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Madras High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 56 (MAD)

State of Mysore v. Kenchegowda

1999-01-23

A.R.SOMNATH IYER

body1999
ORDER This is a Revision Petition presented by the State in proceedings arising under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order made by the Court of Sessions setting aside an order made by the First Class Magistrate, Pandavapura, under section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the respondents to execute a bond and to furnish security. The dispute mainly relates to an area of land measuring nine acres is Survey No. 42 in the village of Peehally in the district of Mandya. P.W. 1 claimed that area of land under a grant which, according to him, had been made to him by the Government. P.W. 1 does not belong to the village of Peehally but 15 another village. His case was that whenever he made any attempt to cultivate the land granted to him, there was obstruction by almost everyone in the village of Peehally including the women and children of that village. At one stage, according to P.W. 1 the intercession of P.W. 11 was sought for the settlement of the controversy and the advice tendered by P.W. 1 had been discarded by the villagers of that place. He accordingly invoked police intercession and the concerned Inspector of Police commenced proceedings on 10th February, 1959, under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the First Class Magistrate, Pandavapura. The order made by the Magistrate under section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was that the respondents in this Revision Petition should execute bonds in the sum of Rs. 250 each with a surety for the same sum of money to keep peace for a period of one year. The respondents preferred an appeal from this order of the Magistrate to the Court of Session and in that appeal the order made by the Magistrate was set aside. The finding recorded by the Court of Session was that Survey No. 42 which was claimed by P.W. 1 was not a cultivable land but was a tank filled with water and that if the villagers of Peehally who claimed to be entitled to the waters of that tank for the irrigation of their lands, did not allow. The finding recorded by the Court of Session was that Survey No. 42 which was claimed by P.W. 1 was not a cultivable land but was a tank filled with water and that if the villagers of Peehally who claimed to be entitled to the waters of that tank for the irrigation of their lands, did not allow. P.W. 1 to let out the water of that tank which he was attempting to do and to cultivate the land thereafter, they could not properly be bound over under the provisions of section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this Revision Petition presented on behalf of the State, it is argued by Mr. Radhakrishnan, the learned Government Pleader, that the approach made by the Court of Session to the decision of the case was misconceived, since, according, to him, the main question to which the Court of Session had to address itself was whether there was a likelihood of the breach of the peace and not whether Survey No, 42 was a tank or a land. It may be that if the argument is advanced in that form, it may be possible to think that the Court of Session did not really investigate the principal question arising in proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it does not appear to me that the fact that the Court of Session rested its order on its finding that Survey No. 42 was a tank filled with water and not a cultivable land can render its order unsustainable. That part of the order of the Court of Session in which it recorded a finding that Survey No. 42 was a tank has to be read along with the other parts of the order made by that Court and, when it is done, it will be discovered that the Court of Session did really address itself to the question whether there was justification for an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this case. It is true as pointed out by Mr. It is true as pointed out by Mr. Radhakrishna that the Magistrate did make an analysis of all the evidence in the case and adverted to the evidence of P.W, 12 a Police Inspector according to whose evidence while P.W. 1 was trying to let out the water in the tank on Survey No. 42, the men and women of the village of Peehally were resisting his attempt to do so and that on a particular day after P.W. 1 had made an opening in the tank bund through which he wanted to let out the water of the tank, that opening had been closed up by the villagers of Peehally and that P.W. 1 was making attempts to restore the opening. P.W. 12 gave evidence that it that stage, he discovered some commotion in the village. The Magistrate, however, next proceeded to rely upon some hearsay evidence given by P.W. 12 that some tension in the village existed even after the intercession by P.W. 11. The position, therefore, at all material stages was that P.W. 1 was trying to cultivate the land claimed by him under the grant made to him by the Government while the villagers of Peehally were equally determined to prevent him from so cultivating it. It is equally clear - and that is the finding recorded by the Court of Session — that the land which P.W. 1 wanted to cultivate and which formed the subject matter of the dispute, was not really a cultivable land but was a tank full of water. That finding recorded by the Court of Session is a finding on a question of fact by which I am bound and which I cannot disturb in the exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. That finding recorded by the Court of Session is a finding on a question of fact by which I am bound and which I cannot disturb in the exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. If, therefore, P.W. 1 wanted to drain the tank of its water and then to make it a cultivable land so that he can cultivate it and the villagers of Peehally were claiming the right to irrigate their lands from the waters of the tank, and therefore, while P.W. 1 was trying to make an opening in the tank so that the water might flow out the villagers of Peehally were closing that opening wherever it was made, and P.W. 1 was again making another effort to restore that opening which he had made, can it be said that the case was one for an order under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure e In my opinion, since the main purpose of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the preservation of public peace and tranquillity and the prevention of wrongful acts that might disturb such peace and tranquillity the employment of their machinery to cripple the resisting power of some one who is opposing the endeavour of another to recover immovable property would be a clear misuse of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This view which I take was what was also enunciated in Bijoy Singha Neogy v. Empress1. The true rule propounded in that case is that the proper course in a case in which there was likely to be some dispute regarding the possession of immovable property, would be to institute proceedings under section 145 and not under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Tested by this principle, what emerges clearly from the finding of the Court of Session is that the area of land claimed by P.W. 1 is not a cultivable land but a tank with water in it and if there is a dispute regarding that property between the villagers of Peehally and P.W. 1, it would be both incorrect and improper to invoke the provisions of section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, just to enable P.W. 1 to drain the waters of the tank so that he might cultivate it and to prevent the villagers of Peehally from resisting any endeavour in that direction. I do not, therefore, find it possible to say that the order made by the Court of Session in this case is for any reason liable to be disturbed. This Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. S.V.S.-----Petition dismissed.