S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this application has, inter alia, questioned an order of punishment imposed upon him to quash order dated 10. 7. 92 and 29. 1. 93 as contained in annexure 'c' and 'g' respectively to the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioner at all material times was working as a Head Constable in the 12th Battalion of the Border Security Force. He was charge sheeted on two charges as would appear from the charge sheet which is contained in annexure 'g' to the writ application and read as follows:-"1. "leaving his picauet without orders from his superior officer in that he, at picquet Bornberia on 10. 3. 92 left the said picquet at about 2130 hrs. without orders from his superior officer. "2. An act prejudicial to good order and disciplines of the force in that he, on 10. 3. 92, while on Naka duty in area village Bornberia within the jurisdiction of BOP Bomberia improperly and without authority ordered constable Baldev Singh to open fire on a civilian marriage party, consequent to which 3 persons sustained bullet injuries. " ( 3 ) THE petitioner was placed under close arrest with effect from 2. 1. 93 (which according to the respondents bears a wrong date) by an order which is in the following term:-"whereas No. 71310032 HC Randhir Singh of this unit has been charged with an Offences under section 16 (d) and 40 of BSF Act 1968 committed on 10. 3. 92 at BOP Bornberia at about 21. 30 hrs. left the said picquet without orders from his superior officer and while on Naka duty in area village Bornberia within the jurisdiction of BOP Bornberia improperly and without authority ordered Constable Baldeb Singh to open fire on a civilian marriage party, consequent to which 03 persons sustained bullet injuries. I hereby direct that the said No. 71310032 HC Randhir Singh be placed under close arrest with effect from 02. 1. 93 (F. N.) till the finalisation of proceedings against him in the interest of discipline of the Force. I hereby direct that the said No. 71310032 HC Randhir Singh be placed under close arrest with effect from 02. 1. 93 (F. N.) till the finalisation of proceedings against him in the interest of discipline of the Force. " ( 4 ) THE petitioner in this writ application has taken a plea that while he was on Naka duty on 10th March, 1992 he came to learn that some Bangladeshis has surreptitiously entered into India and had been taking part in a marriage. The petitioner accompanied by 3 Constables, went to the locale for enquiring into the matter but they were attacked by a large number of persons as a result whereof he was seriously injured and upon becoming unconscious was hospitalised. Allegedly in self-defence the 3 constables accompanied the petitioner had to open fire as a result whereof 3 persons had received bullet injuries. ( 5 ) IT is stated that a request had been made by his superior officer to lodge a first Information report as would appear from annexure 'a' to the Affidavit-in-reply. The petitioner, however, was charge sheeted on the aforementioned charges. He had also been placed under suspension. ( 6 ) THE respondents, however, alleged that with a view to settle scores with another Constable, the petitioner and 3 others have without any authority entered the house of a civilian at night without having a valid search warrant or approval raided a house in a state of drunkenness and fired 8 rounds on the civilian marriage party at about 10. 15 P. M; as a result whereof 3 persons sustained bullet injuries. Such raid, according to the respondents, was motivated and pre-planned with the sole motive to take revenge. ( 7 ) A court of enquiry was held wherein four witnesses were examined on behalf of the department. The petitioner cross examined the civilian witnesses but declined to cross-examine the officers of Border Security Force. Two additional witnesses have also been examined whom also the writ petitioner did not choose to Cross-examine. Two witnesses, however, were examined on behalf of the defence also. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY the charges against the petitioner came within the purview of section 16 (d) and section 46 of the Border Security Force Act which read thus :-"16. Two additional witnesses have also been examined whom also the writ petitioner did not choose to Cross-examine. Two witnesses, however, were examined on behalf of the defence also. