BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS first appeal is at the instance of a wife in a suit for divorce and is directed against the judgment and decree dated August 20. 1997 passed by the learned Additional District Judge. 1st Court, hooghly in Matrimonial Suit No. 236 of 1992 thereby passing a decree for divorce. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein filed the aforesaid Matrimonial Suit No. 236 of 1992 for divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty. The case made out by the respondent in the said application for divorce was as follows. ( 3 ) THE parties were married according to hindu rites on March 12, 1981 and after such marriage they lived in the house of the husband. The respondent was the only male issue of his parents and had to maintain his unmarried sister and parents. He was an M. A. B. Ed. and a teacher in a local High School. The appellant often used to leave her matrimonial home without the consent of the husband or his parents. In the month of October, 1981, she left the matrimonial home without any reason and went to Bagda in the house of father-in-law of her maternal uncle. The husband went there to bring her back but she refused to come, However, in the year 1984, she came back and started living with the husband and ultimately on March 21, 1985 a male child was born in the wedlock. After the "annaprashan" ceremonyof the son, the appellant deserted the husband and filed a false case under Section 498 (A) of the indian Penal Code being G. R. Case No. 601 of 1986 as a result, the respondent and the members of his family were all arrested. However, they were all/acquitted on July 31,1992. The appellant moved a revisional application before this Court against order of acquittal but the said criminal revisional application was also dismissed by this Court. The respondent thereafer filed the instant matrimonial suit for divorce. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement thereby denying the allegations made in the application for divorce and the defence of the appellant was that she was subjected to torture and out of fear of life she had to take shelter at Bagda. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement thereby denying the allegations made in the application for divorce and the defence of the appellant was that she was subjected to torture and out of fear of life she had to take shelter at Bagda. The appellant made allegation of cruel treatment against husband and she justified the allegations made in the case under Section 498 (A) of IPC. ( 5 ) AT the time of hearing of the aforesaid suit the husband himself and two other persons gave evidence in support of the allegations made in the application for divorce while the appellant and her father deposed in opposing the prayer. ( 6 ) THE learned trial Judge by the judgment and decree impugned herein found that the appellant was guilty of both desertion and cruelty and accordingly decreed the suit. ( 7 ) BEING dissatisfied, the wife has preferred the instant appeal. Mr. Palit, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of this appeal has made two-fold submissions. ( 8 ) THE first point taken by Mr. Palit is that in the instant case the learned trial Judge, before proceeding with the trial of the suit, did not try to make any reconciliation between the parties as provided in section 23 (2) of Hindu Marriage Act and in the absence of such endeavour on the part of the learned trial Judge to make reconciliation, the decree passsed by the learned trial Judge is a nullity. Mr. Palit submits that the provision contained in Section 23 (2) of the hindu Marriage Act is a mandatory provision and if a trial Judge grants a decree without complying with the said requirement of law, such decree should be set aside. In other words. Mr. Palit contends that the learned trial Judge does not get any jurisdiction to proceed to the merit of the case unless an attempt has been made for reconciliation. In support of such contention, Mr. Palit has referred the following decisions : (A) Balwinder Kaur v. Hardeep Singh. (b) Chhotelal v. Kamala Debi andors (c) Ram Kumar v. Kamala Dutta. (d) Sakri v. Chhannarlal. (e) Smt. Neera v. Kishan Swarup, (f) Raghunath Prasad v. Smt. Urmila debi (g) Pramlla v. Ajit Ra. j ( 9 ) MR. In support of such contention, Mr. Palit has referred the following decisions : (A) Balwinder Kaur v. Hardeep Singh. (b) Chhotelal v. Kamala Debi andors (c) Ram Kumar v. Kamala Dutta. (d) Sakri v. Chhannarlal. (e) Smt. Neera v. Kishan Swarup, (f) Raghunath Prasad v. Smt. Urmila debi (g) Pramlla v. Ajit Ra. j ( 9 ) MR. Palit next contends that merely because his client could not prove the allegations made in the criminal case started by State under Section 498 (A) of the Indian Penal Code, such fact ipso facto cannot prove cruelty on her part. Mr. Palit contends that the finding of acquittal although was not interfered by this court in a criminal revisional jurisdiction cannot be binding upon a Court exercising matrimonial jurisdiction. According to Mr. Palit the said case was proceeded with by the State and as such his client cannot be blamed because the said proceeding ended in acquittal. Mr. Palit further contends that his client was all along willing to continue the matrimonial relation but due to cruelty on the part of husband she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home and as such the husband cannot take advantage of his own wrong. ( 10 ) WE proceed to take up the second point urged by Mr. Palit before dealing with the first point. After going through the entire materials on record we find that in this case about six months after marriage, although the wife left matrimonial home, she did not come back to her father's place but went to Bagda, which is the place of residence of the father-in-law of her maternal uncle. It further appears from record that the husband tried to bring her back but she refused to come. It also appears from record that from Bagda, the wife wrote letter to her father-in-law thereby admitting her guilt. However, the wife has stated in her evidence that