JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Papinwar, learned counsel for petitioner. Respondent 2 though served, remained absent. The writ petition is directed against the judgment and order, dated 15 February 1999, passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Amravati, in Complaint (ULP) No. 143 of 1996 whereby the complaint filed by the present petitioner under item (9), Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition or Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, was dismissed. 2. Sri Papinwar, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that petitioner was serving as an Engineer in the department run by respondent 2. The petitioner, while he was in the employment of respondent 2, has submitted application for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995, and requested respondent 2 to allow him to retire from service with effect from 17 August 1995. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner thereafter changed his mind and decided to revoke/cancel his application for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995, and therefore submitted another application, dated 24 July 1995, by which he has withdrawn the voluntary retirement letter/application, dated 17 May 1995. It is submitted that respondent 2 has received both the applications of the petitioner. However, respondent 2 ignored the application, dated 24 July 1995, while passing the order, dated 1 November 1995. It is further stated that the order, dated 1 November 1995, passed by respondent 2 taking into consideration application for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995, and there is not even a whisper m the order, dated 1 November 1995, about the application, dated 24 July 1995, by which the petitioner has revoked his request for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995. 3. The learned counsel submitted that the above referred factual aspect of submitting application for voluntary retirement, datea 17 May 1995, requesting respondent 2 to allow the petitioner to retire with effect from 17 August 1995, as well as submission of another application, dated 24 July 1995, by which the petitioner has revoked the request of voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995, receipt of the above referred application by respondent 2 and passing order of accepting the permission to retire voluntarily, dated 1 November 1995, is not disputed by any of the parties. 4. 4. The learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the petitioner was well within his legal right to withdraw the application for voluntary retirement before 17 August 1995, before it is actually acted upon by the respondent. 5. In the instant case, since the petitioner has, vide application, dated 24 July 1995, withdrew his request for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995, there was no occasion for respondent 2 to act upon the application, dated 17 May 1995. Consequently, the petitioner should have been continued in service and his services should not have been terminated by respondent 2 with effect from 17 August 1995. It is submitted that the Industrial Court in fact has accepted the contention in this regard and also held in Para. 5 of the impugned order that the petitioner is entitled to submit the application for withdrawal before 17 August 1995. The learned counsel further contended that in spite of accepting the contention raised by the learned counsel the Industrial Court passed the impugned order, dated 15 February 1999, only because the petitioner has not given any specific reason for changing his mind to withdraw the application for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995. According to the learned counsel, this reasoning is not proper and same is also not sustainable in law. The learned counsel therefore contended that the impugned order is not just and proper and same is liable to be set aside. 6. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and perused the impugned order passed. The factual aspect as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner is undisputed. In the instant case, the petitioner has submitted his application for voluntary retirement on 17 May 1995 and requested respondent 2 to allow him to retire with effect from 17 August 1995. The petitioner submitted another application, dated 24 July 1995, by which the petitioner has revoked the request of voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995. In view of this factual aspect of the case, in my opinion, the petitioner was well within his right to withdraw the request of voluntary retirement before 17 August 1995, i.e., the date on which the petitioner has requested respondent 2 to allow him to retire. The controversy is covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in J.N. Shrivastav v. Union of India [1998 (5) L.L.N. (Supp.)]. 7. The controversy is covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in J.N. Shrivastav v. Union of India [1998 (5) L.L.N. (Supp.)]. 7. The Apex Court in the above referred judgment has held that: “It is well settled that even if the voluntary retirement notice is moved by an employee and gets accepted by the authority within the time fixed before the date of retirement is reached, the employee has locus poenitentiae to withdraw proposal for voluntary retirement.” 8. In the instant case, respondent 2 for the first time acted upon the application, dated 17 May 1995, on 1 November 1995, i.e., the date on which respondent 2 passed the order of voluntary retirement and the application for revocation of request of voluntary retirement was made by the petitioner to respondent 2 on 24 July 1995, i.e., much prior to the order of voluntary retirement passed by respondent 2. It is also true that the Industrial Court in fact accepted the contention in this regard raised by the petitioner. However, the complaint came to be rejected only on the ground that the petitioner has not put forth the reasons for changing his mind to withdraw the notice/application for voluntary retirement, dated 17 May 1995. This finding of the Industrial Court is totally misconceived and devoid of substance and same is therefore not sustainable in law at all. At this stage Sri Papinwar, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that respondent 2 authority should be directed to treat the petitioner to have validly withdrawn his proposal for voluntary retirement with effect from 24 July 1995 and treat the petitioner to be in service till the date of his superannuation. Respondent 2 also be directed to make good to the petitioner all the monetary benefits by treating him to have continuously worked till the date of his actual superannuation. While considering the submissions in this regard, it may not be lost sight of the fact that the petitioner was always ready and willing to work. However, respondent 2 did not allow him to work after 1 November 1995. In the circumstances, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Respondent 2 is directed to make available all the requisite monetary benefits to the petitioner in accordance with law subject to adjustment of any pension amount or other retirement benefits already paid to the petitioner. In the circumstances, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Respondent 2 is directed to make available all the requisite monetary benefits to the petitioner in accordance with law subject to adjustment of any pension amount or other retirement benefits already paid to the petitioner. Rule made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.