S. N. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Order passed by Assistant District Judge, Small Cause Court, Sealdah, 24 Parganas (South), dated 19-5-97 in Title Appeal No. 89 of 1996 confirming the Judgment and decree dated 29-2-96 passed by Munsif, 2nd Court, Sealdah, 24 Parganas in Title Suit No. 176 of 1991 whereby the plaintiff's suit for eviction of the tenant/defendant was decreed. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff/landlord filed the aforesaid Title Suit against the defendant/tenant for eviction mainly on the ground of default and reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation. The defence was that the defendant was neither a defaulter nor the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation. It was contended that the plaintiff's husband and her son resided in their own house at Madhyamgram and that sons of the plaintiff's husband's elder brother are not the members of her family. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsif found that notice to quit was legal, valid and sufficient and that the same was validly served upon the defendant. He further found that the defendant was not a defaulter for the purpose of eviction and further that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for her own use and occupation as she cannot be asked to split up her family in two places, one in the suit premises and the other at Madhyamgram which is 45 kilometers away. On such findings the suit for eviction was decreed by him. The learned First Appellate Court affirmed the decree passed by the learned Munsif. ( 4 ) IT appears from the Judgment of the Courts below that both the learned Munsif and the First Appellate Court came to the concurrent findings on the following points of facts :- (i) The plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises. (ii) The defendant was not defaulter for the purpose of eviction. (iii) Notice was valid and legal and the same was served upon the defendant. (iv) The room on the 2nd floor was not a part of tenancy as would be evident from the Exts. 'ka' series. The defendant occupied the same with the permission of the vendor of the plaintiff. That possession has been revoked by the plaintiff from the moment of his purchase. (iv) The room on the 2nd floor was not a part of tenancy as would be evident from the Exts. 'ka' series. The defendant occupied the same with the permission of the vendor of the plaintiff. That possession has been revoked by the plaintiff from the moment of his purchase. The learned Munsif held that the possession of these rooms on the second floor by the defendant has caused annoyance and nuisance to the plaintiff within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (e) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. This point, however, was not raised before the 1st Appellate Courtand as such he did not pass any decision on this point. It may be noted that as the room on the 2nd floor is found to be outside the tenancy of the defendant no decision in this suit which is essentially a suit for eviction of a tenant from the tenanted premises, is called for. (v) The plaintiff has only three rooms in the ground floor of the suit premises which is inadequate for herself, her husband, three adult sons who have attained marriageable age and two daughters and that plaintiff requires in all 5 bed rooms, one drawing room and one dining room with kitchen, store and thakurghar. (vi) The husband of the plaintiff and one of her sons reside at Madhyamgram where by partition of the ancestral building they are in possession of four rooms, two of which were allegedly tenanted. Both the Courts below held that as there was no inspection by commission in respect of Madhyamgram residence, it is not proved that those two rooms were tenanted. ( 5 ) IN addition to the above findings on facts both the Courts have concurrently held that existence of alternative accommodation elsewhere at a distant place does not defeat the plaintiff's claim for reasonable requirement of the suit premises inasmuch as the plaintiff cannot be asked to split up her family and to reside in two places. In the Second Appeal this finding is under challenge. ( 6 ) IN this High Court the appellant has filed an application being marked CAN 6129 of 1998 under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC along with the xerox copy of the receipt purported to be granted by the Ex-landlord at the time of inception of tenancy disclosing that the landlord took advance of Rs. ( 6 ) IN this High Court the appellant has filed an application being marked CAN 6129 of 1998 under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC along with the xerox copy of the receipt purported to be granted by the Ex-landlord at the time of inception of tenancy disclosing that the landlord took advance of Rs. 150/- on granting of receipt stipulating that at the time of termination of tenancy the said amount would be adjusted against monthly rent. It has been urged before me that the same amount not being adjusted before termination of tenancy by a service of notice to quit, the said notice to quit is bad in law. This point was not raised before the learned Munsif as also before the 1st Appellate Court and the said case was not made out in the written statement. This being a new defence raised for the first time before the Second Appellate Court such petition cannot be entertained. The aforesaid petition CAN No. 6129 of 1998 is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, only one question of law can be formulated in this appeal :"whether the plaintiff irrespective of her accommodation elsewhere is entitled to get a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation. " ( 8 ) IN Calcutta Film Library v. Shila Sen reported in (1993) 2 Cal LJ 248 the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court such a matter came up for decision before the Division Bench of this High Court. In that case plaintiff's husband had a house in New Delhi where the husband was working in a non-government organisation having no intention to come to Calcutta in near future. The landlady's son had left for USA. It was held by the Division Bench. "it is not for the Court to suggest in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement that landlady could have hired an accommodation on some reasonable rent or that since because the landlady are staying with her relations and there could not be any reasonable requirement for the landlady. It is for the landlady to decide where to stay and even assuming that the landlady stays permanently in Delhi and frequently comes to Calcutta that is also her reasonable requirement. It is for the landlady to decide where to stay and even assuming that the landlady stays permanently in Delhi and frequently comes to Calcutta that is also her reasonable requirement. Inasmuch as when the landlady comes to Calcutta she had a right to reside in her own house and it is not for the Court to suggest while she would come to Calcutta, she may stay in hotel or some friend's or relations house. We are of the view that since husband and landlady had a house in Delhi it cannot be said that they had no reasonable requirement in her Calcutta house. " ( 9 ) BOTH the Courts below have come to a concurrent findings on the basis of reasons recorded by them. It has been held by the 1st Appellate Court. "that staying of the husband of the respondent and her son to live permanently at Madhyamgram house is situated at a distance of 45 minutes' journey from Calcutta, the husband of the respondent is an aged man and at this stage splitting of family obviously, is not desirable by the respondent and her members of family. Moreover, this splitting of family will incur additional expenditure to maintain two units at Madhyamgram and Calcutta which must put an enhanced financial burden upon the respondent. " ( 10 ) THE reasons assigned by the learned Court below are, therefore, cogent and the findings based on such reasonings have been supported by the Division Bench of this High Court in Calcutta Film Library's case, (1993 (2) Cal LJ 248) (supra ). In Jeeban Jamini Debi v. Banku Behari Guin reported in (1963) 65 Cal WN 799 the Division Bench held,"in a suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement for personal use and occupation, it would not be reasonable to compel the plaintiff landlord to split up his family into two portions and to keep the two in two separate houses, where the two houses are not adjacent. "such a finding of the Courts below, therefore, does not call for any interference and accordingly the same is upheld by me. ( 11 ) THE appeal, is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The decree passed by the Court below is hereby affirmed subject to modification that the appellant is directed to vacate the suit premises within three months from this date. Appeal dismissed.