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1999 DIGILAW 567 (GUJ)

VALJIBHAI KALIDAS MAKWANA v. DSP,kheda

1999-10-01

S.K.KESHOTE

body1999
S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, an Ex-trainee constable of the Police Department of the Kheda District, by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is praying for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other writ, direction or order directing the respondents to take him back in service and pay him all back wages and arrears of salary from the date of his wrongful dismissal. Second prayer has been made for asking from the respondents as to why after so many reminders even today the petitioners appeals at annexures H and I have not been disposed of. Third prayer has been made for declaration that the dismissal of the petitioner from service is illegal and unconstitutional. The petition was amended and further prayers have been made that is, for interim relief to stay the operation of the order of dismissal of the petitioner from services annexure A and second to direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to join his duties with immediate effect, pending admission and final disposal of this petition. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are that the petitioner was recruited as Police Constable on 23/01/1971 and he was sent for training at Police Training School. It is the case of the petitioner that he successfully completed his training on 4/11/1971 and proof thereof is a certificate which has been given to him, which is there on the record of this special civil application as annexure B. The petitioner after completion of his training joined as Police Constable at Kheda camp, Kheda and he continued to discharge his duties till 13/11/1971. On 13th November, 1971, the petitioner was called in the office of the respondent No. 1 and he was orally told that he stood dismissed from services with immediate effect and was asked to surrender his belt and badge in the office. The petitioner on 1 4/11/1971 requested the respondent No. 1 to give him the reasons and circumstances under which his services were abruptly brought to an end. It is the say of the petitioner that his services could have been brought to an end only after giving him a show cause notice and holding a departmental inquiry. The petitioner on 1 4/11/1971 requested the respondent No. 1 to give him the reasons and circumstances under which his services were abruptly brought to an end. It is the say of the petitioner that his services could have been brought to an end only after giving him a show cause notice and holding a departmental inquiry. However, under annexure A the order of the respondent No. 1, he was given out the reasons of his discharging from services i. e. he was found copying during the weekly test conducted on 13th October, 1971 held at Police Training School, Baroda. The petitioner urged that for the act aforesaid he had already been punished to undergo extra drill for six continuous days from 13/10/1971. It is the say of the petitioner that this punishment was in addition to the punishment of having to undergo extra drill of three days for remaining absent from the night roll call of 6/10/1971. Summing up, the petitioner submitted that it is a case of double penalty to him. The petitioner replied to the letter of the respondent No. 1 dated 3/12/1971. When he heard nothing from the respondent No. 1 in the matter, he submitted a detailed representation dated 31/01/1972 to the DIG and IGP. The Inspector General of Police, vide his letter No. 6372 informed to the petitioner that his application dated 31/01/1971 has been received and is under consideration. Likewise, the DIG, Baroda vide his letter dated 20/03/1972 informed to the petitioner that his application is under consideration. However, when nothing has been done in the matter, the petitioner approached to the Gujarat State Vigilance Commission by applications dated 1/11/1972, 18/12/1972 and 1 7/04/1973. The petitioner contends that all the applications aforesaid were responded with general remark that inquiry is going on with the petitioners case. Last letter in this respect has been received by the petitioner from the office of the Gujarat State Vigilance Commission which is dated 1 5/05/1973. In the meanwhile, the petitioner approached to the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat by his application/representation dated 17th April, 1973. This letter/representation of the petitioner came to be replied by the Home Minister vide his letter dated 19/04/1973. In the meanwhile, the petitioner approached to the Home Minister of the State of Gujarat by his application/representation dated 17th April, 1973. This letter/representation of the petitioner came to be replied by the Home Minister vide his letter dated 19/04/1973. The essence of the letter aforesaid is stated to be that his representation /application has been sent to the Secretary, Home Department with the instructions that the petitioner may contact the Home Department in the matter. The petitioner urges that he sent an appeal to IGP, Gujarat State on 17/09/1972, copy of which is filed on the record of this special civil application as annexure H. The petitioner filed an appeal to the DIG, Gujarat State also, copy of which is annexure I, but it is his grievance that those appeals were not decided. The petitioner collectively submitted the reminders which were sent to the authorities concerned from time to time as annexure `k. He made reference of his representation dated 14/03/1988 but when nothing has been done he filed this special civil application in this court on 18/06/1988, which is admitted. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 2 filed reply to the special civil application and opposed the same. