JUDGMENT 1. This revisional application is directed against the judgment and order dated 15th January, 1996 passed by Shri Milan Chatterjee, Additional Sessions Judge, Hooghly in Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1994 whereunder he set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by Shri B. Konar, Judicial Magistrate, Third Court, Hooghly dated 28th July, 1994 in T.R. Case No. 39 of 1993 arising out of Criminal Case No. 558 of 1992 under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts leading to the present revision may be summarized as follows: – "The revision-petitioner Sm. Santi Das filed a complaint against Shri Dilip Das (opposite party no.2 in the present revision) before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly on 24th December, 1992 alleging that the said accused Dilip Das married her according to Hindu rites on 4th November, 1992 and took her in his house as his wife immediately thereafter and they lived as husband and wife for some days. The two maternal uncles of Dilip, namely, Satyanarayan and Dulal and one brother of Dilip named Samir were not happy with that marriage and could not accept her and troubles arose and they provoked Dilip against her and Dilip demanded from her dowry to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand). Her father being a poor man could somehow pay Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) and other articles as dowry, but could not pay more. On 8th November, 1992, the said maternal uncles of Dilip prompted him to beat her and use filthy languages at her and Dilip dealt fists and blows at her and on the night of 8th November, 1992, he left the house leaving her alone. On the next day, that is, 9th November, 1992, the said maternal uncles of Dilip and the said brother of Dilip in collusion with one another drove her from Dilip's house and as a result, she was compelled to take shelter in the house of her father. Subsequently, she came to know that Dilip was living with another woman. On the next day, that is, 9th November, 1992, the said maternal uncles of Dilip and the said brother of Dilip in collusion with one another drove her from Dilip's house and as a result, she was compelled to take shelter in the house of her father. Subsequently, she came to know that Dilip was living with another woman. Thereafter, on 24th December, 1992, she lodged the said complaint before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against the four accused persons, namely, Dilip, his brother Samir and his two maternal uncles, Satyanarayan and Dulal and issued summons under Section 498A I.P.C. Thereafter, the accused persons appeared before the Court and trial was held. Charge was framed when all the accused pleaded not guilty and, thereafter, witnesses were examined on behalf of both the sides and the accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C. and the learned Judicial Magistrate, after hearing the learned Advocates for both the sides passed the judgment finding the accused persons guilty of the offence under Section 498A I.P.C. and convicting them thereunder and sentencing them to r. i. for three months each." 3. Being aggrieved by that judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, the convicts preferred an appeal before the Court of Sessions. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the materials-on-record and hearing the learned Advocates for both the sides came to hold that the charge against the accused persons had not been substantiated from the evidence on record and he reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted all the accused persons. 4. Being aggrieved by that judgment of acquittal, the complainant, Sm. Santi Das, has preferred the present revisional application before this Court challenging the impugned order as erroneous, illegal and not sustainable. 5. Learned Advocate for the opposite party, State of West Bengal, has urged before me that the revision will not be maintainable against acquittal in view of a number of reasons. In the first place, the legal principle in this regard has been enunciated by the Apex Court in a number of reported judgments. 5. Learned Advocate for the opposite party, State of West Bengal, has urged before me that the revision will not be maintainable against acquittal in view of a number of reasons. In the first place, the legal principle in this regard has been enunciated by the Apex Court in a number of reported judgments. It has been held that revisional power in this regard is to be exercised by the High Court with great care and caution and very sparingly and it will interfere with an order of acquittal only in exceptional cases to prevent a gross miscarriage of Justice or to set at right a patent wrong or error of law or of fact which would otherwise cause irreparable injury Bansi Lal & other vs. Laxman Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721 : 1986 Cr. LJ 1603. 6. In a host of other decisions reported in K. Chinnaswamy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & another, AIR 1962 SC 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh & another, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; Khetra Basi Samal & another vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1970 SC 272 and Ramesh Chandra J. Thakur vs. A.P. Jhaveri & another, AIR 1973 SC 84 , the Apex Court has reiterated that the power of High Court to set aside the order of acquittal, at the instance of a private party, is to be exercised only in exceptional cases of glaring defect in procedure or manifest error and on point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of Justice. It has been further held that since sub-section (3) of Section 401 Cr. P.C. forbids the conversion of finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it places a limitation on the power of High Court to set aside an acquittal order which should be exercised only in exceptional cases. An illustrative list of such exceptional cases has been spelt out as follows: – (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but still acquitted the accused. (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution listed to produce. (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible. (iv) Where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial or appellate Court. (v) Where acquittal is passed on compounding all the offences invalid under the law. 7. (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible. (iv) Where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial or appellate Court. (v) Where acquittal is passed on compounding all the offences invalid under the law. 7. In the present case, the learned Appellate Court below appears to have analysed and evaluated the evidence on record and after making a thorough assessment thereof, he has come to the conclusion that the prosecution charge has not been proved beyond doubt. Nowhere, there is any instance of his discarding the evidence or shutting out the evidence nor I find any trace of his having wrongly admitted inadmissible evidence or having indulged in any jurisdictional error. He has carefully scanned the evidence and arrived at his own decision and so far as the question of belief and disbelief is concerned there is no scope under a revisional application for this Court, to interfere with his finding. 8. In a very recent Division Bench judgment reported in Bimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh, 1999 Cr. LJ 16 (SC), Bimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh, the Apex Court has held that the interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of Justice or the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial Court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered. It has been further held that where the trial Court assessed the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and as such acquitted the accused appellant, the High Court has no reason or scope to enter into the domain of reappraisal of evidence which it was not authorized to do in exercise of its revisional power. In the instant case, as I have already pointed out, the appellate Court below made a thorough assessment of the evidences adduced before the trial Court by the prosecution as well as by the defence and gave elaborate reasons for his not being convinced about the contention of the prosecution that the charge has been established. In the instant case, as I have already pointed out, the appellate Court below made a thorough assessment of the evidences adduced before the trial Court by the prosecution as well as by the defence and gave elaborate reasons for his not being convinced about the contention of the prosecution that the charge has been established. In such circumstances, in view of the abovementioned settled legal position, this Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, has no competence or scope to enter into a reappraisal of the same evidence already considered by the Court below. 9. As I have shown above, there has been no defect or infirmity touching the jurisdiction of the trial Court or the aspects which have already been discussed above. 10. In that view of the matter, this Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, is unable to order a retrial or to hold that the order of acquittal should be converted into one of conviction. 11. Another question also has been raised touching the maintainability of this revisional application. Under Section 401, sub-section (4) of the Cr. P.C., it is provided that where, under this Code, an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. Under Section 378 Cr. P.C., a private party is permitted in a case instituted on complaint to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal provided special leave is obtained from High Court. So, it follows that since a provision for appeal has been laid down in respect of such cases, preferring of revision is barred. From that point of view also, the present revisional application having been filed by a private party, that is, the complainant of a complaint case, suffers a set back. 12. In view of the above reasons, I am constrained to hold that this revisional application will not be legally maintainable and on merits also it does not hold any water. In the result, the revisional application is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal of the appellate Court below be affirmed.