( 1 ) THESE two appeals arose out of two suits, case and counter; one for specific performance and another for vacation of the suit property. One T. P. Abdulla is the appellant in both the appeals who is the plaintiff in O. S. No. 64 of 1994 is the suit for specific performance filed by the tenant t. P. Abdulla. This suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and such dismissal came to be confirmed by the First Appellate Court in Regular Appeal No. 13 of 1995 and hence R. S. A. No. 754 of 1997 came to be filed. The other suit in O. S. No. 65 of 1994 which was filed at an earlier point of time and later renumbered is the suit for possession against the aforesaid T. P. Abdulla filed by one K. T. M. Abdul Sathar on the ground that T. P. Abdulla, the appellant herein was a tenant of the suit property and that suit was decreed by the Trial Court and such decree came to be confirmed by the First Appellate Court in R. A. No. 12 of 1995 and hence R. S. A. No. 753 of 1997 came to be filed. ( 2 ) THE facts which are common are that the appellant herein was permitted to occupy a small tiled house situated in the property bearing Sy. No. 205 of Mekur Hosakeri Village as a licensee belonging to the plaintiff Abdul Sathar (who died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives are respondents herein) who had 15 cents of land in the said Sy. No. 205. It was claimed that T. P. Abdulla was staying in that house as a licensee; as the same was required for the plaintiff for the use of his servants, he called upon to vacate the same by a notice dated 6-4-1983, and it was resisted. Hence, the suit for eviction was filed. ( 3 ) THE defendant Abdulla claimed that the plaintiff Abdul Sathar was not the absolute owner of the land in Sy. No. 205 and he further claimed that the property originally belonged to one K. K. Mohammed and after his death his legal representatives have become the owners. Hence, the suit for eviction was filed. ( 3 ) THE defendant Abdulla claimed that the plaintiff Abdul Sathar was not the absolute owner of the land in Sy. No. 205 and he further claimed that the property originally belonged to one K. K. Mohammed and after his death his legal representatives have become the owners. He denied that he was permitted to occupy the suit house as a licensee and contended that K. K. Mohammed inducted him in the suit house as a tenant in the year 1963; at that time there was only katcha hut which was later demolished and new thatched house was constructed by him in the year 1965 and he was paying a ground rent of Rs. 5/- per month to K. K. Mohammed from 15-4-1965 and subsequently on 10-11-1978, K. K. Mohammed executed an agreement of sale of the land for a sum of Rs. 1,500/- and received the entire consideration amount and in terms of the agreement, sale deed has to be executed after 5 years from the date of the agreement and further the defendant was permitted to make improvements on the property. Therefore, in terms of the agreement of sale he filed O. S. No. 65 of 1994 a suit for specific performance. Both the suits were clubbed together and tried. ( 4 ) IT was found by the Trial Court that the property originally belonged to K. K. Mohammed and after his death his legal representatives became the owners of the property. Though initially the appellant disputed the ownership, later it was conceded that Abdul Sathar has become the owner of the property under the partition deed. Therefore, there is no difficulty to come into conclusion that the property belonged to K. K. Mohammed and then succeeded to by Abdul Sathar. The possession of the appellant was held to be that of a licensee by the Trial Court as the agreement ex. P-1 does not disclose the status of the appellant either as tenant or as a licensee. But on the evidence available and the documents produced it is found that T. P. Abdulla, the appellant herein was only a licensee and not a tenant. The Trial Court further found that the late K. K. Mohammed had executed an agreement of sale dated 10-11-1978 agreeing to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. The Trial Court further found that the late K. K. Mohammed had executed an agreement of sale dated 10-11-1978 agreeing to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/- and that he had paid entire sale consideration of Rs. 1,500/- to Sri K. K Mohammad under the agreement of sale dated 10-11-1978. But on the question of limitation the Trial Court found that the suit should have been filed at least three years from the date of receipt of notice issued by K. T. M. Abdul Sathar seeking eviction of the suit premises as per Ex. D-6. It is to be noticed that the notice was issued under Ex. D-6 dated 6-4-1983 and it was admittedly served on the said Abdulla and he was called upon to vacate the suit premises and the same was required by K. T. M. Abdul Sathar. The reply was sent by the appellant-Abdulla under Ex. P-10 on 12-5-1983. But the suit for specific performance filed on 10-11-1986 that is three months after the expiry of the time specified for filing a suit