N. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) PURSUANT to the Order of Reference, passed on 5/11/1995 by learned Single Judge (Honble Shri R. D. Vyas, J), these revisions, by the order of Hon'ble Chief Justice, have been placed before us for resolving the question as extracted in para 4 below. ( 2 ) FACTS are in narrow campass. The State Government by a notification dated 13th February, 1997, issued under Section 36 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short the Act) constituted nine Special Courts in the State at Indore, Ujjain, Gwalior, Rewa, Jabalpur, Bhopal, Raipur. Mandsaur and Sagar for the areas indicated therein. The area indicated for each Special Court, included 4 to 5 Sessions Divisions. The area assigned to the Special Court Ujjain consisted of Sessions Divisions Ujjain, Dewas, Ratlam and Shajapur, Later on by a subsequent notification dated 2nd April, 1998 the State Government in super session of the earlier notification dated 13/2/1997, constituted 45 Special Courts in the State, thus, providing one Special Court for each of the 45 Sessions Divisions. Obviously, like any other-Special Court, the jurisdiction of Special Court, Ujjain was limited to the Sessions Division Ujjain only; However, the cases giving rise to the present revisions, amongst others, were pending in the Ujjain court on the date when the subsequent notification dated 2/4/1998 came into force. The court, it appears, had already taken cognizance and framed charges in these cases. Admittedly, these cases arose from the area which now falls within the jurisdiction of Special Court, Ratlam. The accused persons of these cases, therefore, moved applications for transfer of their cases to Special Court, Ratlam on the ground that by virtue of this second notification, the court at Ujjain ceased to have jurisdiction to try these cases. The learned Special Judge however by the orders impugned, dismissed all the applications. The learned Judge was of the view that the notification dated 2/4/1998 had no retrospective effect and the cases in which cognizance had already been taken, shall be continued to be tried by the Ujjain court. The accused-petitioners thus approached this Court in revision. ( 3 ) WHEN these revisions came up before the learned Single Judge, he felt bound by a decision dated 14/10/1998, passed by another Single Judge (Hontble Shri S. P. Khare, J.) of this Court at Jabalpur in Misc. The accused-petitioners thus approached this Court in revision. ( 3 ) WHEN these revisions came up before the learned Single Judge, he felt bound by a decision dated 14/10/1998, passed by another Single Judge (Hontble Shri S. P. Khare, J.) of this Court at Jabalpur in Misc. Case No. 559 1/98, but at the same time entertained doubt as to its correctness. The learned Single Judge observed :-Prima facie I agree with the submission by the learned Advocate. Since I am bound by the Single Judge's Judgment dated 14/10/1998 in the aforesaid Misc. Cr. Case, with which I do not agree prima facie, I would refer the matter to the Division Bench for considering the aforesaid points. The learned Single Judge has posed the controversy in following terms :-The controversy arises whether, in the circumstances, the Court at Ujjain having the jurisdiction over the aforesaid four Districts having taken cognizance and frame charges, would still continue to exercise the jurisdiction over the Districts other than Ujjain after super session of the Notification under which that Court was constituted whereas by subsequent Notification another Court is constituted for different areas and the jurisdiction of Ujjain Court is limited to Ujjain city only. ( 4 ) THE imbrued question is whether on coming into force of second notification dated 2/4/1998, the Special Courts constituted under the previous notification dated 13/2/1997 were divested of the jurisdiction to try the cases already pending before those Courts on and before 2/4/1998. ( 5 ) WE have heard Shri C. R. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Girish Desai, learned Govern ment Advocate for the respondent-State. ( 6 ) SECTION 36 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act of 1989, provides for constitution of Special Courts and appointment of special judges by the State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. This section, insofar as relevant for our purpose reads thus:36. Constitution of Special Courts.- (1) The Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of the offences under this Act, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Special Courts as may be necessary for such areas as may be specified in the notification. (2) A Special Court shall consist of a single Judge who shall be appointed by the Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. (2) A Special Court shall consist of a single Judge who shall be appointed by the Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Only a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge can be appointed a special Judge. Section 36-A confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Special Court constituted for a particular area to try all offences under the Act, arising from that area. Section 36-B provides for appeals and revisions to High Court from the judgments and orders passed by the Special Courts. Section 36-C provides for application of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1913 to the proceedings before the Special Court as if the Special Court is a Court of Sessions. This brings us to Section 36-O which may usefully be reproduced at this stage. It reads:136_o. Transitional Provisions.- (1) Any offence committed under this Act on or after the commencement of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988, until a Special Court is constituted under Section 36, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) be tried by a Court, of session: provided that offences punishable under Sections 26. 27 and 32 may be tried summarily. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed to require the transfer to a Special Court of any proceedings in relation to an offence taken cognizance of by a Court of Session under the said subsection (1) and the same shall be heard and disposed of by the Court of Session. ( 7 ) A reading of the aforesaid provisions, makes it clear that although Section 36-A confers exclusive jurisdiction on a Special Court to try all the offences under the Act arising from the area for which the Court is constituted, the causes pending in Sessions Court on the date of constitution of tile Special Court and of which the cognizance had already taken by such other Court, shall remain unaffected and continued to be tried by that Court. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH sub-section (2) of Section 36-D refers to the cases pending in a Court of Session on and before the date of constitution of a Special Court, the underlying principle remains the same and would obviously apply to the cases pending in a Special Court before constitution of another Special Court for the same area. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH sub-section (2) of Section 36-D refers to the cases pending in a Court of Session on and before the date of constitution of a Special Court, the underlying principle remains the same and would obviously apply to the cases pending in a Special Court before constitution of another Special Court for the same area. ( 9 ) SHRI Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners had laid much emphasis on the word supersession used in the notification dated 2-4-1998. According to him, by this notification not only the earlier notification dated 13-2-1997 was totally oblitrated, the jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the previous notification in respect of the area which now fell outside its jurisdiction was also taken away even in respect to the pending cases arising out of that area, we are however, unable to acceed to the contention. ( 10 ) THE Notification in question is obviously issued by the State Government under the delegated powers conferred by Section 36 of the Act. Generally speaking, such power may be conferred to make subordinate legislation in the shape of a Rule, a Bye-law or a Notification, which have retrospective operation. However, in the absence of an express or-necessarily implied power to that effect, subordinate legislation be it a rule, a bye-law or a Notification, cannot have retrospective operation (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh, 6th Edition, 1996, Chap. 12, Syn. 6 ). In the instant case, Section 36 of the Act does not seem to have given any such power either expressly or by necessary implication to the State Government to issue a notification having retrospective operation. The notification dated 2-4-1998 also does not give even slightest indication of being retrospective in operation. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Ors. v. Titaghur Paper Mills, while construing the similar word supersession used in a Orissa Government Notification, issued under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, held: the word supersession in the Orissa Govt. Notification SRO Nos. 900/77 and 901/ 77 dated Dec. 29, 1977, is used in the same sense as the words repeal and replacement and, therefore, does not have the effect of wiping out the tax liability under the previous notifications. All that was done by using the words Tin supersession of all previous notifications in the Notification dated Dec. Notification SRO Nos. 900/77 and 901/ 77 dated Dec. 29, 1977, is used in the same sense as the words repeal and replacement and, therefore, does not have the effect of wiping out the tax liability under the previous notifications. All that was done by using the words Tin supersession of all previous notifications in the Notification dated Dec. 29, 1977, was to repeal and replace previous notification and riot tot wipe out any liability incurred under the previous notifications. ( 12 ) THE word supersession used in the M. P. Govt. notification dated 2/4/1998 has to be construed similarly, that is to say it will not have the effect of wiping down the acts done or action taken under the previous notification dated 13/2/1997. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also lays down the same rule of Construction. ( 13 ) THE order dated 14/10/1998 passed by brother Khare, J. does not as such lay down any preposition of law on the Point. By the said order, certain pending cases were mitered to be transferred from one Special Court to another on ground of convenience. Obviously, the order was passed in exercise of the Power of High Court to transfer cases under Section 407, Cr. P. C. ( 14 ) IT is pertinent to mention here that the High Court through a memorandum dated 9th July, 1998 has clarified that the only cases in which cognizance has not been taken by the Special Court on or before the date of issuance of notification dated 2/4/1998 shall be transferred to the newly constituted Special Courts. This memorandum, we find, is in tune with the legal Position already stated hereinbefore. ( 15 ) WE, thus, conclude that the Notification No. 1-6-1989/xxi-B (1) dated 2/4/1998 shall not affect the special cases pending on 2/4/1998 and in which cognizance had already been taken by the Special Courts already constituted under the previous Notification dated 13/2/1997. Such cases shall be continued to be tried by the Courts in which they are pending on that date. The cases in which cognizance has not been taken shall alone stand transferred to the Special Courts constituted under the subsequent notification dated 2/4/1998 for the respective areas. Such cases shall be continued to be tried by the Courts in which they are pending on that date. The cases in which cognizance has not been taken shall alone stand transferred to the Special Courts constituted under the subsequent notification dated 2/4/1998 for the respective areas. ( 16 ) THE question as to when cognizance is understood to have been taken is fairly well settled by a catena of decisions of Honble the Supreme Court as also of this Court. The latest decision on the Point was made by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 2472/97 an 147-1997 and it was held that the Sessions Court trying offences under the NDPS Act can be said to have taken cognizance there of only when it has applied its mind for the purpose of framing of charge. In the instant cases also the Special Court, Ujjain has framed charges, and it can be thus said that the Court has taken cognizance of the offence in all these cases. ( 17 ) WE, thus, answer the reference as aforesaid and direct that these revisions be now placed before the learned Single Judge for further orders. Reference answered accordingly. .