T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Petition is against the dismissal of I. A. II by the first appellate Court by allowing I. A. I and confirming the sale by the first appellate Court. The appellate Court has reversed the order of the Trial Court under which the sale held on 28. 8. 1992 was set aside. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case that given raise to the above C. R. P. is that one Enni Mallikarjuna, in pursuance of a final decree obtained on 9. 5. 1987 filed execution Petition No. 65/1990 on 6. 11,1990 to bring the property to recovery of money; the sale proclamation was published on 19. 7. 1992 spot sale was on 26. 8. 92 and the sale in the Court was on 28. 8. 1992, there were no bidder so far as item 1 to 4 and 6 are concerned excepting item-5 namely the land measuring 1 acre 25 guntas in Sy. No. 144/2 of Yadagigalamana village; only half of the said land was brought for sale and the first respondent herein became highest bidder for Rs 13,000/- on the date when the sale was held on the spot; on 26. 8. 1982; when the matter had come up before the Court for final on 28. 8. 1982 none came forward in bidding for more; on 28. 8. 1982, when the sale was knock down in the name of the first respondent, he deposited Rs. 4,000/- and the remaining sum of Rs. 9000/- on 10. 9. 1992 the first respondent filed I. A.-I Under - Order 21 Rule-92 CPC to confirm the sale and to make it absolute; in the meantime I. A. II was also filed by the judgment debtor under Order-21 Rule-89 to set aside the sale. ( 3 ) THE objection to the sale was that there was no sale proclamation was published on spot; there is illwill between himself and first respondent; sale notice is silent about portion of the land put to sale; value of the property was not mentioned in the sale proclamation; after purchaser is a lecturer and he has no right to purchase the property under the provision of Karnataka Land Reforms act; even then the Judgment debtor was ready and willing to pay the decretal amount and consequently, the sale must be set aside. ( 4 ) THE first respondent action purchaser contended that the judgment debtor has not deposited the money required to be deposited in law within the stipulated time to maintain an application under Order 21 Rule 89; and consequently, the sale must be confirmed. ( 5 ) THE trial Court holding that even application under Order-21, Rule -8 is not filed within time and an objection filed on 25,9. 1992 can be construed as an application, sei aside the sale. The Trial court also found that as per the report of the Court Ameen the court has adopted the proper procedure; it is also found as a fact, no application has been filed by the judgment debtor under Order- 21, Rule-89, CPC within 30 days of sale. The J. D. R. also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act later along with application under Order-21, Rule 89 the Court also finds Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not apply to execution proceedings and therefore application filed later is not maintainable; however the application can be construed from the objections filed on 25. 9. 1992. On the other hand the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the sale cannot be set aside. I. A. I, filed by the judgment debtor under Order 21 Rule 89 was filed on 24. 7. 1993; it was also found that the decree amount and also solatium amount was not deposited within 30 days from the date of sale. Consequently, the application for setting aside the sale was dismissed and the sale was confirmed by the first appellate Court. ( 6 ) IT is contended that I All is one filed under Section 151 CPC and therefore no appeal lies; the proclamation of sale and sale was defective and the property was probably undervalued; the objection filed on 25. 9. 1992 is certainly can be construed as an application under Order 21 Rule 89; the property is valued more than 1. 5 lakhs there was no need to bring the entire property to sale when the entire property is valued at Rs. 50,000/-; consequently, the sale is liable to be set aside. 9. 1992 is certainly can be construed as an application under Order 21 Rule 89; the property is valued more than 1. 5 lakhs there was no need to bring the entire property to sale when the entire property is valued at Rs. 50,000/-; consequently, the sale is liable to be set aside. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the auction purchaser it was submitted that 60 days limitation is provided under Article-127 and the same having been not paid, the Court has no power to apply Section 5 of the limitation Act; even I. A. No. lv was liable to be dismissed as the deposit was not made within 30 days; there is no need to fix a minimum charge in the proclamation of sale and in-adequacy of sale is not a ground for setting aside the sale; what was brought was one half of the property and not a entire property; admittedly no application was filed by the petitioner for setting aside the sale under order 21, Rule-91, by alleging fraud; under Rule-89, the sale can be set aside only if the applicant paid the required amounts with solatium; if this was not made, the Court has no choice but to confirm the sale; even the alleged payment of Rs. 7130/- said to have been made to 2nd respondent was on 31. 