for specific performance. Following the dictum of this Court in Kareem Baig and others v Dr. Mohammad Khizar Hussain and Others, the Trial Court held that the suit is barred by limitation. Holding therefore, on the expiry of the stipulated period of three years, the defendant has lost all his rights consequently he should not resist the suit for possession field by the plaintiff because the defendant has ceased the agreement of sale and that right had become barred by time, the suit for possession was decreed and the suit for specific performance was dismissed. On appeal by the appellant before the First Appellate Court, the First Appellate Court confirmed the findings rendered by the Trial Court and dismissed both the appeals. ( 5 ) THE following substantial questions of law were raised in this regular second appeal: (a) Whether the limitation for filing the suit for specific performance expired within three years from the date of service of the plaint in O. S. No. 65 of 1994 (Old No. 144 of 1983) or whether the suit filed in November 1996 within three years from the date fixed for specific performance? (b) Whether the plaintiff T. P. Abdulla in the suit for specific performance could have been denied the decree on the ground that he had knowledge of refusal to execute the sale deed even in the absence of any reference to the agreement to sell and implied refusal to execute the sale deed? ( 6 ) IT was mainly contended that under the terms of Ex. P-1, the sale deed has to be executed after five years from the date of agreement,. e. , on or before 10-11-1983. This fact is mentioned in para 4 of the agreement and is spoken to in the evidence of P. W. 1 which has remained unchallenged. The agreement Ex. P-1 also referred to the assurance on the part of K. K. Mohammed that he would execute the sale deed after partition is effected. However, it has come on record as Ex. D-5 that there was a partition on 2-4-1967 itself. Therefore, the covenant in para 4 of the agreement would prevail, namely, that the sale will be executed after five years from the date of agreement namely on 10-11-1983. K. K. Mohammad passed away somewhere in 1982, the L. Rs of the deceased K. K. Mohammad filed O. S. No. 144 of 1983 which was later renumbered as O. S. No. 65 of 1994 on 28-7-1983 seeking a decree for possession on the ground that the appellant was a tenant and that his tenancy had been determined. It was not the case of the legal representatives that the time stipulated in the agreement Ex. P-1 had expired or that the agreement to sell was not true; it is also not in dispute that the appellant Abdulla had not paid any rents to defendants/respondents nor was there any attornment of tenancy after the demise of k. K. Mohammad. Therefore the appellant was in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement to sell. ( 7 ) THE suit summon in O. S. No. 65 of 1994 was served somewhere in October 1983; the agreement was dated 10-11-1978, and the sale deed was to be executed after five years. That time expired on 10-11-1983; therefore the suit filed on 10-11-1986 should be held to be in time and not barred by limitation. ( 7 ) THE suit summon in O. S. No. 65 of 1994 was served somewhere in October 1983; the agreement was dated 10-11-1978, and the sale deed was to be executed after five years. That time expired on 10-11-1983; therefore the suit filed on 10-11-1986 should be held to be in time and not barred by limitation. It is further contended by the appellant that the agreement to sell 15 cents of land and a house for an agreed consideration of Rs. 1,500/- was entered into in the presence of C. K. Khader and P. K. Abdulla (who is no more) and under the said agreement, the entire sale consideration was paid under Ex. P-1; in the reply notice Ex. D-6 the appellant was referred to agreement of sale and also that it should be executed after five years at any time as and when demanded by Abdulla. The agreement was denied in O. S. No. 144 of 1983 which was later renumbered as O. S. No. 65 of 1994. On 10-11-1983 a notice was issued by the appellant-T. P. Abdulla calling upon the legal representatives of K. K. Mohammed to execute the sale which was followed by another demand made by the notice dated 9-12-1983. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon on the following decisions. (i) Contending that mere delay in extending up to period of limitation not sufficient ground to refuse relief which he is entitled to the dictum in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v G. Yelloji Rao and Others, the following passage was relied upon. " under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, relief of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with sound and reasonable judicial principles. The cases providing for a guide to Courts to exercise discretion one way or other are only illustrative; they are not intended to be exhaustive. As Article 113 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of 3 years from the date fixed thereunder for specific performance of a contract, it follows that