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY the charges against the petitioner came within the purview of section 16 (d) and section 46 of the Border Security Force Act which read thus :-"16. Offences punishable more severely on active duty than at other times-any person subject to the Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say; (a)???????? (d)without order from his superior officer leave his guard, picket, patrol or post;46. Civil offences-subject to the provisions of section 47, any person subject to this Act who at any place in or beyond India commits any civil offence shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if charged therewith under this section shall be liable to be tried by a Security Force Court and, on conviction be punishable as follows, that is to say; (A)IF the offence is one which would be punishable under any law in force in India with death, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, assigned for the offence, by the aforesaid law and such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; and (B)IN any other case, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, assigned for the offence by the law in force in India, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned. " ( 9 ) HOWEVER, the Commandant of 12th Battalion in exercise of its power conferred upon him under Rule 51 (2) (iii) decided to try the petitioner by a Summary Security Force Court. ( 10 ) THE petitioner contends that such a trial had never in fact been held and purported sitting took place on 2. 2. 93 and without giving an opportunity to the petitioner, he has been forcibly put into prison for 89 days and was demoted to the rank of Constable which was a reduction of 3 stages. The petitioner contends that he had not been served with a final order with reasons nor could he get an opportunity to exercise his statutory right of making representation and/or appeal under section 117 of the Border Security Force Act. The petitioner contends that he had not been served with a final order with reasons nor could he get an opportunity to exercise his statutory right of making representation and/or appeal under section 117 of the Border Security Force Act. This writ petition was filed when the writ petitioner was in prison, and by an order dated 27. 4. 93 a learned Judge of this court directed maintenance of status quo as regard the service of the petitioner. ( 11 ) MR Mrinal Kanti Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the purported order of punishment imposed upon the writ petitioner, only on the basis of alleged plea of guilt made by him, was wholly illegal. It has submitted that as the promulgation order was served on the petitioner on 27th March, 1973, the same was illegal. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner's signature had not been obtained on the alleged recording of admission of the petitioner's guilt. It has further been submitted that the trial for the said purpose would mean trial in terms of the relevant rules governed by Chapter-11 of the Border Security Force Rules. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, the provisions of Rules 145, 147, 148 and 149 had not been adhered to. It has further been submitted that it was not a case where a trial by a Summary Security Force Court should have been taken recourse to. In any event, according to the learned counsel, the principles of natural justice had not been complied with and no reason in support of the order has been assigned. In support of his aforementioned contention reliance had been placed Dr. Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in (1994)5 SCC 267 , S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in (1990)4 SCC 594 , M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union and Anr. reported in (1974)3 SCC 318 and Ashis Kumar Kundu v. Border Security Force reported in 1997 (7) SLR 240. ( 12 ) MR. Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in (1994)5 SCC 267 , S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in (1990)4 SCC 594 , M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union and Anr. reported in (1974)3 SCC 318 and Ashis Kumar Kundu v. Border Security Force reported in 1997 (7) SLR 240. ( 12 ) MR. Mihir Chakraborty, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents have produced a Xerox copy of the records and submitted that from a perusal thereof it would appear that the petitioner had not only been allowed to be represented by a friend in terms of Rule 157 of the Rules but he having pleaded guilty was sentenced on the basis thereof. ( 13 ) SECTION 74 (1) enables the authorities to hold a trial in respect of an offence punishable under the Act by a Summary Security Force Court. Sub-section (2) of section 74 reads thus :-" (2) When there is no grave reason for immediate action and the reference can without detriment to discipline be made to officer empowered to convene a Petty Security Force Court for the trial of the alleged offender, and officer holding a Summary Security Force Court shall not try without such reference any offence punishable under any of the sections 14, 17 and 46 of this Act, or any offence against the officer holding the court. " ( 14 ) IN the instant case admittedly a reference of the Summary Security Force Court has been made. Section 115 of the Board Security Force Act reads thus :-"transmission of Proceedings of a Summary Security Force Courts-The proceedings of every Summary Security Force Court shall, without delay, be forwarded to the officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector-General within whose command the trial was held, or to the prescribed officer, and such officer, or the Director-General or any officer empowered by him in this behalf may, for reasons based on the merits of the case, but not on merely technical grounds, set aside the proceedings, or reduce the sentence to any other