10. 1992 i. e. after two months and two days from the date of sale; consequently the confirmation of sale is certainly correct. ( 8 ) HEARD the respective counsel. ( 9 ) THE question that arise for consideration is whether without filing an application under Order 21 Rule 89, a sale can be set aside? Whether the time prescribed for filing of application or for depositing of amount can be extended by applying Section 5 of the limitation Act? and whether the sale in this case is to be confirmed or not? ( 10 ) THERE is no dispute that within 30 days no application is filed under Order 21 Rule 89 or under Order 21 Rule 90. An objection to la. can never be construed as an application within a meaning of order-21 Rule 89 or 90. In fact the wording in Order 21 Rule 89 as per the Karnataka amendment is "may apply to have the sale certificate on his deposit in Court. An objection to la. can never be construed as an application within a meaning of order-21 Rule 89 or 90. In fact the wording in Order 21 Rule 89 as per the Karnataka amendment is "may apply to have the sale certificate on his deposit in Court. " even without the Karnataka amendment, Rule 89 also uses the same words. Order 21 Rulet 89fi) reads as follows:- (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the Judgment debtor or any person deriving title from the judgment debtor or any person holding an interest in the property or whose interests are in the opinion of the Court. substantially affected by the sale, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court, (a) for payment to the purchaser a sum equal to five percent of the purchase money, and (b) for payment to the decree holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been paid or deposited towards satisfaction of the decree; ( 11 ) THE applications filed in this case are as follows:- (a) LA. No. 1 by Respondent-1 under Order-21 Rule-92 dated 13. 11. 1992 for confirmation of sale. (b) LA. No. 2 by petitioner/judgment debtor under Order 21 Rule 89 dated 24. 7. 1993 for setting aside sale dated 26. 8. 1992/ 28. 8. 1992, on the ground that the entire amount has been paid to decree - holder. (c) LA. No. 3 by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation act dated, 24. 7. 1993 seeking condonation of delay in filing the above I. A. No. 2. (d) LA. No. 4 by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC dated 24. 7. 1993 to treat the objection dated 25. 9. 1992 as an application under Order 21 Rule 89. No. 3 by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation act dated, 24. 7. 1993 seeking condonation of delay in filing the above I. A. No. 2. (d) LA. No. 4 by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC dated 24. 7. 1993 to treat the objection dated 25. 9. 1992 as an application under Order 21 Rule 89. ( 12 ) THE 1st respondent action purchaser filed his written arguments and contended that :- the question that arises for consideration in the matter is whether the application I. A. No. 2 under Rule 89, I. A. No. 3 for condonation of delay in filing I. A. No. 2, and I. A. No. 4 for treating objection as application under Rule 89 CPC filed by the petitioner were maintainable and whether the alleged payment was within time? The facts and dates relevant for this purpose are: a) date of sale at spot 26. 8. 1992 b) final bid/sale in Court 28. 8. 1992 c) i. A. No. 1 was filed by respondent-1 under Order 21, Rule-92 for confirmation of sale ( 13 ) 11. 1992d) i. A. No. 2 under Rule 89 by petitioner for setting aside sale filed on 24. 7. 1993 e) i. A. No. 3 under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing I. A. 2 filed on 24. 7. 1993 f) la. No. 4 was filed by petitioner to treat the objection as an application Under Order 21, Rule-89 on 24. 7. 1993 g) according to petitioner, the alleged payment of Rs. 7130/- was made directly to JDR -Respondent No. 2 on 31. 10. 1992 (Admittedly the amount is not deposited in Court as per Rule 89 and alleged to have been paid to DHR after 2 months 2 days) h) according to petitioner, he deposited Rs. 650/- towards solatium on. . . 9. 9. 