the said letter was not written by her at her own volition but she was forced to write such letter at the instance of her maternal uncle and other relatives. In such event, she came back to her matrimonial home in the year 1984 and started living with her husband. However, the wife has stated in her evidence that the said letter was not written by her at her own volition but she was forced to write such letter at the instance of her maternal uncle and other relatives. In such event, she came back to her matrimonial home in the year 1984 and started living with her husband. Ultimately, after the birth of the son she left matrimonial home for good on February 17, 1986 and on the same day lodged a complaint at the local police station against her husband and in-laws making allegations under Section 498 (A) of the indian Penal Code. On the basis of such allegation, a criminal case was started and the husband and other members of the in-laws except the father-in-law, were all arrested and detained in cutody. As indicated earlier, ultimately the said case ended in acquittal of the accused persons. The wife, however, preferred a revisional application before this Court which was also dismissed in the year 1993. ( 11 ) ALTHOUGH Mr. Palit appearing on behalf of the wife tried to convince us that there was no part of her client in the matter of proceeding with the criminal case, we find that on the allegation of wife herself such case was started. There is no dispute that husband and other members of the in-laws were arrested. Ultimately when the criminal case ended in acquittal she tried further by filing a criminal revision case thereby praying for conviction of the husband and in-laws but ultimately failed. Under the aforesaid circumstances we find substance in the contention of Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the husband that such act on the part of the wife amounted to cruelty and her intention was to terminate the matrimonial relationship forever. We find force in the contention of Mr. Banerjee that even after acquittal of the husband, if the wife insisted on sending the husband to jail knowing fully well the consequence that in case of conviction her husband will lose his job, it naturally follows that she had no intention to come back to her husband. ( 12 ) THE law is now settled that if unfounded allegations are made against husband which is ultimately proved to be false, one such act amounts to cruelty. ( 12 ) THE law is now settled that if unfounded allegations are made against husband which is ultimately proved to be false, one such act amounts to cruelty. After going through the evidence on record of this case we find that even if we do not take into account the decision of the criminal Court regarding acquittal, the wife had failed to substantiate her defence of torture. No independent witness has come forward to depose in support of such defence. We have already mentioned that apart from the father of the wife no other person than herself gave evidence although letters of other relatives have been marked exhibit in this case. In this connection, it may be mentioned here that immediately after February 17, 1986 the husband filed a suit for restitution of conjugal right but in view of initiation of criminal proceeding against husband and other members of the family he did not proceed with the said suit and after acquittal filed the instant suit for divorce. ( 13 ) THEREFORE, in the fact of the present case, we are of the view that the wife deserted the husband on February 17, 1986 with the intention never to come back and as such the husband is entitled to get a decree for divorce on that ground. Apart from that, we have already indicated that act of the wife in the matter of initiating a baseless criminal proceeding amounts to cruelty. Even after acquittal, when the State did not prefer any appeal she of her own preferred a revisional application before the Court against order of acquittal but was unsuccessful. Even in the written statement and deposition before the Trial Court, she justified her action. Therefore, we find that the husband has suffered immensely for the aforesaid act of the wife as a result he has been humiliated before the society and being a teacher of the said locality his prestige has been lowered down in the eyes of local public including his students. Be that as it may. we are of the firm view that such reckless act on the part of the wife amounted to cruelty and as such the husband was rightly granted a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty also. ( 14 ) WE will not proceed to deal with the first contention of Mr. Be that as it may. we are of the firm view that such reckless act on the part of the wife amounted to cruelty and as such the husband was rightly granted a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty also. ( 14 ) WE will not proceed to deal with the first contention of Mr. Palit that without making endeavour for reconciliation as provided in Section 23 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court could not pass a decree for divorce. To appreciate the aforesaid contention, the provision contained in Section 23 (2) of the Act is quoted below : "before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance. in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties:provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (u), clause (iii ). clause (iv), clause (v ). clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. " ( 15 ) AFTER going through the aforesaid provision we find that in a proceeding for grant of any relief except on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv ). clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13, a duty is cast upon a Trial Court to make endeavour to bring about conciliation between the parties where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. ( 16 ) IN the instant case as it appears from record and admitted by both the parties that there was neither endeavour to bring about such conciliatibn nor was any application filed by even the appellant before the learned trial