Judgment M.Y. Eqbal, J. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of dismissal passed by the respondent no.3, Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa and also for setting aside the order passed by the respondent no.2, Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Chotanagpur Range, Ranchi in appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of dismissal of his service. 2. The petitioner was charged with the offences of committing rape on Sukarmani Ho, an unmarried girl of the same police station. The charge against the petitioner was that while he was posted as writer constable at Dumaria Police Station on 26.5.86 he started dragging away Sukarmani Ho at about 7.30 PM, who was returning from Dumaria hat alongwith his aunt Mangali Ho and sister-in-law, Bilmati Ho. When she tried to raise alarm the petitioner shut her mouth and lifted her to a nearby bush and committed rape on her. A criminal case was also registered under Sections 366/376 IPC being Dumariai P.S. Case No.9 of 1986. A departmental proceeding was initiated and the enquiry officer, after recording the evidence of the witnesses, came to a finding that the charge levelled against the petitioner was proved. On the basis of the finding of the enquiry officer the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa passed the final order of dismissal of the services of the petitioner. A copy of the impugned order has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ application. The petitioner then preferred an appeal before the respondent no.2, which was also dismissed. 3. Mr. M.M. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, assailed the impugned orders as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the enquiry was conducted ex parte and neither the memo of charge nor any notice of the departmental proceedings was ever issued or served on the petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that even the memo of the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner nor a second show cause notice was issued before passing the order of dismissal. Learned counsel then submitted that although a criminal case was registered under Sections 366/376 IPC but from perusal of the same it would appear that no case under Section 376 IPC was made out rather it was a case under Section 354 IPC. Learned counsel then submitted that although a criminal case was registered under Sections 366/376 IPC but from perusal of the same it would appear that no case under Section 376 IPC was made out rather it was a case under Section 354 IPC. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the petitioner was ultimately acquitted in the criminal case by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Ghatshila in Sessions Trial No. 30/96. A copy of the said judgment has been attached and marked as Annexure 1/B to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner on 24.6.99. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that after committing the offence of rape on 26.5.86 the petitioner proceeded on leave from 27.5.86 and he remained absent from his duty till 3.2.87. It is further stated that the petitioner intentionally left the place just after a day of occurrence knowing about the seriousness of the offence and the violent move of the public against him due to his misconduct. The respondents further stated that the departmental proceeding was drawn and efforts were made by the conducting officer to serve the copy of the charge and the statement of allegations but the same could not be served as the petitioner was absent from his duty and was not available at the head quarter. The respondents have filed copies of the memo of different dates in support of the fact that efforts were made for serving the charge-sheet and the notices regarding the departmental proceeding. Lastly it is stated in the counter affidavit that several intimations were sent to the petitioner through the respondent no.4 where he was posted by wireless message and registered post to attend the proceeding on the date fixed and to submit his explanation and to cross examine the prosecution witnesses but the petitioner never appeared before the conducting officer. 4. From perusal of the impugned order of dismissal, it appears that in the departmental proceeding the victim girl Sukarmani Ho was examined. Besides her, Mangli Ho and Gangadhar Ho and the then officer-in-charge of Dumaria and one more officer Shiv Kumar Singh were examined. The Disciplinary authority, after considering the evidences of the above named witnesses, found that the charge levelled against the petitioner was conclusively proved. Besides her, Mangli Ho and Gangadhar Ho and the then officer-in-charge of Dumaria and one more officer Shiv Kumar Singh were examined. The Disciplinary authority, after considering the evidences of the above named witnesses, found that the charge levelled against the petitioner was conclusively proved. There is no material before me to disbelieve the finding arrived at by the enquiry officer, on the basis of which the impugned order was passed by the concerned respondent. 5. It is well settled that if the finding of the departmental enquiry is based on appreciation of evidence then this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, should not interfere with the said finding of fact. In this connection reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & ors (1996)1 UJ (SC) 80. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner put reliance on the judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge in sessions trial. From perusal of the judgment, it appears that only the mother of the victim girl was examined as prosecution witness no.1 but she was declared hostile. It does not appear from the judgment that prosecution side took any steps for the examination of other prosecution witnesses including the victim girl, the doctor and I.O. rather from the judgment it appears that the Sessions Court closed the evidence and passed the judgment holding that charges have not been proved. Even if there be any finding of the Sessions Court, the disciplinary proceeding or the order of punishment cannot be set aside. Be that as it may, it is a sorry state of affairs that a police officer, who is protector of the society, committed such type of offences in or near his police station. The conduct of the petitioner of taking leave after commission of the offence and remained absent for six months itself proves the guilt against him. 7. Having regard to the entire facts of the case and the totality of the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order of punishment passed by the respondent authority needs no interference by this Court. This writ application is, therefore, dismissed.