1993 i) 31 1/2 guntas only out of Sy. No. 144/2 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas sold. 13. It is further contended by the respondent-1 that. Order 21 rule 89 provides for filing application tor setting aside sale on depositing in Court solatium equal to 5% of purchase money and also the amount specified in the sale proclamation and 60 days limitation is provided under Articles 127, sub-rule (2) of Rule-92 requires the said deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale. Order 21 rule 89 provides for filing application tor setting aside sale on depositing in Court solatium equal to 5% of purchase money and also the amount specified in the sale proclamation and 60 days limitation is provided under Articles 127, sub-rule (2) of Rule-92 requires the said deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale. Admittedly the above I. A. 2 to 4 were filed by the petitioner a year after the sale and hence barred by time. Section 5 of Limitation act has no application to such I. As. To this effect, the dictum in mohan LAL vs HARI PRASAD YADAV AND OTHERS C/w (MOHAN LAL AND OTHERS vs PARMANAND GUPTA AND another) is relied upon to the following effect:- a. Executing court has no jurisdiction to entertain such application (Order 21 Rule 89 Section 148) after a period of 60 days prescribed under Article 127 of Limitation Act Section 5 of Limitation Act not attracted to such application in view of express exclusion contained therein Exercise of Court's discretion to enlarge time under Section 148 also not invocable, time for making such application being not fixed by Court. B. Order 21, Rule 90, Objections filed by Judgment debtor/ petitioners under, dismissed by executing Court Order of executing Court affirmed by High Court in appeal Held, no interference called for in SLP Constitution of India, article 136. " the amount required to be deposited to invoke Rule-89 was not deposited as per Rule 89 at any time much less paid or deposited within 30 days time as provided under Rule 92 (2) which is mandatory. In this regard, the 1st respondent placed reliance in P. K. UNNI vs nirmala INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS to the following effect:- "civil P. C. (1908), Order 21, Rules 89 and 92 (2) Limitation act (1963), Article 127 (as amended by Act 104 of 1976), application for setting aside sale of immovable property sold in execution Limitation for making deposit deposit has to be made within 30 days from date of sale under Rule 92 (2) and within 60 days under Article 127 of Limitation Act. The current construction of Rule 92 (2) of Order XXI of Civil p. C. leads to the irresistible conclusion that the time for making a deposit in terms of Rule 89 of Order XXI is 30 days, and article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribing the period for making an application under Rule 89 has no relevance to the prescribed time for making the deposit. Neither provision has any effect on the other as to time. Rule 89 postulates an appiication on deposit. It says "may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court". These words show that deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application to set aside a sale. That condition must be satisfied within the period prescribed by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 92, which undoubtedly is 30 days. Parliament refused to alter that provision even when a part of the sub-rule was substituted. Though sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 had received the special attention of Parliament in 1976, Parliament addressed itself particularly to the sub-rule, and yet did not, apart from the special contingency provided for by the amendment, think it necessary to extend the period generally prescribed under Rule 92 (2) to make the deposit which is a condition precedent to an application to set aside a sale. Prior to the Amending Act 104 of 1976 the period prescribed by Article 127 was 30 days. As a result of the amendment, a period of 60 days is provided for making an application to set aside a sale. It is important to remember that Article 127 appears in Part-I of Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, dealing exclusively with applications. Article 127 thus relates solely to the making of an application and not to a deposit. This article governs applications made under Rules 90 and 91 as well. Thus, prior to the Amending Act. 104 of 1976, the period prescribed for the making of an application was identical to that for the making of a deposit. But as a result of the amendment, different periods are now prescribed for the making of the deposit and the application. That it was the legislative intent to provide different periods of limitation for these two matters is, from the language used in the two enactments, clear and explicit. But as a result of the amendment, different periods are now prescribed for the making of the deposit and the application. That it was the legislative intent to provide different periods of limitation for these two matters is, from the language used in the two enactments, clear and explicit. The reason why the legislature provided for different