JUDGMENT - SAHAI VISHNU, J.:---Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-detenue has impugned the detention order dated 3rd October, 1998, passed by the first respondent Mr. R.H. Mendonca, Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai, detaining him under section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. L.V. of 1981) (Amendment 1996), (hereinafter referred to as the M.P.D.A. Act). The detention order along with the grounds of detention also dated 3rd October, 1998, was served on the petitioner-detenue on 6th October, 1998. True copies of the detention order and the grounds of detention are annexed as Annexures A and C respectively to this petition. 2. The prejudicial activities of the petitioner-detenue necessitating the issuance of the impugned detention order, as contained in the grounds of detention in brief are as under:--- You (petitioner) are an active member of the Amar Naik gang and you and your associates have created a reign of terror in the minds of the public in the localities of Hiranandani Gardens, Powai, Marol Maroshi Road and the areas adjoining thereto within the jurisdiction of the Sakinaka Police Station in Brihan Mumbai. You (petitioner) and your associates armed with deadly weapons such as revolver do not hesitate to use the same while committing offences like assault, attempt to commit murder, extortion of money and criminal intimidation. Action taken against you under the normal law of the land was inadequate and with a view to prevent you from indulging in criminal activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, you were detained on 1st February, 1996 under the National Security Act vide detention Order No. 39/PCB/Z-II dated 30th January, 1996, which was confirmed by the Government of Maharashtra and you were released after the completion. 2-B. The in-camera statement of witness A is contained in Ground No. 5(b-i) witness act in his statement which was recorded on 12-8-1998 has stated that he knows you (the petitioner) as notorious goonda affiliated to Amar Naik gang. In the past, you had thriced telephoned him and demanded Rs. 10,000/- on threats. 2-B. The in-camera statement of witness A is contained in Ground No. 5(b-i) witness act in his statement which was recorded on 12-8-1998 has stated that he knows you (the petitioner) as notorious goonda affiliated to Amar Naik gang. In the past, you had thriced telephoned him and demanded Rs. 10,000/- on threats. He has stated that one day in the last week of May 1998 at about 5 p.m., you along with the two unknown associates entered his shop by putting a revolver on him; threatened him to give the monthly hafta immediately; and threatened also to shoot him. On seeing this, the customers present in the shop ran away. The passers by also started running away. At this point of time, your associates whipped out choppers resulting in the witness getting terribly frightened and his paying Rs. 10,000/- to you. While leaving, you again threatened the witness not to inform the police or else he would be killed. Consequently, he did not inform the police. Witness B's statement is referred to in Ground No. 5(b-ii). It was recorded on 12th August, 1998 and he has stated therein that you (the petitioner) are a notorious goonda and belong to the Amar Naik Gang. You and your unknown associates collect monthly hafta money from the shop keepers and jewellers. In the past you and your associates had visited his place of business and threatened him to pay Rs. 25,000/- as monthly hafta money. Thereafter, you had telephoned him and demanded money on threats. One day in the second week of June, 1998 at about 23 hours, you along with your three unknown associates came near his place of business and called him out. You then demanded monthly hafta money. Witness told you (the petitioner) that he would ask his partner and then pay. On this you got enraged and whipped out a revolver and put at his temple and demanded Rs. 25,000/- immediately and threatened him that else he would be killed. Consequently, he paid you Rs. 10,000/-. You threatened him to pay the remaining amount within 2/3 days and while leaving, you threatened him in terms that if he informs the police, he would killed. Consequently, he did not inform the police. 3. We have heard Mr. Prakash Shetty for the petitioner and Ms. V.K. Tahilaramani, Public Prosecutor for the respondents. Although in the writ petition, Mr. You threatened him to pay the remaining amount within 2/3 days and while leaving, you threatened him in terms that if he informs the police, he would killed. Consequently, he did not inform the police. 3. We have heard Mr. Prakash Shetty for the petitioner and Ms. V.K. Tahilaramani, Public Prosecutor for the respondents. Although in the writ petition, Mr. Shetty has pleaded a large number of grounds running from Ground No. 8(i) to (xxiv) but, since he is only pressing 2 grounds namely Ground No. 8(viii) and 8(xx), we are not adverting to the other grounds. Ground No. 8(viii) in short, is that the petitioner was in custody in C.R. No. 238 of 1998 under section 307, I.P.C. etc. when the impugned detention order was passed against him and since he had not applied for bail in the said C.R., there was no compelling reason for the first respondent to pass the impugned detention order against him. 4. Ground No. 8(viii) has been replied to in para 19 of the return of the Detaining Authority. In the said para, the Detaining Authority has mentioned that since there was likelihood of the detenue preferring a bail application in the said C.R. and there was possibility of his being granted bail by a Court of law, there was no prohibition to pass the impugned detention order as the detenue was likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities on being released on bail. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner-detenu has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 Cri.L.J. 2657, (Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P. others)1, wherein in para 5, after referring to some earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has quoted para 19 of the judgment rendered by it in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1196, (Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and another, Appellants v. Union of India and others, Respondents)2, which reads thus:--- "From a catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher Court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to prompt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law." 6. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to prompt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law." 6. A perusal of the said para would show that the detention order can be passed against a person in custody provided the grounds of detention show:- (i) that the Detaining Authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there are compelling reasons justifying the detention despite his being in custody It would also show that 'compelling reasons' implies that there must be some cogent material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which, it may be satisfied: (a) that the detenue is likely to be released from custody in the near future; and (b) taking into consideration his antecedent activities he is likely to revert to prejudicial activities after being released from custody making it imperative to preventively detain him. 7. The grievance of Mr. Shetty is that in the instant case, since no bail application was made on behalf of the petitioner-detenu for the grant of bail, there was no cogent material before the Detaining Authority for concluding that the detenue was to be released from custody in the near future. 8. We have examined Ground No. 8(viii); para 19 of the return of the Detaining Authority wherein the said ground has been replied; and the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 Cri.L.J. 2657 (supra). We are constrained to observe that we do not find any merit in the said ground. In this connection, it would be useful to advert to para 7 of the grounds of detention. In the said para, the Detaining Authority has not only shown his awareness that the detenue was in custody in C.R. No. 238 of 1998 but, has also mentioned therein that he may be granted bail under the normal law of the land in due course and in view of his tendencies and inclinations he was satisfied that once he was released on bail, he was likely to revert to the similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under the M.P.D.A. Act. It is true that no application for bail was made by the petitioner-detenue in the said C.R. but, there was no impediment in law for him to make such an application at any point of time an there was always reasonable likelihood that in case he made such an application, he would be granted bail. In such a situation, we feel that there was cogent material before the Detaining Authority on the basis of which, it could have concluded that the detenu was likely to be released from custody. 9. For the said reasons, in our view, Ground No. 8(viii) fails. 10. We now come to Ground No. 8(viii). In short, the said ground is that even assuming the prejudicial acts stipulated in the grounds of detention to be true, it would be a case of violation of law and order and not public order. Ground No. 8(xx) has been replied to in para 31 of the return of the Detaining Authority and therein he has denied the averment in the said ground that the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention amount to disturbance of law and order and not public order. 11. The test for determining whether an act offends law and order or public order was laid down by the Supreme Court in the oft-quoted case of (Arun Ghosh v. The State of W.B. others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228. Hidayatullah, C.J., (as he then was) in para 3 has laid down that if an act disturbs the even tempo of life or tranquility of a country as a whole or a specified locality, such an act would constitute breach of public order. But, however, if the impact of an act is merely restricted to an individual or some individuals it would amount to violation of law and order. When bearing in mind the said ratio, we examine the grounds of detention, we find that the acts of the petitioner amount to violation of public order. But, however, if the impact of an act is merely restricted to an individual or some individuals it would amount to violation of law and order. When bearing in mind the said ratio, we examine the grounds of detention, we find that the acts of the petitioner amount to violation of public order. The incident given out in Ground No. 5 (a-i) (in respect of which C.R. No. 238 of 1998 referred to para 5(a-i) was registered) shows that it was committed in broad-day-light in the heart of Mumbai, in the area of Powai within the limits of Sakinaka Police Station and in our view, the impact of such an act cannot be said to be restricted to the victims but, was such that it can be safely presumed that the even tempo of life in the said locality was disturbed. Again, we find that in the in-camera statement of witness A referred to in ground 5(b-i) there is a clear mention that in broad-day-light, the petitioner and his two unknown associates entered the shop of witness A and threatened him to give monthly hafta immediately and if he failed to do so, they would shoot him. He also stated that "on seeing this, the customers present in the shop ran away. The passers-by also started running". A perusal of the underlined portion would show that the impact of the act was not restricted to witness A alone but, it also affected the customers present in the shop who ran away. In such a situation, the statement of witness A makes it clear that as a result of the said Act, the even tempo of life of a segment of community namely those present in the shop at the time when the act was committed was affected. In this view of the matter, the said Act would squarely constitute breach of public order in terms of the ratio laid down in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228 (supra). 12. We may also mention that a perusal of para 6 of the grounds of detention would show that the petitioner-detenue has been detained as a dangerous person under the M.P.D.A. Act. 12. We may also mention that a perusal of para 6 of the grounds of detention would show that the petitioner-detenue has been detained as a dangerous person under the M.P.D.A. Act. A perusal of section 2(a), 2(iv) and explanation to section 2(a) would show that if a dangerous person commits activities which directly or indirectly cause or are calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity amongst the general public or any section thereof or grave or widespread danger to life or public health, the said dangerous person would be violating public order. A perusal of Ground 5(a) and 5(a-i) and 5(b-i) of the grounds of detention would show that the petitioner-detenu was a dangerous person whose acts directly caused harm, danger, alarm and a feeling of insecurity amongst a section of the public namely that section residing in the area where Rajesh Mayekar, Sujet Ravate and Vinayak Mayekar were fired upon and the section of the public which was present in the shop of witness A when the incident took place. In this view of the matter, the petitioner-detenu also violated public order under the M.P.D.A. Act. 13. For the said reasons, we feel that Ground No. 8(xx) is also devoid of substance. 14. As we have mentioned earlier, no other ground has been pressed by Mr. Shetty learned Counsel for the petitioner. 15. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed. -----