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the termination of the services of the petitioner is wholly arbitrary and unjustified and in fact is void-ab-initio as it has been done as a penalty and that too without giving any notice and an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even if it is taken that the petitioner has adopted unfair means in the examination, his services could have been brought to an end after holding a departmental inquiry, which has not been done in the present case. It has next been contended that it is a clear case of double penalty given to the petitioner for his conduct to use unfair means in the examination. He had to undergo punishment of extra drill and for the same act or misconduct he could not have been punished again. Lastly, it is contended that this conduct of the petitioner was not taken to be serious by the institution as what it transpires from the document annexure B that he successfully completed his training. ( 5 ) THE counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that this writ petition suffers from delay and laches. Lastly, it is contended that this conduct of the petitioner was not taken to be serious by the institution as what it transpires from the document annexure B that he successfully completed his training. ( 5 ) THE counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that this writ petition suffers from delay and laches. The services of the petitioner were brought to an end on 13/11/1971 whereas this petition has been filed by the petitioner in the Court on 16/06/1988 i. e. after more than 16 years of his discharge from the services. He further contends that this petition may be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. Second contention has been raised that the petitioner suppressed material facts on which ground also this writ petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of this preliminary objection, learned counsel for the respondents has given out that for his misconduct of using unfair means in the examination he admitted this fact on 14/10/1971, and he has been discharged from the services but he has not disclosed this fact. The application of the petitioner made on 14/11/1971 for taking him back in the service was rejected by the respondent No. 1 under his letter dated 3/12/1971, copy of which has been sent to the petitioner. This fact has also been concealed by the petitioner. The application made by the petitioner on 9/02/1972, to take him back in the service was came to be dismissed by the respondent NO. 1 under his letter dated 24th February, 1972. This fact has also not been disclosed. The petitioner then approached to the respondent No. 3 and Home Department under his letter dated 20th September 1972 to take him back in service. The respondent No. 1 was instructed in pursuance of that application of the petitioner to sent his report to the State Government and accordingly on 30th December, 1972, a report has been forwarded by the respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 3. The petitioner then made an application to the Government of Gujarat in Home Department on 17th April, 1973, which was replied under the letter dated 8th May, 1973 and the petitioner was informed that it would be open to him to file an appeal against the order of termination of his services as per the provisions of Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) Rules, 1956. The contents of that letter are informed to the petitioner, which were received by the petitioner on 2nd June, 1973 but this fact has also not been disclosed. So after 1973, the petitioner did nothing. Then he filed an application on 1 4/03/1988 to the respondent No. 2. He then addressed another letter/application dated 1 2/09/1988 to the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 had called for necessary information from the respondent No. 1 and after careful consideration and due deliberation he has held under his letter dated 1 7/12/1988 that the order of discharge passed by the respondent No. 1 was just, legal and proper. That has also been addressed to the petitioner vide letter dated 31/12/1988 and this fact has also been concealed. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that whatever appeals filed by the petitioner have been decided or stands decided under the letter dated 17th December, 1988. ( 6 ) ON merits, it is submitted that the petitioner has used unfair means in the examination. He was only a trainee and his appointment was on probation and on misconduct of his, he was discharged from services, to which no exception can be taken. Learned counsel for the respondents then raised a legal question also that leaving apart how the applications of the petitioner are dealt with by the respondents and the communications sent to him by them, it is a case of simpliciter discharge of a probationer on his serious conduct which if we go by the reference of his services, he has no right to challenge the same. ( 7 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 8 ) ON the record of the special civil application, I do not find the rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondents. The averments made in reply affidavit stand uncontroverted. ( 9 ) DELAY in challenging the order of the respondent under which the services of the petitioner were brought to an end is there. The petitioner filed applications/representations from time to time till 1973 and thereafter he did nothing may be for the reason that he was not medically fit, which is difficult to accept and then in 1988 he filed the applications. The petitioner filed applications/representations from time to time till 1973 and thereafter he did nothing may be for the reason that he was not medically fit, which is difficult to accept and then in 1988 he filed the applications. From reply to the special civil application, I find