periods for the two matters which are the necessary steps one following the other to be taken for setting aside the sale on an immovable property sold in execution of a decree is not for the Court to question. The Supreme Court would not assume that the legislature made a mistake in this respect or made an omission in accomplishing what it had set out to achieve. There is no inconsistency between the two sets of provisions prescribing different periods of limitation. Such inconsistency can arise only if obedience of one provision will result in disobedience of the other. While Rule 92 (2) requires a deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale, Article 127 requires an application contemplated under Rule 89 to be made within 60 days from the date of sale. The deposit must necessarily precede the application for no application under Rule-89 can be made except on depositing the amount in Court. Further, the words of the statutes being clear, explicit and unambiguous, there is no scope to have recourse to external aid for their construction. " ( 14 ) THE further contention of the first respondent before this Court is that even I. A. No. 4 was liable to be dismissed as deposit was not made within 30 days. Hence I. A. No. 2, 3 and 4 were liable to be dismissed as has been rightly done by the Civil Judge in view of the provisions of CPC, Limitation Act, In this regard, he relied upon the dictum of Supreme Court in AIR 1990 SC 133 and 1994 (4) SCC- 177 mentioned supra. The further contention of the 1st respondent is that the Executing Court in the instant case had never fixed any minimum price, nor has it any jurisdiction to do it. The further contention of the 1st respondent is that the Executing Court in the instant case had never fixed any minimum price, nor has it any jurisdiction to do it. Neither there is any order of the executing Court, nor there is any condition in the sale proclamation, nor there is any provision in CPC or under Rule 66 of Order 21 to the effect that the sale/bid shall not be accepted and confirmed if the bid amount is lower than the value mentioned in the sale proclamation/lstihar. Rs. 50,000/- mentioned in Isthihar patti is only the approximate estimate of the value of Panchas for entire Sy. No. 144/2 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas as observed by the trial Court, but it is not the minimum price at all. Intact even the executing Court has not said in its order that any minimum price was fixed by it nor has said that the price mentioned in Istihar is the minimum price. This respondent has purchased the land for more than the market price because the land is highly convenient and useful for better cultivation and enjoyment of his own lands which are situated by the side of the land in question. The land is not good since there is lack of proper cultivation and care and water. The Courts below have observed that the sale proclamation and sale was in accordance with law and that as observed by the Trial court there were about 17 persons participated in the auction. These circumstances would clearly indicate that there was a keen competition to purchase and that it fetched a very good price which is even more than the market price. The petitioner has not produced any evidence to show that the value of the property is more than the bid/purchase price. On this aspect, the 1st respondent relied upon the dictum of this Court in H. N. VINAYAKA and OTHERS vs firm OF H. VENKATASASTRY and SONS to the following effect:- tor setting aside a sale by Court under Order 21 Rule 90 cpc, it is necessary for a judgment debtor to show that there was not only substantial injury caused as a result of the low price fetched but such a result was on account of the material irregularities or fraud in the publication and conduct of sale AIR 1971 SC 2337 relied on. Where the price fetched at the sale is not shown to be grossly inadequate, a consideration of the material irregularities, unless any rule or law of a mandatory character has been infringed, is rendered un-necessary. A contention that the purchaser not having been an agriculturist could not have purchased the lands by virtue of the provisions of Section 80 of the Land Reforms Act is not open to a judgment-debtor in an enquiry under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC. RADHY SHYAM vs SHYAM BEHARI SINGH is relied upon to the following effect:- "in order to set aside an auction sale mere proof of a material irregularity such as the one under Rule 69 and inadequacy of price realised in such a sale, in other words injury, is not sufficient. What has to be established is that there was not only in-adequacy of the price but that that in-adequacy was caused by person of the material irregularity or fraud. A connection has thus to be established between the in-adequacy of the price and the material irregularity. " further the question of adequacy or otherwise of the sale price is irrelevant as it is outside the scope of Rule 89 under which the petitioner-Judgment-Debtor sought for setting aside the sale. The civil Judge had rightly confirmed the sale. ( 15 ) THE further contention of the 1st defendant is thai the records show that since the decretal amount was not paid till 1992 inspite of several opportunities for over several years having been afforded to the petitioner, right from the suit in 1980 till 1992, his mortgaged property was brought for sale in the said execution with due notice and knowledge of the petitioner. Sale proclamation was duly published on 19. 