sentence which the court might have passed. " ( 15 ) A finding of Summary Security Force Court does not require an approval of the prescribed authority but compliance of the provision of section 115 serves the purpose. " ( 15 ) A finding of Summary Security Force Court does not require an approval of the prescribed authority but compliance of the provision of section 115 serves the purpose. In the instant case, however, the said provision does not appear to have been complied with. ( 16 ) SECTION 116 of the Act also provides for alteration of finding or sentence by a higher authority. Section 117 provides for an appeal. Section 167 (2) of the rules also provides for a petition against finding and sentence of court by the charged officer. Rule 143 of the rules provides for the procedure after plea of quilt is raised. Upon perusal of the records it appears that the records are maintained interim of the printed forms and only blanks had been filled up. It is recorded :-"the accused having pleaded guilty to both 1st and 2nd (Two) charges, the court explains to the accused the meaning of charge (s) to which he has pleaded guilty and ascertains that the accused understands the nature of the charge (s) to which he has pleaded guilty. The court also inform the accused the general effect of that plea and the difference in procedure which will be followed consequent to the said plea. The court having satisfied itself that accused understands the charge (s) and the effect of his plea of guilty, accepts and records the same. The provisions of Rule 142 (2) are complied with. " ( 17 ) HOWEVER, from the records it does not appear that any procedure has been adopted after allegd compliance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 142. Evidences were necessary to be recorded even in a case where the delinquent officer pleads guilty as is evident from Clause (b) of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 143 clearly states that the evidence shall be taken in the like manner as is directed by these rules in the case of a plea of 'not Guilty'. The petitioner has also not been allowed to make his submission although statements in this regard had been made in the affidavit-in-opposition. The order of promulgation has also not been passed as is required under Rule 159 of the said rules, but even prior thereto the sentence had been executed. ( 18 ) THE rules REFERRED TO hereinbefore, have been framed with a view to protect a delinquent officer from an arbitrary trial. The order of promulgation has also not been passed as is required under Rule 159 of the said rules, but even prior thereto the sentence had been executed. ( 18 ) THE rules REFERRED TO hereinbefore, have been framed with a view to protect a delinquent officer from an arbitrary trial. Such rules were, therefore, required to be strictly followed. As mandatory provisions of the rules had not been followed, the impugned order cannot be sustained although the petitioner has pleaded guilty. In normal circumstances such a plea of guilt might have been sufficient to proceed to pass an order of punishment but in terms of the statutory rules framed under Border Security Force Act, the concerned respondents were bound to follow the procedure laid down under the Act and Rules framed there under. Moreover, no reason has also been assigned in the order nor any final order has been passed. ( 19 ) IN M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union and anr. reported in (1974)3 SCC 318 , the apex court observed :-"the giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or abrbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Second, it is a well-known principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. Third, it should be remembered that an appeal generally lies from the decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial authorities to this court by special leave granted under Article 136. A judgment which lies not disclose the reasons, will be of little assistance to the court. The court will have to wade through the entire record and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong. A judgment which lies not disclose the reasons, will be of little assistance to the court. The court will have to wade through the entire record and find for itself whether the decision in appeal is right or wrong. In many cases this investment of time and industry will be saved if reasons are given in support of the conclusions. So it is necessary to emphasise that judicial and quasi-judicial authorities should always give the reasons in support of their conclusions. " ( 20 ) IN S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India reported in (1990)4 SCC 594 , the apex court has held that assigning of reasons is a part of the principles of natural justice. ( 21 ) IN Dr. Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 267 , the apex court has clearly held:-"the concept of natural justice is not a static one but is an ever expanding concept. In the initial stages it was thought that it had only two elements, namely, (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause and (ii) no one shall be condemned unheard. With the passage of time a third element was introduced, namely, of procedural reasonableness because the main objective of the requirement of rule of natural justice is to promote justice and prevent it miscarriage. Therefore, when the legislature confers power in the State Government to be exercised in certain circumstances or eventualities, it would be right to presume that the legislature intends that the said power be exercised in the manner envisaged by the statute. If the statute confers drastic powers it goes without saying that such powers must be exercised in a proper and fair manner. Drastic substantive laws can be suffered only if they are fairly and reasonably applied. In order to ensure fair and reasonable application of such laws courts have, over a period of time, devised rules of fair procedure to avoid arbitrary exercise of such powers. True it is, the rules of natural justice operate as checks on the freedom of administrative action and often prove time-consuming but that is the price one has to pay to ensure fairness in administrative action. And this fairness can be ensured by adherence to the expanded notion of rule of natural justice. True it is, the rules of natural justice operate as checks on the freedom of administrative action and often prove time-consuming but that is the price one has to pay to ensure fairness in administrative action. And this fairness can be ensured by adherence to the expanded notion of rule of natural justice. Therefore, where a statute confers wide powers on an administrative authority coupled with wide discretion, the possibility of its arbitrary use can be controlled or checked by insisting on their being exercised in a manner which can be said to be procedurally fair. Rules of natural justice are, therefore, devised for ensuring fairness and promoting satisfactory decision making. Where the statute is silent and a contrary intention cannot be implied the requirement of the applicability of the rule of natural justice is read into it to ensure fairness and to protect the action from the charge of arbitrariness. Natural justice has thus secured a foothold to supplement enacted law by operating as an implied mandatory requirement thereby protecting it from the vice of arbitrariness court presume this requirement in all its width as implied unless the enactment supplies indications to the contrary as in the present case. " ( 22 ) IN Ashis Kumar Kundu v. Border Security Force reported in 1997 (7) SLR 240, I had the occasion to consider a large number of decisions and held that the principles of natural justice required to be complied with in the manner laid down under the Boarder Security Force Rules. ( 23 ) IT has further been noticed :-"in Shri Hanuman Steel Rolling Mill v. CESC Limited, reported in 1996 (1) Cal HN 469, it has been held :-in Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edition, page 497 the learned author observed:-"the hypothesis on which the courts built up their jurisdiction was that the duty to give every victim a fair hearing was just as much a canon of good administration as of good legal procedure. Even where an order or determination is unchallengeable as regards its substance, the court can at least control the preliminary procedure so as to require fair consideration of both sides of the case. Nothing is more likely to conduce the good administration. Even where an order or determination is unchallengeable as regards its substance, the court can at least control the preliminary procedure so as to require fair consideration of both sides of the case. Nothing is more likely to conduce the good administration. ' apart from the rules of audi alteram partem, which means that no one shall be condemned unheard, corollary of which is that he should be given reasonable notice of the nature of the case to be met, there are other rules of common law to the same effect. [see Franklin v. Minister Town and Country Planning, 1947 AC 87 : 1947 (2) All ER 289, John v. Rees, 1970 Ch D 345]. In De-Smith's Judicial Review of Administration Action, 5th Edition, at page 403, the learned authors have REFERRED TO various decisions while emphasising the need to comply with the principles of natural justice in a case of forfeiture or deprivation of some right as also in the cases where application are required to be filed as for example the cases of licence. " ( 24 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned this court has no other option but to hold that a purported order of punishment imposed upon the petitioner being not in conformity with the law, the same is liable to be set aside. This application is allowed with liberty to respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. However, in the event, the petitioner is found not guilty, it will be open to the concerned authorities to consider the question of compensating the petitioner and in case he is found guilty, the fact that he had undergone imprisonment for some time should also be taken into consideration. In the facts and circumstances of this case the petitioner shall be entitled to costs. Counsels fee assessed at 100 gms. Application allowed.