that all the applications filed by the petitioner were attended from time to time by the respondents. The appeals-cumapplications filed by the petitioner to the IGP and DIG have been considered and decided in the year 1988. Those orders were communicated to the petitioner but curiously enough he has concealed all these facts from this court and filed this special civil application to give out an impression as if his applications were not decided. This conduct of the petitioner certainly disentitle him from seeking any relief from this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction. It is expected of a litigant who approaches this court and seeks relief from it under its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction, and it is the legal obligation of the litigant, to candidly disclose all the material facts in the petition. The correspondence under which the petitioners applications earlier were rejected have not been disclosed by the petitioner. Be that as it may. As otherwise on merits, the petitioner has no case, this preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents needs not to be decided. ( 10 ) THE petitioner was appointed as Trainee Constable. He was sent for training and in the training he used unfair means in the examination. The petitioner who has opted for Police services much more discipline, honesty ad fairness is expected from this class of employees. Learned counsel for the petitioner though contended that it was not an appointment on probation, I do not find any substance in this contention. Every appointment on selection, either has to be made on probation or otherwise is a temporary appointment and until it culminates in permanent appointment as a result of confirmation in the services, it is liable to be terminated at any time where the work is not found satisfactory and otherwise the conduct of the person is not befitting to a Police Officer. In such matters, the principles of natural justice are not required to be followed nor any inquiry has to be conducted. In such matters, the principles of natural justice are not required to be followed nor any inquiry has to be conducted. It is not the case where some stigma has been casted to the petitioner or his services were terminated under a stigmatic order. ( 11 ) THE petitioner has admitted that he used unfair means in the examination. This admission is clearly borne out from the facts of the special civil application as well as the reply to the same. When this is admitted, I fail to see otherwise what was the necessity of holding the inquiry. The inquiry would have been necessary where the petitioner is confirmed in the services, and if this conduct was there, his services could have been brought to an end by simpliciter discharge, which what precisely has been done in the present case. ( 12 ) ). THE termination of the services of the petitioner was not by way of penalty and even if at one point of time it was given out that he may file an appeal, it is of no consequence or significance. Under the Discipline and Appeal Rules only those orders are appealable which have been passed by way of penalty. In this case, this termination of the petitioner is not by way of penalty but it was a simpliciter discharge for the reason that the petitioner admittedly used unfair means in the examination. The petitioner stated that appeals have been filed but as earlier stated in view of the 1988 order those otherwise stood disposed of. If it is taken to be not disposed of then the petitioner has to establish as a fact that in fact the appeals have been filed and legally the orders are appealable, which is not the case here. ( 13 ) IN reply to the special civil application, the respondents have denied receipt of appeals alleged to have been filed by the petitioner in 1970s but the petitioner has not produced on the record of this special civil application any proof of filing of the appeals. This is a disputed question of fact and burden lies on the petitioner to establish as a fact that he has in fact filed appeals. In the absence of any proof of filing of the appeals, the averments made by the petitioner cannot be accepted. The appeal is a creation of statute. This is a disputed question of fact and burden lies on the petitioner to establish as a fact that he has in fact filed appeals. In the absence of any proof of filing of the appeals, the averments made by the petitioner cannot be accepted. The appeal is a creation of statute. Only in case the appeal is provided under the statute, this right can be availed of and not otherwise. Rules, 1971 are not applicable in the present case for the reason that this order of termination of the petitioner from services is in fact an order of simpliciter discharge from services and not by way of penalty. It is not appealable. This order was not otherwise appealable so filing of the appeal by the petitioner was of no consequence but still the respondents have acted fairly and reasonably and whatever representations filed by the petitioner have been considered and accordingly the same have been disposed of. It is not the right of the petitioner that what he says has to be accepted. The petitioner is an employee who before his services could have been confirmed has indulged in such a serious conduct of using unfair means in the examination. This conduct has rightly been taken to be serious by the respondents and it is correct to state that the petitioner may not turn out to be a good police officer and his services have rightly been terminated. In such matters, the principles as are to be applied to removal of a permanent employee cannot be made applicable in this case. ( 14 ) IN the result, this special civil application fails and the same is dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted by this Court stands vacated. No order as to costs. .