judge. In this Court, immediately after the appeal was taken up and Mr. Palit took up this point, we adjourned the matter and tried to have a conciliation between the parties. Although, the wife wanted to continue relationship, the husband expressed his inability to restore the relationship. ( 17 ) MR. In this Court, immediately after the appeal was taken up and Mr. Palit took up this point, we adjourned the matter and tried to have a conciliation between the parties. Although, the wife wanted to continue relationship, the husband expressed his inability to restore the relationship. ( 17 ) MR. Palit seriously argued that once a decree has been passed, there cannot be any effective conciliation before this Court inasmuch as husband being armed with a decree for divorce will never agree to reconcile. Mr. Palit contends that failure of the learned trial Judge to perform the duty cast upon it under Section 23 (2) of the Act cannot be cured by an Appellate Court where decree has already been granted. ( 18 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has on the other hand contended that an Appellate court has all the power of a Trial Court in view of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such in this first appeal, the Court can try for a reconciliation and even if the same was not done by the learned trial Judge such defects can be cured by this Court. Mr. Banerjee further contends that provision contained in section 23 (2) of the Act cannot be said to be mandatory in that sense so as to declare a decree passed in the absence of any attempt of reconciliation as nullity. In this connection, Mr. Banerjee refers to two decisions, one in the case of Smt. Sushma Kumari v. Om Prokash and other in the case of Jivubai v. Nrngappa. ( 19 ) IN the case of Balwinder Kaour v. Hardeep Singh (supra) the wife filed a suit for divorce and the same was decreed ex parte. Subsequently, she made allegation before the appellate Court that she never wanted divorce and the petition for divorce was filed by practising fraud on her. The Appellate Court having turned down her prayer, she preferred special leave application before the Apex Court. While disposing of the said appeal, the Apex Court set aside the decree and remanded the matter back to the learned trial Judge to decide the matter afresh. The Appellate Court having turned down her prayer, she preferred special leave application before the Apex Court. While disposing of the said appeal, the Apex Court set aside the decree and remanded the matter back to the learned trial Judge to decide the matter afresh. While disposing of the said appeal the apex Court observed that Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act cast a duty upon the court a duty to satisfy that the ground of claiming the relief existed and that the petitioner was not taking advantage of his or her own wrong or that there was no collusion or connivance in the said proceeding. The Apex Court further observed that even in the ex parte cases, Court should endeavour to find out the truth by putting question to the witness and eliciting answers from them. In our opinion, the said decision is not an authority for the proposition of law that in a given case in the absence of any effort for reconciliation between parties by the learned trial Judge the decree should be set aside. ( 20 ) IN the case of Chhotelal v. Kamala debi and Ors. (supra) the husband filed an application for restitution of conjugal right and in the suit filed an application before the Court for making an endeavour at reconciliation between the parties in accordance with Section 23 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, on the date fixed for appearance, an application was filed on behalf of the wife alleging that she was apprehensive of being molested at the hand of petitioner and his associates in case she came out of her father's house for the purpose of going to the Court premises. In view of such application, the learned trial Judge did not try to make any reconciliation and ultimately rejected the prayer for reconciliation. The husband preferred a revisional application before High Court and in revision, the High Court set aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge and directed the Court to try for reconciliation. In Ram Kumar v. Kamala Dutta (supra ). it has been held by Jammu and Kashmir High court that without making a sincere effort at reconciliation, the Court should not direct the husband to file objection against the petition for divorce. In Ram Kumar v. Kamala Dutta (supra ). it has been held by Jammu and Kashmir High court that without making a sincere effort at reconciliation, the Court should not direct the husband to file objection against the petition for divorce. While arriving at such conclusion the said Court relied upon the decision in the case of Chhotelai v. Kamala Debi (supra ). In Sakri v. Chhanarlal (supra), it was held by Rajasthan High Court that the duty cast upon a Court under Section 23 (2) of the Hindu marriage Act can be exercised even before final hearing of the case i. e. , before granting relief and in that case, the Court remanded the matter back to the learned Trial Corut for making a reasonable effort at bringing about reconciliation after setting aside a decree for restitution of conjugal right. In the case of Smt. Neera v. Kishan swarup (supra), the Allahabad High Court held that Section 23 of the Act made it a primary duty of the Court to ensure that marriage tie is not broken and enjoined the Court to make every effort in the first instance to bring about a reconciliation between the parties before proceeding to grant any relief. In the said case although no effort was made in the Courts below for effecting reconciliation, the Appellate court tried for reconciliation but failed and the appeal was thereafter decided on merit and the decree was affirmed. In the case of Raghunath Prasad v. Smt. Urmila Debi (supra) a revisional application was filed against the order of the learned trial Judge who abandoned the course of reconciliation on the submission of the wife that there was no chance of reconciliation. