JUDGMENT 1. - This misc. petition is against the order dated 18.2.1997 of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh whereby he directed the re-opening of Cr. Case No. 997/98, which had already been decided on 17.1.1996. 2. Mr. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioners pointing out that applying the principles of Common Cause Case the petitioners had been acquitted vide order dated 17.1.1996, but the Magistrate has re-opened the case in view of the second judgment of the Common Cause Case, contends that the case was not covered by the second judgment of Common Cause. He also points out that the case is of petty nature between the real brothers. 3. The learned Public Prosecution's contention is that the earlier order dated 17.1.1996 was without jurisdiction, and therefore, this Court should not interfere in the impugned order. 4. I have considered the above arguments. The brief facts of the case are that in a case registered at the instance of Shanti Devi in 1993 the poiice, after completion of the investigation, gave Final Report. The learned Magistrate refused to accept the Final Report and issued process against the petitioners for offence under Secs. 147, 451 and 323 IPC. As the case was not decided within a period of 2 years, the learned Magistrate on the basis of the judgment in the case of 'Common Cause' A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996 Cr.LR (SC) 430) closed the proceedings and acquitted the petitioners. The judgment in the second case of 'Common Cause' A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1997 Cr.LR (SC) 132 ) was rendered by the Apex Court on 28.11.1996. In the classificatory judgment some more categories of cases were added to the categories of the cases mentioned at para No. 4 of the judgment of the first case. Their lordships directed that in the additional category of cases if the accused had already been discharged or acquitted as a result of the judgment in the first Common Cause Case, the Court may recall the earlier order of discharge or acquittal and proceed with the case. On the basis of the classificatory judgment, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order. 5. It has to be accepted that the case was not covered by the third paragraph No. Ill of the Judgment in the second of in the 'Common Cause Society' (Supra). On the basis of the classificatory judgment, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order. 5. It has to be accepted that the case was not covered by the third paragraph No. Ill of the Judgment in the second of in the 'Common Cause Society' (Supra). The direction for re-opening the criminal cases already decided, was made in respect of n wly added category of offences mentiond in (n) to (r) only. This direction did not cover the category of cases stated in the first judgment. 6. The offences in which the process was issued against the petitioners were not of any of the category mentioned at (n) to (r). It is thus obvious that the impugned order could not be passed on the basis of the judgment in the second Common Cause Case (supra). 7. Now it is to be seen if the validity of the earlier order dated 17.1.1996 can be seen in these proceedings. 8. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is that the offence under Section 147 IPC in which process was issued is an offence against public tranquillity, and therefore, the directions in the first Common Cause Case should not be applied to the case. No doubt, the offence under Section 147 IPC is offence against public tranquillity and therefore directions contained in the first Common Cause case were not applicable to this case. However, as the State or the person, who had lodged the FIR, did not challenge the order dated 17.1.1996, that Order has thus attained finality. 9. True it is, this Court can suo moto interfere in the illegal orders of a Court. Yet keeping in view that the matter is of petty nature and it is the dispute between brothers in which the police had given Final Report and the Incident had taken place some 6 years ago, it is not deemed proper to interfere in the order dated 17.1.1996. 10. Consequently, the petition succeeds. The impugned order is set-aside.Impugned order set-aside petition allowed. *******