mere delay without more extending up to the said period cannot possibly be a reason for a Court to exercise its discretion against giving a relief of specific performance. Nor can the scope of the discretion, after excluding the cases mentioned in Section 22 of the specific Relief Act, be confined to waiver, abandonment or estoppel. Nor can the scope of the discretion, after excluding the cases mentioned in Section 22 of the specific Relief Act, be confined to waiver, abandonment or estoppel. If one of these three circumstances is established, no question of discretion arises, for either there will be no subsisting right or there will be a bar against its assertion. So there must be some discretionary field unoccupied by the three cases, otherwise the substantive section becomes otiose. It is difficult to define that field. Diverse situations may arise which may induce a Court not to exercise the discretion in favour of the plaintiff. It may better be left undefined except to state what the section says namely, discretion of the Court is not arbitrary, but sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal". (ii) While discussing the principles governing the award of decree for specific performance, the supreme Court held in Ramesh Chandra Chandiok and Another v Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by his L. Rs and Others, to the following effect. " that on the facts and circumstances of the case A must be held to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract till date of suit and was therefore entitled to a decree for specific performance. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. They have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. There was no material on record to show that A at any stage was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. This relief is discretionary but not arbitrary and discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles. We are unable to hold that the conduct of the appellants, which is always an important element for consideration, was such that it precluded them from obtaining a decree for specific performance". (iii) Contending that the grant of specific performance is rule then refusal is an exceptional, reliance was placed in Prakash Chandra v Angadlal and Others, the following passage was relied upon. " the next question is whether the relief of specific performance being a discretionary relief granted in equity should be refused to the appellant. The ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. " the next question is whether the relief of specific performance being a discretionary relief granted in equity should be refused to the appellant. The ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. In the present case, the conduct of the appellant has not been such as to disentitle him to the relief of specific performance. He has acted fairly throughout, and there is nothing to show that by any act of omission or commission he encouraged Mohsinali and qurban Hussain to enter into the sale with the first and second respondents. There is no evidence that the appellant secured an unfair advantage over Mohsinali and Qurban Hussain when he entered into the agreement. Nor is there anything to prove that the performance of the contract would involve the respondents in some hardship which they did not foresee. In our opinion, there is no reason why the appellant should not be granted the relief of specific performance". ( 8 ) AS against these submission, the respondent relied upon the dictum of this Court referred to by the Trial Court earlier and in K. Gu-rurao v M. Subba Rao, and relied upon for the following passage and it is submitted that the suit must be held to be barred by limitation. " in a case where the agreement fixed the date of performance of the agreement, whether that date has expired or not, if the very agreement is denied, the person in whose favour the agreement is executed is required to exercise his right within a period of three years from the date of knowledge or notice of the fact that the agreement is denied. Therefore, filing of suit by plaintiff seeking possession of the suit schedule property from the defendant who was in possession of it pursuant to the agreement of sale and the possession was sought on the basis that it was illegal possession, amounted to repudiating the agreement of sale. Therefore, the defendant is required to enforce the agreement within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of the denial of the agreement". Therefore, the defendant is required to enforce the agreement within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of the denial of the agreement". ( 9 ) AFTER hearing the arguments of the respective Counsels, I am convinced that the appellant/plaintiff cannot be deprived of the relief of specific performance on the ground of limitation. It was strongly argued by the Counsel for the respondent that there was a specific denial of contract of sale or denial of contract of sale under Ex. P-10. But I find a reading of