82/77 and a Bench of this Court, after hearing the parties, allowed the civil revision application and set aside the impugned order dated 4.2.77 passed in Misc. Case No. 8/76 under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC holding that such application was not maintainable. The defendant no.2 thereafter, filed appeal and challenged the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 10. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Sr.counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, assailed the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge as being illegal, contrary to law and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge is based on conjecture and surmises inasmuch as there was not even foundational facts in the pleading of the defendant no.2 for arriving at such conclusion. Learned counsel submitted that the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge is based on conjecture and surmises inasmuch as there was not even foundational facts in the pleading of the defendant no.2 for arriving at such conclusion. Learned counsel further submitted that learned Single Judge has completely overlooked the settled law that a subsequent purchaser cannot raise the plea of readiness and willingness but the learned Single Judge took up that issue and decided it against the plaintiff. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon a decision in the case of Jugraj Singh & anr. V/s. Labh Singh & ors. ( AIR 1995 SC 945 ). Learned counsel further submitted that there is neither any pleading on behalf of the defendant no.2 nor any evidence was led on the issue that he was a bona fide purchaser without notice but the learned Single Judge also decided this issue in favour of the defendant. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge in refusing specific performance is neither judicial discretion nor reasonable one. 11. On the other hand, Mr.Chandrashekhar, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent no.1 mainly advanced his argument on the power and discretion of the Court in the matter of granting specific performance. Learned counsel submitted that grant of decree for specific performance is equitable discretionary relief and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Learned counsel further submitted that when the learned Single Judge after considering the facts and evidence on record came to a finding that great hardship will be caused to the defendant while granting specific performance, this Court exercising Letters Patent appellate jurisdiction is not supposed to disturb the finding of the learned Single Judge. 12. Before appreciating the rival contention of the parties, it would be useful first to look into the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal. The learned Single Judge has not distrubed the finding arrived at by the trial court that there was a valid and binding agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 inasmuch as the learned Single Judge mainly decided the appeal on the question of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. The learned Single Judge has not distrubed the finding arrived at by the trial court that there was a valid and binding agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 inasmuch as the learned Single Judge mainly decided the appeal on the question of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. The learned Judge held that there is no document to show that the plaintiff was ever ready or has shown his willingness to perform his part of contract nor there is any document to show, except the general evidence, that he has tendered money. For better appreciation the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge is quoted below : "There is no document to show that plaintiff was ever ready or has shown his willingness to perform his part of contract nor there is any document to show, except a general evidence, that he had tendered money. When he tendered money, in whose presence and why it was refused, ail has not been stated. It is admitted position that under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the grant of specific performance of contract is discretionary. The exercise of discretion should be judicial. The plaintiff has also claimed alternatively for recovery of earnest money. I think that in the present situation and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff should have been ordered to recover the earnest money. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that appellant had entered into the shoes of defendant no.1 and as such he is willing to pay the earnest money in absence of any cogent evidence of willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. In my view a decree in such a situation should not have been granted for specific performance of contract and alternative relief claimed by the defendant should have been granted to the plaintiff with interest." 13. I will first take up the issue as to whether the mandatory requirement of law with regard the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract has been complied with or not. As noticed above, the learned Single Judge mainly proceeded to decide the appeal on the basis that the plaintiff failed to fulfil the requirement which disentitled him from getting a decree of specific performance. As noticed above, the learned Single Judge mainly proceeded to decide the appeal on the basis that the plaintiff failed to fulfil the requirement which disentitled him from getting a decree of specific performance. From perusal of the plaint, it appears that in paragraph 5, 6, 8 and 12 the plaintiff has categorically pleaded that he tendered the balance consideration money to the defendant and asked him to execute and register a sale deed which the defendant no.1 avoided. Thereafter, the plaintiff gave a lawyers notice requesting the defendant no.1 to execute and register sale deed after receiving the balance consideration amount but he failed to do so. The plaintiff further pleaded that he was and is always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and to pay the balance amount of Rs.9600/- and also to bear the cost of registration etc. As noticed above, the defendant no.1 did not file any written statement nor deny these facts. The defendant no.2, in his written statement, simply stated that he had no knowledge about the facts pleaded by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, clear that there is no denial by the defendants in the pleading which amounts to admission of the facts that the plaintiff was always ready and Willing to perform his part of contract. Moreover, the plaintiff, in his evidence, has stated in details about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In absence of any evidence from the side of the defendants the learned Single Judge assumed the fact against the plaintiff. It is well settled that in order to prove himself ready and willing to perform his obligation under a contract to purchase shares, a purchaser is not necessarily to produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bank of India Ltd. V/s. J.A.H. Chinoy (1950 PC. 90) and Nathu Lal V/s. Phool Chand (1970 S.C. 546). Be that as it may, Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Sr.counsel rightly submitted that the plea about readiness and willingness is available only to the vendor or to his legal representative and the plea is not available to the defendant no.2, who is the subsequent purchaser. 