7. 1992 in accordance with law; out of several items, only a portion of 31 1/2 guntas out of item No. 5 measuring 1 acre 23 guntas in Sy. No. 144/2 was brought for sale. This was conducted at the spot on 26. 8. 1992; since no others offered the bid higher than that of this respondent, he was declared as the purchaser. No. 144/2 was brought for sale. This was conducted at the spot on 26. 8. 1992; since no others offered the bid higher than that of this respondent, he was declared as the purchaser. Though the petitioner was aware of all the proceedings, he did not pay/deposited the decretal amount either before sale or after sale he did not deposit in to Court 5% of purchase money and the amount, specified in the sale proclamation within 30 days or application forsetting aside the sale was not filed within time. However, the Trial court dismisses I. A. Nos. 1 and 3 against which the 1st respondent preferred an in M. A. No:33/93 under Order 43, Rule 1, the Civil judge after applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the dictum referred at supra, has set aside the orders of the Trial Court. It is further contended that no application is filed by the petitioner for setting aside sale by alleging fraud under Order 21, Rule 90: the claim of the auction purchaser cannot be defeated by simply filing application under Rule 89 without complying with the requirements of law and the said application of the petitioner are liable to be dismissed in view of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court and the sale must be made absolute. To this effect, the 1st respondent relied upon the dictum of Supreme Court in JANAK RAJ vs GURDIAL SINGH AND ANOTHER to the following effect:- "the result is that the purchaser's title relates to back to the date of sale and not the confirmation of sale. There is no provision in the Code of Civil procedure of 1908 either under Order XXI or elsewhere which provides that the sale is not to be confirmed if it be found that the decree under which the sale was ordered has been reversed before the confirmation of sale. It does not seem ever to have been doubted that once the sale is confirmed the judgment debtor is not entitled to get back the property even if he succeeds thereafter in having the decree against him reversed. The question is, whether the same result ought to follow when the reversal of the decree takes place before the confirmation of sale. There does not seem to be any valid reason for making a distinction between the two cases. The question is, whether the same result ought to follow when the reversal of the decree takes place before the confirmation of sale. There does not seem to be any valid reason for making a distinction between the two cases. It is certainly hard on the defendant judgment-debtor to have to lose his property on the basis Of a sale held in execution of a decree which is not ultimately upheld. Once, however, it is held that he cannot complain after confirmation of sale, there seems to be no reason why he should be allowed to do so because the decree was reversed before such confirmation. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 contains elaborate provisions which have to be followed in cases of sales of property in execution of a decree. It also lays down how and in what manner such sales may be set aside. Ordinarily, if no application for setting aside a sale is made under any of the provisions of Rule 89 to 91 of Order XXI, or when any application under any of these rules is made and disallowed, the court has no choice in the matter of confirming the sale and the sale must be made absolute. If it was the intention of the legislature that the sale was not to be made absolute because the decree had ceased to exist, we should have expected a provision to that effect either in Order XXI or in Part. II of the code of Civil Procedure of 1908 which contains Sections 36 to 74 (inclusive ). " the dictum in TRIBHOVANDAS PURSHOTTAMDAS THAKKAR vs ratilal MOTILAL PATEL AND OTHERS is relied upon to the following effect:- order-21, Rule 89 requires that two primary conditions relating to deposit must be fulfilled: the applicant must deposit