Ex. P-10 there has been no reference at all to the contract of sale or any particular denial. On the other hand Ex. D-6 which is given as reply on 12-5-1983, a reference has been made in paragraph 3 of the notice. In para 4 it has been made clear that after the expiry of the period stipulated, the agreement shall be enforceable, it is necessary to extract the paras 3 and 4 of Ex. D-6: "3. On 10-11-1978, your client's father Sri K. K. Mohammed executed an agreement of sale of the land in favour of my client for a sum of Rs. 1,500/- and received the full consideration and agreed to execute the sale deed at any time after 5 years, on demand by my client. My client was also authorised to make any improvement in the property and as such he has improved the house and tiled and electrified the same. He has also paid the house tax. Apart from the coffee and orange plants put, in the possession of my client, my client has planted coconut trees and vegetables. 4. The agreement stated above is binding upon the legal representatives of the deceased K. K. Mohammed and your client is not entitled to evict my client. After the expiry of period stipulated in the agreement, my client will demand the execution of the sale deed by the legal representatives of Sri K. K. Mohammed". There appears to be no rejoinder to this reply notice Ex. D-6. Therefore it is also necessary to point out that after Ex. D-6 when on 29-7-1983 O. S. No. 144 of 1983 was filed by P. A. Holder of legal representatives of Abdul Sathar, there is not even a whisper about the agreement of sale dated 10-11-1978. There appears to be no rejoinder to this reply notice Ex. D-6. Therefore it is also necessary to point out that after Ex. D-6 when on 29-7-1983 O. S. No. 144 of 1983 was filed by P. A. Holder of legal representatives of Abdul Sathar, there is not even a whisper about the agreement of sale dated 10-11-1978. There is neither repudiation nor expression of disinclination to execute the sale deed. The agreement to sell is not even denied in the plaint in O. S. No. 144 of 1983. It is seen that two other notices were issued on 10-11-1983 and on 9-12-1983 and there appears to have been no reply at all. Therefore, on the facts of this particular case there has been no specific repudiation of the agreement of sale though the legal representatives of Abdul Sathar had an opportunity to deny the recovery of licence or to deny the agreement or to repxidiate the same. Under such circumstances and in the light of the particular facts of the case, it cannot be said that the suit for possession would amount to repudiation to the contract of sale or denial. If that is counted as repudiation then that will be setting a bad precedent, every case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case. Here admittedly, there is no denial in this case. Even in the Division Bench case in Gururao case, supra, it was found that the very agreement was denied. Therefore taking into consideration, the averments made in the plaint in that suit and subsequent suit, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that such a relief is not available to the agreement holder. But in view of the Supreme Court dicta in Mademsetty Satyanarayana's case, supra, it is found that there was a repudiation of the contract on the next date of the action itself. But yet, the Supreme Court accepting the arguments, the Counsel for the agreement holder mr. But in view of the Supreme Court dicta in Mademsetty Satyanarayana's case, supra, it is found that there was a repudiation of the contract on the next date of the action itself. But yet, the Supreme Court accepting the arguments, the Counsel for the agreement holder mr. A. Viswanath Sastri, that mere delay in filing the suit for specific performance could not possibly be a ground for exercising discretion against the plaintiff as the Limitation Act prescribed a period of 3 years for filing such a suit and that under the Indian Law relief of specific performance could be refused only if the plaintiff abandons or waives his right under the contract, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the plaintiff to the specific performance. In this case also there is no proof of the appellant abandoning or waiving his right under the Contract. On the other hand, it is seen that-he has been very vigilant to approach the Court to establish his right to specific performance. Another significant point is that even in the reply notice, he has expressed his mind very clearly and expressed his understanding in the agreement by saying that his right comes only after expiry of five years. ( 10 ) IN the light of the above discussion and on consideration of the conduct referred to supra, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the contract of sale and consequently setting aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below, both the appeals are allowed, the appellant is granted decree for specific performance and the suit filed against the appellant for eviction shall stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.