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court set aside the order and directed the opposite party/wife to appear for reconciliation. In the case of Pramila v. Ajit Raj (supra), an appeal was preferred by wife against decree for divroce which was passed by mutual agreement. At the time of hearing, it was urged that in view of Section 34 of the Special Marriage act, decree could not be passed unless there is an endeavour by Court to bring about reconciliation between the parties which was not actually done in that case. At the time of hearing, it was urged that in view of Section 34 of the Special Marriage act, decree could not be passed unless there is an endeavour by Court to bring about reconciliation between the parties which was not actually done in that case. The learned Judge accepted the said contention and set aside the judgment and decree and directed the matter to be heard afresh after complying with the said provision. In the case of Sushma Kumari v. Om prokash (supra) relied upon by Mr. Banerjee, it has been held that a duty is no doubt cast in every case to make an attempt for reconciliation but non-observance of such duty will not make the order of the learned Trial Court without jurisdiction and the said defect can be rectified by Appellate Court. In the said case, it was held that decision in the case of Chhotelal v. Kama/a Devi (supra) was no longer a good law in view of subsequent decision of the same Court in the case of Rajkumari v. Harban Singh. In the case of Jivubai v. Ninagappa (supra) the Division Bench of Mysore High court held that although a Trial Court has a duty to perform by making every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties under Section 23 (2) of the Act, the matter does not go to the question of jurisdiction and such defect does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case and the same can be rectified by the Appellate Court when the matter comes before the Appellate Court. ( 21 ) AFTER considering all the aforesaid decisions referred to by the learned Advocates for the parties, we find that no dobut a duty is cast upon a Court to try for reconciliation before proceeding to decide a suit under the aforesaid act. But the language 'employed' in Section 23 (2) clearly says that such duty is to be exercised where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. As pointed out earlier, the wife did not apply before the learned trial Judge for conciliation. But the language 'employed' in Section 23 (2) clearly says that such duty is to be exercised where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case. As pointed out earlier, the wife did not apply before the learned trial Judge for conciliation. Therefore, in our opinion, in the fact of the present case where the wife was all out to send her husband to jail on the basis of false allegation and even invoked the criminal revisional jurisdiction of this Court against order of acquittal although State had not preferred any appeal. no useful purpose could be served by making any endeavour for reconciliation. We are therefore of the view that although the aforesaid provision imposes a duty upon Court to endeavour a conciliation, absence of such endeavour in a given case where there is no possibility of any reconciliation as will appear from the conduct of the parties, a decree cannot be set aside on the ground on non-compliance of Section 23 (2)of the Act. We are unable to accept the extreme proposition of law advanced by Mr. Palit that the failure of a Court to comply with the requirement of Section 23 (2) of the Act makes a decree of nullity. If we accept the aforesaid contention, in that case, no ex parte decree for divorce can at all be granted. The position would have been however different if the wife drew attention of the Court complaining inaction of the Court in the matter of conciliation. In such a case, inspite of such request on the past of one of the parties if the Court ignores provision under Section 23 (2) of the Act a party can pray for interference with the ultimate decree for violation of Section 23 (2); but in a case of this nature where on the face of it. it is not possible to have any reconciliation and at the same time neither of the parlies approached the court, a decree passed on contested Trial cannot be set aside on that ground alone. Therefore, we find no substance in the first contention of Mr. Palit. Therefore, both the point taken by Mr. Palit having failed. we affirm the decree for divorce. ( 22 ) HOWEVER. Therefore, we find no substance in the first contention of Mr. Palit. Therefore, both the point taken by Mr. Palit having failed. we affirm the decree for divorce. ( 22 ) HOWEVER. as regards the decree for permanent alimony of the wife and payment for maintenance and education of the minor son, who is admittedly staying with mother, we are of the view that amount of Rs. 800/- for wife and Rs. 400/- for son cannot be said to be adequate. There is no dispute that the husband is at present getting a salary of Rs. 8,000/-per month. Even if we ignore the contention of Mr. Palit that husband has other income from private tuition, in our opinion, wife should be entitled to get permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 1,600/- per month. In addition to that the son of the parties, who is admittedly living with the appellant is also entitled to get a sum of Rs. 1,600/- for maintenance as well as educational expenses till he attains majority. Therefore we modify the order of permanent alimony under Sections 25 and 26 of the act by directing the husband to pay a sum of rs. 1,600/ per month to the appellant until she remarries and a further sum of Rs. 1,600/ for the maintenance and educational expenses of the son to be paid to the appellant until he attains majority. ( 23 ) WITH the above modification. the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge are affirmed In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs Amit Talukdar, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed with modification in alimony amount.