in the Court for payment to the auction purchaser 5 percent of the purchase-money; he must also deposit the amount specified in the proclamation of sale less any amount received by the decree holder since the date of proclamation of sale for payment to the decree holder. By abandoning the execution proceeding the claim of the creditor is not extinguished; he is entitled to commence fresh proceedings for sale of the property. By abandoning the execution proceeding the claim of the creditor is not extinguished; he is entitled to commence fresh proceedings for sale of the property. Rule 89 of Order 21 is intended to confer a right upon the judgment debtor, even after the property is sold, to satisfy the claim of the decree-holder and to compensate the auction purchaser by paying him 5 percent of the purchase money. The provisions is not intended to defeat the claim of the auction purchaser, unless the decree is simultaneously satisfied. When the judgment creditor agrees to extend the time for payment of the amount due for a specified period and in the meanwhile agrees to receive interest accruing due on the amount of the decree, the condition requiring the judgment-debtor to deposit in Court for payment to the decree- holder the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for the recovery of which the sale was ordered cannot be deemed to be complied with. An order setting aside a Court sale in execution of a mortgage decree cannot be obtained, under Order 21, Rule 89 by merely depositing 5 percent of the purchase money for payment to the auction purchaser and persuading the decree holder to abandon the execution proceeding AIR 1935 Mad 1050 and AIR 1940 mad 427 (FB) and AIR 1948 Nag 127 and AIR 1956 Cal 462 and AIR 1962 Mys. 36 Ref. to. " lastly, the first respondent relied upon the dictum of KOLLORU kantharao vs TAMMAIMA NARAYANA MURTHY AND ANOTHER is relied upon to the following effect:- "sale held in execution of money decree - cannot be set aside except under Rules 89, 90 and 91 - recording of satisfaction of decree - Petition for under Order 21 Rule 2 (2a) not maintainable after sale had taken place, even though sale is not confirmed. The rights of the auction purchaser may be inhoate or limited and may not be absolute till the same is confirmed. But they are only subject to the provisions contained in Rules 89, 90 and 91. Though no period of limitation is prescribed under Order 21 Rule 2 for filing an application by the judgment debtor for recording full satisfaction of the decree as a necessary corrolary it follows that the said application can be tiled only before the properties are brought to sale. Though no period of limitation is prescribed under Order 21 Rule 2 for filing an application by the judgment debtor for recording full satisfaction of the decree as a necessary corrolary it follows that the said application can be tiled only before the properties are brought to sale. It is true that 90 days is prescribed for filing an application under Order 21 Ruie 90 and no such express provision exists in Order 21 Rule 2 (2a ). But Order 21 Rule 2 (2a) cannot be read in isolation. It must be read along with other provisions. At the stage of sale, the interests of a third party intervene. Before the sale is ordered, the Rules provided for several opportunities for the judgment-debtor to pay the amount even after attachment and proclamation of sale. But when once the properties are sold the sale can be set aside only in the manner specifically provided for and by. necessary implication it follows that an application under Order 21 Rule 2a is not maintainable after the sale is conducted, even though the sale is not confirmed. " ( 16 ) THE further contention of the 1st respondent auction purchaser was that as per the entries in the revenue records standing in the name of the respondent, the main occupation of the respondent is agriculture. Apart from this it is not open for the petitioner to raise such contention; the alleged payment made by the petitioner to 2nd respondent cannot be recognised as it is not deposited in Court and even then it is not made within 30 days as required under Rule-89 read with 92 (2); the petitioner and the 2nd respondent colluded with each other to defeat the right of the 1st respondent and such payment cannot take away the right or extinguish the right of the 1st respondent. Thus, he prayed for dismissal of the C. R. P. ( 17 ) ON the other hand the 2nd respondent relying upon the dictum of NANI GOPAL RAUL vs T. PRASAD SINGH AND OTHERS, supported the case of the petitioner. ( 18 ) IN the light of the above discussion, the order passed by the first appellate Court is valid and does not call for any interference by this Court. Consequently the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. But in the circumstances no order as to costs. --- *** --- .