90) and Nathu Lal V/s. Phool Chand (1970 S.C. 546). Be that as it may, Mr. Debi Prasad, learned Sr.counsel rightly submitted that the plea about readiness and willingness is available only to the vendor or to his legal representative and the plea is not available to the defendant no.2, who is the subsequent purchaser. In the case of Jugraj Singh vs. Labh Singh (supra) thier Lordships of the Apex Court observed : "That plea is specifically available to the vendor/defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent purchasers have not only the right to defend their purchase on the premise that they have no prior knowledge of the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. They are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Though they are necessary parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent purchaser, the plea that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract must be available only to the vendor or his legal representatives, but -not to the subsequent purchasers. The High Court, therefore, was right in rejecting the petitioners contention and rightly did not accept the plea. We do not find any ground warranting interference." 14. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge is not correct in law in dismissing the suit on the plea taken by the subsequent purchaser, although not pleaded and proved that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The main plea which was available to the defendant no.2 was that he was the bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, This issue is not at all considered by the learned Single Judge which can only disentitle the plaintiff to get a decree of specific performance. However, I will discuss this issue hereinafter. 15. It is well settled that when after taking into a contract for the sale of certain property with the plaintiff the vendor subsequently consents to allow the same property to the defendant, then in a suit by the plaintiff for the specific performance of contract in his favour, the burden. of proving good faith and lack of notice to the contract heavily lies upon the defendant. of proving good faith and lack of notice to the contract heavily lies upon the defendant. The Specific Relief Act lays down a general rule that the original contract may be specifically enforced against a subsequent transferee but always an exception to the general rule and, therefore, it is for the transferee to establish the circumstances which will allow him to retain the benefit of a transfer, which prima faice, he had no right to get. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bhup Narain V/s. Gokul Chand (1934 P.C. 68) and Sankar Lal Narain Das V/s. New Mufassil Company Ltd. (1946 P.C. 97). 16. From perusal of the pleading, it transpires that in paragraph 12(e) of the plaint the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the defendant no.1, on some pretext or other, avoided registration of the deed and later on he learnt in 1973 that the defendant no.1 is intending to sell this land to some person of B.S.L. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it is alleged by the plaintiff that after execution of the agreement he went to the suit property and apprised defendant no.2 of the fact regarding the agreement dated 1.12.70 and requested him to pay the monthly rent This fact has not been denied by the defendant no.2 in the written statement. The defendant no.2, therefore, before obtaining the sale deed from the defendant no.1 was aware about the agreement executed by defendant no.1 in favour of the plaintiff for the sale of suit property. The defendant no.2 also did not lead any evidence to prove that he was the bona fide purchaser without notice. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, committed serious error of law in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit when no valid defence was available to the defendant no.2, the subsequent purchaser. 17. Now, I shall deal with the question with regard to the power of the court in the matter of granting of a decree for specific performance. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, committed serious error of law in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit when no valid defence was available to the defendant no.2, the subsequent purchaser. 17. Now, I shall deal with the question with regard to the power of the court in the matter of granting of a decree for specific performance. It is well settled that the relief for specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary and the discretion must be exercised by the court in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the power to decree of specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Recently in the case of K.Narendra V/s. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. [ (1999)5 SCC 77 ] the Apex Court observed : "Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Man David V/s. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy [ (1996)5 SCC 589 ; AIR 1996 SC 2814 ) by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate Court." 18. Mr. Mr. Chandrashekhar Singh, learned Sr, counsel, has tried to impress this Court that grant of specific performance of contract will cause serious hardship to the defendant no.2 for the reason that he has been in possession of the suit property after purchase since, 1973. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that in such circumstances, equitable discretionary relief cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. The submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. It is well settled law that the party, who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of the court must come to the court with clean hands. In other words, the party, who makes false allegation does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to equitable relief. In the instant case, as noticed above, the defendant no.2 was aware about the agreement entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1 for sale of the property at a market price of Rs. 11200/-, out of which a sum of Rs. 1601/- was paid by the plaintiff as earnest money. In spite of the said agreement, the defendant no.2, in collusion with the defendant no.1 got sale deed executed in his favour showing the price of the suit property at Rs. 2000/-. The price at which defendant no.2 alleged to have purchased the suit property shows that the sale deed was a collusive and sham transaction. Besides the above fact, the defendant" no.2 took a false plea in the written statement that he is the rightful owner of the suit property. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the learned Single Judge again committed error of law and error of fact in holding that the decree for specific performance would put the defendant no.2 to undue loss and the plaintiff will get undue advantage. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in law. It is a fit case where the defendant no.2 should be asked to join as a vendor alongwith owner of the suit property and to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 19. Lastly, Mr. Chandrashekhar Singh, learned Sr. counsel, took shelter of the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific. It is a fit case where the defendant no.2 should be asked to join as a vendor alongwith owner of the suit property and to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 19. Lastly, Mr. Chandrashekhar Singh, learned Sr. counsel, took shelter of the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific. Relief Act and submitted that in the decree passed by the trial court there was a specific direction to the plaintiffdecree holder for depositing of the balance consideration amount within two months from the date of decree but the plaintiff-dec Fee holder failed to deposit the balance consideration amount in the court. The plaintiff also failed to make a prayer in the trial court by filing application for extension of time for depositing of the amount in terms of the decree and more than 20 years have passed but till date the plaintiff appellant has not deposited the balance amount of consideration. In that view of the matter the learned counsel submitted that this Court should not exercise discretion in favour of the plaintiff by granting a decree for Specific performance. In this connection, learned counsel put heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm V/s. C. Alagappan ( AIR 1999 SC 918 ). I do not find much force in the submission of the learned counsel. The operative portion of the decree of the trial court reads as under : "That the suit be decreed ex parte with cost at ex parte scale as against both the defendants. Both the defendants hereby directed to execute a registered sale deed in respect of the land in suit in favour of the plaintiff within two months from the date of this order on receipt of balance consideration of Rs. 9600/- from the plaintiff failing which the plaintiff should deposit this very amount in the court in the name of the defendants and after that the Sirestadar of this Court will admit the execution of the sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff before Sub Registrar, Dhanbad. 9600/- from the plaintiff failing which the plaintiff should deposit this very amount in the court in the name of the defendants and after that the Sirestadar of this Court will admit the execution of the sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff before Sub Registrar, Dhanbad. It is further declared that the sale deed dated 29.1.73 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 in respect of the suit land is collusive, sham and has not conferred any title whatsoever in favour of the defendant no.2 and it is not binding upon the plaintiff. Pleader fee Rs. 25/- and clerk fee Rs. 2/- only." 20. After decree was passed by the trial court the defendant no.2 initiated a proceeding by filing application under Order 9 Rule 13 for setting aside the exparte decree. That application was registered as Misc. Case No. 8/76. That miscellaneous proceeding continued till February, 1977 when miscellaneous case was allowed by the trial court and the exparte decree set was aside in terms of order dated 4.2.77. The plaintiff-appellant then moved this Court against the aforesaid order by filing civil revision being C.R.No.82/77. That civil revision application was finally disposed of in terms of judgment dated 15th May 78, whereby the civil revision application was allowed and the impugned order dated 4.2.77 passed in Misc. Case No.8/76 was set aside. The defendant no.2 thereafter immediately preferred First Appeal No.38/78(R) against the ex parte judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The said First Appeal remained pending till 1988 and the appeal was finally disposed of in terms of judgment dated 15.1.1988 whereby the appeal was allowed in part and the decree for specific performance was set aside. The plaintiff-appellant then preferred this Letters Patent Appeal before this Court. It further transpires from the records that when civil revision No.82/77 was pending, this Court by order dated 14.4.77 stayed the further proceeding of Title Suit No. 39/73 pending before the trial court. It is, therefore, evident that the decree for specific performance remained unenforceable at all the time during pendency of the aforementioned litigation between the parties and therefore it cannot be said that the plaintiff failed to deposit the balance consideration in terms of the decree passed by the trial court. It is, therefore, evident that the decree for specific performance remained unenforceable at all the time during pendency of the aforementioned litigation between the parties and therefore it cannot be said that the plaintiff failed to deposit the balance consideration in terms of the decree passed by the trial court. As a matter of fact the decree for specific performance was set aside by the trial court itself and subsequently after the civil revision application was disposed of, the appeal filed by the defendant no.2 was finally allowed and the decree was set aside. During all this period there was no executable decree in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the question of depositing the balance consideration amount does not arise. 21. Be that as it may, the question of law raised by Mr. Chandrashekhar Singh, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the defendant no.2, is not involved in this appeal for the reason that neither any application has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant for extention of time nor the defendant no.1, vendor, has filed any application before the trial court or before this Court for rescinding the contract. The question, therefore, is academic at this stage and there is no need of going any further on that question. Suffice it to say that the ratio decided by the Apex Court in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firms case (supra) does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 22. Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned counsel further made submission that while granting a decree for specific performance the conduct of the plaintiff has to be taken into consideration while exercising discretionary refief. The submission of the learned counsel is also devoid of any substance. On the contrary the conduct of the defendants is such that equity cannot come in rescue in their favour. The defendant no.1, vendor, neither contested the suit nor filed written statement. The defendant no.2 got a sale deed executed and registered in his favour from the defendant no.1 which is collusive one. Not only that, the defendant no.2 although gave an evasive reply in the written statement, failed to lead any evidence and allowed the suit to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff. At the appellate stage the defendant no.2 raised all the defences which are based on no evidence. Not only that, the defendant no.2 although gave an evasive reply in the written statement, failed to lead any evidence and allowed the suit to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff. At the appellate stage the defendant no.2 raised all the defences which are based on no evidence. There is nothing on the record to show any bona fide on the part of the defendants to get a sale deed executed and registered in favour of defendant no.2. In that view of the matter, I do not find any justification in dismissing the suit on the ground not even pleaded nor any evidence was ledon behalf of the defendants. 23. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sub Judge, Dhanbad is restored. The defendant-respondents are directed to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant in respect of the suit property on receipt of the balance consideration within two months from today, failing which the same shall be done through the process of the court. In the facts and circumstances of the case the defendants no.2- respondent shall be liable to pay exemplary cost quantified at Rs. 2,500/-. S.J.Mukhopadhaya, J. 24 I agree.