JUDGMENT 1. -The misc. petition is directed against the order dated 2.3.1998 passed by the learned Special Judge cum Additional Sessions Judge, Merta whereby he allowed the revision filed against the order of the Executive Magistrate dated 16.8.1997 attaching the disputed land and appointing receiver thereon. 2. The contention of Mr. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioners was two fold. One, the order passed by the Executive Magistrate attaching the immovable property and appointing receiver was interlocutory in nature and no revision lay against that order, and therefore, the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge interfering in the order of Magistrate is not sustainable in law. Two, on the ground that there was revenue suit pending between the parties, the order of the Magistrate passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. could not be set aside. Mr. Patel cited the cases of Yaqub Ali v. Stale of Raj., 1995 (2) WLC (Raj.) 730 , Siddique Ali & Ors. v. Md. All & Ors., 1993 (2) Crimes 426 , M/s. Punj Lloyd Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Ors., 1994 (1) Crimes 49 & Gulam Farid & Ors. v. State of Raj., 1997 (1) WLC 583 in support of his contentions. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Punia learned counsel for the respondents contended that the order passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. cannot be placed in the category of interlocutory order and revision lay against that order. His further contention was that in the pending revenue suit the parties can make application for the injunction or appointment of receiver, and therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was perfectly justified in setting aside the order passed by the Executive Magistrate. 4. First, it is to be seen if the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. was interlocutory in nature and revision before the Sessions Judge did not lie against that order. The contention of Mr. Patel is based on the case of Yaqub All v. State of Raj . (supra) in which at para No. 6 of the report it has been observed that the order impugned in the revision was interlocutory in nature. In that case, two orders; one under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and the other under section 146(1-) Cr.P.C. were passed. The learned Single Judge of this Court held that the order passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. was interlocutory in nature. In that case, two orders; one under section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and the other under section 146(1-) Cr.P.C. were passed. The learned Single Judge of this Court held that the order passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. was interlocutory in nature. With due respects, it is difficult to follow the ruling as the view expressed therein is contrary to the various decisions of this Court: 5. In the case of Umrao v. Sheonarain, RLW 1973 353 this Court held that an order of attachment on the ground of emergency passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and revision lies against that order. Again, in the case of Malam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 Cr.L.J. 730 this Court held that an order passed under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. is a final order in the sense that it is amenable to revision. This view was reinforced in the case of Ghanshyam v. Smt. Parvati, 1977 RLW 492 wherein it was held that an order of attachment and appointment of receiver is a final order and revision lies against it. The same view was taken in the case of Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Kailash Chandra, 1981 RLW 549 wherein it was held that an order accepting or rejecting application under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. for attachment is not an interlocutory order. The issue even came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sitaram v. Ghasiram, 1980 RLW 155 wherein it was held at para No. 8 that an order of attachment under sub-sec. (1) of Section 146 Cr.P.C. is a final order and not an interlocutory order. 6. In view of the aforesaid legal position, it has to be held that the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate attaching the land and appointing receiver was not in the nature of interlocutory, and it was final order which was amenable to revision. The learned Sessions Judge has, therefore, not erred when he entertained the revision petition and decided the same. The other rulings cited by Mr. Patel, which are of Delhi and Guwahati High Courts, cannot be said to have laid down correct law. 7. Coming to the second contention, it may be stated that it is an admitted fact that there is a revenue suit pending between the parties in respect of the land in dispute. The other rulings cited by Mr. Patel, which are of Delhi and Guwahati High Courts, cannot be said to have laid down correct law. 7. Coming to the second contention, it may be stated that it is an admitted fact that there is a revenue suit pending between the parties in respect of the land in dispute. Therefore, the parties are in position to approach the Civil Court for interim order such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of property during pendency of the suit. The order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is in consonance with the dictum of the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., 1985 SC 472 . 8. It is to be noticed that proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 146 Cr.P.C. lays down that in the event of receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to subject of dispute by any Civil Court, the Magistrate shall discharge the receiver appointed by him. This clearly means that when the Civil Court is seized of the matter, and the parties have an opportunity to make application to such Court for appointment of receiver and ordinarily the Executive Magistrate should refrain from appointing receiver on the property under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. 9. From the observations of this Court in the case of Gularn Farid v. State of Rajasthan (supra) that mere pendency of the suit does not deprive the Executive Magistrate of his jurisdiction under section 146 Cr.P.C. to appoint a receiver, it cannot be understood that if Civil Court has not appointed a receiver the order appointing receiver under section 146(1) Cr.P.C. should always be maintained. It depends upon the facts & circumstances of each case. Keeping in view the observations made in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. (supra) it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge suffers from any illegality as to warrant interference by this Court. 10. Consequently, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******